Abstract: On April 2, 2025, the second administration of Donald Trump declared sweeping new global tariffs, perhaps even potentially triggering a global trade war. Allies, key trading partners, and other countries worldwide are all subject to at least a 10 per cent baseline import duty. The repercussions are expected to be worldwide and hard-hitting. Key allies of the US in East Asia, such as Japan and South Korea, finished with their cajoling of Washington seem to be looking at options to offset the trade deficits through alternative arrangements, most notably through partnerships with China, as the three countries reiterate support for a rules-based, open multilateral trading system.
Introduction
A 19th-century statement by Lord Palmerston remains highly relevant to today’s global engagements. He stated, “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.”[1] This perspective on international relations is becoming increasingly evident in contemporary geopolitics, shaped by a complex security environment. A clear example is the ripple effect of Trump’s wave of executive orders imposing sweeping tariffs since taking office in 2025.
From Huawei to “Liberation Day”: The Evolution of US Trade Policy
The April 2 “Liberation Day”[2] global tariffs have intensified existing concerns, leading to speculation that Japan, South Korea and China may be contemplating a coordinated response.[3] Amidst looming tariff threats, Japan, South Korea and China for the first time after five years since December 2019 convened the 13th Trilateral Economic and Trade Ministers’ Meeting on March 30, 2025 at Seoul, South Korea.[4]
For long-time US allies, the ongoing developments under the Trump administration have been overwhelming. In fact, the steps being undertaken by the Trump 2.0 government are a 180-degree turn of events considering how his first administration had barred Huawei in 2020,[5] which insulated its competitors not only in the US but also in Japan and South Korea.
In addition, the CHIPS and Science Act, issued by the Biden administration in 2022,[6] was widely seen as a collective win for the US, Japan and South Korea. However, coming to 2025, the offensive salvo of tariffs on all the US trade partners, except for Russia and North Korea,[7] by the Trump second administration has surely shifted the goal posts even for Japan and South Korea.
Japan, South Korea and China: A Strategic Realignment?
The meeting of Japan, South Korea and China’s Economic and Trade Ministers on March 30, some may claim, is a standard restart after five years but considering the ensuing developments in global trade, it does indicate an intent for deepening engagements. Although Japan and South Korea did not openly state specifics about the meeting outcomes highlighting any collective response to the US tariffs, China’s Global Times reported that the three countries are expected to be “using their collective strengths to jointly resist the turbulence brought by the US’ irresponsible approach.”[8] Per the joint statement,[9] emphasis was placed on ensuring transparent and steady implementation of the RCEP Agreement that came into force in 2022. Besides, the ministers discussed accelerating negotiations on the long-stalled Japan-South Korea-China Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which has been dormant since 2012.[10]
The paradigm shift in the US administration’s approach to global trade tariffs while not even sparing its key allies such as Japan and South Korea, each levied with a 24 per cent[11] and 25 per cent[12] reciprocal tariff, respectively, has escalated concerns about a negative impact on the world economy. China, on the other hand, was hit with a 34 per cent reciprocal tariff on April 2, in addition to two earlier rounds of import taxes since January 2025, bringing Beijing’s total tariff burden to 54 per cent.[13] Moreover, Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi has also cast doubt on whether the US tariffs are in line with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules,[14] further highlighting potential inconsistencies in the US’s stance on global institutions and norms.
Additionally, the joint statement of the 13th Trilateral Economic and Trade Ministers’ Meeting on March 30, reaffirmed Japan, South Korea and China’s support for a rules-based, open and inclusive multilateral trading system centred around the WTO, suggesting a counterbalance to the US protectionist policies.[15] The statement also indicates that the three countries aim to reinforce economic integration by improving supply chain management cooperation and export controls within Northeast Asia. These measures are intended to mitigate trade uncertainties caused by US global tariffs.
Conclusion: Shifting Alliances in a Changing Economic Order
As push comes to shove and all the cajoling that was possible from Tokyo and Seoul towards Washington proved unproductive, the two key allies of the US in East Asia are going to weigh all options to protect their national interests. Instead of strengthening ties with allies, Donald Trump’s second administration appears to be distancing itself from its key allies in East Asia, namely Japan and South Korea, while China is grabbing the opportunity by extending them both a red-carpet welcome. If Lord Palmerston’s 19th-century views were to still hold, Japan, South Korea, and China, despite their disputes over territorial claims as well as historical grievances, would prospectively consider closer geopolitical and economic interests as an objective reality.
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*Dr. Tunchinmang Langel, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA)
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.
Endnotes
[1] Oxford Reference (2016), “Oxford Essential Quotations (4 ed.),” https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780191826719.001.0001/q-oro-ed4-00008130 (Accessed April 2, 2025).
[2] David Goldman and Kevin Liptak (2025), “Trump is now planning a splashy ‘Liberation Day’ announcement. What he’ll say is still up in the air”, CNN, March 31, 2025, https://edition.cnn.com/2025/03/31/business/liberation-day-announcement-trump/index.html (Accessed April 2, 2025).
[3] The Wall Street Journal (2025), “China Says It Is Aiming to Coordinate Tariff Response With Japan, South Korea,” April 1, 2025, https://www.wsj.com/economy/china-says-it-is-aiming-to-coordinate-tariff-response-with-japan-south-korea-c7a19540 (Accessed April 2, 2025).
[4] Korea.net (2025), “Joint Media Statement of the Thirteenth Economic and Trade Ministers’ Meeting between the Republic of Korea, Japan and the People’s Republic of China,” March 30, 2025, https://www.korea.net/Government/Briefing-Room/Press-Releases/view?articleId=7931&type=O&insttCode=A110412&categoryId=109&language=A020101&pageIndex=1&gov=#none (Accessed April 2, 2025).
[5] US Department of Commerce (2020), “Commerce Addresses Huawei’s Efforts to Undermine Entity List, Restricts Products Designed and Produced with U.S. Technologies,” May 15, 2020, https://2017-2021.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2020/05/commerce-addresses-huaweis-efforts-undermine-entity-list-restricts.html (Accessed April 2, 2025).
[6] David Shepardson and Jeff Mason (2022), “Biden signs bill to boost U.S. chips, compete with China,” Reuters, August 10, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/technology/biden-sign-bill-boost-us-chips-compete-with-china-2022-08-09/ (Accessed April 2, 2025).
[7] The Indian Express (2025), “Only 2 countries got spared from Trump’s ‘liberation day’ tariffs. Here’s why”, April 3, 2025, https://indianexpress.com/article/world/trump-reciprocal-tariffs-relief-russia-north-korea-9923035/ (Accessed April 4, 2025).
[8] Liu Yang and Qi Xijia (2025), “China, S.Korea, Japan call for enhancing trade cooperation,” Global Times, March 30, 2025, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202503/1331179.shtml (Accessed April 2, 2025).
[9] Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry of Japan (2025), “Joint Media Statement of the Thirteenth Economic and Trade Ministers’ Meeting between the Republic of Korea, Japan and the People’s Republic of China”, March 30, 2025, https://www.meti.go.jp/press/2024/03/20250330001/20250330001-a.pdf (Accessed April 2, 2025).
[10] The Hindu (2025), “China, Japan, South Korea agree to promote regional trade as Trump tariffs loom,” March 30, 2025, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/china-japan-south-korea-agree-to-promote-regional-trade-as-trump-tariffs-loom/article69392680.ece (Accessed April 2, 2025).
[11] Takuya Karube (2025), “Trump to slap new 24% tariff on Japan, at least 10% on all countries,” Kyodo News, April 3, 2025, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2025/04/d5f352983d39-update2-trump-unveils-mix-of-universal-reciprocal-tariffs.html (Accessed April 3, 2025).
[12] Song Sang-ho (2025), “Trump unveils 10 pct 'baseline' tariff, 25 pct 'reciprocal' tariff on S. Korea,” Yonhap News Agency, April 3, 2025, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20250403000553315?section=national/diplomacy (Accessed April 3, 2025).
[13] Keith Bradsher (2025), “China Will Face at Least 54 Percent Tariffs With Trump’s New Order,” The New York Times, April 2, 2025 https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/02/business/economy/trump-china-new-tariffs.html (Accessed April 3, 2025).
[14] Kyodo News (2025), “Japan seriously concerned U.S. tariffs not in line with WTO rules,” April 3, 2025, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2025/04/061cc76b941f-urgent-japan-seriously-concerned-us-tariffs-not-in-line-with-wto-rules.html (Accessed April 3, 2025).
[15] Korea.net (2025), “Joint Media Statement of the Thirteenth Economic and Trade Ministers’ Meeting between the Republic of Korea, Japan and the People’s Republic of China,” March 30, 2025, https://www.korea.net/Government/Briefing-Room/Press-Releases/view?articleId=7931&type=O&insttCode=A110412&categoryId=109&language=A020101&pageIndex=1&gov=#none (Accessed April 2, 2025).