Indian Council of World Affairs

Abstract: 2025 marks two decades of electoral democracy in Iraq. Since the first elections in 2005, Iraq has experienced a tumultuous political landscape characterised by a fragile democratic framework and persistent governance issues. This paper assesses the evolution and challenges of Iraq’s democratic processes over the years. 

Introduction 

Iraq holds significant geopolitical and strategic importance in the West Asian region because of its central location and influence, serving as a vital link between the Persian Gulf, Levant, and broader Arab world while bordering key regional powers like Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey. As one of the few states in the Arab world to experiment with democracy, Iraq’s political trajectory over the past two decades provides a critical lens to understand the region’s challenges. Despite ongoing political instability, security crises, and sectarian tensions, Iraq’s democratic system has demonstrated resilience, offering valuable insights into state-building efforts in post-conflict societies. From India’s perspective, Iraq’s role as one of India’s most important energy partners underscores its strategic importance, making it a vital country for strengthening diplomatic engagement and pursuing a deeper academic inquiry into its political system. 
 
Early Steps Towards Democratic Transition 

The 2003 US invasion of Iraq led to the fall of Saddam Hussein’s 24-year-long Ba’athist regime. For the next two years, Iraq was ruled by several interim governments.^[i] On 30 January 2005, elections were held for the formation of a Transitional National Assembly (TNA) under a proportional representation system.^[ii] The elections were boycotted by many Sunni Arab parties, such as the Iraqi Islamic Party.^[iii] It resulted in the mainly Shi’ite-led United Iraqi Alliance winning 48% of the vote. A newly formed Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) took charge of Iraq. Led by Ibrahim al-Jaafari, the ITG was again an interim arrangement tasked with running the country. However, it oversaw the drafting of a new Iraqi constitution, deliberating it through the TNA and securing its ratification. The TNA formed a Constitutional Committee to draft a new constitution, which was approved by 79% of voters in an October 2005 referendum and came into effect on 28 December 2005. Two Sunni-majority provinces, al-Anbar and Salaheddin, had voted against the referendum by the required two-thirds majority, but the outcome of the referendum largely depended on the Sunni-majority province of Nineveh, which narrowly rejected the charter by 55–45%. This narrow rejection was insufficient to prevent the constitution’s adoption. Prominent figures like Mahmud al-Azzawi and Salih al-Mutlag alleged widespread electoral fraud in the entire electoral process.^[iv] After the adoption of the new constitution, elections for the Iraqi parliament were held on 15 December 2005, and a new stable government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki took charge in May 2006 for a complete four-year tenure till 2010.^[v]

Iraq’s Constitution and Governance System

The first article of Iraq’s 2005 Constitution adopted a federal system as the structure of government. The constitution established ten exclusive domains that fell within the purview of the government, which included national security, defence, and foreign policy, among others.^[vi] Iraq’s 329-member unicameral parliament, the Majlis al-Nuwwab or the Council of Representatives (CoR), is elected for a four-year term. Executive power rests with the President and a Council of Ministers (Majlis al-Wuzara). The ‘candidate of the parliamentary majority’ is nominated as prime minister by the president, while the president is nominated by the members of the CoR with a two-thirds majority. A complex federal judiciary was established, comprising a new federal supreme court with the power to interpret constitutional provisions and a higher juridical council overseeing judicial matters.^[vii]

One of the most notable features of the Iraqi constitution is the establishment of a federal system. The Kurdistan Region is constitutionally recognised as a federal region within a sovereign and independent Iraq. This federal structure was intended to balance the diverse ethnic and sectarian composition of Iraq, providing a legal framework for power-sharing among the Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurdish populations. Despite its progressive elements, the balance between federal and regional authorities remains a contentious issue, with frequent disputes over resource allocation and administrative powers, particularly concerning oil revenues.

Article 2.1 of the constitution declares Islam as the official religion and a fundamental source of legislation. It prohibits the passage of laws that contradict Islam’s settled legal rules.^[viii] The constitution’s emphasis on Islamic law as a source of legislation has sparked debates about the extent to which it should influence the legal system, raising concerns among secular groups and religious minorities.

The political process of drafting the constitution was marred by the exclusion of significant Sunni representation, leading to feelings of disenfranchisement and contributing to sectarian tensions.^[ix] These issues, coupled with pervasive corruption and weak state institutions, have hindered the constitution’s effectiveness in promoting a stable and inclusive political environment. Consequently, while the constitution has laid the groundwork for democratic governance, its practical application has been fraught with challenges that continue to adversely affect Iraq’s political stability and social cohesion.

Muhasasa System and Its Shortcomings

Since the first elections in 2005, Iraq has experienced a tumultuous political landscape characterised by persistent governance issues. Iraq’s political system remains polarised and unstable, largely due to an informal consociational arrangement known as Muhasasa Ta’ifia. The Iraqi Constitution rejects sectarianism and makes no mention of the division of federal posts according to ethnicity or sect. Nevertheless, the political actors came to an unspoken understanding on the division of ministries and important posts in accordance with the Muhasasa system. Under the Muhasasa system, the President of Iraq should be a Kurdish, the Prime Minister a Shia, and the Parliamentary speaker a Sunni.

The Muhasasa system, which started out as a consociational power-sharing arrangement, turned into a partisan quota system for the apportionment of public institutions. This eventually led to the creation of political fiefdoms, which made the state’s institutions crumble rapidly, made it difficult for anybody to be held accountable, and encouraged widespread corruption to grow exponentially.^[x] This decline has been facilitated by the rentier structure of the Iraqi state. The quota system was an instrument used by armed groups and politicians to reward loyal supporters and inject money into their coffers. The system has produced weak and corrupt regimes, but its strength comes from the parties that have become an inevitability in the Iraqi political setting and who fiercely fight any attempt to remove this system that sustains them.

Political Fragmentation in Iraq

Iraq held five parliamentary elections between 2005 and 2024. After the 2005 elections, Iraq witnessed political instability, sectarian tensions, and leadership changes, with key events including the US military withdrawal in 2011 and the rise and fall of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The 2021 legislative election in Iraq saw 21 coalitions, 108 parties, and 789 independent candidates run for 329 seats of the CoR. The Iraqi political scenario and the continuing fragmentation can be attributed to a number of issues. First, there has already been fragmentation as a result of the struggle against Saddam Hussein. A large portion of the anti-Saddam resistance was structured along confessional lines, with exiles in different countries founding their own organisations and obtaining support from various sources. However, none of the groups was especially successful; thus, in 2003, no organisation could lay claim to the honour of having freed the entire country. The issue worsened after the 2005 elections divided the parliament. The electoral system of proportional representation with open lists will likely continue to render the polity fragmented. The system also promotes unfavourable levels of rivalry between candidates from the same parties. Open-list systems have the potential to worsen issues and widen rifts in highly fragmented environments.^[xi]

The formation of coalition governments, where authority is frequently divided along sectarian lines, creates a never-ending cycle of political impasse and instability, and it is the most prominent sign of Iraq’s political fragmentation. During the elections of 2005 and 2010, Shi’a parties formed unstable coalitions with the primary goals of splitting up state power and resources, gaining support, or fending off an impending danger. The majority of these alliances were opportunistic and sought to acquire rather than exercise power.

The proliferation of armed militias is another significant challenge to the country’s stability and governance, leading Iraq towards further fragmentation. These militias function independently of the central government and are frequently organised along sectarian, ethnic, or tribal lines. Iran-backed militias, such as the Badr Organization, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and Kataib Hezbollah, have strong ties to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and are considered the most active and capable. These militias usually pursue their own restricted goals, which might include attaining political and ideological objectives, safeguarding their communities, or controlling territory, rather than the interests of the state or the Iraqi people in their entirety. Their existence jeopardises the government’s claim to exclusive authority over the lawful use of force, which is an essential feature of sovereign nations. Due to the absence of a centralised government, different factions frequently engage in violent confrontations with one another and exercise influence over the local populace. The proliferation of armed militias thwarts attempts to create reliable security structures that can uphold law and order across the entire country.^[xii] Iraqis may resort to militias for protection rather than relying on trained security personnel under the control of the national government, which would continue to fuel the cycle of violence and vigilantism. Iraq's authorities need to address the matter by mobilising its internal strength, cooperating with regional allies, and working with external partners who have a significant strategic presence in the country.

Governance Crisis and Current Situation

Iraq is facing a multifaceted crisis characterised by rampant corruption, poor governance, and widespread proliferation of uncontrolled weapons. The fragile political system has been unable to address the country’s challenges. Unemployment, disguised under bloated and unproductive state institutions, has worsened societal frustrations, particularly among the youth. The COVID-19 pandemic further exacerbated economic and social conditions in a country still reeling from decades of conflict and instability.^[xiii]

Armed groups, including state-affiliated factions, tribal militias, terrorist organisations, and private citizens, wield significant power. Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC) factions,^[xiv] some loyal to Iran, challenge state control, while Kurdish Peshmerga forces^[xv] prioritise regional interests over national unity. Tribal militias and open arms markets further contribute to Iraq’s instability. As a result, the state struggles to assert its authority, earning the description of being weaker than some of these militias.^[xvi]

The last parliamentary elections in Iraq were held in October 2021. However, Iraq struggled with forming a government for a year. After securing the most seats, the Al-Sadr bloc attempted to put together a majoritarian government with support from the Kurds and Sunni Arabs. These attempts were, however, effectively blocked by the Coordination Framework,^[xvii] which is believed to be backed by Iran and consists of the Fatah Coalition, the State of Law coalition led by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and several other parties. On 13 October 2022, Iraq’s parliament finally voted Abdul Latif Rashid as the new president, who in turn designated the nominee of the Coordination Framework, Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, as the new Prime Minister.^[xviii]

Sudani wields limited influence over his own cabinet. The limitations on al-Sudani’s capability to carry out his duties come from his differences with the Kurds and some Sunni factions, most notably the previous Speaker of the Parliament. He is unable to carry out his aspirational goals to the fullest extent possible because of these disagreements and his challenges in executing the government program’s agreed-upon measures. He continues to employ the same rhetorical devices prevalent in all of the past programmes of the previous governments. Therefore, it is proving to be difficult for him to carry out his ambitious agenda in light of these numerous challenges.^[xix]

Iraq is also witnessing a rise in sectarianism as religious factions, especially Shia Islamist groups, are attempting to reform laws and governance structures. A key focus is on amending the 1959 Personal Status Law to shift authority over family, inheritance, and personal matters from state courts to religious institutions, undermining constitutional protections and gender equality. The growing influence of the Coordination Framework and tacit clerical support have fueled these efforts. Such changes risk deepening societal divisions and establishing parallel religious and political power centres, further weakening Iraq’s state institutions and contributing to long-term social and political instability.^[xx]

Iran’s influence in Iraq extends beyond militias to government ministries and the economy. Iraq relies on Iran for electricity and has become a market for cheap Iranian goods. This dominance has fueled public resentment, with recent protests denouncing Iran’s interference and disregard for Iraq’s sovereignty.^[xxi] Since assuming power, Sudani has sought to balance Iraq’s relations between the Arab countries and Iran. As of 2025, Sudani is firm in his position despite his weak authority over the entire country. Fresh elections to the parliament are expected to be held in 2025.

Conclusion

The legacy of US involvement in Iraq has been its political system rooted in ethnic and sectarian representation, which is unprecedented in the country's history. While ethnic and sectarian divisions existed prior to the US occupation, these identities became institutionalised in Iraq’s political framework. Such systems may appear stable in the short-term but often entrench divisions and foster long-term instability.^[xxii] While Iraq has avoided a return to widespread sectarian warfare and maintained relative stability, the roots of division still remain unresolved. Reduction in violence should translate into meaningful societal reconciliation to make Iraq a stable, inclusive, and prosperous state with resilient democratic institutions; an Iraq which is at peace with its neighbours and the region at large.

As Iraq approaches its 2025 parliamentary elections, there is significant public scepticism regarding the electoral process and its ability to facilitate genuine change. The last local elections in December 2023 demonstrated a continuation of this trend, with established parties maintaining their dominance amid allegations of electoral fraud and manipulation. The evolving political dynamics suggest that while electoral democracy has taken root, Iraq’s path towards a more robust and inclusive governance model remains fraught with challenges, including civil liberties violations and ongoing public discontent. As such, the future of Iraqi democracy hinges on addressing these systemic issues and fostering a political environment that allows for meaningful reform, representation, and governance.

*****

*Farhan Khan, Research Intern, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal. 

References 

[i] Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael. Iraq in the Twenty-first Century: Regime Change and the Making of a Failed State (New York: Routledge, 2015), pp. 20-34.

[ii] Ali A. Allawi. “Chapter 16. The Interim Iraqi Government” in The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), pp. 280-293.

[iii] Michael Howard. “Main Sunni party pulls out of Iraqi election,” The Guardian, December 28, 2004, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/dec/28/iraq.michaelhoward.

[iv] “Deep divisions follow Iraq referendum,” Al Jazeera, October 26, 2005, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2005/10/26/deep-divisions-follow-iraq-referendum.

[v] Phebe Marr and Ibrahim al-Marashi. “Chapter 10. The US Attempt at Nation-Building in Iraq, 2003–2006” in The Modern History of Iraq (New York: Routledge, 2017), 4th edition.

[vi] Hasan A. Boudairy. “Iraqs Constitution of 2005, Between Establishment Failures and Reform Requirements,” Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, November 2021, pp. 13-16, https://www.kas.de/documents/265308/265357/IRAQ%E2%80%99S+CONSTITUTION+OF+2005%2C.pdf/6d025c07-f9dc-10df-e3a5-bda0633577f0?version=1.0&t=1643116660754.

[vii] Andrew J. Flibbert. “Chapter 3. From Dictatorship to Troubled Democracy, 1988–2022” in Iraq: Power, Institutions, and Identities (New York: Routledge, 2023), pp. 84-113.

[viii] Intisar A. Rabb. “We the Jurists": Islamic Constitutionalism in Iraq,” Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 10, no. 3 (March 2008), pp. 534-541. https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1211&context=jcl. (Accessed January 5, 2024)

[ix]Jonathan Steele. “Iraqi constitution yes vote approved by UN,” The Guardian, October 26, 2005, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/oct/26/iraq.unitednations.

[x] Massaab Al-Aloosy. “With Iraq’s Quota System, the New Government is More of the Same,” The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, November 15, 2022, https://agsiw.org/with-iraqs-quota-system-the-new-government-is-more-of-the-same/.

[xi] Marina Ottaway. “Fragmentation of Iraq's Political Spectrum,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 13, 2009, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2009/11/fragmentation-of-iraqs-political-spectrum?lang=en.

[xii] Asa'ad Tarish A. Ridaah. “Nation-Building in The Fragile States: Iraq After 2003 as a Model,” Political Sciences Journal, no. 66 (December 2023), pp. 55-76. https://doi.org/10.30907/jcopolicy.vi66.672. (Accessed December 27, 2024)

[xiii] Renad Mansour, Mac Skelton and Abdulameer M. Hussein. “COVID 19: Assessing Vulnerabilities and Impacts on Iraq,” Chatham House, September 15, 2020, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/04/covid-19-assessing-vulnerabilities-and-impacts-iraq.

[xiv] PMCs refer to the leadership bodies which oversee the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), a state-sanctioned coalition of mainly Shia militias formed in 2014 to combat ISIS. While these militias are integrated into Iraq’s security apparatus, some PMF factions operate autonomously, with varying political and regional allegiances, including ties to Iran.

[xv] The Kurdish Peshmerga forces are the military wing of the Kurdistan Regional Government, responsible for defending the autonomous province of Iraqi Kurdistan. They fight against ISIS and play a key role in providing regional security.

[xvi] Michael Knights and Alex Almeida. “Militias Are Threatening Public Safety in Iraq,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 14, 2019, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/militias-are-threatening-public-safety-iraq

[xvii] The Coordination Framework is an umbrella body of Iraqi Shiite parties.

[xviii] Sarhang Hamasaeed. “A Year After Elections, Iraq May Finally Be Set to Form a Government,” United States Institute of Peace, October 20, 2022, https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/10/year-after-elections-iraq-may-finally-be-set-form-government.

[xix] Yahya Al-Kubaisi. “One year in power: an overview of Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s government,” Centre Français de recherche sur l'Irak (CFRI), January 3, 2024, https://cfri-irak.com/en/article/one-year-in-power-an-overview-of-mohammed-shia-al-sudanis-government-2024-01-03.

[xx] Harith Hasan. “The Risks of Deepening Sectarianism in Iraq,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 28, 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/diwan/2024/08/the-risks-of-deepening-sectarianism-in-iraq?lang=en.

[xxi] Steven A. Cook. “Twenty Years After the War to Oust Saddam, Iraq Is a Shaky Democracy,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 17, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/article/twenty-years-after-war-oust-saddam-iraq-shaky-democracy.

[xxii] Marina Ottaway. “Iraq and the Problem of Democracy,” Wilson Center, January 13, 2023, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/iraq-and-problem-democracy.