Indian Council of World Affairs

Subodh Bharti:  May I request you to kindly keep your phones on the silent mode. Thank you. Good afternoon, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen. It is my pleasure to welcome all to the Indian Council of World Affairs for this panel discussion on the theme, Advancing Sub-Regional Cooperation: An Important Dimension of India's Neighbourhood First Policy. We will start this afternoon's program with Ms. Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, Additional Secretary, ICWA, delivering her welcome remarks. The panel discussion will be chaired by Ambassador Harsh Vardhan Shringla, former Foreign Secretary, Government of India. The discussion will be followed by a brief question and answer session moderated by the Chair. May I request Ms. Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, Additional Secretary, ICWA, to kindly give her welcome remarks.  

Nutan Kapoor Mahawar:  Former Foreign Secretary and Chair, Shri Harsh Vardhan Shringla, distinguished experts, students and friend.  

Over the past decade, India's Neighbourhood First Policy has played a pivotal role in nurturing and strengthening ties with our neighbouring countries. It is a policy rooted in the principles of respect, dialogue, peace, prosperity and cultural exchange, what we refer to as the five S's of Samman, Samvad, Shanti, Samriddhi and Sanskriti in PM Shri Narendra Modi's words. These principles have guided India's diplomatic efforts to forge deeper, more meaningful relationships with neighbouring countries that are close in terms of geography, culture, economy and aspirations.  

As we reflect on India's role in the region, it is clear that the country's size, population, resources and growing economic and military strength place it at the centre of South Asia and the Indian Ocean. These characteristics are indeed a source of strength for India. India does not, however, believe in adopting hegemonic approaches towards its neighbours or its extended neighbourhood. India has always seen itself as a large tree with deep roots that keep the soil together. Our approach is founded on the belief that the stability, growth and prosperity of India's neighbours are intrinsically linked to India's own progress, which can foster mutual prosperity and security.  

Given the changing global geopolitical scenario, regional challenges, India's geography, and the need to provide for all-encompassing security, economic and connectivity linkages, India has recognised that bilateral relations alone are not sufficient to address the complex and interconnected regional challenges or to harness emerging opportunities. India has therefore been actively engaging in regional and sub-regional frameworks such as BIMSTEC, BBIN, and the Colombo Security Conclave. These initiatives are designed to enhance cooperation in areas such as trade, energy, security, infrastructure, and cultural exchange, vital components which can contribute to peace, progress, and prosperity.  

Today's discussion is important as it is going to look at the sub-regional aspect of India's Neighbourhood First policy and its progress and challenges. It is evident that India has been actively engaging bilaterally with its neighbours through initiatives focused on connectivity, economic and developmental cooperation, as well as maritime security cooperation. Additionally, India has taken a leadership role in supporting projects and initiatives such as the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, electricity cooperation among Nepal, India, and Bangladesh, as well as initiatives pertaining to cross-border cargo movements. These efforts are supplementing the bilateral vision and initiatives such as with Sri Lanka on promoting connectivity in all its dimensions to enhance sub-regional integration and fostering strengthened interdependencies.  

SAGAR covers not only countries and India's immediate neighbourhood, but also covers the extended neighborhood and the Indian Ocean region. Colombo Security Conclave is an important sub-regional approach of our Sagar vision. Likewise, the initiative to develop the terminal in Nicobar under Sagarmala, the development of the Sabang Port in Aceh under joint consideration of India and Indonesia, and potential complementarity with other regional maritime hubs like Singapore, Kelang, and Colombo can also provide for a basis for a sub-regional approach under SAGAR.  

It is also important to recognise that while sub-regional cooperation is an essential element of India's foreign policy, when it comes to engaging with immediate neighbourhood, it comes with its own set of challenges. These include navigating internal political developments in partner countries, addressing India's security concerns, and ensuring that the goals of sub-regional cooperation are mutually agreed and are implemented to mutual benefit.  

Today's discussion will touch upon critical questions such as the benefits of advancing sub-regional approaches and initiatives. How do sub-regional initiatives serve India's broader strategic security interests? What are the economic, diplomatic, and security factors that shape India's sub-regional approach? Given the unpredictable and tumultuous political environment in neighbouring South Asian countries, how can we strengthen these sub-regional mechanisms? 

From a subcontinental approach of BBIN to the maritime approach of Colombo Security Conclave, and now extending into the extended neighborhood, India's sub-regional approaches for its neighbourhood are evolving and adapting in consonance with India's commitment to regional security and prosperity in a world undergoing geopolitical shifts and ferment. 

I'm sure that the panel will come up with many such observations and recommendations. I look forward to an engaging discussion. I wish the panellists all the best. 

Subodh Bharti:  Thank you, ma'am. May I now request Ambassador Harsh Vardhan Shringla to give his remarks and conduct the proceedings. 

Harsh Vardhan Shringla:  Namaskar and good afternoon. Distinguished guests, ambassadors, diplomats, colleagues, friends, let me welcome you to this discussion on advancing sub-regional cooperation, the importance of India's Neighbourhood First policy. This theme, that sub-regional cooperation, lies at the heart of India's Neighbourhood First policy. And I think it is a very timely discussion. I want to thank the ICWA, Ambassador Prashant Pise, Additional Secretary Nutan Mahawar, Subodh Ji, and all the others who have contributed to organising this discussion today. 

As regional and global dynamics evolve, sub-regional frameworks offer a pragmatic and result-oriented approach to fostering connectivity, trade, and stability in our immediate neighborhood. And India has been, as Nutan has pointed out, at the forefront of several such initiatives, whether it's the BIMSTEC, whether it is the BBIN, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal Construct, India, Myanmar, Thailand Trilateral Highway, and many others that have been mentioned, and to discuss this in some detail, we have with us a very, very eminent set of panellists, starting, of course, with Prof S D Muni, Professor Emeritus of Jawaharlal Nehru University School of International Studies. Prof Muni needs no introduction. He has, for several decades, been at the forefront of both as an academic and as a practitioner in providing inputs into our policymaking when it comes to our neighbourhood. And he has contributed extensively to the discourse in how our policy is shaped in that context. He has also contributed by way of writing over 30 books and monographs and at least 200 papers on the subject. And we are looking forward to his remarks in today's discussion. 

Our other participant is Dr Prabir De, who is someone I have known for as long as I've been in service, I think. And he has-- again, he's a part of the research and information system for developing countries. The RIS has worked extensively on connectivity between Northeast part of our country and Southeast Asia. And I think he's one of the very eminent people who can, I think, give us some sense of where we stand and how we can proceed further when it comes to sub-regional cooperation. 

And of course, we have Captain Sarabjeet S Parmar, a distinguished fellow of the Council for Strategic and Defence Research and the Centre for Military History and Conflict Studies at the United Services Institute. Captain Parmar was a senior naval officer. He's commanded at least two naval ships. He has written extensively on maritime security and the maritime domain. And that is an important part of our sub-regional and regional connectivity. One of the areas, I think, which involves sub-regional cooperation in the maritime domain was the group that was set up under the National Security Advisors of India, Sri Lanka, Maldives, later Mauritius also. And that was an important part of sub-regional discussions that we had on areas that were of interest to all of our countries in the immediate Indian Ocean region. We're looking forward to listening to his remarks as well. 

So I will just try and put things in context, although Nutan has done that largely. But I will try and focus on six areas where we could quickly see how we are conducting our subregional cooperation. The first is, of course, our historic role and India's leadership in the subregional area. And we have, of course, our engagement in subregional cooperation is rooted in geography, history, and shared aspirations for growth. I think that is one sort of given. As I mentioned BIMSTEC is a prime example of how to build a dynamic regional framework. But the BBIN, of which I will speak a little of my own experience in a short while, and our Northeast, of course, is pivotal as a gateway to, as I mentioned before, Southeast Asia and as part of our Act-East policy. And, of course, we are trying to strengthen all of these regional frameworks, and that also will be discussed. 

The second point is connectivity as a game-changer. Connectivity is key, infrastructure is key to unlocking the subregional potential, whether it is through multimodal transport, corridors, or Indian waterways, or digital networks. I think there are many ways to promote connectivity, but all of them are important. And I think this is something that is evident in all of the subregional cooperation constructs that we spoke about. 

Digital connectivity is the third, which is India's leadership in digital public infrastructure. India has emerged as a global leader in DPI with transformative systems like the UPI, CoWIN, Aadhaar. We already collaborate with countries in our region, whether it is Bhutan, Nepal, or Sri Lanka, to integrate UPI-based digital payments, making transactions faster and more efficient. Even in Sri Lanka, I think we have already had some level of collaboration on their system, which is similar to Aadhaar, developing that system of personal identity. And, of course, we should explore partnerships for digital skilling and knowledge-sharing to help our neighbours build a robust digital ecosystem. 

The fourth is energy and sustainable development cooperation. Energy security, of course, is very critical for regional collaboration. India is enabling cross-border electricity trade with Nepal, with Bhutan, and Bangladesh. I think there is scope to do that also with Sri Lanka, sort of integrate connectivity. Here, of course, the development of a sub-regional green economy, including sustainable agriculture, climate adaptation programme, and disaster-resilient infrastructure should be a priority. 

The fifth point I wanted to make was regional security and stability. Security cooperation of course is important and maritime security in the Bay of Bengal is a shared priority where enhanced naval cooperation, disaster relief coordination are vital. There is a BIMSTEC, a coastal security initiative and joint training program and I think this is an area of very useful collaboration but there's also cyber security and digital governance as key areas of regional cooperation given threats to critical infrastructure and financial systems. 

And the last is strengthening institutional and financial mechanisms. So for sub-regional cooperation to be effective we need strong institutions and financial frameworks. We probably need to work on concluding a BIMSTEC free trade agreement as quickly as possible. Financing for sub-regional projects are a challenge. We need to find innovative ways of funding such regional infrastructure projects through public private and other partnerships and India's role as a capacity builder through scholarships, technical assistance and training programs should be expanded further to support partner countries. 

Now I'll just give you two examples where I have been involved as a practitioner and it impinges directly on our regional and sub-regional cooperation. The first is SAARC. I was dealing with our SAARC desk in a time when we were about to go in for a SAARC summit. This was in Thimphu in 2010 and at that time Prime Minister I K Gujral who was at the helm was very very keen to see how we could promote regional cooperation. He had this vision of South Asia working together in forwarding in finding our own common aspirations through joint cooperation collaboration. And for that SAARC summit we prepared very extensive portfolio of projects that could I think take South Asian regional cooperation to the next level of, I would say, understanding and also I think would bring our country closer together. And one of them was the South Asian University and so as we went in with a blueprint and started negotiating on the documents and discussing this with our partners in South Asia we realised that Pakistan had absolutely no intention of allowing us to take the initiative on regional cooperation. I think from their point of view if they couldn't do it then nobody else could and I think this whittled down the text with some support from some other countries in the region, and ultimately that vision of making the South Asian university a world-class university, which was I think Mr Gujral's, in a certain sense, his dream, was I think sort of stymied by a very clear reluctance of Pakistan to move forward on SAARC. And SAARC works on the principle of consensus. So unless all countries who are part of the South Asian regional cooperation, the SAARC group, agree to something, it doesn't move forward. 

So we realised that it is easy to shoot down things, but it's very hard to push through initiatives in a forum like SAARC. And of course, subsequently you saw that SAARC then was sort of mothballed, and we are going forward with BIMSTEC, and there's good reason for that. I mean, I'm telling you from the point of view of someone who has experienced what it means to work on regional initiatives, and we may all have a vision of everyone working together, but you can only go with those who are willing to work on a certain level of cooperation. You cannot force the pace, and you cannot work with those who don't want to cooperate or don't want to allow forward movement in terms of development, connectivity, etc. And I think there is a lesson here for all of us. And today we are in a happy space where most of our countries who are part of BIMSTEC are very keen on moving forward in that cooperation. The second example I wanted to give you was sub-regional cooperation in the form of BBIN – Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and Nepal. 

Now, here was a smaller group of countries, and this group of countries, actually every country was very keen to move forward to get the gains of regional cooperation, whether it was trade, whether it was connectivity, whether it was allowing motor vehicles access to the region. In all areas, I think there was a level of cooperation that was quite remarkable and refreshing. I mean, I did this as part – not part of SAARC, but did this as part of another desk I moved to after that, dealing with some of our regional immediate neighbours. And I realised that the sort of progress that we could make in BBIN was quite extraordinary. And I would think that in today's context we should focus, of course, on regional cooperation, the larger picture, but we must use sub-regional cooperation wherever it works, whether it is India, Maldives, Sri Lanka, maybe Mauritius, or it is India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, and possibly Myanmar. Whatever we construct is sort of one that is feasible, and where there is a willingness, like a coalition of the willing, I think we should be able to quickly move and get the results that we can. So I'll leave that thought here and we have a lot to look forward to from our panellists, so I'll perhaps invite Prof S D Muni to make it from your seat itself, sir. 

S D Muni:  Thank you very much. I am grateful to ICWA for this opportunity again and to be on the panel for this very important discussion. India had an experience of regional engagement even before SAARC. That was Colombo Plan. But I would not call it a sub-regional grouping because it spread across Commonwealth countries in a big way. The regional or sub-regional context came only with the establishment of SAARC. And SAARC, I don't know whether we call it regional or we call it sub-regional. Why I am raising this question is that SAARC, when it started, did not have Afghanistan and it did not have Myanmar. Afghanistan, we brought in later on, but Myanmar is still not a part of the SAARC. So how do we constitute a region, and I'm not even questioning or bringing in Indonesia and Thailand for that matter, which have a maritime boundary with India and could have been, later on, have been in a different context it has developed. But when it began, this is what the problem was. SAARC allowed sub-regional cooperation within its own framework. 

There is a – in the charter, I think, number 8th or 9th, there is a clause which says that two or more than two countries or two members can join on specific projects. And that is where the sub-regional cooperation really started. Now the launch of Neighbourhood First, I think, has always been in India's foreign policy without being called in so many words. Neighbourhood First is a typical Prime Minister Modi's contribution. And before that, he mentioned about Gujral. There was a Gujral doctrine. Atal Bihari Vajpayee talked about South Asian community. There were various ways. I mean, at no stage, Indian foreign policy was bereft of concern for the neighbours and emphasis on the neighbours. So it – but the sub-regional aspect, he mentioned very rightly – Ambassador Shringla mentioned BBIN and SAARC. The sub-regional cooperation within the SAARC actually started with the paralysis of the SAARC. I am aware of the fact that BCIM predates SAARC paralysis, but BCIM started with the Thai initiative and as long back as 1997 did not, sorry, BCIM we did not touch with a pair of tongs to begin with because there was a sea in it and that was not, the business communities were not comfortable with it, political and strategic communities were not comfortable with it. The BCIM is still being pursued in its own way but India is still not a very active. Now BIMSTEC started in 1997 at the Thai initiative. Initially even Myanmar was not a part of it for a short while, but later on Myanmar joined in 1997 itself and we pushed Nepal and Bhutan into BIMSTEC in 2004 because we knew that SAARC somehow was not really getting around. 

But then later on, Pakistan became a problem in SAARC, that is true, both on two counts particularly, on connectivity and on terrorism. And despite all India's efforts, despite other countries' efforts, this equation would not really gel in one way or the other. And we didn't know what to do with Pakistan. But with the beginning of Prime Minister Modi's regime, a concerted policy emerged, I think some of you will throw light on that, that Pakistan needs to be isolated. And this is where our emphasis on BIMSTEC became far more prominent than it was before that. So from that period, I think BIMSTEC has got much more involvement from India's side than it was there. Now within the SAARC framework, there are two significant initiatives which India has taken and I include BIMSTEC in that. So BBIN and BIMSTEC. Now in BBIN also, I don't wonder why M is not there, why Myanmar is not there. In the beginning, from the – I have never been able to understand that why we could not take it. BBIN unfortunately could not proceed very smoothly because of Bhutan's reservations. And they said this is environmental pollution but there are other reasons also and we can discuss that. Bhutan was not forthcoming and when Bhutan was not forthcoming after a couple of years, even Bangladesh said that what is the point in getting it but Bangladesh has been brought back. Bhutan also through our initiatives and persuasion has agreed now to send an observer group in the meeting and it is very much there. But all these years what we have gained under BBIN is of course the passenger charter protocol, how to move passenger cars and others but the goods loaded trucks are still to be worked out. The draft has been prepared but it has not been approved. Therefore we are still in a process of building it up and it is not there and that is not a satisfactory progress. Theoretically there are every meeting of the senior officers, even up to the level of foreign ministers would say we have to emphasise on implementation. Without implementation we cannot proceed further. This is a problem which is why this question of implementation comes repeatedly in these gatherings is an issue. Not to the same extent but this is a problem in BIMSTEC also. 

Now BIMSTEC as I said, 1997 first summit took place in 2004 and then after that the summits have not been regular. We are I think, still correct me-- we are still waiting for the sixth summit which is supposed to be held in Thailand in April 2025. It should have been held in 2024 before that, but institutionally, a lot of progress has happened in BIMSTEC. There is certain institutional structure that there are summit meetings, there are ministerial meetings, there are senior officers meetings. All this is very much there. But on terms of progress, in every meeting, the emphasis is made on that the implementation should be there. We must seriously commit ourselves to implementation. There is a plethora of areas which have been covered under BIMSTEC and I think it is a visionary approach in a way and now they have also adopted, not adopted, they have also prepared a BIMSTEC vision for 2030. It is called Bangkok vision 2030. And there again the emphasis on implementation is very much there. There are seven sectors which have been clubbed for development activities. I have all the details, but I don't want to run out of the time. We will have, if there are questions, we can go into that. But beyond that, there are efforts on India's part. 

For instance, setting up of the energy centre in Bangalore, which has taken place very recently. And a lot of push is being done to BIMSTEC from India after, as I said, the paralysis of SAARC. And there is a debate, there is an assumption in the air that we probably want to build BIMSTEC as an alternative to SAARC. I don't think it is practical. Because BIMSTEC excludes three of our Islamic neighbours, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Maldives. And this is not a very great sign. In BIMSTEC, we have rest of South Asia, rest of our other neighbours being there. And if they could be more energetic by excluding Pakistan, SAARC would have seen a very different image. And I'll come to this fact as to why, where is the problem. 

The problem in SAARC is not only India-Pakistan, to my understanding. India-Pakistan is a problem, but that's not the only problem. So we need to energise much more than what is being done, even in terms of BIMSTEC. So we have both the BBIN and BIMSTEC in my analysis, and I think Prabir would probably give more details, and maybe even discount me and correct me there, that they have made a tardy progress. They have made a progress, but they have made a tardy progress, not to the satisfaction of all of us. Now this – why is it so? Why it is that these – the progress has not been made? And I have details of what the progress has been done so far. India has done good, and as Ambassador Mahajan – sorry, Mahawar – mentioned rightly, that beyond these two sub-regions, we have done a good job. I'm not quite charmed by the Colombo Security Conclave, but certainly the Sri Lanka and Maldives and India on maritime things, and we have brought in Mauritius also very close to us. We have had many laterals involving Indonesia. We have many laterals involving other extended neighbours. We have done reasonably well so far as other countries are concerned. But within the immediate neighbourhood – and that is the framework of the Neighbourhood First – Neighbourhood First doesn't go to to Asia Pacific. Neighbourhood first remains within there. The progress is not very satisfactory. 

I have three areas of concern for me why this progress is not very satisfactory. One is, again, Ambassador Mahawar mentioned very rightly, the internal political turbulence within it. Look, even with Pakistan, every time, Prime Minister Modi even went to Lahore all of a sudden to see if we can change things there. But the government's changed there. I remember one of the statements being quoted for Nehru when he was trying to resolve Pakistan problem. He said, I don't know who to talk to in Pakistan because the government's regimes are changing so fast. And later on, military took over, and this civil military conflict within Pakistan is a curse not only on Pakistan, but I would say on the whole of the region, which is vitiating the entire atmosphere. And therefore, this, but beyond Pakistan. 

Even in other countries, we have problems. What are the problems? First is political turbulence. No government in Nepal for more than five years. The consistency of cordial relations with India keeps on changing, even in relation to Sri Lanka. And now we know Bangladesh is a big issue for us. And Maldives, we have seen earlier talking about. Now, if you don't have a very smooth bilateral relationship and mutual trust between India and some of these smaller countries, how do you proceed further in sub-regional or regional or anywhere else? Now, this is where the internal problems, political, which are not our creation. It's largely of their creation, but it is there. And this fluctuating relationship with India is a big problem. To my mind, in these smaller neighbours, other than Pakistan, Pakistan is a separate problem. Let's not get into that. Other than Pakistan is an identity issue. They find a little India within their country everywhere. 

And the question that comes to before them is, how close to India is not too close? Geographically, culturally, historically, economically, they are bound to have a kind of a mutual relationship with India. But they have not decided how close we can go to India because of identity question, not only culturally and socially, but also economically, also strategically. They don't want to tie themselves up. They don't want to accept that India's security problems are our problems. They don't want to accept that India's political problems are our problems, or their problems are India's problems. This is where the small neighbourhood issue is a big one, a big hurdle in facilitating and pushing forward the subregional cooperation. 

The second is India's own push. Look, we are in an MEA establishment and we all know that MEA does its best so far as to push this concern. But this is not enough. This is not enough on counts which are important, resource constraint. We cannot flow in so much of money, so much of the resources as, today for instance, China can do that. And others are attracted for that, for various reasons, rational or irrational reasons. Even for the sake of political corruptions. The regimes find it easy to associate themselves with China or with the country which can facilitate their continuation in power, either through financial support or political and diplomatic support, then they find India is in terms of forthcoming. India is a polarising issue in the domestic politics of all the neighbouring countries, whether we like it or not. Therefore, our relationship fluctuates depending upon who comes to power. And since the political scene is very unstable, we are all the time troubled by that. The resource constraint is one important. 

Delivery deficit is another problem. And delivery deficit, again, Indian foreign policy makers, Ambassador Shringla and his colleagues are acutely conscious of it. But the problem doesn't lie all in MEA. The problem lies in commerce ministry. The problem lies in finance ministry. The problem lies in home ministry. How do you deal with it? How do you coordinate with them? As a result, projects which we promise are not delivered on time or when they are delivered, they are not delivered to the full satisfaction of the countries on the receiving side. Therefore, this delivery deficit, we have tried to bridge it. I think Prime Minister Modi has pushed, Manmohan Singh pushed it. For instance, in Bangladesh, he appointed an Indo-Bangladesh group to see where are the bottlenecks and let us clear them. I am sure that has been done with other neighbours also by now, but things don't move because there is a lot of democratic decision making, whatever else it is, and this is a really problem. 

Thirdly, I would say that we have a complacent diplomacy vis-a-vis neighbours. Some of us have a tendency to take them for granted. It’s Nepal, it’s done. It’s Sri Lanka, it will happen. For Bangladesh, it’s done. It will not be done. It's not happening. Gone are the old days. These countries have become far more ambitious, far more aspirational and they really want things to be delivered to them. And the third problem is now the Chinese push, which has really given a competitive and a rival centre which offers to meet the political and economic demands of our neighbours. And there is no neighbour of India, I would say including Bhutan, Bhutan is not diplomatically associated, but Bhutan very much likes to have an engagement with China. And the goods which are sold in Bhutan, somebody tells me almost 30% of them come from Chinese origin, whether through Thailand, whether through Singapore, doesn't matter, but it's there. Therefore, this is a major challenge and we have to, or the Indian diplomacy has to prove itself to the neighbours vis-a-vis the Chinese diplomacy. And until that is done, don't blame your neighbours if they are tilting towards a more attractive centre, both financially and politically.

So unless we work on these three fronts, I think the slow and crawling progress of our sub-regional cooperation would continue. I might not have pleased many of you, but this is what my view. Thank you. 

Harsh Vardhan Shringla: Thank you, sir. Let me request Dr Prabir De to take the floor. 

Prabir De: Thank you very much for the invitation and it's a great pleasure coming to ICWA and also seeing the audience, the Chair, Ambassador Shringla, and Prof Muni, colleague, Captain Parmar, many others, opening remarks by Additional Secretary, she has covered almost all gamut of the sub-regional cooperation. So I'm not going to discuss many issues of the sub-regional cooperation. Let me concentrate more into the BBIN, so Advancing BBIN Sub-Regional Cooperation, that's what my title is, quickly, what's the BBIN, it's known to all of you and Ambassador Shringla and Prof Muni have already discussed the latest development in the BBIN, challenges, etc., but quickly, the SAARC process in 2014 has given a new momentum to the BBIN four countries, starting with a motor vehicle agreement that's not ratified by Bhutan, and Prof Muni is very right, that's the passenger protocol, it's almost freezed by the participating countries. But because of the issues in Bangladesh, it's not coming up. 

India-Bangladesh coastal shipping agreement and protocol on inland water transit, which are renewed, but as you know, the regime change in Bangladesh, these all coastal projects, including ACMP agreement for use of Chittagong and Mongla port, Bangladesh's current authority are not giving any due attention. You can say that these are the projects, futuristic projects, which we spend time, Ambassador Shringla's precious time, and many others, it has come down to almost standstill. Now, sub-regional cooperation and regional cooperation only work when the member states, participating states, participating countries, if they have an agreed consensus to, if there are differences, it won't work. 

So today, what I see that BBIN, it is a wheel, if you see the four of it, the SAARC, BIMSTEC, SASEC, and MGC, it's a common wheel, if you put a strength to that wheel, it actually move all of them. So it is a very futuristic thought, which when the ministry of external affairs thought about these projects. But today, it's not moving, or maybe it's in a standstill, and I would like to argue how do you give fresh momentum. That's what my presentation is all about. Let's come to, in the trade part, there are four participating countries, three countries that depend more on India, be it in terms of their trade. And India has given them free access, Bhutan, Bangladesh, even our currency is pegged in the fixed exchange rate, that kind of relations. Bhutan and Nepal. Bangladesh is looking forward and concluding a CEPA, and that is not happening at the moment, even the joint study group concluded a few years back. 

So India has already, it's a kind of a benign neighbour to all of them, that they produce, they sell it without any barriers at the border, except the 25 items. But there are issues on the trade. That's what I am arguing here. If you look at the BBIN trade, without any formal trade agreement, the trade has actually flourished more than our expectations. The graph indicates the inter-regional trade, except the COVID period. It has seen a couple of peaks. And the table and the charts, it all indicates that the Bangladesh is actually the huge gainers in terms of their BBIN participation, 7.1% of their global trade is actually with the region. So we expect Bangladesh to come forward because they are the lead gainers. 

India is here, we are not forcing any of our neighbours to follow our Indian task or any kind of template. They look at India as a market, as a place for their own prosperity. And more about BBIN, it's basically through the land borders. If you look at our north-eastern part of India, the seven sisters, and Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, their exports, international value chain across the borders. Silently, they have changed a lot in the last 10 years. But there are choke points. Prof Lama, in his writings, and Prof Muni as well, they call it maritime choke points, we know very well, but this is a land choke point, particularly the chicken-snake area and many other areas. Because Bangladesh, Nepal, they are doing more trade. Bangladesh, Bhutan, are doing more trade. We are facilitating those. 

So what I see, over time, that there are opportunities and opportunities India has extended by strengthening its border infrastructure. You walk into any integrated check post, it looks like an airport, by the way. The latest one, which is Sabroom, which I travelled and part of LPI project, it is no less than any of the metro airports, the kind of facilities and infrastructure it has. But the matter of fact is that Bangladesh didn't cooperate. The other side of Sabroom, it looks like just a village. They didn't pick up the infrastructure, neither they allowed us to go and build that. So if the regional cooperation, sub-regional cooperation is not participated by all the participating countries, so it is a piecemeal basis, it stops at somewhere. 

So what I see that in the last 10 years, because of India's facilitation of the border trade, trade has grown up, the data indicates, and it looks like a kind of border economic zone. We are allowing Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, north-eastern part of India to utilise the lesser-fared economies, that we have border infrastructure, and lots of convergences across the border in terms of industrial value chains. They look like the GMS, Greater Mekong Subregion border economic zones. If you look closely with the ADB, the bank and many other organisations, they are feeling the same thing which I'm talking about. But the situation in Myanmar and Bangladesh is actually posing a great threat to this kind of connectivity. We have to overcome those, and I'm coming up with some of the recommendations. Some pictures, they tell you that these are the industrial value chains India successfully promoted over time. 

These are the products we buy in Delhi. You go to Zara, H&M, or Trend, and Uniqlo. The cotton shirts, cotton products, all are Bangladesh, basically. We wanted Bangladesh to use the BBIN corridors, because cost would have been much lesser than what being sold at Uniqlo. Uniqlo price is a bit high, by the way. I have checked it myself. Other products, food products, pharmaceuticals, which in Nepal and Bhutan they are using. So what I see, the Druk, for example, the Bhutanese companies. The truck with the linen, or the Pran, Rahima Food Group, which when Ambassador Shringla was the High Commissioner. So those are the big time, in terms of our integration across the border in the BBIN. 

Well, where we have lost, or we are losing in a sense, that BBIN countries, we have forecasted that the trade, 55 billion, just before what happened in the Bangladesh in July and August last year. We expected the BBIN countries, their inter-regional trade, likely to touch 55 billion. And with the support of the Japan and other countries, we wanted industrial value chain, trade investment, deeper integration, because Bangladesh has a great, very futuristic coastal shipping agreement, very futuristic SEMP, Agreement for Use of Chittagong and Mongla port, and Bangladesh is setting up an international quality port in Matarbari, which has a deep linkage with the Northeast, and Northeast and global exports, using the Matarbari port. Now, this has been kept on hold. Hopefully, this will come out. So is it that we are losing India, Nepal, Bhutan? Practically, the latest data I have analysed, I have time, so I will not cross. Don't worry. I have seen the month-wise data, from June 2023 to November 2024, India's export to Bangladesh and India's import from Bangladesh. And Bangladesh's readymade garment exports, that is, Bangladesh Garment Manufacturing and Export Association, they provide on a real-time basis. I picked up, this is public domain data. So that all indicate, after the July incidents, whatever so-called revolution in the history of Bangladesh, I mean, they are losing in terms of their global exports, readymade garments. And so also our trade is, if you see the July onward, the trade has been slowing down, both our exports and as well as the imports. 

But we're continuing with our projects, which wanted Bangladesh to join, like Agartala Akhaura. Sir was instrumental when he was the Joint Secretary, BM Division. And it's almost completed. Today, Ashuganj to Agartala, the highway projects by RITES and other, as abandoned. Bangladesh authority said that, please leave. So, they have all left that. So projects like Agartala Akhaura, and connecting it to Chottogram, then onwards to Matarbari and then to Kolkata. We have been talking about connecting in Vande Bharat, kind of a railway line infrastructure from Agartala to Kolkata. It's all actually not happening. 

But India's losses are not that. Only things that, had it been, you know, BBIN could have been done in a way that if Bangladesh participated, this kind of futuristic projects, India's coming about Bhutan, like Gelephu Mindfulness City or our semiconductor projects in Guwahati, Multimodal Logistics Park at Jogighopa in Assam. If you see the advertisement, IWT is at today. So and the ICPs that we have done at the Darranga in Bhutan and as well as in Sabroom, railway line extension to the Imphal, Agartala, Dhaka, Kolkata Railway, which is not being discussed at the moment, expansion of the Guwahati airport. So Bangladesh could have been gained out of it. 

These are the projects. It has a high regional impact. An airport like Agartala, 60% of Agartala international airports is basically by the Bangladeshis, Comilla region. They come crossing the border land because five years multiple entry without restriction from the entry point and exit point. Today they are, Comilla, Brahmanbaria, Chattogram, they are suffering huge because they are the patients which are supposed to go to rest of India. So projects at India is continuing unilaterally, but losers are Bangladesh, maybe to some extent Nepal as well. We have done quite well in IWT just a few years back. Remember that MV Ganga Vilas, that super luxury cruise which we started from Banaras using the Bangladesh water, national waterways too, and then went into Sadiya in Assam. And then on return, it has, but after that Bangladesh said no, no more. So these are the projects which are not, the Ganga Vilas passengers are not, most of them are foreigners. They had a stop at several places of Bangladesh as well. They wanted to see the heritage in Bangladesh, which Bangladesh wanted to show to them. So tourism projects with an improvement of IWT, this has also got hampered on the BBIN. So more quickly, Bangladesh comes back to the normal, that is actually going to help their trade with Bhutan, their trade with Nepal, and so on. 

These are the projects actually identified, implemented by the chair himself, like the oil pipeline, Bangladesh and India; Nepal, India. So energy sector, as Additional Secretary rightly said, and many others, because there is a common challenge for all of them. So, and India has allowed, and has been allowing it is actually, exporting Nepal electricity to Bangladesh. Bangladesh participation to our unilateral initiative like global biofuel alliance, I don't know if there is a summit, as the GBA is coming up, who is going to attend it, like that. Or International Solar Alliance, those are the projects which are going to help all the neighbours in the BBIN and the beyond. 

Okay, these slides I have discussed, the Sabroom, but because of time limitation. In short, the 14th of August, we are actually waiting for Bangladesh to come and join. They didn't come. So later in November, the Sabroom ICP was opened, at the Sabroom, see the things that India has done, looking at its geostrategic position, it's a new gateway. It's land port is ready, Asia's largest railway container yard at the Sabroom. International Buddhist University, electrified double-gauge, broad-gauge railway line, so Rajdhani Express, starting from Agartala, it has a link with the Sabroom as well. So lots of things we have planned. We are forward, from here, where we would like to go. I go by the chair and Prof Muni and the additional secretary, ma'am. That economic relations is pivotal in terms of its advancing regional cooperation, that's what India's plan, India has been doing successfully, the number and amount of development cooperation aid extended to the four countries, this is perhaps, I haven't done the current statistics, it will pick up most of it, which is allotted amount in South Asia. So India has done phenomenally well, its performance, a very splendid performance in strengthening partnerships in many ways, multidimensional relations in the BBIN. Current Bangladesh arrangements, whatever, I think the sub-regional regional cooperation is likely to slow down. If Bangladesh doesn't come forward, BIMSTEC, BBIN, SAARc, so on and so forth, might get, so it is better that Bangladesh should be on board. They know the advantage, they know their benefits. Bangladesh is elevating into a developing country from the first January next year, it’s just less than 12 months. From the first January onward until 2029, the subsidies on the GSP will get reduced more and more. They need to stand up on their own. Subsidy won't help them. If they don't come back on BBIN, BIMSTEC, and the regional cooperation integration in the Neighbourhood First policy in that way, the losses are more with the Bangladesh, not with us. 

Four recommendation, which I will leave it here for discussion that we have a Gati Shakti Master Plan in view of our Viksit Bharat program 2047 trillion Indian GDP and Gati Shakti is the third edition of the Master Plan. So, time, perhaps, we can do in BBIN Gati Shakti, we need to link our logistics plan with the neighbourhood. Speed up the BBIN motor vehicle agreement if the passenger protocol is ready. So we can start with the three countries. In any way, Nepal, India, Bhutan, we are already having passengers up and running our buses and all. Only losers is the Bangladesh, that's what. Strengthening the energy linkages more, support to the energy exchange. Last is that continuing with the border connectivity and the border security. Some of the places where the border connectivity is there, security is missing, like West Bengal side. 

It's a great threat to us. So security and connectivity border, those need to go sync in hand-in-hand. And holding the summit, Prof Muni suggested that Sixth BIMSTEC summit in early 2025, is going to be a game-changing event, I think. Thank you very much, sir. Well, this is the pictorial. Can I have the last slide, just if I may give half and half. So I thought that let me put it in this kind of illustration. So I made just kind of what happened in case of regional cooperation integration. We have a scenario one, which is the BBIN, you can say. 

Scenario two, the liberal, different country join in the BBIN, the D1, for example, which is not part of sharing common agenda or common culture. Actually, the big nation who joins, they split the regional cooperation integration. That's happening. The scenario three is the reality today. Thank you very much. 

Harsh Vardhan Shringla: Thank you, Prabir. Can I invite Captain Sarabjeet S Parmar to now make his remarks. 

Sarabjeet S Parmar: Thank you, chair. I'm not sure if it's... Yeah, okay. Thank you. ICWA, thank you once again for the privilege of coming and engaging in a panel discussion, and I'm going to keep my remarks very short so that we can have pointed remarks, and I'm going to look at a couple of aspects, and the first I'm going to start with, how would you define the maritime domain if you were to look at the neighbourhood first policy? Can you limit it on the seas? It's an impossible task, and I think the maritime connectivity issue that was brought up and the instability that is in our adjoining region impacts that connectivity issue. So by large, Bay of Bengal, definitely. Arabian Sea, halfway through to the Yemenis coast, perhaps, yes, you could look at it. But the new area coming into play is the southern ocean and the rerouting of SLOCs as where the Cape is going to open that portal and that is a place nobody is looking at. And when the SLOCs change their routes, the attendant threats, risks, and challenges will accompany. So we're having a new arena which may open if the SLOCs continue that side. 

So I just thought I'd put this out there. And one more aspect where the maritime domain impacts is that instability on land will eventually find a method of impacting or fomenting instability on the maritime domain. Nobody would have imagined that instability and conflict in the Gaza would result in a Red Sea situation. The Houthis have been operating on land for a long time. But this is a window. They have their linkages with their state sponsors. And therefore, we have missiles being fired on merchant shipping in the Red Sea. And a lot of that shipping either starts or stops in our neighboUrhood area. An attendant industry that has got impacted by that is our shipbreaking. In this region, India and Bangladesh have the biggest shipbreaking industries. All these ships come via the Red Sea. That is finding a slow decline. And therefore, our Alang shipyard, the shipyard in Bangladesh, and this is an ancillary industry. You can imagine the type of products that can be made from the metal is taken. And if you read Prime Minister Modi's recent statement that the metal coming out of Alang can be used for making containers, because we are losing containers because of rerouting via the Cape at a phenomenal rate. So we have a shortage of ships at sea. We're having a shortage of containers. Again, I get back to the main linkage of maritime connectivity. But I'll address that in a little bit. So I thought, let me just put this in perspective. 

Trust is the next part. So as Additional Secretary Nutan mentioned beginning that we are no longer a hegemon, but we are now going forward with the monikers of preferred security partner and first responder. And that, I think, is something both on land and on the sea. And that is something that speaks volumes. And despite our differences with Maldives, the trust factor has reigned supreme. And willy-nilly, both nations gave each other room to manoeuvre. And therefore, we are slowly regaining the confidence level of interaction with Maldives. Sri Lanka had a problem, the debt issue. We chipped in. And now we have Bangladesh. So all this instability And you need to go back to the days of the strife in Sri Lanka during the civil war, the impact it had on the surrounding maritime domain, and the way it impacted our coastal defence and security. So instability is something that we cannot afford to have in the region. And therefore, if we are to work together on sub-regional cooperation, then instability is something that needs to be addressed first and foremost, and again, I will come to that, certain more linkages after that. 

Insofar as sub-regional cooperation is concerned, if we are going by the umbrella term of Sagar, then you have neighbourhood policy first, followed by Act East, Look West, all this more or less overlaps with our maritime domain where we are looking for this specific region in what we're looking at out here. So economics is the main binder, if that be the case, and if you do remember, when IORA was formed in its earlier avatar and Nelson Mandela had come to Delhi, it was based on economics and trade. BIMSTEC started the same. Nothing is different today. The security element has come in slightly late. Those of you who would remember the 2011 foreign ministers meeting on IORA in Bengaluru, that is the time security was introduced into the IORA lexicon by the Australian foreign minister. Now we find that it has propagated towards BIMSTEC also. There is a little delay in deliverables out there. A lot has been discussed by the earlier speakers, but the fact remains that if you want to be a stronger region and an interconnected region, then you need to secure your economic maritime interests. 

And let me go back to the Red Sea now. So now we're having a rerouting of ships. How is it affecting our region? Let me cover it in two main aspects. One is the rising cost because of the travel of time. More fuel is required. More fuel means CO2 emissions increase, but let's put that aside for a minute. So you have ships who are rerouting and when they exit the Malacca Strait, they head for the Cape of Good Hope. What are the last ports of call for fuel? Singapore, Sri Lankan ports and the southern ports of India. These ports are reeling from congestion. Fuel is not available. There is a 30% demand hike in fuel for fuelling of shipping. So end result is you have limited ships available, you have limited containers because all container ships who are routing via the Cape are losing containers at a phenomenal rate. Those need to be replaced. Where are those industries? Definitely not in this region. So this is a chance of cooperation for containers to be built in this region and we can therefore chip in and feed in with the logistic supply chain. These are just certain ideas that come through. The other issue is new SLOCs that are going through the Southern Indian Ocean. No nation is present there. So this again presents a big opportunity for India to operate with the other bigger nations and show that the Southern Indian Ocean region and the interests of our neighbourhood gets protected.

When I speak of neighbourhood, UNCLOS provides landlocked nations the right to use the seas. So therefore UNCLOS has also been signed by Afghanistan, Nepal and Bhutan, though they haven't ratified it, but they have signed. So, when you talk about the maritime domain, many times we seem to put the landlocked nations aside. I think it's time we got them into the debate, and UNCLOS does provide a lot of provisions and articles for landlocked nations also to work with the coastal states towards resources. And now we're looking at the High Seas Treaty that looks at biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction. India was a nation who signed all these international conventions when they came out on day one, but for the High Seas Treaty, we took a year to sign it. Sri Lanka has not yet signed. So therefore, I think there is a time to look at the High Seas Treaty within these nations and see that what is it that we feel is going to impact this region when you have other nations coming in who have the technology and who look at exploiting the biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction. We already have the presence of many nations. 

IUU fishing is one example. China is coming in with deep sea mapping. The main reason given for that is submarine operations, but the other reason also is the resources available on the seabed. And that's something we may lose out on, and I think that is another area where perhaps we can look at. Minilaterals and bilaterals, I'm a big fan of minilaterals. I think it's the best thing you can do. Three nations, not more than five. So I think the Colombo Security Conclave, which has done human work, and I would like to maybe disagree with Prof Muni with all due respect, sir, that a lot of issues have been looked at. But again, the thing is that when we walk down this lane, and if BIMSTEC is sort of stalled, IORA is also a little bit stalled, where are these problem areas? 

So therefore, if you have a solution with three nations coming together, picking a common aspect, getting a solution, and going on to the next, it's something that I think we can look at. But my suggestion again is not more than five nations insofar as minilaterals are concerned. There are lessons we can take from other multilateral organisations. IONS is one, Indian Ocean Naval Symposium. The working groups have done good work, especially HADR, where the standard operating procedure was accepted by the IONS members. It's also been accepted by IORA. And therefore, HADR, which is the most common low-hanging fruit, is something that I think we have developed enough. And there are many other such low-hanging fruit that we are exploiting. It's good for cooperation, but beyond that, what? So if it is time to knock at the next level, then we need to ask ourselves hard questions that can we look at more than just this soft power cooperation? There will be a time when we'll have to look at it. So therefore, within this region, whether you call it through either SAARC or BIMSTEC or whatever organisation you want, or even on a minilateral level. These are hard questions we need to start asking now, and I'll give you another reason why. 

Back to maritime trade. Insurance is an issue. Those of you who remember the famous measles map of piracy days, 2010, and the high-risk area covered the full western coast of India and Sri Lanka, and insurance costs went to the roof. Although that, HRA ceases to exist in the first and last year, and it did take India a good five years to reduce the HRA back to the original size. But Lloyd's has a joint war committee, and they frequently come out with joint war committee listed areas. And in the Indian Ocean Region, there is the area of the Red Sea which is there. But there is an advisory for the Bay of Bengal also, and this is interesting. So last year, sometime in September 2024, the JWC came out with what it called the Rakhine State Advisory, and said because of the existing state in Myanmar, underwriters are informed that when you look at insurance rates for ships who are in this region, you need to keep this in mind. Now, insurance rates, I have not done the study, but I am sure insurance companies being insurance companies will take advantage of this. 

But there's an interesting paragraph in this advisory that mentions India and China. And it says that if the state, or if the instability increases due to the differences of India and China, who have both interests in Sittwe and Kyaukphyu, respectively, this is an aspect that needs to be taken. So this is something that within the Bay of Bengal, again, BIMSTEC needs to sit down and talk is that how do we keep the insurance rates low, the prices are low, and therefore your maritime economic interests are more or less secure. These are certain aspects that are generally not spoken about too much, but I think it's time to do that. And there is one another issue, is that when we talk about sub-regions, even though you have a commonality of nations who work across these regions, whether it's Arabian Sea or the Bay of Bengal, and I like to give you the example of India and Indonesia. Now we do coordinated patrols with Indonesia. By the way, we also do with Bangladesh and Myanmar. 

And last year we did not have the bilateral exercise or the coordinated patrol because of the state of affairs. Hopefully this year we should regain and limp back to normalcy with our relations with Bangladesh. We also do with Myanmar, so we need to restart that. But what India and Indonesia do in the Bay of Bengal will be vastly different from India and Indonesia perhaps would look at doing in the South China Sea. So each area will have a different convergence point or a divergence point and the same would apply to the, I would say, the Arabian Sea when we engage our island nations. I'm going to include everybody in this apart from Maldives, which is also part of the Neighbourhood First policy out there. 

If we are going to look at certain aspects, as I said, how much more can we go along the low-hanging fruits? Let me add one more element here, which is called non-combatant evacuation operations. And take you to 2015 Yemen. So when there was instability in Yemen at that point in time, the Indian Navy again, and this speaks volumes for India’s foreign policy recognition as a stable nation, and let me go further back to 2006 in Lebanon. The Indian Navy was again the only navy in India, the only nation whose navy was permitted to enter Beirut. Both sides, the Hezbollah and Israel, gave us a four-hour cease-fire window. Take your people, move out. Apart from Indian citizens, we also took out international citizens from other nations. In Yemen, certain warships who approached the Yemeni coast to take out their citizens was fired upon. So Ambassador Shringla may correct me on this, but my reading says that we were approached and we were asked, can we take out their citizens, which we did. So far, we have been lucky. We have gone in, under the understanding, with the government in power, with a semblance of control on their land, that come in and get out. Tomorrow may not be the same case. 

So are we willing to look at an SOP, apart from with the bigger nations and our own neighbours, is that how do we work together? Would we be willing to put boots on ground to get our people out? Let me give you a nightmare situation. Noncombatant evacuation operations under pandemic conditions. So now, again, we need perhaps to look at an SOP on pandemics. We have enough experience in this region, including the Indo-Pacific, and that's, I think, another low-hanging fruit that needs to be looked at. But again, I said that there are certain low-hanging fruit that have been exploited enough, so what is the next step? That's the question we need to ask. Whatever we do, whether it's multilateral or minilateralism, if we base it on three pillars of enhancing stability, ensuring security and preserving peace, our general approach would be acceptable to everybody. That, I think, should be the tagline for all our engagements out there but then of course when we look at those deliverables we should be cognisant of the fact what is the amount of capacity and capabilities these nations bring with them. 

Smaller nations always have a tendency of getting overwhelmed by big nations. We've had this discussion on the Indian Ocean region where many years ago India was called a hegemon for a variety of reasons. But if we are going to engage these nations and we are going to build their capacity and capability, what is the amount of capacity and capabilities those nations can absorb? How much assistance can we give them? This needs to be discussed across the table. I'm sure it must have been done earlier, but perhaps we need to rework the situation because times have passed and, as was said earlier, all nations have the right of strategic autonomy as one, and they all have ambitions, and that needs to be duly respected. And, well, I'll stop here, I think, and we'll go ahead with the question-answers. Thank you. 

Harsh Vardhan Shringla: Thank you, Captain Parmar. I think we've had a fairly interesting discussion with a historical perspective of sub-regional and regional cooperation, a sort of analysis of the status of that cooperation, and also a more broader discussion on the issues of maritime security, so both land borders and maritime security, which are part of our regional cooperation. I think one or two points struck me as we went along with the discussion. One is, of course, that our bilateral initiatives have been more effective in fostering a connectivity, trade, people-to-people contacts, and these objectives that we are trying to achieve through sub-regional and regional cooperation, whether it is with Nepal or Bhutan or Sri Lanka or Bangladesh, I think bilaterally we've been able to do more. 

Of course, the moment you take that forward to involving three countries, four countries, things become more complicated and difficult, but the sense I also get is that we have – there is a sense of urgency to fast-track and move that sub-regional and regional cooperation forward in the near future. The concept of whether when we spoke about a sort of a regional Gati Shakti or a Gati Shakti Master plan, whether the concept of sabka saath, sabka vikas, and sabka vishwas, of course, can also apply to our entire neighbourhood, and which has always been, I think, a fairly important tenet of our neighbourhood first in foreign policy, is that how do we consider the entire sub-region or region as one, let's say, larger area of infrastructure development connectivity, people-to-people connect, so that you can work with each other and it becomes a win-win situation. 

And finally, of course, we have the BIMSTEC Summit, which is coming up, which is important, and as pointed out, we could expect some fairly important outcomes. So I'll open the floor here. I think we are a little short on time, but let's open it out to the extent that we can. And please address your questions either to the panel or to individuals, and let's get you involved in this discussion. 

Ranjit Rai: I'm a retired naval officer who has seen this, that Sarabjeet already explained to you that it is basically a maritime region which connects you. That's why the Prime Minister went to the word Sagar. But my only question to you is, to the panellists and to the ex-Foreign Secretary, he has mentioned every problem. Pakistan we fully understand. We did not include in the IORA or IRC, Pakistan, though it was an Indian Ocean thing. For some reason, people know, we did not include Pakistan, we did not include Iraq. So therefore, we were in a jam in that area. I'm speaking on behalf of the Navy. Therefore, you understand, Bangladesh is a recent one, but when the sea border was being demarcated, China fought for Bangladesh and got you a tri-border on the Talpati Island. I think the Foreign Secretary doesn't have to be told all this. And we lost out. But my only question, Sarabjeet has explained everything. It's come out. But, sir, with Sri Lanka, the Katchatheevu Island puts the Indian Navy in a very difficult position. The government in Tamil Nadu doesn't want us to touch the fishermen. New Delhi says, stop Indian fishermen from going. I think this problem with the Navy, of those of us who have served in the Navy, has been terrible. So from the ex-Foreign Secretary, how did you look at it from that time? Every other day in the newspaper, you read 20 Indian fishermen caught, or 25 Sri Lankan fishermen caught. And Sarabjeet, you have explained it very well. What happens on land affects the Navy. And we have never come to a reconciliation that we make friends, the staff college, the trainee, whatever we have done, the amount of work we've done in the region is even beyond Sagar in COVID or whatever. But we are very much getting involved in what happens on land. Tamil Nadu government, and I would really like to be clear, because I served through that period, fishermen and the Katchatheevu Island. Can we be able to solve it? 

Harsh Vardhan Shringla: Do you want to say something? So, no, I think this is a very interesting point. I mean, I think as far as our foreign policy is concerned, the Navy and our maritime domain is a very, very important part. It's an extension of our foreign policy. So when a naval ship goes to do an evacuation, as Captain Parmar mentioned, say in Yemen, or we go and provide relief after an earthquake in Mozambique or in Banda Aceh, I think the words that Nutan used was first responder. We are also net security providers. And that, I think, is achieved through the very, very close coordination that has been evident with the MEA, with our other ministries, and the Indian Navy, which is why we have so many naval officers now serving in the MEA in various desks, because that level of coordination is very, very essential. 

And in the Western Indian Ocean, I think we have achieved a certain level of trust in terms of what we are offering in a non-intrusive manner to all of our friends in the Western Indian Ocean, whether it is Seychelles, it is Comoros, Madagascar. I think we have a certain level of understanding of that area, which was far beyond Sri Lanka and Maldives in a way that very few countries have today. So when we talk about the core, I think we bring to the table values that are available because of such initiatives that we have taken. But coming to the more specific issue of the fishermen involving Sri Lanka, Katchatheevu, of course, is now a historic issue. But just a few months ago, the archives were released, as you probably know, that after 50 years, some of the secret documentation was released. And what was very evident is the fact that I think the level of Tamil Nadu government had been consulted on the matter. There was quite extensive sort of consultation before the government took the decision to hand over Katchatheevu to Sri Lanka. But if you analyse it today, I mean, you could also say that it was a decision that doesn't bear out in terms of the sort of benefits we have received. After all, Katchatheevu is, what, some 20 nautical miles off our coast. It has always been part of our land revenue records. It is a place where Indian fishermen have always utilised. And today, at one point in that document, 1974, it says that Indian fishermen can fish in the waters in and around Katchatheevu. But that was later withdrawn. And today, Sri Lanka does not give you the right. So you go 20 nautical miles or 50 nautical miles off your coast, and you're already hitting Sri Lankan waters in that very narrow Palk Bay and Gulf of Mannar. And I think therein lies the problem. And the other issue that we should all know is that fishermen on both sides are Tamils. The conflict is between fishermen of your coast of Tamil Nadu and your northern coast of Sri Lanka, which is Jaffna area. And on both sides, you have fishermen that were affected are Tamils. And I would say that when it comes to livelihood, then it's very important. We need to be cognisant of the fact that it has to be sustainable fishing. But there was one area that we think, one initiative that was very useful is that fishermen on both sides were sort of encouraged to meet and discuss how they can resolve the issue. Because it is fishermen who can resolve this issue between themselves. A government of course, can provide that framework, but it is fishermen who are affected. Your livelihood is affected on the Sri Lankan side and on the Indian side also. 

So I think there are historical factors here. There could be some level of diplomatic errors that have been committed in the past. That is my sense after looking at all the documentation concerned. And at the same time, of course, people are involved and you have to manage that situation in a way that is humane. I mean, Sri Lanka, of course, technically has a point that you are transgressing our international boundary. You're fishing in our waters and therefore we have the right to arrest you and confiscate your boats. But when there are injuries, when people are killed, when you're detained for very long, then I think is where the problem lies. And I think this issue doesn't have an immediate solution. You encourage your fishermen to go for deep-sea trawling. You provide them with other livelihoods, but it is not something that can be resolved that easily from my sense. But I'm open to any comments that anybody else on the panel. 

S D Muni:  Can I just add a footnote to this? The problem lies with the trawlers and they go much beyond around Katchatheevu. They go much beyond into the Sri Lankan waters. It's the powerful vested interest in Tamil Nadu which are reaping economic benefits that force the ordinary fishermen to go and fish into the deep-sea water. It's a domestic issue in Tamil Nadu and therefore it is a political issue between Centre and the state. And I don't know why it has not been resolved. I mean, if any other country would have done it to us, Navy is not the solution to that. Navy has nothing to do there and should not do that. I mean, even when Sri Lankan Navy is deployed there, I think that should be out. But the real problem is within Tamil Nadu. The people who are exporting fishes, the people who are lending the deep trawlers for the fishing and almost forcing the fishermen to go and get that much of a fish to them so that they can continue it. This is, to my mind, entirely an Indian issue which we must resolve within India. 

Harsh Vardhan Shringla:  Other questions? 

Subodh Bharti:  Thank you Chair. I am Subodh. I would like to know, from any of the panellists, that India is a facilitator of this sub-regional in this region, especially the BBIN, BIMSTEC, in terms of facilitating the cross-border trade and recently allowing countries to free trade.

So I wanted to know is there any possibility to facilitate services trade or more on tourism sector, some kind of subregional cooperation in tourism from the Indian side or how the neighbouring countries in the subregion see India as being a facilitator of subregion in the South Asia. 

Prabir De: India already, if we have seen India Nepal, India Bhutan and India with Southeast Asian countries, we provide quite a free flow of passenger movements in terms of tourists, in terms of students. India has allowed 10 ASEAN countries to come on arrival visa arrangements, Bhutan and Nepal. So the tourism is quite liberalised in that way. But if you'd like to know, as in BBIN context, the regional tourism programme, I think Bhutan and Nepal both allowed Bangladesh to fly there, but they need to have a pre-paid visa and very liberal kind of arrangements. Some countries on return in Southeast Asia, they want Indian visa fee waiver, Malaysia for example, or Thailand. So tourism is a big industry and in the BBIN. There are issues in the name of tourists. I know that it is also sensitive that, for example some tourists, they come to India, they don't return back. So I think here the tourism is a big industry, tourism is a big opportunity, in a regional and sub-regional context, once the BBIN process is quite normal, this discussion can happen. In the BBIN there are five areas of cooperation. Tourism is one of them. So this is much my response to sir. 

Sarabjeet S Parmar: I want to add on to what Commodore Ranjit Rai said, apart from the centre state issue with this, there is another underlying problem that not many nations are looking at, and that is the movement of the fish, and most of it is due to climate change. So one easy solution for the India-Sri Lanka problem is that, let's hope that the fish in this area moves out on its own and then we don't have that problem, but that's on a lighter side. On the tourism part Subodh, when we speak of tourism, automatically we see images of beaches, of forts, temples and all that. Medical tourism is something that we were quite heavy in and I think before the COVID period, but I don't know if the numbers have increased. I know Coimbatore and Calcutta are two big medical hubs. So that's another area that we can actually start concentrating back on again. 

Harsh Vardhan Shringla: I think there are a couple of other questions. How much time do we have? Take one last question. Gentleman in the back. 

Unidentified Speaker:  Sir one of the projects which was conceptualised in 2008 around that time was the Kaladan Multipurpose Transport Project and that was conceptualised with the view that if there is some day Bangladesh we get into a problem, that is the route through which we will service Northeast. But all this discussion, I somehow didn't find Kaladan and that project after 15 years has not been commissioned and we know there are issues around the people, the land acquisition and there are security issues. But one of the things is that even in today's discussion that was not discussed. What is the future? Whether we need to give an impetus on that now that the day has come when Bangladesh has become a problem in terms of connectivity and all these things. Thank you, sir. 

Harsh Vardhan Shringla: So this Kaladan Multipurpose Transport Transit Project, it's a long name for this, essentially was to provide our Northeast with access to the sea. And particularly, you're right, at a time when Bangladesh at that time was being difficult. Later on, of course, as was pointed out by Dr Prabir De, they gave us access to Chittagong and Mongla ports and there were other points of access coming up. But Kaladan always remains an alternative link for the Northeast and I think we must continue to prioritise that project. Today, because of the internal issues within Myanmar, there is obviously not much we can do to progress that work on the ground because you have to keep in mind that this is a greenfield road that we're cutting through very difficult terrain to reach the river at Paletwa and then get down to Sittwe port and get access to the sea. I think Captain Parmar mentioned Sittwe and Kyaukphyu ports. Also, we have to keep in mind that in the problem that's happening in Myanmar in the Rakhine state and the sort of, let's say, insurgency that is there, the only two cities that have not been taken so far are really Sittwe and Kyaukphyu. Otherwise, the Arakan army has taken over all the other parts of the province and including all the entire border areas have been taken over by the Arakan army. The reason, ostensibly, for which they haven't taken these two places is that because it involves other countries. India's interest in Sittwe and Chinese interest in Kyaukphyu. 

So we have invested in Sittwe. That is an important port. There is a coastal shipping agreement that we have proposed. The one with Bangladesh, as Prabir pointed out, is quite advanced. We want to extend it to Myanmar and then ultimately Thailand also. So we have coastal shipping, which will enable much more inter-country trade than having scheduled shipping lines, which is very expensive. And your quantities are smaller. So that is very important. The Kaladan project has to be prioritised. We have to finish it as soon as possible. But this is predicated on progress in Myanmar's own internal affair. And I suspect it will take some time unless we work out a separate deal with those who control the situation on the ground, which is essentially Arakan army. 

So I think we have had a great discussion and we will now leave it to Subodh. 

Subodh Bharti:  Well, it goes without saying that this was an enriching panel discussion today. On behalf of the ICWA, I would take this opportunity to express my gratitude to the distinguished chair, panellists, and my special thanks to all our members of this audience. To know more about the ICWA research work, events, outreach programmes and publications, do visit our social media handles, our website, Twitter, LinkedIn, YouTube and Facebook. Thank you and please join us for high tea in the foyer. Thank you.

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List of Participants 

1. Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, Additional Secretary, ICWA 
2. Ambassador Harsh Vardhan Shringla, Former Foreign Secretary: Chair 
3. S D Muni, Professor Emeritus, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University 
4. Prabir De, Professor, Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS), New Delhi 
5. Captain Sarabjeet S Parmar, Distinguished Fellow, Council for Strategic and Defence Research Distinguished Fellow, New Delhi, & Centre for Military History and Conflict Studies United Service Institution of India (USI)