Indian Council of World Affairs

 

Stuti Banerjee:  Good afternoon, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen. It is my pleasure to welcome you all to the discussion of the book titled, Friends: India's Closest Strategic Partners, by Professor Sreeram Chaulia. It is a book that looks at seven major bilateral strategic partnerships of India. The discussion will be chaired by Ambassador Ashok Sajjanhar, Former Ambassador of India to Kazakhstan, Sweden, and Latvia. Our two distinguished discussants are Professor Badrul Alam, Retired Professor from Department of Political Science, Jamia Millia Islamia University, and Dr. Dhananjay Tripathi, Associate Professor, South Asian University. The discussion will be followed by a brief question-and-answer session, which would be moderated by the chair. May I now request Ms. Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, Additional Secretary, Indian Council of World Affairs, to kindly give her welcome remarks.

Nutan Kapoor Mahawar:  Distinguished experts, members of the diplomatic corps, students, and friends, very warm welcome to this panel discussion.

I would like to begin by focusing on the main title of the Book – ‘Friends’. Twenty eight years ago when I joined the Indian Foreign Service, this word was still in use in diplomatic parlance, in communiques, in outcome documents, in dip speak. The 1971 Treaty that we had with the Soviet Union, which was befittingly replaced in 1993 post-Soviet collapse, was called the Treaty of Friendship, for instance, which became important for India’s Cold War period foreign relations in addition to the policy on non-alignment and ‘friendship’ with the newly independent colonies of the Global South. One can also cite the example of the 1970 ‘UN Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States’ which talks of ‘friendly’ relations between States.

Then somewhere along the line the word ‘partners’ began to gain currency, as opposed to ‘friends’. It was a curious shift – a not entirely comfortable shift – for ‘partners’ depict a relationship that is transactional, as if the ties between countries and peoples were a business or a commercial or even for profit dealing or undertaking. The word ‘friends’, on the other hand, is beautiful – it depicts bonds, affinity, camaraderie, care, trust and understanding. When I describe a country as a friend, it is immediately and easily comprehensible to a layman uneducated in the intricacies of international relations and even to a child. The word ‘friend’ contributes to a positive imagery of countries and, more importantly, their people. After all, the 1970 ‘UN Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States that I alluded to earlier talks of ‘friendly’ relations between States and not of ‘partnerships’.

ICWA welcomes this return of focus on describing countries as ‘friends’ that the book by Professor Sreeram Chaulia that we have gathered here to discuss today symbolises.

No country wishes to be a loner. No country wishes to be an outcaste. Countries seek constant validation and acceptance for their polity, economy, culture and style of governance through friendships. The strategic content of friendships between countries have always been key. How can my friend assist me in my time of need? How can I assist my friend in its time of need? How can a friend bridge my deficiencies in strategic sectors without making a noise about my deficiencies and without hurting my honour? How can two friends keep their word to each other and not betray? Like persons, countries are known by the friends they keep. This does not mean that those that don’t deserve to be talked to, should be talked to. Or that those who need calibrated engagement, need not be engaged in a carefully calibrated manner.

As stated in this book, India aspires to be a ‘Viswamitra’ – a friend to all. Named after an ancient Indian sage, this term amply reflects an aspiration for state behavior in international relations based on time-honored wisdom. For India, this aspiration is reflected in the ease with which it can engage with a G7 or a G20 or a BRICS overcoming the north-south and east-west divides or the ease with which it can engage with either party to a conflict like Ukraine-Russia or Israel-Palestine or to a traditional fault-line like Saudi Arabia-Iran or India’s contributions to peace on the Korean Peninsula in the 1950s. It is also reflected in platforms where India is able to bring together countries who may not necessarily be close friends with each other but are unanimous in their view when it comes to friendship with India such as India-Middle East Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) or India’s Chairmanship of G20, as also elaborated upon in the book.

The book is also premised on what External Affairs Minister Dr S Jaishankar, who launched this book, has said - that India aspires to be a leading power and not a balancing power. We have to be seen on our own merit, for what we bring to the table as a civilisational state and not as a counter-balance. Counter-balances are Cold War relics that mirrored the US-USSR divide at the macro level in different regions of the world. This is not to say that we don’t believe in competition. We do. We believe in competition, in competing for self-improvement, for securing our interests keeping in mind our values, and for global good. We believe in shouldering responsibilities according to our growing capabilities. We have sound leadership skills.

The book ‘Friends: India’s Closest Strategic Partners’ by Professor Sreeram Chaulia identifies seven friends of India and essays these bilateral relationships: Australia, France, Israel, Japan, Russia, UAE, US. It visualises that these friends if dotted on the world map make an elongated arc – India’s own arc of friendship that can be perceived as a global string that joins the key dots from multiple outward-spanning concentric circles or mandalas envisaged by Kautilya… 7 is an auspicious number in Hindu philosophy.

I look forward to an engaging and lively book discussion. I welcome all the panelists and wish them all the best. I now request Ambassador Sajjanhar to take the floor. Thank you, sir.

Ashok Sajjanhar: Thank you very much, Nutan, for your very substantive presentation, very substantive comments. I think they have really set the stage for our discussions today on this very important contribution that has been made to the study of evolution of India's foreign policy, particularly in the current day context.

Let me first of all thank the ICWA for the invitation, for the gracious invitation to me to chair the session and also to get all of you and all of us together here to deliberate on this very important theme, this very important subject. My first felicitations, of course, go to Professor Sreeram Chaulia for his contribution. He has provided an in-depth understanding and appreciation on this very important subject of how India's foreign policy and external relations have evolved, particularly over the last one decade.

I am sure everyone of us here is aware that Professor Chaulia is an eminent and accomplished author. If I am not mistaken, this is your sixth individual standing book. Okay. I am not off the mark. He is a well-known commentator. He is a well-known analyst. He is a show host of a very popular weekly TV serial, Indian Diplomacy. And in addition to all these qualities, he is also very erudite and a very successful eminent professor. He has brought in generations of young academics and scholars in the discipline of international relations, I think I can see several of them in the audience also today.

I will flag just a couple of points because we have some very well-known people who are going to be speaking in addition to the author himself. I think the unique perspective that in my view Professor Chaulia brings out in his book is that India needs to be treated as a sui generis entity, as a unique entity which cannot be compared to the other powers that have existed. For instance, there have been so many commentaries as to how can India be simultaneously a member of the BRICS, of the SCO and also of the Quad and whether these are not contradictory in some way or the other.

And I think it needs to be recognised as to what India's role is there and how it has evolved as far as the BRICS is concerned, started with four countries, basically large developing emerging market countries which wanted a better voice for themselves and a better place for themselves as far as the international economic and financial architecture is concerned. As far as the SCO is concerned, there have been – some people have alleged that this is a China-dominated organisation. Does India really need to be there? And I think we need to understand that the basic purpose as far as India's presence in the SCO is to reach out to the four Central Asian countries which are also members of this. And otherwise, of course, there are other possibilities of meeting other members.

As far as the BRICS, we have seen it evolved, it emerged as an economic organisation, but of course in recent times it has sought to get politicised. That notwithstanding, India has very clearly maintained that it might be, in our view, it is a non-Western organisation. It is not an anti-Western organisation. As far as the Quad is concerned, I think we have – India has maintained very clearly that this is an inclusive organisation. It speaks for a free and open Indo-Pacific. It speaks for a prosperous, secure, and an inclusive – it is not designed to be against any other country. Also, we know that this has emerged as a force for global good and it provides alternatives to the countries in the Indo-Pacific.

So I think this is – as far as India's perspective is concerned, it needs to be understood from a variety of different views and not taken to be in one slot. The other is that while India is a member of several multilateral organisations, several plurilateral bodies, and has very strong bilateral partnerships, but still one of the defining features of India's foreign policy is its strategic autonomy. That in addition to all these partnerships, it very zealously guards its position as having followed the policy of strategic autonomy. Professor Chaulia, I see, has termed it as India having a stubborn mind and a personality of its own. So I don't know whether I'll use that same expression. But I think what the External Affairs Minister, Dr Jaishankar has said is that India deals with this less by hedging, that is not simultaneously cooperating and countering, but more by its active pursuit of its values and interests.

And in that context, it does not have exclusivist relations and it follows a policy of multi-alignment where on the basis of a set of issues, it decides what is to be done. I think we have also seen that over the last 10 years particularly, maybe possibly since the time that we started the economic reform program in the country, but particularly over the last 10 years, we have seen that India has grown very significantly in economic terms from a 10th or 11th largest economy, it has emerged as the 5th largest economy, soon to be the 3rd largest economy, fastest growing major economy.

In that context, its capacity to contribute has also grown very significantly. So I think it needs to be seen that India's strategic partnerships have also developed in consonance with its economic rise and its economic growth and as that goes on, I think as its economy grows, its significant partnerships will become that much stronger, that much wider, that much deeper and that much more vibrant.

The last point that I would like to make is that these bilateral ties, if we look at, for instance, the proactive manner in which the Prime Minister has reached out to different countries and I was having a look at that, out of the seven members that Professor Chaulia has mentioned, Prime Minister Modi travelled to the United States the largest number of times, nine times. The other four members, for instance, were the second largest number, that is to four of the other partners that Professor Chaulia has identified.

For instance, as far as the United Arab Emirates is concerned, he travelled seven times. Now it will come as a surprise to many of you that his travel in 2015, August 2015, was the first by an Indian Prime Minister for more than three decades. So for more than three decades no Indian Prime Minister went there and over the last 10 years we have seen about seven visits and this is notwithstanding that about two years or so were taken away by COVID. Then even as far as Russia is concerned, one of the other, that also seven times and here also no travels during COVID, no travels really during from February ‘22 till July ‘24 when the first visit took place and if these interregnums had not taken place, the number of times it could have been much more.

As far as France is concerned, again seven times and that we have seen the bonhomie and the partnership between Prime Minister Modi and President Macron. We have seen as far as Japan is concerned, again seven times visits and this was actually the first country that Prime Minister Modi decided to visit after he came to power in 2014, first country outside the ambit of the South Asian region and not considering Fortaleza where he went in Brazil in July of 2014 for the BRICS Summit.

So all these countries, the only two countries, Israel, he was the first Prime Minister to visit after the recognition diplomatic ties were established in 1992. So 25 years no visit by the Indian Prime Minister and Australia when he went there in November 2014, it was a visit after 28 years that was taking place. So the point I am making is that bilateral partnerships have grown very significantly all these, but of course there could be many more and maybe Professor Chaulia when he speaks about it he is going to mention those, along with these bilateral partnerships they have also resulted in very strong, because when you develop that confidence, trust and that comfort level, comes other strong plurilateral organisations.

And we see the emergence of the Quad in 2017 particularly. You have the United States, India, Australia, Japan. You see IPEF, Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. All these countries and more are there. We see I2U2, India, Israel, UAE, United States. We see IMEC in which again many of these countries are involved. And Australia, France, India, I could give many examples. So the point I'm making is as India rises economically, strategic partnerships get that much stronger. Bilateral relations have grown and they have led to a plethora of mushrooming of very many bilateral--plurilateral and multilateral settings.

So with these few words, let me say what a great pleasure it is for me to welcome each and every one of you. We have the author himself who will share his thoughts about his book for about 10 minutes and then we have two discussants. So let me take this opportunity to first invite Professor Chaulia. You have the floor and I'm sure everyone is looking forward very much to hear your views.

Sreeram Chaulia:  Namaste. Always I am overwhelmed to be in Sapru House because those of you who know the history and the pedigree of this place, it's the origin of all thinking about Indian foreign policy even before we gained formal independence. So ICWA is an iconic institution of this country in our field of international studies and research on international affairs. So whenever I have had the privilege of being hosted for a book discussion here, I feel overwhelmed. So thank you Nutanji and the team, means a lot to me. Ambassador Sajjanhar, one of the doyens of the Diplomatic Corps, he has been here and has been educating the public since his retirement. I don't have to say much but concur with many of his points. So let me come to the crux of the book and why I wrote this and what I think is the fundamental message of this book.

You know specialisation and the way we have divided the field of international studies, we usually do it in terms of regions or countries. So scholars focus on one region or sub-region and spend much of their writing career on it. In my case, I have been more of a comparativist. So I cannot be called a specialist of any one country other than India. So what I have tried to do here, and I noticed that the literature also reflects that. So you'll have a single volume entirely on Japan, India, entirely on Australia, India, entirely on France, India, entirely on Russia, India, and so many on US, India, and so on, Israel, India.

So the genesis of this book was that I was thinking that there isn't actually a single volume that covers all our major partnerships or friends in one place. And obviously, when you cover so many countries, I have seven case studies in seven chapters plus a long introduction. You will lose some detail, but there is a trade-off. You give up some of the specificity and the nitty-gritty of the details, but in return, you get the big picture. So that was the whole trade-off. And I thought it's worth it because there's no book covering our major bilateral ties with all these key countries in a single volume, especially not a singly-authored one.

Sometimes you have these edited volumes. So I thought that in a way, like Ambassador Sajjanhar was saying, this book is not so much about what we are doing with each country in painstaking detail. Rather, it's about what is the import of this relationship? What is this relationship doing for India and for partner X or partner Y? And why do they need us? And why do we need them? And what does this tell us about the aspirations of both sides? And it's not purely bilateral either because what we do with country X will have an impact on country Y also because they are interrelated. In fact, if you see the cover, I believe the publisher's copy is out there at the end, and I'll be happy to sign them.

But if you see the cover, the blow-up here, you can see how, for example, Japan opened up for us, I show in chapter one, because the US was willing to open up to us and because Japan is a treaty ally of the US. They have the concept of quasi-allies. For example, Australia and Japan are not direct allies, but by virtue of being part of the US hub-and-spokes network in the Pacific, they are called quasi-allies. So I've come up with a new term called quasi-friends also because by virtue of being US allies, they are also friends with us in one way.

But it's not just because they're taking the cue from the US. It's because many of these middle powers, I'm showing in this book, as you know, there are quite a few middle powers. We have Japan, Australia, France. Russia because of the economic weakening, I consider it a middle power, not a great power anymore. These countries, in one way or the other, also seek to diversify their partnerships because they can't rely only on one security or economic guarantor anymore. So in a way, doubts about the US's strategic credibility actually benefit India's partnerships because India is seen as more needed and more wanted by some of these countries because they can't put all their eggs in the US basket.

Likewise, if you look at the countries from the West Asia or Middle East region, these two also, of course, are close US allies/strategic partners. But again, the issue about the waning credibility or the reliability of the US is there. And especially when you had the first Trump administration, I show how many countries began to think, okay, we need to have a broader set of friendships to secure ourselves and for our prosperity. And surely the second Trump administration will also accelerate this process.

So what I'm saying here is India is not a substitute to the US, but what I'm saying is that India fills a certain gap in the eyes and minds and the interests of these countries. So this is not so much about what we are gaining from all these seven partners. I do show that in economic, in military, in geopolitical, how they are enabling our rise. But it's also about how dependable a friend India is.

The other thing I wanted to flag for your attention, many people who saw the title and were talking about friends, Nutanji also talked about the history of this terminology of friendship in international relations. Many of them keep referring to Palmerston's famous maxim that there are no permanent friends or enemies. We only have permanent interests, nations. Now what I found from my research here is a little bit counterintuitive. Many of these friends are actually longstanding friends. And we have sustained them. They are de facto permanent friends.

I mean, Russia is the oldest. You go back to 1960s, 70s, and until now, it's more than 60 years and we have sustained it. From bipolar to multipolar to, sorry, bipolar to unipolar to now an emerging multipolar order, Russia remains a friend, right, against the odds, as I call it, the long bear hug. The others also, like, it's now more than 20 years. Israel is the newest. Israel, Australia, and UAE are kind of like newer friends with whom we have signed strategic partnerships a little later and who are growing very fast. These partnerships are growing the fastest, especially Australia, you know.

But some of these are older. Like, Japan has been there for a while. France has been there for a long time. So what I'm trying to say is that India is actually a fairly steady friend that doesn't easily give up on major relationships. So in that sense, there's a greater degree of continuity and predictability with India. And that's also its strength. And I show why we are wanted by so many countries is because we stick to our friends. We don't abandon them. And we don't play dirty politics with them. Rather, our view is that these are assets or treasures that have been nurtured over time.

And the third point I leave you with is that I also refer to a lot of our ancient Indian statecraft in this book. And the concepts of friends and enemies and frenemies, enemy's friend and friend's friend and so on and so forth are very much part of our ancient statecraft and wisdom and advisories that were given by diplomats and strategic thinkers to sovereigns, to kings and rulers. So the notion of friends and how to expand your circle of friends, how to maximise friendships, and how to use that as a building block to become more powerful in the world or in any interstate system or interkingdom system, that is very much part of our strategic culture.

And both in practice and in writing, we have emphasised that. And I show that throughout the book. So it's in our genes and our DNA to not just be friendly in a very cliche way, but in a way that makes them strategic and which we can leverage. And I think that's what I've tried to show in the book. So do read it. And I would like to just conclude by saying that this path I'm showing for India is not a middle power, but a rising power, which is above the status of middle power, but not yet a great power. And this intermediate trajectory of the next 20 years, the Amrit Kaal, as Prime Minister Narendra Modi calls it, I believe we will need these friendships. We have to be mature and rational, not emotional, and maintain these friendships and sustain them, because each of them has enormous utility for India.

So my humble call is, especially for young people out here, not to get carried away by the news cycle. We may have problems with certain friends occasionally, but it doesn't mean that the friendship is worthless or that they are enemies in disguise. We have chosen these friendships, these strategic partnerships, after a lot of due consideration. Core interests are entangled there. So let's not lose the plot by becoming irrational. So these friendships, we have sustained them and need to be sustained. Otherwise, our path to the great power status will be full of obstacles and problems.

So the only way we can overcome these next turbulent 20 years, as you know, the world order is going through very, very violent and shaky times. So for us to be secure and to have uninterrupted rise to the topmost echelons, to be equal of China and of the US in all parameters of power, we will need these friendships. So let us conserve these friendships and see the value in them. Somebody told me this is a very optimistic book in dark times. I said, yeah, if you actually look at the crux of our friendships, there is room to be optimistic. So I'm challenging the pessimists and those who are venting at certain friends. In fact, Dr Jaishankar said that at the launch function of my book that some friends are more complicated than others. Yes, they're complicated, but they're nonetheless friends. Thank you.

Ashok Sajjanhar:  Thank you. Thank you very much, Professor Chaulia for these very insightful comments about your book. Let me now invite Professor Mohammed Badrul Alam for his comments.

Mohammed Badrul Alam: Thank you very much. First of all, a warm good afternoon to everybody, to Nutanji, to Dr Nivedita, Dr Stuti, ICWA Parivar. It's great feelings to be in the same desk with Ambassador Ashok Sajjanhar Saheb, Professor Sreeram Chaulia, Dr Dhananjay Tripathi. This book, I liked it so much that actually I read it three times in the last two weeks. First, let me flag off a couple of things that I liked about the book. Then I will try to tear apart a little bit in a very friendly way. I think Sreeram is my friend, so I can take some liberty.

It's, I think, a very simple book, very crisp, very smooth flowing narratives. I think it's a very candid and lucid analysis with a critical insight with India's globalist outlook. So Nutanji talked about Vishwamitra, Vishwabandhu. We talk about Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam and the last motto of G20, one earth, one family, one future. So I think, and the reason I said it's a very modest book in the sense because he did not try to hit six balls in an over, just like Yuvraj Singh. He was being very meticulous, very proportionate.

It's not that just these seven countries are India's only friends. We have got friends everywhere, just because Africa is not included in this volume, or Latin America is not there, or South America is not there, that doesn't mean that they are not our friends. Everybody is our friends, and we believe in inclusivity. But he deliberately picked up these seven countries, because he feels that these are the countries in which we have got very robust partnership, and hopefully it will continue for the foreseeable future.

I think it's a reader-friendly book. Particularly, I think it should be of great interest to IR specialists, area studies experts, foreign policy analysts. I was telling somebody this morning that if somebody's walking through past T3 airport, past the security, and bump into WH Smith, or traveling by, Rajdhani, Shatabdi or Vande Bharat, I think this is a book that I would strongly recommend. It's a critically incisive analysis of complex, bilateral, interdependent nature of India's relations with the major countries in the world.

It showcases India. I was counting how many times Professor Chaulia has said rising power, emerging power, leading power, major power, swing power, multivector power, mutable power, quoting everybody from EAM Jaisankar to Kautilya. He did not leave anybody. Let me add one more. India as a happening power. So it is happening everywhere. I think if we have it, I think we should show it, we should flaunt it. And I think India deserves to be that. India has earned it in the last 10 years as Ambassador Sajjanhar said.

But as a student of international relations, the things that I liked about this particular book is from my own discipline is if you need to situate or contextualise this particular book, Friends, within the mainstream IR theories that we are all familiar of. For example, the realist theory that Morgenthau talks about, Kenneth Walsh, John Mearsheimer talk about power, national interest, survival, self-help. I think we all have that in right proportion.

If you move up into neorealist theory, Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, Joseph Greco, etc, they talk about capabilities. So that is Agni-1 to Agni-5 to Nag, Trisul, INS Arihant, so on and so forth. If you move on to constructivist theory, Peter Katzenstein, Alexander Wendt, he talks about social interaction, social structures, ideas, and norms. I think we have also imbibed those kind of things. If we go into decision-making theory, I think Professor Chaulia has said about the rational actor model, Essence of Decision by Graham Allison. I think we take things in a very rational way. It's not like randomly we wake up in a fine morning and we decide what to do.

If we go into groupthink, like Irving Janis kind of things, we do things in a collective way. For example, today, if I think there is going to be a crisis, for example, I think Prime Minister Modi will be there, Rajnath Singh will be there, Jaishankar will be there, Ajit Doval will be there, so it is a collective decision. They listen to everybody, and then what is the best course possible? So I think if you look at all these mainstream IR theories, I think the book provides that. It doesn't mean that it is in all equal measure. America is different, France is different, Israel is different, UAE is different, Japan is different, Australia is different.

Now coming into certain specific things, like for example, in page 284, it talks about China as an opponent, as a threat. I think personally, I think the word opponent and threat, just like hegemon, is a little bit loaded. So I think I feel more comfortable with statement by, for example, Rory Medcalf or Ashley Townsend, who talk about competitive coexistence, cold coexistence, conflictual coexistence. It was not a long time ago we talked about Hindi-Chini bhai bhai, then bye-bye, but I think the recent border talks shows that it is possible to co-exist even with an adversary like China.

The next point I would like to make is the page 282 table 3 Annexure. He talked about strategic and other partnerships. As far as Russia is concerned, in 2000 we have a strategic partnership, 10 years later special privileged strategic partnership. I mean, when you hear the word privileged, you get – feel like you got an update from American Express credit card, or from economy class to premier economy, maybe if you're lucky go into business class. So I think those things aside, I think a lot of people will still agree in spite of BRICS and SCO and time-tested friendship with Russia, they have helped us in good times and in bad times, S-400, oil, everything. I think a lot of people will also agree in IR circles that what Josef Joffe from Johns Hopkins recently said, the whole world is coming down to two and a half powers, mainly USA, China, and Russia as a half power, basically piggybacking behind Beijing.

I think if you look back at the end of World War II, from 1945 to 1949, those four years, US at the end of World War II was a unipolar world, ‘49 to ‘89, roughly 40, 42 years. It was a bipolar world, US, SU, United States, Soviet Union. Then ‘90 onwards till 2000, again it was a unipolar world, US as the sole superpower. Again at the beginning of 2000, the 21st century, again it's a multipolar world, there are multiple clusters of power, multiple powers at different parts of the world. Then 2010, as Amitav Acharya says, it's more like a multiplex world, Western hegemony is still there, but there is an emergence of Global South that you have to listen to, you have to take care of them.

But I think in the last couple of years, again, some specialists will argue, again it is a bipolar world. But the difference of that bipolar of the Cold War and this bipolar, it is mostly between US and also China. The third point I would like to make is this issue of personal chemistry. I think, of course, I do believe in personal chemistry, personal bonhomie between the top leaders, whether it is Modi-Macron, Modi-Albanese, Modi-Ishiba, Modi-Biden, and different countries. But I think sometimes if we stress the things too far, I think there is a possibility of a backlash. For example, I was thinking like Modi-Bibi or Modi-Benjamin Netanyahu. I mean, he's a very popular leader. He's the prime minister several times at different times in Israel.

But let us say there is another leader in liquid party, Gantz or Gallant or somebody else. I mean, we still need to do business with him. Let us say that a labor party like Peris comes to power, we need to deal with him. If there is a party called Kadima that comes as a solo like Ehud Elmert, either solo or in coalition, we have to deal with it. So I think I feel more comfortable with a bipartisan approach like the US things, like in the Clinton years, Democrats, eight years, we had a good relationship. Then George W Bush, we had Indo-US nuclear deals. Then we have got Obama. In fact, the credit goes to Prime Minister Modi that during his 10 years, he has dealt with Democrats and Republicans, with Obama, with Trump, and with Biden, and again, Trump is coming in a few weeks' time.

The next point I would very quickly deal with is the Desi discourse. I think I have some interest in that one. I think I really liked it when he talks about brain drain, brain bank, brain gain, brain recirculations, but I think I will argue with him in the sense that he says that, yes, I mean, it is true that we have a good, robust relations with the Israeli lobby, with the Jewish lobby, but it is true that we also have an equally robust relationship with Italian Americans, Italians, with Greek Americans, with Armenians, and many things. And that's why we have a very powerful India caucus group in the US Congress. And he also dealt with this Desi aspect in UAE also. I think Ahlan Modi and many other things. I think a lot of the soft power outreach, for example, the temple diplomacy, the herbal diplomacy. I would also add Saraswati diplomacy, NEP 2020, IIT Delhi opening a branch in Abu Dhabi.

So I think there are many things that needs to be taken care of. India-Japan, his first chapter, he used the word, for example, rising sun and leaping tiger, peacock and koi fish, let me make it a little bit more spicy, sushi and samosa, tandoori and tempura. So I think, but the problem is Japan is, again, it goes back to the fundamental question. Is Japan, “a normal country?” Because that has been bugging them since the first Gulf War of 1991. And they have to take care of China because of the historical past, Yasukuni Shrine, textbook issues, Nanjing Massacre, Senkaku Islands, so on and so forth. So how they will deal with that, with China factor, because it is there, it's a big dragon out there, so they have to deal with that in some ways.

The next point I would like to deal is, UAE, I think the only balancing factor, he talks about it, and also the thing is, problem is, if you really stretch out with everybody, maybe you will stretch out thin, I mean. So I think they need to take care of it, I mean, how to balance both, like string of pearls with string of ports, etc. So how to take care of those things. And also, in the Israel things, that I like the term when you say Israel is a hard state, which in many ways is true because of the nuclear asymmetry, and also India is an assertive state. What happens if there is a role reversal, or if a country is both, or either one? So I think that also needs to be explained.

Coming back to US, okay, now that Trump 2 is coming, 2.0, Trump returns as the world terms, okay? We don't know, I mean, all we know is from Trump 1, he's a very crazy person. In a way I like Trump is because he's predictably unpredictable, and unpredictably predictable. So I mean, he's transactional, what he says he means, what he means is what he says, okay. When he says I don't like this climate change things, drill, baby, drill. He means it, okay, so if you give it, the thing is people think by instinct that maybe he will be against China, okay. But I mean, this is a double-engined government. This is Donald Trump and Elon Musk. This is Trump and Tesla. So the thing is, if he gets a good deal of selling few thousand more cars, electric cars in Beijing, okay, Musk can tell Trump to make a deal. So maybe he can play another Nixon in China. So I mean, I will not be surprised if there is going to be some kind of bonhomie between Trump and Xi Jinping in the short term to the intermediate term.

So I think these are the things I need to say. There are a lot of other things maybe I'll share with Professor Chaulia in a separate time. Again, I would like to thank him very much for this great book, okay, for his latest baby, the sixth one. Thank you so much. Thank you.

Ashok Sajjanhar:  Thank you very much, Professor Badrul Alam. I think you've raised a number of issues and a number of questions, I'm sure. In addition to Professor Chaulia, there are many in the audience also who would like to discuss those and maybe contest those also what you have mentioned. But thank you very much for your remarks. Let me now turn to the final speaker of the evening, Dr. Dhananjay Tripathi from the South Asian University. Also, 10 minutes, please.

Dhananjay Tripathi:  Thank you, Chair. I think speaking the last has its own advantages. You can skip a lot of things. So I'll try to complete my comments in 10 minutes. First of all, I'd like to express my thanks to Nutanji and ICWA for giving me this opportunity to be with all of you today to discuss this very relevant book on Indian foreign policy, authored by one of the leading experts on this subject, Professor Chaulia. And I must congratulate you, Professor Chaulia, on this book. And thank you for authoring it at a moment when the world is in transition.

There are a lot of discussion on India's relation towards China, towards US. And particularly, there are commentaries being written by people like Ashley Tellis, who actually questions India's credibility, friendship, many other things in his recent commentary on India. Also, the Ukraine-Russia war and situation in West Asia has raised a number of questions on Indian foreign policy. And I think this is the right book to be followed if you want some of the answers of these debates and arguments.

The book succeeded in bringing out some of these complex issues in a very simple language that even a non-IR scholars can follow. And it defined who are India's friends. The book has selected, as other speakers have also pointed out, seven countries, but also made a point that countries like South Africa, Brazil, Germany, are also very relevant for India. The selection criteria were also mentioned, its economy, strategy, and geopolitics. Why these seven countries were selected.

Chapter one has beautifully explained what are the major challenges for Indian foreign policy, China, terrorism, and sustaining economic growth. Also the author explained why China is also a factor in a foreign policy of most of these countries that has been selected in this book. Like for US, France, and even to an extent for Russia. The book actually starts with Japan, and the chapter is termed as Feeding Koi Fish. Of course, as Professor Alam has said that why not sushi and samosa. But the book has explained why this title, and has gone on explaining the personal chemistry between the Prime Minister Modi and Shinzo Abe. The book has explained that India and Japan are two neighbors of China and had certain apprehensions toward China. And how Shinzo Abe actually has transformed or have taken out the Japan's foreign policy from his very pacifist understanding and brought this point that China is a potential threat and how Japan has to invest in India. I think wonderfully explained in this chapter.

Also been explained like why Japan and India relationship was not being given priority despite a lot of ODA, official development assistance, being given from Japan to India and huge investment of Japan in India. There is a US factor that was there during the Cold War that has very well explained.

The second is Australia. Again with Australia it has been explained why Cold War was one of the factors and why it is not being taken into consideration by Indian foreign policy in that way. But Australia also have two major issues and that is China and terrorism. The book has actually brought out these issues but also the personal chemistry. Already been discussed how many times Prime Minister Modi have visited to number of these countries and what kind of relevance he has given to Australia. There is one critical point being mentioned on Australia that India and Australia also have to really take care of the trade balance and that is relevant.

The third is the US and I really enjoyed that chapter. It is a very honest description of India-US relation. I think you won't get it very easily, this kind of discussion on India-US relationship. It explained about the Cold War and on page number 132, it discussed how the largest and the oldest democracy have not been on the same page during the Cold War, what was the reasons? Then explained the China pressure on the India-US relationship, what is the China pressure? And also have pointed out, as I said, it's a very honest description, also said that why the sudden exit from Afghanistan and also on Bangladesh? I think very well discussed some of these critical issues between India-US relationship. It's not only about praising, but critical points are also being discussed.

Of course, Russia is the next in the book, and as explained, from Soviet Union to Russia, it remained one of the very solid friends of India. The book started with, the chapter starts with Rajnath Singh's visit to Moscow at a critical time when there was a Galwan Valley case had happened, and Russia has expedite the military supplies for India. A lot of questions being raised during that time, the Ukraine-Russia war, that why India is supporting Ukraine. I think some of the answers is in this chapter. Please read it.

The next is France. I really like the discussion on France, and it's been mentioned by Professor Chaulia that France has always maintained a very independent position in the Europe. It's a very autonomous mindset, and a mindset of a great power. France have never been on a critical side in 1974, in 1998, when India has done its nuclear test, and France and India are two very relevant power in Indo-Pacific.

The chapter six, the sixth partner is Israel, and it's very well explained how India has criticised terror, but at the same time supported the two nation solution. Again a very honest description of India-Israel relationship, and there is a mention in the book that how India-Israel military relationship can go further, but there is a US issue in that. Seventh is the UAE, and it has been mentioned that how, during the revocation of Article 370, Pakistan has tried its best to convince UAE and Saudi Arabia to be critical of India, and how India has diplomatically not allowed that to happen. UAE is one of the investors in Kashmir and other parts of India, and UAE also have a concern for terrorism.

A fantastic book, Professor Chaulia. Relevant themes and timely publication are three phrases that I would like to use for this book. I would also like to mention, before I close, that one need to read, for the young audiences, I would say that three books together. One, again, by Professor Sreeram Chaulia, and that is The Modi Doctrine. Second book, I think, by Indian foreign minister, Dr Jaishankar, Why Bharat Matters. And this book. If you read these three books, you will get a very concrete and a comprehensive understanding of the contemporary Indian foreign policy. And I feel that these three books are going to stay with IR scholars in India and abroad for a very long period of time.

And I would like to close with one sentence from the book, from the conclusion, and which, actually, Nutanji has already beautifully summarised what “friends” mean. But I think, in the book, the essence that he brought out, and he said, the book says, to sum up, India cannot make do without friends, as it assumes its destiny as a leading power in the world. The kind of the power that India is today and will be tomorrow is reflected in its choices of friends and the form of cooperation it engages in with these friends. Thank you very much.

Ashok Sajjanhar:  Thank you very much, Professor Dhananjay Tripathi, for your comments. You have elaborated on all the elements that Professor Sreeram Chaulia has brought out in the book. And let me express my regrets to all the author, as well as the speaker, for hurrying them up, because I understand from the organisers that this is the time that we have available, and we cannot really stretch beyond that. And I'm sure everyone here is looking forward to the question-answer session, because that is what really lends meat to the great substance, because I think it has to be an interactive session. So we just have about 10-odd minutes. Maybe I'll be able to take one round of three questions. So please make your questions short and concise, and then I'll pass the floor on to the author.

Let me start by, I can see one hand. So let me, okay, I can see two more. okay. So very quickly, I also had a question that I wanted to ask. Let me put it very quickly first, and then I'll go to the other, those who want to ask questions. One is, Sreeram, in this book, we see that there is no, you have not included any country from the neighborhood, from SAARC, from BIMSTEC, not even from the extended neighborhood, you know, which is Central Asia. Of course, you could also consider that the United Arab Emirates is also a part of the extended neighborhood. But maybe that's getting a stretch, not one from the ASEAN. So what do you attribute that to? I have a few other comments, but maybe I'll reserve them for the chai pe charcha after this. So first, yes.

Unidentified Speaker: That was my question, actually. Why not even Singapore, none from ASEAN or the neighborhood?

Ashok Sajjanhar:  Okay, okay. So that's good. So then we have, okay, first here. Yeah.

Yash Chandan:  So good afternoon, everyone. My question is, of course, to you, Author. How much more potential do you see in India's strategic partnerships to address non-traditional, non-strategic security threats, such as pandemics, cyber threats, natural disasters, etc? And do you see any conflict between these and more pronounced threats when counting ties with a strategic partner? Thank you.

Ashok Sajjanhar: Yeah, maybe you could introduce yourself, and then anyone else would have the floor.

Yash Chandan: Yeah, so I am a third year student at National Law University, Sonipat. I'm Yash Chandan.

Ashok Sajjanhar:  Okay, yeah. And I saw one at the end. Yeah, I'll come to you.

Sarbjit Dudeja: My name is Dr. Sarbjit Dudeja. Professor Chaulia, we are claiming that these are our seven friends. Can you say they also say we are their friend of India, seven countries? Second, we claim to be a Vasudhev Kutumbakm Vishwaguru. And why we are failing to have a friendship with our neighborhood? Most of the country neighbor are hostile. Thank you.

Ashok Sajjanhar:  At the end, yeah, question.

Samar Roy: Good evening to all the dignitaries on the dais. Professor Sreeram Chaulia.

Ashok Sajjanhar:  Your name, please.

Samar Roy: My name is Samar Roy, and I'm a student of international relations. Sir, optimism, just for being the sake of being optimistic, because if we go slight away, we can indulge in optimism bias also. So why I'm saying so? Because one of the very…S D Muni sir has said India's neighborhood relation fluctuates between breakthrough and breakdown. So was India ready for the situations like Bangladesh debacle, or was it caught red-handed? And do you think this thing is going to be one of the biggest obstacle in India becoming from rising power to a superpower?

Ashok Sajjanhar: Thank you. You know, this is the only sort of, you know, one.

Leena De Gupta:  I'm Professor Leena De Gupta. I'm a comparative educationist, and I was very happy to know that you use the mode of comparative in your analysis. And so I would like to know whether you have at all talked of the countries with whom we were very friendly, India was, soon after independence, like Canada, Trudeau's father was a very close friend of India, and England was also pretty close to India, but have you discussed why they have fallen on the wayside, or other countries also involved? Thank you.

Ashok Sajjanhar:  Okay, all these questions, and you have all of five minutes to respond.

Sreeram Chaulia:  Yes, sir. This is going to be like a rapid-fire round of Indian Diplomacy TV show. No neighbouring country or extended neighbourhood country included as a case study in the book. Sir, I actually went with the official list of strategic partnerships that the Ministry of External Affairs has signed, and we have actually not declared a strategic partnership with any neighbouring country in a formal sense. When the previous regime of Sheikh Hasina was there in Bangladesh, Harsh Vardhan Sringalaji, our foreign secretary, had said that it is more than a strategic partner. But otherwise, the officially signed ones, there are about 36 of them right now, and they are all shown in the annex of the book.

So I looked at that list, and then out of them, I picked the seven I think were the strongest in terms of defence, economics, and geopolitics. So this is not to downplay the importance of neighbouring countries, but it's just that for our rise, there's another conceptual reason also, apart from the formal reason. For our rise to happen, we need to expand our footprint and influence in different far-flung parts of the world. The definition of a great power or a superpower is a country that exercises significant influence further away from its shores. So neighbouring countries cannot enable us to do that.

And that's why if you see the geography of this extended arc of friendship I talk about, it covers about five to six sub-regions of the world. And that was my point, that through these launchpads, we are able to take off and exert greater influence and presence in different sub-regions of the world. They help to extend our influence further away. So that's why I wasn't focused on neighbourhood. But neighbourhood figures anyway, in the way we partner with these countries.

Non-traditional threats, pandemics, climate change, can these be addressed with these core strategic partners? Well, the depth of some of these bilateral relationships is so strong that we do address some of these issues. But I would not place these above the traditional security issues, because we do pandemic public health and climate change kind of cooperation with many countries, I mean, not just these, and some of these are, in fact, was, I can't remember, was it Denmark or, I can't remember, there's one of the smaller European countries with whom we even say we have a green strategic partnership. For me, that is not as much as a classic strategic partnership, because there's not enough defence component there. There's not enough geopolitical component there, right. So I had to leave out some. But non-traditional areas come in.

Even with Israel for that matter, most people think of Israel in terms of hard security and counter-terrorism and defence, right. But look at what they've done with agriculture in our country. It's an extraordinary contribution to improving productivity of our farmers. There are a lot of non-traditional areas in which Israel and India cooperate. People don't focus on that as much, but it's covered in the chapters.

Does India count in the top seven list of these friends? That's an interesting question. I don't know if they made a top seven or a top five list in all these countries. But India definitely will figure in the top five for every one of them. In fact, the great Shinzo Abe once predicted that the Japan-India relationship will one day be even more important for them than the Japan-US relationship, which is the core security alliance, right. So I think for all these countries, there's no doubt that India figures right up there. It may even be one of the top three partners for most of these countries. We'll have to actually find out if they've actually given a rank ordering. But if they do a rank ordering, India will be right up there.

Does India count – sorry, optimism bias in the book. Is there optimism bias? Am I being too naive about the benefits and the utility of these friends? No. Actually, if you read the chapters, I do talk about problems we have with all of them, many of them, and I do talk about how we have tried to overcome them. I do – like was being said, that it's a candid reflection of our relationships. I do mention the downsides and where we have not been able to coordinate. The classic example is with the US in countries like Myanmar and Bangladesh. We have been disappointed and we have not been able to coordinate, and my expectation is that perhaps under the new Trump administration, we'll be able to coordinate better with the US on these matters than was the case before. So I'm not over-optimistic, but we need this optimism, because rising powers cannot rise on the basis of pessimism. Think about it.

And we have to value these friends. That is my ultimate point for what they stand for. And sometimes we agree to disagree with them, and that's okay. Formerly friendly countries, Canada and so on – ma'am, I'll give you a very counterintuitive example of a formerly friendly country. It's the People's Republic of China. Until – in fact, we have signed a strategic partnership with them in the year 2005. There was an India-China strategic partnership. It seems so hard to believe from the contemporary lenses, but those were the days. This is the pre-Xi Jinping era. They were not so aggressive, not so pushy, and not so hegemonic as they have become now. So some of these lapse. Some of these partnerships do lapse. I don't think we have officially gone out and torn the strategic partnership with China to shreds in public glare, but it has lapsed. There is no question of China being a strategic partner of India. Whether we want to call it an opponent or adversary, that is of course a semantic thing, but my fundamental point is they stand in the way because they do not want India to be their equal.

They have a zero-sum mentality and we have to accept this and work with this and work with our friends to be able to counterbalance them. So formerly, Canada has never been a strategic partner for obvious reasons, as you know since the 1970s and 80s we have been having issues with them over the Khalistan issue. We have never signed a strategic partnership with Canada. We could do it with China, but not with Canada. Can you just imagine how bad things have always been with them? And for whatever reason, even though the US warmed up to us and the US allies and the Europeans warmed up, the Canadians due to their own contorted and convoluted domestic politics have not been able to. I hope that one day we can call them our friends, but we will look for a lot of remedial measures from their side before we can even think of a strategic partnership. Forget closest strategic or best friend, I mean that is a long way away.

Ashok Sajjanhar:  Okay, very quick, last one.

Unidentified Speaker:  Sir, I am a student of Internation Relations. I want to ask, how can India as a Vishwamitra collaborate with friendly nations to build a global knowledge ecosystem?

Sreeram Chaulia:  I don't know, it seems like a very complex concept, but I will simply say that we have a world view and we have countries that share our world view. For example, in this list I would say France, classic sharing of world views and no conflict of interest at all. So we work with them to advance these concepts in the world and many of these countries barring probably the US itself and we don't know what is the US position on this, many of these countries want a multipolar world order. So they are at that level, at the level of concepts and knowledge, we are with them and there is a convergence of interests and we try to promote these values on the world stage. It is not just a hardcore defence and hardcore trade and investment, there are also these softer ideas which we promote and I argue in the book that these friendships also help to burnish our soft power and our image on the world stage also.

So in terms of knowledge, I don't know whether we are jointly producing any knowledge, but certainly at the level of concepts there is convergence if not congruence and we promote these ideas and values and that helps us to also be seen as moral power that has a certain, we bring certain ethical approaches to international relations and if we have more friends echoing our views, for example Prime Minister Modi's view that this is not the era of war, that has been echoed by so many of our core strategic partners and that helps to amplify the message and also helps to show that we are generating solutions to big world order problems and in collaboration with friends when we do these things, it has greater impact than just we ploughing a lonely furrow and simply doing it for ourselves. So I think at that level there is some convergence.

Ashok Sajjanhar: Thank you very much. So we come to the end of the program. Let me first of all thank the ICWA, Nutan and Stuti and all the others who were there for arranging this, all of you for coming here and, for this very interesting question and of course our author and the panelist. The way I look at the book is it is an eminently good read. Even I think, of course, it is very useful for scholars, it is very useful for practitioners, it is very useful for researchers. I was very impressed, Sreeram, when I saw that the amount of research that you have done as I think Professor Badrul Alam also said.

There are so many international scholars that have been referred to in your book, the footnotes, I think it goes up to about 500 or something, if not more than that. So I think it is really condensed and it contains a lot of very useful information and not only information, purely as information, but something very, very analytical and bringing out all the points. Now, let me try to address just two issues that were raised, one by Professor Badrul Alam when he said, that these personal relations, could they act as obstacles in terms of taking forward a partnership?

I think the way I look at it and, Sreeram may be offline over tea, we could discuss this even further, that they are really act as a catalyst in terms of taking your relationship forward. And if you look at the previous experiences over the last 10 years, just to give you an example, I think when 2014 Prime Minister Modi had come in Australia, we had Tony Abbott as the Prime Minister, that changed to Scott Morrison again, conservative there and then Albanese, a liberal, the relationship has continued to evolve and continue to grow and Prime Minister Modi has had excellent relations with all three of them.

You look at the United States also, whether it was at the Howdy Modi event everyone was castigating Mr Modi for saying, Ab Ki Baar Trump Sarkar. But when Mr Biden comes, he says that India-US partnership is the most important partnership in the world for them today, in the 21st century. I could give you many more examples. So I think the fact is what it has been made clear by our leadership that when our Prime Minister reaches out to the leadership of any other country, it is being done in terms of what that country represents through its leader. It is not a personal relationship in that sense that India's position always has been and is also in the case of Bangladesh.

I think there was a question on Bangladesh. India will always work with the government in power, whichever government in power. And I think we have been eminently successful in that. I remember in 2014 when the BJP Prime Minister Modi, before even he had taken the oath and his party had won power, he got the call from President Barack Obama. There were many in the country, many analysts and scholars who said that because of the insult and humiliation to Mr Modi that he should not take the call. But I think these personal aspects are pushed to the side when it is the interest of your country that is involved. And I think that is what we have seen over the last so many years.

And the last comment on your question, Madam, about Pierre Trudeau, the relations at the time of Pierre Trudeau were not good at all. Let me assure you, even at that time the person who was responsible for putting the bombs in Kanishka, we had made a request, Talwinder Singh Parmar, we had made request for extradition. Like today we have made request for extradition of 26 people, none of them has been responded to or treated with either sensitivity or seriousness. Even at that time, two years before the Kanishka crash in 1985, we had asked for the extradition of Talwinder Singh Parmar. That was not done. So I think right through, as far as Canada is concerned, there has been a lot of insensitivity to our core security concerns and that is why you see these problems that come in this way.

So once again let me thank the ICWA, let me thank each and every one of you. I would like all of you to join me in giving a big round of applause to our author and also to our discussants. As I said, this is an eminently readable book and I am sure it is going to be a very eminent addition to the literature that is available on Indian foreign policy. So wish you all the success and thank you for your presence here. Thank you.

Stuti: Thank you so much, sir. I take this opportunity to express our gratitude to Professor Alam and Dr Tripathi for their insightful remarks as discussant. I also take this opportunity to thank Ambassador Sajjanhar for chairing the discussion and for his incisive comments. Thank you, sir, much for that. I take this opportunity to welcome our guests to join us for tea.

Ashok Sajjanhar: Thank you.

*****

List of Participants 

1. Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, Additional Secretary, ICWA 
2. Ambassador Ashok Sajjanhar, Former Ambassador of India to Kazakhstan, Sweden and Latvia: Chair 
3. Proferssor (Dr.) Sreeram Chaulia, Dean, Jindal School of International Affairs, O.P. Jindal Global University 
4. Mohammed Badrul Alam, Retired Professor, Department of Political Science, Jamia Millia Islamia University 
5. Dhananjay Tripathi, Associate Professor and Chairperson, Department of International Relations, South Asian University 
6. Dr. Stuti Banerjee, Senior Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs