Introduction
The US elections in 2024, resulting in President Donald J. Trump’s win for the second time, have been a matter of much debate about the possible implications of his victoryfor countries worldwide. [i]The U.S elections are one of the most highly analysed elections across the globe, owing to the global influence of the superpower and its impact on world politics, such as its involvement in the Ukraine and Gaza crises.Hence, countries embroiled in regional turmoil, such as the Arab countries in light of the Israel-Hamas war, face considerable implications under the new Trump administration. One of these countries is Jordan, a relatively peaceful country in West Asia bordering Syria and Israel and thus facing the fallout from the crisis in these countries. This paper analyses the possible fate of US-Jordan relations in Trump 2.0, underlining the role of Jordan in the West Asian crisis.
US-Jordan Relations So Far
[ii]Jordan has long been hailed as a beacon of stability and balance in West Asia since its independence in 1946.[iii] Despite its security concerns in the Israel-Palestine issue, King Abdullah II of Jordan has always advocated for the two-state solution and good relations with the US and European nations.[iv] Jordan was the first Arab country to sign a free trade agreement (FTA) with the US in 2001. Jordan’s relations with the US stem from a range of security, economic and other factors.[v]Jordanian concerns about its security and the aid it receives from Western countries, especially the US, have rendered it dependent on being in the US’ good books[vi].[vii] Jordan’s strategic significance in West Asian polity, such as the Israel-Hamas war, makes it an attractive ally for the US to pursuestability in the region.[viii]Apart from the shared goal of stability, Jordan actively works with the US to curb cross-border and cyber terrorism by constituting anti-terrorism units and entering into various resolutions, memorandums and agreements with the US, for example, the Memorandum of Intent between the Public Security Directorate and its American counterpart on strengthening cooperation and support under the Antiterrorism Assistance Programme. This had made Amman not only an attractive butalso a trustworthy ally in the eyes of Washington.[ix] The US and Jordan are partners in the “War on Terror” in their respective countries and strive to keep terrorism under check.[x] Tomaintain warm relations with the US and prevent being dragged into the Gaza conflict repeatedly, Jordan has kept its distance from Hamas and refused to let Hamas officials set their offices or base operations in the country.
An additional factor defining the US-Jordan relations is the Iran factor. The US and Iran have been locked in a geopolitical rivalry since the 1979 Iranian revolution,and the US has been committed to preventing Iranian influence and its “Axis of Resistance” (Hezbollah, Hamas and Houthis) from destabilising West Asia. [xi]As a US ally, Jordan has borne the impact on its Aqaba Port from the disruption in the Red Sea by the Houthis, along with attempts by Hamas to provoke Jordanians into fighting against Israel. Iran has also allegedly attempted to smuggle weapons to opponents of the Hashemite regime in Jordan.[xii]Despite this, Jordan has helped the US and its other major ally, Israel, by shooting down Iranian drones and intercepting Iranian missiles aimed at Israel, as well as authorizingFrance to use its military base to down these drones and “allowing Israeli fighter jets to enter Jordan’s airspace and intercept the Iranian missiles.” These factors, based on mutual interests and active cooperation from both sides, have defined US-Jordan relations until now.
Trump 2.0: Trump’s Approach towards Jordan
President Trump’s administration in the past has been defined by unilateral decisions rather than subtle signalling or posturing in his foreign policy.[xiii]For example, within a week of his inauguration, Trump had threateneda freeze on almost all aid to foreign countries, excluding Israel and Egypt, citing his “America First” policy. This freeze was a sharp reminder from the US to these countries to fall in line with Trump’s vision, or risk losing aid, along with Trump’s preference for pulling the US out of wars and international organisations that do not benefit the country. This is not the first time the Trump administration has threatened tostop aid, but a standard continuation of his West Asian policy from 2017 to 2021.[xiv]In August 2018, Trump cut off aid from “the United Nations Relief and WorksAgency, the main organisation supporting Palestinian refugees, severely impacting the lives ofPalestinian refugees, including those in Jordan, and leaving the Jordanian government scrambling to find alternative funding sources.”He also tried to reduce funding for Jordan but was overridden by Congress and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson.[xv]The suspension of aid was in response to Jordan’s criticism of Donald Trump’s proposed peace plans for Gaza and his “Deal of the Century.”
Moreover, Jordan had felt ignored and sidelined during President Trump’s first term, as it believed the White House focused more on developing relations with Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt.[xvi]Even though both former US President Barack Obama and Trump shared the vision to reduce US liabilities in West Asia and focus on more pressing threats like China, Trump moved away from Obama’smore neutral stance between Israel and Palestine.[xvii]In turn,he put in place several initiatives, such as the shift of the US embassy from TelAviv to Jerusalem and recognition of the Golan Heights as Israeli territory, to indicate his support for Israel in the conflict.[xviii]In his current presidential term, Trump has appointed individuals like MikeHuckabee and Steve Witkoff, who are pro-Israeli,to his West Asia team of officials. Also, unlike his term in 2017–2021, Trump has returned with a majority in the Senate and the House of Representatives, and it will not be easy to block any of his executive orders, for example, the aforementioned cutting off of Jordanian aid,which was blocked by Congress earlier.[xix]
While the former US President Joe Biden’s administration had reservations about Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s far-right tendencies and his will to end the war, the 47th President of the US does not seem to have such convictions and has called on Egypt and Jordan to take in more Palestinians to “clean out Gaza,”igniting the Jordanian or Egyptian option again. [xx]Trump 2.0 has marked a shift from Biden’s stance— that Gaza should not be depopulated and that it should ultimately be a part of a future Palestinian state.[xxi]Jordan already has 760,000 refugees, and taking in any more would seriously be more destabilising andcostlier for Jordan and Egypt than accepting American aid in return.
During the recent visit of King Abdullah to the US on 11 February 2025 Trump doubled down on his threat to cut aid to Jordan if the latter does not take in more Palestinians, with no right of return to the refugees. The King, in turn, later responded that he would do what is best for Jordan but talked about an upcoming Arab counterproposal for the Gaza situation, signalling a cautious approach from Jordan to work out a solution without displeasing the US.[xxii]Both the US and Israel have rejected this plan as of March 2025. President Trump’s reiteration and insistence on Jordan taking in more Gazans during his meeting with King Abdullah imply tense relations ahead for the US and Jordan for at least the next four years, as well as strong chances of domestic unrest among the Jordanian population.
Conclusion
The election of President Donald Trump to office, keeping in mind Trump 1.0’s track record and Trump’s actions immediately after assuming office in January 2025, does not seem to bode well for Jordan. If Trump 2.0 goes in the direction of Trump’s previous term, US-Jordan relations may well be downgraded and risk further instability in West Asia. Cutting off aid to Jordan and insisting on taking in more refugees can worsen Jordan’s already precarious economic situation and with Jordan having to find allies elsewhere. It can also adversely impact Jordan’s anti-terror efforts.In addition, suspending aid, which was meant for democratic reforms in Jordan, would result in democratic backsliding in the Hashemite kingdom and the rise of unrest and radical elementsin the youth. In a situation like this, the US too may risk its regional security and access to bases, like the Muwaffaq Salti Air Base, to counter terrorists. Trump’s silent endorsement of Israel may embolden the latter to annex the West Bank, forcing Jordan and others into a war and the unravelling of the “Deal of the Century.” This is especially important as President Trump has expressed a lack of faith in his mediated ceasefire between Israel and Hamas and the future of the Gaza crisis. Although it is yet to be seen whether the new Trump administration focuses on its long-term ally Jordan or pursues other West Asian heavyweights like Saudi Arabia instead, a success like his Abraham Accords in 2020 is unlikely if one side is given free rein. In any case, the region is likely to see shifting equations among the countries of the region, a dynamic which will receive an impetus due to the peculiar nature of Trump 2.0 politics.
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*Aishwarya Upreti, Research Intern, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.
Endnotes
[i] Lyons, J.2024. “Geopolitical plates shifted this year. Now the world braces for the Trump effect”. ABC News. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-12-30/geopolitical-plates-shifted-in-2024-middle-east-trump/104751936.
[ii] Sheikh, A. M.2020. Political and Economic Relations between United States of America and Jordan (1990-2019). https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3648432.
[iii] Ameer, S.2024. “What is at stake for Jordan in the Israel-Hamas War?”orfonline.org. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/what-is-at-stake-for-jordan-in-the-israel-hamas-war.
[iv]“U.S. relations with Jordan - United States Department of State.” (January 6, 2025). United States Department of State. https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-jordan/.
[v] Haines, J., & Jeffrey-Wilensky, J.2025. “Countries that receive the most foreign aid from the U.S.”US News & World Report. https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/countries-that-receive-the-most-foreign-aid-from-the-u-s.
[vi] Jordan was the third largest recipient of financial aid from the US in 2023.
[vii] Choucair, J.2006. ILLUSIVE REFORM: Jordan’s stubborn stability. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep12891.
[viii] India Today.2024.”Israel only wants wars, no end game: Jordanian Minister on Middle East tensions.”India Today. https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/israel-wants-wars-no-end-game-jordan-minister-sadafi-escalating-middle-east-tensions-2608490-2024-09-30.
[ix] Brown, N. J.2006. “JORDAN AND ITS ISLAMIC MOVEMENT: the limits of inclusion?” https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep12889.
[x] Robbins, E.2024. “Jordan rejects hosting Hamas as pressure rises on Qatar.”FDD. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/05/02/jordan-rejects-hosting-hamas-as-pressure-rises-on-qatar/.
[xi]“Could the Israel-Hamas war hurt Jordan’s stability” (n.d.). Bluemarble.https://globalaffairs.org/bluemarble/jordan-middle-east-role-israel-gaza-hamas.
[xii] Dagres, H. 2024. “Jordan took out Iranian munitions over its airspace. Now it has tensions with its people and Iran.” Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/jordan-israel-iran-retaliation-gaza/.
[xiii]‘Which countries will Trump’s foreign aid suspension hurt most?’. 2025.Al Jazeera.
[xiv] Sheline, A.2024. “Jordan on the Edge: Pressures from the War in Gaza and the Incoming Trump Administration.”Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. https://quincyinst.org/research/jordan-on-the-edge-pressures-from-the-war-in-gaza-and-the-incoming-trump-administration/.
[xv] Studies, A. U. F. P. 2021.“Deal of the Century”: What is it and why now?”Arab Center Washington DC. https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/deal-of-the-century-what-is-it-and-why-now/.
[xvi] Feith, D. J., & Libby, L. 2020. “The Trump Peace Plan: Aiming Not to Make a Deal, but to Make a Deal Possible.”Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep26342.
[xvii] Feierstein, G. M. 2018. “Trump’s Middle East Policy at One Year: Policy Lacks Strategic Coherence Despite Rhetoric.”Middle East Institute. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep17578.
[xviii] Guttman, N. 2025. “Getting to know Trump’s Middle East team.”Moment Magazine. https://momentmag.com/trumps-middle-east-team/?srsltid=AfmBOoqzPoBPJHR2fHT3Anbi03ZKeEgxdPB0c_wRj4LIJieXK9HzNPxF.
[xix] Hansler, J.2024. “Blinken tells Israeli government that Palestinians must be allowed to return to homes in Gaza.”CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/09/politics/blinken-israel-gaza-war-talks/index.html.
[xx]“Trump suggestion that Egypt, Jordan absorb Palestinians from Gaza draws rejections, confusion.”(January 27, 2025). CBS News. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-gaza-israel-palestinians-relocation-reaction-egypt-jordan-europe/.
[xxi]“Jordan’s three balancing acts: Navigating the Post-October 7 Middle East.” (n.d.). United States Institute of Peace. https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/09/jordans-three-balancing-acts-navigating-post-october-7-middle-east.
[xxii]Mason, J., & Lewis, S202. “Trump presses Jordan to take in Palestinians from Gaza; king opposes displacement.”Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trump-jordans-king-set-tense-meeting-gazas-future-2025-02-11/.