Indian Council of World Affairs

Lakshmi Priya: Before we begin today's program, I request everyone to kindly switch off their mobile phones or keep them in silent mode. Good afternoon, excellencies, ladies and gentlemen. I'm Dr Lakshmi Priya, Research Fellow at the Council, and I look at the developments in Iran and the GCC countries. On behalf of the Indian Council of World Affairs, it is an honor and privilege to welcome you all to the panel discussion on Re-evaluating Iran amidst turbulence in the Middle East. Iran is going through a difficult phase and the region is in a constant state of turmoil since long. Tehran's hope for an optimistic future relies on revival of the nuclear deal for which talks are undergoing. Third round of talks is to take place on Saturday in Oman, and the framework for the deal is being drawn by both the parties. In this context, today's discussion will re-evaluate Iran's position as the region strives to cope up with challenges posed by the conflict in Gaza and the Yemen crisis. 

The panel discussion will begin with welcome remarks by Ms Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, Additional Secretary, ICWA. Thereafter, Ambassador D P Srivastava, Former Ambassador of India to Iran, will give his remarks and chair the discussion led by Professor Reshmi Kazi, Mr Atul Aneja, and Dr Omid Babelian, who will deliver his remarks online. The discussion will be followed by a question and answer session moderated by the chair. May I now invite Ms Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, Additional Secretary, ICWA, to deliver the welcome remarks. 

Nutan Kapoor Mahawar: Dear friends, welcome to the panel discussion on re-evaluating Iran amidst the turbulence in the Middle East. Since the Islamic revolution of Iran in 1979, Iran has provided arms, training, and financial support to non-state actors and proxy groups, militias, and political movements in at least six countries, namely Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Yemen, and Bahrain. Iran has exercised both direct and indirect control over these proxy groups, allowing it plausible deniability when these groups use violence while maintaining the power to have them operate in Iran's interests. A downside for Iran has however been that these groups have also often developed their own interests which Iran did not control or direct. 

Now for the first time since the revolution, we are witnessing a weakening of Iran's axis of resistance in the region in the wake of the Gaza war and the fall of Assad in Syria. Let's recall that in the first Trump administration one of President Trump's top foreign policy goals was to limit Tehran's regional influence and support for militant groups across the Middle East. I look forward to the panel discussing if Iran has begun to perceive terrorism any differently in the region in the wake of the Gaza war and the turbulence in the Middle East. Domestically, President Pezeshkian is considered to be the most reform-oriented president since President Khatami. However, despite taking some initiatives such as rolling back some internet restrictions and pausing the draconian new hijab law, his government is struggling to strike a balance with the hardliners. 

I hope the panel will probe into any tangible shifts in Iranian polity with the weakening of Iranian proxies in the region when there is continuing stronghold of hardliners in the Pezeshkian government. US-Iran hostility, as we all know, has been a defining feature of global geopolitics since the revolution. The two have been locked into enmity, brinkmanship, vicious cycle of allegations and counter allegations, and shrill rhetoric over issues ranging from terrorism, nuclear and missile proliferation, radicalization, and sanctions. Iran was designated as a terrorist country by US in 1984 under the Reagan administration, while the Clinton administration was the first to sanction Iran's proxies. President Bush in 2002, you would recall, in the State of the Union address, labelled Iran as part of the Axis of Evil along with DPRK and the Iraq of that time, pre-Gulf War II. Present dynamics under Trump 2.0 continue in the same tenor. Tensions are expected to continue to simmer with occasional escalation despite President Trump's call for a new nuclear deal. 

The Gaza war also brought out in full glare the shadow play and machinations between Iran and Israel for decades. For Israel, Iran has been an existential threat with its support to the proxy groups. For Iran, Israel has been a country backed by a Western power which has challenged its ambition and legitimacy. Iran was the second Muslim country to recognize Israel after Turkey under the Pahlavi dynasty. However, after the revolution, in a quest to emerge as the leader of the Muslim world, it has maintained a cold approach towards Israel as is well known. It is interesting to note that the beginning of Iran's nuclear program lies in the geopolitical manoeuvres of external forces and not so much from an organic need for civilian use. During the Shah's rule, before the revolution, the program is understood to have been encouraged by the US in order to strengthen Iran's regional role as an ally of the U.S. and Israel. Therefore, current opposition by the US reflects how policies and stances change according to the changing scenarios. Iran has been a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT, and maintains that it has a peaceful nuclear program. 

However, time and again it has been accused of violations in terms of levels of enrichment and under Trump 2.0, it has become more chaotic. Iran is widely considered to be nuclear capable and the Iranian nuclear issue has brought to the fore the flaws in the global non-proliferation regime based on the NPT. I hope the panel will look at the options available to Iran on the nuclear issue, defiance or accommodation, especially in the context of the recent developments in the traditionally close cooperation between Russia and Iran. 

Friends, I also want to mention that this month we have held three discussions on Syria, DPRK, and Iran. It was not without design that we clubbed these together and held the discussions consecutively. For these three countries form what has been described as the axis of evil. While events in all these three countries have overtaken since they were described as axis of evil, the phrase continues to persist in the memory of the international relations community. 

There is evil in this world for sure friends, but it doesn't reside only in these three countries. Labelling the people or a country evil makes for hitting the nadir in international relations. Further, operationalizing the underlying thought through promulgation of law means international relations have sunk into the Mariana Trenches. This is symptomatic of a deep crisis in international relations, to say the least, which needs urgent attention through dialogue, diplomacy and cooperation, which unfortunately continue to be in short supply today. Prior to President Bush's axis of evil, you would all recall that we had the labelling of the Soviet Union as an evil empire at the height of Cold War by President Reagan. Shortly after, a handful of years later, the Soviet Union collapsed and disintegrated, causing ripples in international relations whose causes and effects are still being studied. Use of the word evil in diplomatic rhetoric also symbolises the crossover of international relations and geopolitics into theology. Real world, after all, is a fusion of the battles between countries and battles between religions. If this is so, then it helps to remember that both good and evil reside within each person, and the most difficult battle is really the battle within, and that relentless monitoring of oneself, one's actions and behaviour is key as much for states as it is for individuals to not go astray from the right path. No one people can be evil, no one country can be so. If you are born, you have the right to exist, right to exist with dignity and respect. This is equally applicable to a person as to a state. As they say in Hindi, hate the wrong action or behaviour, not the individual or the wrongdoer. That does not of course mean not to accost evil, navigate it and fear not to defeat it. In the discipline of international relations and diplomacy, it helps to emphasise that no problem, no issue is unsurmountable if there is will. And if the time is also on our side, the more the possibilities of finding good solutions. And of course that, as Bollywood never fails to tell us, good always triumphs over evil in the end. So really, do not worry, neither does the axis of evil argument hold, nor is evil beyond defeat. I look forward to a thought-provoking discussion. I wish the panellists all the best. 

Lakshmi Priya: Thank you, ma'am. May I now invite Ambassador DP Srivastava to make his remarks and chair the discussion. Thank you. 

DP Srivastava: Madam, all colleagues and my thanks to ICWA for inviting me and I look forward to an interaction with all of you and I have very distinguished colleagues on the panel who bring a range of experience. I have served in the region on both sides of the Gulf. I started as an Arabist, I went to American University in Cairo way back in 70s, in 1980. As I keep joking, I am from the last century, but I ended up on the other side of the Gulf and I don't know whether it was accident or design, but I had the privilege of serving in Iran for four years during the first round of sanctions and I was witness to the negotiations between Iran and P5 plus one. Now there is a major difference in the context. During the 2012 to 2015 period, when the first round of negotiations on JCPOA took place, there were problems. ISIS arose in Iraq, Iran in 2014, but there were no problems compared to what we have witnessed in Middle East in last one year. In case of emergence of ISIS, Iran, Russia and America were on the same side, also the Arab Gulf countries. So the alignments were more straightforward. The last round of Middle East now has emerged, I hope it has emerged, from the longest war since the Second World War. It has lasted, you know, the events which started on 7th October 2023 with Hamas attack on Israeli civilians, which must be condemned by all. That war continued for a year and a half. It started with a war between Israel and Hamas, which is a non-state actor. It spread to Israel's northern border with Hezbollah. It eventually led to a direct exchange between Iran and Israel. In fact, there were two rounds of exchanges in terms of missile and drone attacks and the counter and the retaliation. 

And eventually, it led to change of regime in Syria. Now, what has one part of the spectrum, which is Houthi attacks on Red Sea, that is still continuing. And situation in Gaza is by no means settled. Now, you are aware of the chain of events. Let me just point out a broad issue. Of the different sources of instability in the Middle East, perhaps the oldest and the most prominent is the Israel-Palestinian issue. And this is not of Iran's making. This predates, you know, till 1979, till the Iranian revolution. Iran and the Shah in Israel were military allies. So, Iran had nothing to do with the creation of the Palestinian problem, which has arisen because of Israel's continued occupation of Palestinian lands. And despite Oslo Accord, that has not been vacated. And that will continue to be an element of instability going forward. Two-state solution has not only been recognized by India, it has been recognized by US and this was reiterated at the level of US President Biden. Now, US policies seem to be in a flux, and that policy has again changed. But the fact is that there is very wide acceptance to this formula, two-state solution, including EU. 

Now, let me... So, you have now seen a region which is more volatile. Now, what has kept from India's point of view and from the point of view of large number of countries which depend on oil. The interesting part is that during this one-and-a-half years war, the oil prices remain stable. This is something which applies to us of great interest. And what has kept it stable? What has kept it stable is the fact that Iran's rapprochement with Saudi Arabia is holding. And that rapprochement began after 2019, when there were attacks on Abqaiq and Khurais facilities of Saudi Arabia. And Saudi Arabia found that US under Trump administration, which was-- Trump was a very friendly administration for Saudi Arabia, they did not intervene. And something similar happened a year later in case of UAE. So the Gulf countries have tried to build their bridges across with Iran. And the latest manifestation was visit of the Saudi Defence Minister to Iran. And he was given audience with Supreme Leader. In my four years, I never saw any defence minister or foreign minister being given audience with Supreme Leader. So this shows the change. Now that change actually has gone beyond that. And this is a positive part. I had mentioned the negative earlier, that is it's a more volatile situation. The positive part is that when the first round of negotiations on nuclear issue took place and which resulted in JCPOA, this was opposed by Iran's Arab neighbors. And this was led by Saudi Arabia. And Saudi Arabia launched a price war. This started in 2014. And the reason was that Saudi Arabia and Gulf countries feared that as Iran emerges from sanctions, it will become strong and threaten them. 

So to throttle Iranian capacity, they removed the production cap, which led to a fall in oil prices. Now this time it's a very different situation. Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, all of them have welcomed this round of negotiations between US and Iran. So the regional dimension has changed and it has changed in Iran's favor. Now let's look at what is at stake and how a deal will affect major players. A deal is needed by all of them. It is needed by Iran because Iran needs relief from the sanctions. Its economy is badly hurt. And the real exchange rate has gone down very badly. And of course, Iran's position is that Iran does not want nuclear weapons. So if it doesn't want nuclear weapons, as Iranian spokesmen have repeatedly said, a deal is possible. It's only a question of the contours of the deal. Iran insists on right to enrichment, which is 3.67% is part of NPT. So this was also enshrined in the previous JCPOA. 

So, Iran needs it and it is possible. Saudi Arabia's oil-bearing region is in the east, on the gulf, very close to Iran. And though it has one pipeline running east-west to Red Sea, it has very limited capacity. So, bulk of its oil exports, as well as oil exports of UAE and Kuwait and Bahrain, have to take place through Strait of Hormuz. So, it is in Saudi Arabia's interest also, especially given its experience of attack on Abqaiq and Khurais facilities in 2019, that a deal, a nuclear deal, goes through which will help lower the tensions. The same goes for UAE. Now, the elephant in the room is Israel. How does it affect Israel? Israel will also benefit from the deal if Iran's nuclear program is capped. Now, there was criticism in the past of this deal because the hardliners in US and, of course, Israel felt that this left the regional dimension and it left the missile issue outside the deal. Now, regional dimension, as I pointed out, has completely changed, that the regional countries are actually welcoming the negotiations. The missile issue remains outstanding. Iran has made it clear that it will not discuss that. And this will be a deal-breaker. There is no doubt about it. But, from Israel's point of view, you know, Iran, which has already reached 60% of enrichment, if that program is rolled back, it helps Israel also. Though they may not, Netanyahu will not admit it. 

The last, the P3, that is US, Russia and China. If US manages to get this deal, it will emerge again as the, not the hegemon, but the chief security provider in the region. This will be, you know, it's not quite the same thing. Before the revolution, US influence extended to both sides of the gulf. It will not be going back to that period. But, if US can get this deal through without, you know, the other P5 members, this will show its clout in the region. Russia, any war in the region, you know, it will force Russia to take sides. Russia is hoping to have a deal on Ukraine and it would not like to take side against US. So, it is also in Russia's interest to have a deal go through. China, China's position is more complex. It is a non-proliferation hawk. It has signed a strategic, 25-year-old strategic agreement with Iran. Today, I think, Foreign Minister Araghchi, I had the privilege of knowing him. As many other Iranian interlocutors, he is visiting China. Chinese President, during a visit to Saudi Arabia, when he also had meeting with other Gulf countries, I think this was December 22, a statement was issued. This was, that had two elements. There was a reference to Abu Musa and Tunb islands, which, of course, Iranian side objects. But more than that, there was a reference to Iran complying with non-proliferation norms. Now, this triggered a strong reaction in Iran. So, China does not want Iran's nuclear program to go ahead. But at the same time, it does not mind, you know, fishing in troubled waters. There is a Wall Street Journal report a couple of days back, which mentions that Chinese may be providing guidance for Houthi attacks, targeting of shipping in the Red Sea. So, China is probably not very happy with the US emerging, with the normalization of relations between US and Iran. But the rest of them, I think it's a win-win situation. 

Now, let me mention briefly what could be the main contusive deal. The Libyan style deal, which is what Netanyahu mentioned, is no, no, no to Iran. And I don't think that is what is being aimed at by US. In the US position, there's a flip-flop. Witkoff, after the first meet, mentioned 3.67% enrichment level, which was what was agreed in this JCPOA. And next day, he went back and he said it has to be 0% enrichment as President Trump says. Now after this state of flip-flop a statement Iran and US have held second round of negotiations which have again ended on a positive note, so we don't know, we are not privy to those discussions but apparently the two sides have find some way of some convergence so let's see how now what are the Iranian expectations. These were laid down by Mr Shamkhani, he's advisor to supreme leader, he was earlier the secretary national security council or you can call him the national security advisor in our hierarchy. I had the privilege of knowing and working with Mr Shamkhani has laid down nine principles. You would have read them so I don't go in the details but you know the three or four elements. One I have already mentioned that Libyan style dismantlement is not possible. Second he has said that the nuisance has to be contained which is a reference to Israel. Third he has said that the right of enrichment has to be recognized and fourth he said it has to be in a short time span. Now that is an element which could provide-- build a convergence between US and Iranian position. Iranian enrichment program has gone up to 60%, now if Iran is committed to only civilian use why go up from 3.6 7% to 60% unless it's simply a pressure tactic but that creates you know doubts and sometimes distress so with the passage of time the situation will become more complex so a short time period is something which has US interests or Western interests or p5 interest which includes China because as I said China is in fact a new non-proliferation hop because it has achieved its own end so it doesn't want others to join the club. The shorter time frame will also suit Iran, this limits the scope for mischief by hardliners. As you know there's this term is used often in Iran's context but there are hardliners on the other side also and especially Israel. So for Israel and for Mr Netanyahu perhaps no deal is the best deal and if there's a long time span, this will create complications. 

Now, the last part and I'll stop here. What if the deal fails, there will be quick escalation of tensions and this is something which is going to affect the entire world because of oil situation or move straight carries 17% of oil supplies. There is no substitute for 17% of oil from any other sources. Oil prices have shown a downward trajectory lately. You know, they came down from $82 a barrel a year ago to about $67 a barrel today. Roughly 25% decrease. This trend will get reversed and $1 increase in the price of crude oil adds $14,000. Roughly $2 billion to India's annual import bill. So it is not in our interest. It is not in the interest of other countries. It may not be in in the interest of even the oil producers because they'll make the killing from higher prices only if their oil gets out which itself will become a a problem. So, the failure of the deal will carry very serious consequences especially at a time when the world economy is teetering on the verge of recession. Thank you. 

Reshmi Kazi: Good afternoon. Thank you chair. First of all of course I would like to express my gratitude to Smt Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, ICWA additional secretary. Thank you ma'am for inviting me here and giving me this platform to share my views. thank you my co-panellists. Sir has almost covered everything, but my colleagues, some of my colleagues are here. Some students are also here as I see. and of course distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. I would-- this is a very complicated issue and we are in the middle of a very complicated situation. But to begin with I would like to say a few lines from the famous soliloquy of William Shakespeare's play Hamlet. To be or not to be, that is the question. Whether it is nobler in the mind to suffer the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune or to take arms against a sea of troubles and by opposing, end them. With those lines, this phrase basically it is a classic example of existential questioning, exploring the fundamental human dilemma of choosing between life and death. And in this context, the situation at present is, if not life and death, but certainly it's a matter of Iran's existential situation as far as its nuclear program is concerned. Now, way back 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action negotiated by President Obama, and this was one of the best deals that the situation could have brought about. But unfortunately, this deal was criticized for its sunset clauses, sanctioned relief, failure to address Iran's ballistic missile program, and of course, the regional malign influence. Now, despite some of these critiques may be legitimate and they will believe that this was not something which was a fair deal and Iran probably got away with a few shots out there. But even then, I believe that JCPOA was one of the, even though there were some bad options there, I think it was one of the best that the situation could have come up with under the difficult circumstances, particularly when time was running short. And then following January 2016, the IAEA verified that Iran has been taking necessary steps, it has completed the necessary steps as far as the Iran nuclear deal was concerned, the verification processes that were involved, and also ensured that Iran's nuclear program is and remains peaceful. Now, before this agreement, Iran's breakout time, or the time it would have taken Iran to gather enough fissile material to build a weapon, which was only two to three months. Post-JCPOA, it was almost 12 months. And if the deal had continued, then if the treaty had continued, then Iran's nuclear program probably would have been sealed. But with the, you know, unprecedented monitoring that was going on and the access Iran had also provided, the sanctions also were in place, it was very clear that if Iran had violated any aspect of the JCPOA, then the snapback mechanism would be back in place. But as far as the JCPOA was concerned, it helped in shipping 25,000 pounds of enriched uranium out of the country. It dismantled and removed two-thirds of the centrifuges. It also removed the calandria from its heavy water reactor and filled it up with concrete. And it provided unprecedented access to the nuclear facilities and supply chain, which I believe were quite unprecedented in nature. Because Iran completed all these steps, the US and the international community, they were in a position to begin the next stage of the JCPOA, which means that the US would have begun lifting the nuclear-related sanctions on Iran. And even though maybe some of the US sanctions would have continued to remain in place, but it would have at least started the process of the sanctions getting lifted. 

And in 2015, as I pointed out, it was widely understood that Iran was still months away to months, in fact, years away from having a workable nuclear weapon. And in buying time, there was opportunity to use it to try to reach an agreement and then solve the problem once and for all with, you know, in a permanent manner. But today that option does not exist. Time no longer exists. Any deal, therefore, which is made now would have to be more stringent than what the JCPOA was like. Because Iran probably, with its 60% enriched uranium, which Sir also pointed out, it is now probably one or two weeks, as the reports are indicating, just one or two weeks away from having -- it has enough enriched uranium to fuel a nuclear bomb. And probably it also has the ability, as some of the reports have indicated, to fuel up five additional bombs. So to believe that Iran could be convinced to fundamentally change its position on the nuclear program and the sanctions related to them, and also agree to far more stringent restrictions on the JCPOA, such a result is highly unrealistic. So what is left? Probably a narrow agreement, which can be more risky and can do more harm. Not only that, it would, you know, like provide sanctions relief that is likely to bolster. I mean, if there is no other option and if the sanctions relief is taking place at all, it would bolster terrorist partners such as the Houthis and help reinvigorate a now-diminished Hezbollah, possibly. I'm not making any claims on that, but it can, the way these non-state actors act and conduct themselves, probably they can reinvigorate a diminished Hezbollah, all at the same time while Iran might be advancing its ballistic missile program. 

So moreover, as seen following the JCPOA, such a deal would also ensure that there is insufficient leverage under the circumstances. There would be insufficient leverage remaining for the United States and its allies to negotiate over these broader challenges and little interest in, you know, Iranian interest also in responding to that. So how much leverage can be imposed on issues of terrorism and ballistic missiles? These may not be existential threats for regional allies, especially Israel. In the same way, a nuclear-armed Iran would be. But these are also issues which are of pertinent interest because they have been the root cause of conflict, of death, of destruction in the Middle East over the last three decades. In fact, maybe more than that. So viewing them as less important is not the issue, or if you have to believe that, okay, nuclear issue is more important and these issues can be relegated back, probably that is not the right approach because they are also important issues. So the big question now, to be or not to be? 

Amidst all this, there is a lot of confusion which Sir also pointed out, that there have been this flip-flop that is going on with Witkoff's statement, even though White House described, in the April 12th statement, White House described the talks as very positive and constructive. The foreign minister, Iranian foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, he also pointed out that constructive meeting has been held in a very peaceful and respectful environment. No appropriate language was used. And then Witkoff comes and says that probably, you know, Iran might have to dismantle its-- it has to go through the verification of the nuclear program, stopping short of calling for Tehran to dismantle it altogether. But at the same time also pointed out that Iranians, they could be, you know, continue enriching uranium to the level of 3.67%, which is needed actually for a civilian nuclear program. And this was also there as part of the JCPOA, the plan of action. Now, adding a different facet, the Israeli prime minister, of course, as Sir also has pointed out already that they will not halt anything. They will not stop short of anything short than a Libyan style agreement. Now, post that statement, Witkoff's statement comes again that, no, this has to be completely, you know, there has to be total elimination of Iran's ability to enrich uranium, and of course the fuel that is needed for a nuclear weapon. So there is a lot of flip-flop there, and amidst this conflicting statements, I don't know, by the way, Witkoff's statement, should that be regarded. So given the, he's a real estate, you know, he's a businessman after all, whether we should take his statements seriously or not, but of course he's the envoy to the Middle East, but one can ponder on that. But at the same time, there are certain points of convergences. There is a shared opposition to the Iranian bomb, both the Trump administration as well as Khomeini, the Supreme Ayatollah, he has, both of them agree that they do not, they have a shared opposition to the Iranian bomb, they don't see it in their interest to have, to pursue a nuclear weapons program. They also believe that war is not a desirable option out here, neither for Iran nor for the United States. They are not seeking a war, it's not in their interest, and there are larger implications for that. 

On the possibility of regime change, I don't think that's a feasible option given America's interest at home and abroad. I don't think this is a rational choice that, and pretty reckless in nature, and I don't think US would be going for that. Besides, it would also impair any conducive environment for dialogue under the current circumstances, and there are economic interests as well. In fact, the foreign minister in his speech at the, which he was supposed to deliver at the Carnegie Nuclear Conference, which of course is now available in the X of course, X platform, that Iran itself can offer a trillion dollar opportunity in terms of the nuclear industry market to the United States. It plans to build up 19 nuclear reactors, it has at present only the Bushehr nuclear reactor which is working, but they plan to bring up 19 more reactors. So that would, that alone can revitalize the struggling US nuclear industry according to Aragchi. And then, of course, both agree to give diplomacy and dialogue a chance. So you know, both are investing, Iran and the United States, they have clear preference for dialogue and diplomacy over any kind of confrontation, and I believe the technical discussions which were supposed to be held today, but they are now scheduled for, they have been postponed for April 26th. So diplomacy is, these are the points of convergence as far as Iran and United States as I see. So there's a lot of room that is being created for the negotiations to take place in the right way. 

Now, on the other hand, as I see, what are the leverages out here? For Iran, I think threats or this pressure, this idea of putting maximalist pressure on Iran, I don't think this is going to work anymore because Iran has been able to prove to the United States the power of its deterrence. Trump knows that it can start, it knows the way how to start a war with Iran, but its continuation and the end, that is certainly not under the control of the United States. And I'm sure, United States, the Trump administration is quite aware that this will suffer, the administration will suffer. So, and this is a multipolar world where again, it is also characterized by a polyphonic era where global actors, they have their voices out. So Iran is also a voice out here. And I think this has to be taken into consideration. As far as Iran's deterrence is concerned, I think it has proved it very well that the deterrence is still in its favour. Why? Because despite the repeated attacks that have been made by Israel, whether be it in Parchin, whether be it in Isfahan, it was only in and around. I mean, like not in, but rather around these, the air defence system around Isfahan, around Parchin, but not what these air defence system are actually guarding as in the nuclear facilities. So my point that I'm trying to make is that Israel, even though as it wanted to strike on the nuclear facilities, Iran's nuclear facilities, it did not. And more so United States also, sort of asked it to restrain itself from hitting, making any direct hit on Iran's nuclear facilities. What I see interesting out here is that Iran's attack on Israel, I think on April 13, it accepted responsibility. You know, there was no plausible deniability. It hit and it accepted responsibility. As far as Israel is concerned, it hit on Iran's soil. But it was a bit short of accepting the responsibility, as in there was an element of deniability there. 

But on the other hand, Iran, by accepting responsibility, it has rather pushed up through the escalation ladder, as I see. So Iran is willing to take that risk, is willing to push that escalation higher. And in this case, Iran has made no commitment in the sense that Israel has done, that it wants Iran's nuclear weapons program, its nascent nuclear program to be hit and eliminated. It has not set any kind of red lines as such. So even with the hits that it has made, Israel has made, it has not really attacked Iran's nuclear facilities. So there is a commitment. It was like a red line that was set, but it was not able to fulfil that red line. So there is a commitment trap, I believe, that Israel has put itself into. And US does not want to get into this. Neither does the GCC countries, because as Sir pointed out, the Strait of Hormuz, that is the tap which feeds the world with oil. You turn off that tap, and we know the consequences. So then what's on the table? I believe that there are dialogue and diplomacy, of course, which has to be given precedence, which should be given precedence. But on the other hand, if any kind of maximalist pressure is imposed on Iran, then it has several other options, one being escalation itself. And this escalation, it can be a very tricky one. Like, for example, withdrawal from the NPT. It's a signatory of the NPT. It can withdraw from the NPT, which is a sovereign right under Article 10 of the NPT text itself, which permits any signatory under if there is any extraordinary circumstances where its supreme national interests are endangered, then it is within their sovereign right to withdraw from the treaty. And withdrawing from the NPT is certainly not tantamount to building the bomb. So it is your sovereign right. You can withdraw from the treaty. You can come out of the tent and then go ahead with your program. But then that's an option. Withdrawal from the treaty does not mean that it is necessarily engaged in building the bomb. But then one would also have to factor the idea that if that so happens, then the probability of Iran becoming the 10th atomic state remains open. So, what I started with, to be or not to be, in this case, Iran's nuclear program, probably to be. Thank you so much for your attention. 

DP Srivastava: Mr Omid, can you hear me? 

Omid Babelian:  Hello, can you hear me? 

DP Srivastava:  Yes, yes, please go ahead. We are running short of time, but you are welcome. 

Omid Babelian: I hear very well. I randomly hear some lines of Shakespeare. Am I right, to be or not to be? 

DP Srivastava: Yes, please go ahead. 

Omid Babelian: Yes, yes. To be or not to be, that's the question, that's the temptation. So, I want, about what happened yesterday, and I want to offer condolences. Because the time is short, I just quickly start. I will share a simple example to explain Iran's view on what's happening. I am in a country called Syria. Now it's good? The voice is good? 

DP Srivastava:  The signal is breaking, but please go ahead. 

Omid Babelian:  Culture and the context. About Assad, actually, you know, there are many wrong assumptions about this common goal. But they often confuse. Usually, kind of, you know, from outside, not within. For many years, analysts said every conflict in West Asia is between China and Syria. That's not true. Look at what's happening in Gaza. Iran and Hezbollah supported ownership. The issue is not sectarian, it's about rejection and resistance. Another example was Iran is anti-Jewish. 

DP Srivastava:  Can you just switch on? If you switch off the video, just the audio. Can you switch off your video? Please go ahead. 

Omid Babelian:  Please come and visit Iran. We have a lot of Jewish people in Iran. I am from Iran. I have a lot of Jewish friends. There are members in parliament. And it's not what is happening in West Asia. You know that Iran's even official proposal for a referendum in Palestine is not about religion. It's about choice versus occupation. Now a new narrative says, I'm talking about this kind of assumption. But now a new narrative says that this is Iran versus Israel. That too is misleading. The real issue is occupation by Israel, double standards, and disregard for international law. Israel is not even in NPT. Yet no one talks about that. And they commit war crimes openly with no accountability. We have studied in Political Science 101 that war is the exception and peace is the rule. But today, war has become the rule, and that is dangerous. They say, for example, Iran is the source of destabilization in the region. But let me say this. From 1948 to 1979, Israel was involved in wars or military operations in 1948, in 1950, in 1956, in 1967, again 1967, 1972, 1973, 1976, and 1978, not counting numerous targeted killing and ex-territorial illegal operations. So here I think there is a kind of Hegelian articulation about what is happening. He says that evil resides in the very gaze that perceives evil all around itself. And now they started to say that Iran is weak because its proxies are weak. But let me be clear. Iran doesn't have proxies. These are independent, organic resistance movements born from pain and injustice. They actually, many of them, they were before Islamic Republic of Iran. And when Iran also was attacked, the embassy targeted the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, Iran tried to respond in a kind of measured way. Our respond was measured because we want a kind of ceasefire in Gaza. Iran is not a reactive actor. Iran is one of the oldest continuous civilization in the world. And let me say this, we are a master of survival. If there is ever a war forced upon us, Iran will not back down. But Iran is wise enough to know when to act and how. As many of you know from very culture, which is in both our nations, war is not a kind of sacred or holy. Peace, Rita, the cosmic order is holy, is sacred. In Iran, we call this Rita, we call this cosmic order Asha, which is then changed and transformed to the concept of God. Both our civilization, I mean India and Iran, values harmony, justice, and balance. In our ancient Persian epic, the Shahnameh by Ferdowsi, wisdom and peace are noble virtues. But defensive war, I mean defensive war, is sacred and holy. We fought eight years against the invasion of Saddam, Saddam who were supported by Western and Arabs. Yet we didn't lose a single inch of our land. Back then, back then we were a young republic, actually. But today we are stronger and more experienced. This assumption also related to something that I want to talk about, culture and context. Unfortunately, if you now go and see, for example, many European curriculum, it's all about negotiation, art of negotiation, conflict management, but it's not about history. For many of them, they even don't know what is happening in West Asia. What are the narratives, what are the narration? The problem here, again, is they can't understand the context. And without context, people believe shallow headlines. Previous assumption failed, and today's story will also fail because they ignore the internal, local, and organic dynamic of this region. Resistance is not created by Iran. It is a deep, meaningful cause built from dignity and pain. Iran's influence is not artificial also. It comes from its history, culture, and civilization. We want a stable and peaceful region, but peace must be just. 

Israel has spread the lie that this is a personal conflict with Iran. No. It is a global issue of justice, freedom, and self-determination. And until the world sees that, the region will not heal. Now I want to talk about the ballyhoo. The topic is, ignore the noise, stir the right pot. You know, in India, there is an old story from Panchatantra, a clever set of animal tales with deep wisdom. In one of them, a group of animals argue over who gets to rule the jungle. But while they fight, a hunter arrives and captures them all. Why? Because they were too busy fighting among themselves to see the real danger. This story feels familiar to our region. There is so much noise, so much ballyhoo, that we sometimes forget to focus on what really matters. Diplomacy, like cooking, requires attention, timing, and ignoring the distraction around you. Let me share with you how Iran sees this part of the puzzle. The first one is, there are the motto, be indifferent to the ballyhoo. There's always someone shouting, always someone trying to distract. Every time Iran and US try to de-escalate, suddenly there is a breaking news, big headline, accusation, someone trying to raise the heat and burn the dish. What Iran has learned, we've been around for thousands of years. We know how to ignore the smoke and focus on the flame. As Lord Krishna also said in Bhagavad Gita, a person who is not disturbed by the inflow of desire, that enters like rivers into the ocean, can achieve peace. That's Iran's approach. Ignore the noise, stay calm, focus on peace, not pressure. The second one is, believe in balanced diplomacy. You can't make good biryani if all you add is a spice and no rice. Balance is everything. The same is true in diplomacy. Iran believes in dialogue, but not from a place of weakness. We want fair, respectful conversation. We've shown our commitment. Look at JCPOA. We kept our part. Others didn't. Balance means mutual respect, not lecture. It means equal rights, not demands. And like the Indian saying goes, give respect, take respect. That's our motto, too. 

The third one is, build, not break. Let me be clear. Iran is a builder and wants to be a builder. Iran wants to focus on corridor, north-south corridor, Chabahar port and this kind of thing. We are building infrastructure, clean energy, medicine, university. Our nuclear program is about science, not war. Just like Ayurveda, where balance leads to health, our energy program is meant to support life, not destroy it. We want for our people, not weapons for fear. Actually, our ancient prophet Zarathustra said, good thoughts, good words, good deeds. That's the plan of Iranian culture. Our goal is creation, not destruction. The fourth one, ban the bomb. Iran has always opposed nuclear, not just politically, but morally, spiritually. We are also the only country on the planet that officially opposed nuclear arms on moral and religious grounds, through a religious edict by a super-leader outlining such a thing. I also remember about two months ago, I was in Raisina. I'm one of the alumni of Raisina. We had dinner with Dr Jaishankar. Some guy actually asked Dr Jaishankar about Iranian nuclear program and Dr Jaishankar, I think, perfectly answered the question and guided that person to go and study about the literature of proliferation in the 1970s and in the 1980s. At that time, all the literature was that soon Argentina, Brazil, Japan, and Germany will go for the atomic bomb. But ironically, they didn't go for the bomb. So, I think that it's important to also go back and try to understand that kind of literature, too. That was, again, a kind of fashion trend at that time. There's also Sanskrit saying that ahimsa paramo dharma, non-violence is the highest duty. Iran agrees also. That is why we fight against war and we speak for peace. You can reread the region again and see what is happening. And now, Iran, for example, is not in Syria. Yes. Now, see what is happening there. A kind of occupation happening in some cities. And yes, we will always defend our country. But nuclear bomb, that's not who we are. It never was. Iran has also long been a steadfast advocate for the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zone. More recently, a zone-free weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. In fact, Iran first proposed this idea, along with Egypt, back in 1974. 

The fifth one, break the double standard. In Persian carpet weaving, every colour, every strand has its place. If one gets more attention than the other, the whole pattern falls apart. Utilizing balance, each knot treated with equal care, each line respected. But in today's diplomacy, that balance is broken. The occupying regime in Palestine holds hidden arsenals and faces no question. Iran, with nuclear weapon, is constantly watched, blamed, and burdened with sanctions. This is injustice. It's tangled weave. And when the pattern is unfair, the whole carpet loses its harmony. Justice means equal threads, or there's no tapestry at all. This is not justice. It's double standard. And double standard are the poison in the global kitchen. Let's be honest. Rules must apply equally to all, or the whole system breaks down. 

Final word, a taste for peace. At the end of the day, Iran doesn't want to cook up a temporary peace. We want to create a long-lasting dish, something nourishing, something sustainable. But as any chef will tell you, there are some ingredients we won't compromise on, our dignity, our sovereignty, and our security. Iran is a civilization that survives empire, from the Greek to the Mughals, from colonial power to modern pressure. We are still here. We are not just surviving. We are thinking, building, healing, and resisting, because we believe in a better region, a better future. So just like you can’t erase the taste of saffron from a good Indian dish, you can't remove Iran's role from its determination and dignity. 

DP Srivastava:  Thank you, Mr Omid. I think we have exceeded the time. May I request Mr. Atul Aneja to give his views. 

Atul Aneja: Thank you, Nutan ma'am, for inviting me here and team ICWA. Always a pleasure to be here. I would start by saying, in fact, by sticking my neck out and say that a war between, or a US-Israel war with Iran is highly unlikely. And over the next few minutes, I'd like to explain why I think so. The reason why I think that this war is going to be unlikely is for two reasons. One, that Israel alone does not have the capacity to bomb Iran's nuclear facilities. They are spread out all over the country. You have, for example, Natanz and Fordow, for example, about 40 meters deep. I mean, your centrifuges and other enrichment processes are taking place there. And Israel does not have, unless the US supplies it to them, does not have the bunker bombs, 3,000 pound bombs with them to do the job. And second thing is that if you do have the bombs, then you need delivery systems. And that would essentially mean access to B-2 stealth fighters. So far, the United States has refrained from providing that to Israel. Although it's important to understand that six B-2 stealth fighters, bombers have been positioned in Diego Garcia by the United States. So there is certain capability created by the United States. But my point was that Israel alone does not have the capacity to do the job. There was a report in The New York Times saying that Netanyahu actually in May wanted a joint operation of special forces from Israel landing in the nuclear sites in Iran and simultaneously a bombing campaign as well with the support of the United States. But obviously, the United States was not willing to go ahead with that. The Israelis then wanted only an air campaign, but the Israelis themselves realized that that is possible only not before October, and that too with US support. 

So my point I'm making is that Israel alone will not be able to bomb the highly dispersed nuclear facilities in Iran. In fact, the enriched uranium to 60%. You see, you'll need 90% enrichment for a bomb. But 60%, you're getting closer. But that has been concealed all across the country. So I'm not even sure whether Israel has the intelligence, despite all what has been said about the Mossad, of exact locations of where this enriched fuel is sort of located. The question arises that this is possible. Israeli attack is possible if the US joins. And that's the pivotal question. Are the Americans willing to join? There has been clearly a division within the US administration. You have Tulsi Gabbard, because Tulsi Gabbard apparently, and I'm talking of reports which have come in, she is the head of the National Intelligence, that in case there is an attack on Iran, it can spread into a regional war, spreading into the Gulf countries. And that, therefore, should be refrained from. Pete Hegseth is opposed to it. JD Vance is opposed to it. But you have the National Security Advisor for it and the head of the Central Command for it. So it's clearly a divided opinion. But Trump took the call of giving peace a chance, dialogue a chance. And frankly, Israel was not even informed that such a decision has been taken. Till the time, Netanyahu was actually there in the Oval Office. And he was surprised when President Trump announced that a dialogue between Iran and the US has started, or they intend to start the dialogue in Oman and give that a chance. There are reasons why the US would not want a war with Iran. I think the primary objective of the Trump administration, of President Trump himself, is internal, which is MAGA, Make America Great Again. And everything is factored around that. The Americans have realized that this multipolar world, as Dr Reshmi was mentioning, has arrived. And there are new centres which are of primary importance to the Americans. Those centres, unfortunately, for the Europeans, are not Europe, but moving more into Gulf countries. It's not surprising, therefore, that President Trump, when he takes his first visit abroad, he goes for the funeral of Pope Francis, but the real visit is to the region. And the three countries he's visiting starts with Saudi Arabia, and then it's Qatar, and then it is UAE. So from the American MAGA standpoint, it is these countries which probably become more important than Europe. Why? Because they are the source of capital. They are a source of funding for investments to the United States. So the American economy has to revive. There has to be a financial flow which has to come, which is these countries which can provide the financial flow, not the Europeans. 

Second, as Ambassador Srivastava had said, oil. Although America has its own oil, it wants to control oil prices, and therefore would like to join that kind of cartelization, which we saw just before COVID, actually, which was OPEC Plus, which included Russia and the United States joining OPEC countries. And these stable prices of oil are also very important for America's own economic revival. And so keeping the Gulf on its side, is exceptionally important. But if there's a war, if Israel attacks Iran, these plans go for a six, because it's very hard for the Gulf countries then to go ahead with the Abraham Accords 2.0. There's a legacy issue here, because Trump in his first avatar was responsible for forging the Abraham Accords, which got Israel together with UAE, with Bahrain, with Sudan, and one more country. Saudis, of course, were not there, and that would be the prize now. So if you're going to have Abraham Accords expanded, which Trump would want, then you won't want a war in that direction. That does not mean that you sacrifice Israel. You are entrusting Israel security, because there is a very strong domestic Jewish lobby inside the United States, which Trump can't ignore. But he can come to a compromise, and that compromise probably is working out in the dialogue which is taking place in Oman, Rome, and which is extended dialogue. Of course, from the US standpoint, Iran can't have a bomb. Iran probably doesn't intend to have a bomb, but it can't have a bomb, which means that enrichment can't exceed what was there in JCPOA, which is 3.67%. There is a pressure tactics, I think, which is going on, and people are talking with a folk tongue that there has to be a complete, I mean, there has been zero enrichment from the Iranian side. That's probably not going to work, but I think the Americans will be okay with 3.67%. These signals which are coming from Iran, when they talk about that there is some progress in the dialogue, and it's a positive dialogue going on, probably revolves around this, because otherwise, if it's zero, then the point which was being made that what is the credibility of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty of which Iran is a part? And obviously, the Americans would not want Iran to walk out of the NPT. So enrichment has to be allowed, but how much? The second thing, what about the stockpile of enriched uranium up to 60 percent? Where does that go? That will be, I'm sure, a part of the dialogue which will take place, and that's probably where the Russians are coming in, because there is some chatter about shifting that material into Russia, and so that sort of gets looked after. And then you have very intrusive inspections which go on. I think this is a line which the Trump administration, preserving its larger geopolitical interests in the Gulf region, would be able to sell in to the Jewish lobby which is not exactly what Netanyahu wants, but at least secures Israel from a nuclear strike in the future from the Iranian side. So I think that's a workable position which might come through. 

The third point is Iran. And there are two extremes here. One is Iran and another is Israel. You see, you have in Israel the Mizrahi Jewish community, which is an extremely hard line, which believes in messianism ideologically, that the Messiah, the redemption will come only if there is a greater Israel. And you had the Yinon plan, which is actually a plan of expanding Israel into greater Israel, occupying large parts of West Asia. I do not think that the Trump administration is going to allow those extremists to go through on this side, because that doesn't serve America's own larger, make America great again, interest. In Iran, again, you have various factions to see Iran topic, without being factions, I think is being unrealistic. I mean, they do reconcile with each other, but there are factions. If you look at the extreme 12-year school principalists, as they call, I mean, I think they would go with the extremely hard line position, which is usually very ideological. Then there is the so-called reformists like Khatami or Rouhani and people like that would probably go to the other extreme. But I think that there is sufficient realization in Iran that the axis of resistance is frankly, virtually finished. I mean, the Hezbollah has been decimated. There's been regime change in Syria. Houthis are under great pressure. In fact, there is a demonstration by the Americans of bombing the Houthis to show what might come on Iran. So Iran is clearly under pressure at this time, and would want a deal to come through, even in the contest which we've had between Iran and Israel. I mean, it's a fact that Iran could attack the Nevatim airbase, etc. But there was also the missile defences of Israel and Americans together worked, and you could not get too many missiles through. So in terms of Iran having a deterrence, I doubt. So the pragmatic Iranians who would think far and think long would probably at this particular juncture willing for an honourable compromise. And that would be enrichment, limited amount of enrichment. But I think the bigger question which will come in is, and the Americans would put a pressure on the Iranians on that, that you can't revive the axis of resistance again. It can't be, you know, going back to the drawing room of what you had been doing for a very, very long time. Which means, and that's where I think the Russians and the Chinese are going to come in, the dialogue is going to move in this direction that it's okay for Iran to pivot more towards Russia, towards the BRICS countries, towards China, towards Central Asia, Tajikistan, that geography is fine. And look more at the economic track and the geo-economic track. I think nobody's going to object if Iran agrees to pivot in this direction, to be one of the most prosperous countries in the region. And in fact, ancient civilization, which is a fantastic future. But that's something a decision, I'm not sure whether the Iranians would be able to willing to take, given the faction feuds inside Iraq. So that's a call which is not there right now. But I think, given the pragmatism within Iran, who played the long game, which I fully agree, may agree to this kind of a position. And for the Americans, Russians are going to be one of the allies, frankly, what's happening in the Ukraine talks. It's very clear that, you know, if Russia trumps, then Putin and Trump together, the rest of the Europeans on the other side, may come to an agreement that, okay, if it comes to Iran, let it move in the direction of Eurasia, rather than move in the direction of the Middle East. This is one scenario, which I've talked about. There could be, anything can go wrong in this. But I think, given the overall shift, in the Trump administration, which is not just a change of government, I think there is a conservative revolution, which Trump has started. And it is except it is old rules of the game are gone. The Atlantic allies is on death row, as I can see, and new players are coming up. So we are entirely in a new world with new allies, and force coming in. And we are in the multipolar era, perhaps, and Marco Rubio has agreed, and said that in a statement that, you know, the unipolar world, which came into existence, after the collapse of Soviet Union was an artificial creation, and we have to agree and accept to a multipolar world. In fact, he went to the extent of calling China, he said, nobody will be able to stop China. So in the end, this is a situation, a fluid situation. We are moving in the direction of multipolarity, but even the Americans are not looking in terms of unipolar mindsets, or in terms of Cold War mindsets. So there are opportunities here, but we are right in the middle of it, we are in deep flux. But I do believe that it is not in the Americans interest, given their own domestic priorities, to go in for a war. And because of that larger strategic objective, it is quite unlikely that they would allow Israel to go ahead and attack Iran. I'll stop here. Thank you very much. 

DP Srivastava:  We have had a very rich discussion, and if I can just sum up in three or four sentences, the Iranian viewpoint, as IPIS representative mentioned, Iran is opposed to nuclear weapon, but it wants an agreement with dignity and security and respect for its interests. As Professor Kazi mentioned, there does not seem to be any prospect of regime change, nor is it possible for either side to go to war. And as Mr Atul Aneja mentioned, President Trump's policy priorities are basically driven by his domestic agenda, and he is not willing to sacrifice it for the sake of, you know, for Israel. And I'm glad that you mentioned, you brought this out, that Prime Minister Netanyahu who had come to Oval Office looking for some tariff concession, and suddenly he was told that US is going ahead with discussions with Iran. So let me throw open the floor for comments and questions. Please identify yourself and keep your questions short, because we are well behind time. 

Counsellor, Embassy of Iraq, New Delhi:  In the beginning, thank you so much for the invitation. I'm Counsellor, Deputy of the Head of the Mission of the Embassy of Iraq. I just want to highlight a few points. At the beginning, I want to express some of my... 

DP Srivastava: Just one minute. Please. You have to sum it up in one minute.

OD Counsellor, Embassy of Iraq, New Delhi: Okay. I'm trying my best. I express my deep condolences against this, today terrorist attack against civilians in Kashmir. Let me start about this of today. How do we explain that the mediator was sent to Iran, Saudi mediator, was a military defence minister, not a foreign service minister? And as all of you know, that most of the mediator must be civilians. This is first. Of course, it's sending a message, of course. Second, Iraq in 2003 was destroyed by the United States and its allies under the fake, false accusation of having weapons of mass destruction. Third, why did the international society allowed Pakistan and India since independence to have the weapons of mass destruction, both sides, and they are not big powers, just for a purpose of nuclear deterrence, of course. Here, I don't want to defend on my neighbours, Iran, but Iran on their land, declaring that their program is only for civil purpose. At the same side, if they are right or lying, with respect. At the same side, why is Israel killing, occupying a state of Palestine, killing the people of Palestine, declaring and all the world now that Israel has the biggest storage of weapons of mass destruction? Where is the Security Council? Last sentence, where is the Security Council? Did the Security Council authorize America or Israel to behave in this aspect? Last point, that America is paving the way to Israel to extend? Thank you so much.

DP Srivastava:  Let me just respond briefly. Of the points you made, only the first one was a question, the rest were all comments. And it will take a separate session. So let me just respond to that question with my limited understanding. I have served also in Saudi Arabia, that in Saudi system, hierarchy is decided by, you know, your closeness to the ruling family. And I think the defence minister ranks higher. So that is one possibility. And the major Saudi interest is in security. It's not playing the mediatory role. So they needed the defence minister to come to visit and a defence minister who ranks higher in their family hierarchy than the foreign minister. 

Unidentified Speaker:  You pointed out in your comments that the situation in Middle East, it's not as bad as it's been for a year and a half. Well, then what about when the Arab Spring took place? In the name of Arab Spring, Arab Winter, number one. Number two, as this gentleman, he rightly pointed out, Iraq, President Bush, he talked about attacking Iraq because of suspicious weapons of mass destruction. They were not found there. And then the talks which are going on right now, they're not US, they're more Trump talks on the issue of Iran. They've begun since Trump came to power. And he said either negotiate or face the consequences. So there's no guarantee how can Iran trust Trump. It may go the same way, Trump-US, the way it went regarding Iraq. And the third point is a light one regarding the Iranian gentleman who said about Irani saffron, Persian carpets. The other thing which the Iranians cast, the shaami kebab for those who are non-vegetarian. No food, non-vegetarian food is complete without Iranian food. That's the taste test. 

DP Srivastava:  Madam, I come from Lucknow and my language is Urdu. But let me just start with a point of dispute. I think the best food is in Lucknow. Not Persian. Persian food is bland. But we'll discuss that separately about the food. But you know, let me clarify what I had mentioned was, I think, slightly different from what you summed up. I said that situation now is much worse than what it was earlier. And which requires unloading the tensions. 

Arshad:  Thank you, sir. My name is Arshad. I am research fellow at the Council. As we witnessed the steep decline of Iran's influence in the region, particularly with the collapse of the Assad regime and the weakening of the Hezbollah, Hamas, and Houthis influence, my question is what kind of second line of support Iran can cultivate in the region with the help of the countries in the region? Thank you, sir. 

DP Srivastava: Would you like to take this question? Okay, please. Go ahead. 

Atul Aneja: Yeah, so I agree with you that Iran has been weakened after what happened in October, the attacks in Israel. And there's been a systematic, you know, all the pillars of Iranian influence have been, I would say, virtually decimated, but definitely substantially weakened. So I don't think right now Iran is in a position of really thinking of revival of a new line. As I said, probably Iran would be encouraged to look at a different geography in the future. The Russians come in here, I think, are very, very important. The treaty, which has been of strategic partnership signed with Russia, is very, very important here to give Iran a value of deterrence, because without that, I think they're substantially weakened. So they're not, I think, right now in the moment of revival of what has happened. They've absorbed the shock. I think it's going to take a while before Iran bounces back, which I think it will, before you start thinking of at least having the Shia axis with you and go in that direction later, not right now. 

Anurag: Anurag from Symbiosis School of International Studies, and my area is Russia, Iran, and foreign policy nexus. My question to you is that Iran, its sole concept post-1979 is preserving the Vilayat-e-Faqih ideology. So we also know that your Ayatollah is late in the 80s. So could it be the thing that Iran, for the time being, is following its survivability tactics in international politics, which is to find a successor, successing Ayatollah, and for the time being, keeping a low profile for that. The moment they found it, the network is still there. Like, the axis of resistance is still there, because in their foreign policy, axis of resistance means that the war should be kept at bay, away from Iran, which couldn't happen, because Ismail Haniyeh was obviously killed in Iran itself. So for the time being, satisfy the ego of Trump to get the deal and all. 

DP Srivastava: Is this your question or your comment? 

Anurag: Question, question. 

DP Srivastava:  No, no, this is your question. Please come to your question. 

Anurag: The question is that this survivability thing, can it revive again? And Iran coming to, again, this axis of resistance thing and putting pressure on Israel? 

Reshmi Kazi: I don't think it's as simplistic as that, because I mean, at the outset, it's very clear that Iran is giving peace and diplomacy a chance. And to say that Iran is buying time because it has to, you know, it's looking for its own successor. Well, when Iran's leading nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, he was assassinated. Iran's parliament passed a new law directing the government, you know, to rapidly advance its nuclear program and reduce international monitoring. So you cannot really, I mean, we cannot come to the point that, okay, Iran is trying to put things at bay because when it push comes to shove, and Iran has made it very clear, no maximalist pressure is going to work out there. That way Iran's position has been absolutely clear. And in fact, if you are following Iranian daily, particularly Irna, I mean, the kind of opinion pieces that are coming up, they stated very clearly that, you know, we are, if we are pushed to the corner, we will be, we are able to defend ourselves. So I don't think it's as simplistic as, you know, they are trying to buy out some time in this regard. They can react, if they are pushed into any uncomfortable or, as they have said, something which is not an equal footing or disrespectful. 

DP Srivastava: Yes. After this, we, one more, one more question, and then I think we have to wind up. 

Aishwarya Upreti: Good evening, sir. I am Aishwarya Upreti. I am a research intern here at ICWA. Sir, my question is that if this US-Iran deal, nuclear deal, is successful, what opportunities can it bring for India? 

DP Srivastava:  Well, you know, you must have heard of Chabahar, I had the privilege of negotiating Indian participation in Chabahar project, and that progress has been slow because of the sanctions. The second is INSTC, International North-South Transit Corridor. Indian exports to Central Asia is about 2.67 billion dollars, and their global import basket is 67 billion dollars. Minuscule share is because we don't have proximity, you know, going around half the world through China westward into Central Asia or through Russia eastward into Central Asia is prohibitively costly. So, both these things will be easier to address in case, you know, the sanctions against Iran are eased. Last question. 

Varshita: Good afternoon. My name is Varshita. So, Atul sir, my question is, will the presence of USA reduce in Middle East and China increase? And do you think the China-Iran and Russia trilateral cooperation make a difference in the Middle East? To Reshmi ma'am and Omid sir, if you're still online. Last question. Would you think that the women of South Asia should learn from the women life freedom movement of Iran? 

DP Srivastava: Well I think it's a loaded question but let me just make one comment before I give the floor to my colleague. The women, you know, there was earlier a comment about Vilayat-e-faqih, I don't know how many people in India know that the level of tertiary education in Iran is higher than India and the level of women's education. 

Reshmi Kazi: Yeah, I think that sums up a lot as the chair has said what we witnessed in Iran in terms of the you know the resistance the protest that came up and in Jamia this was there's a lot of work which is going on you know in this regard. Anything which is meant to empower women whether be it in Iran or you know any part in South Asia, I think it is contagious in a positive way and we should be imbibing that we should be also supportive but of course there are certain parameters one has to adhere to but as I said women empowerment anything which is you know like championing our cause that should be always celebrated. 

Atul Aneja: Yes, okay you know regarding China, Iran, Russia, I think you know the problem which I'm facing now is that we're looking at in old geopolitical contestations the way the multipolar world is evolving is the pattern is not so clear-cut that you'll have the US, Israel, gulf on one side and it's sort of one alliance versus China, Iran, Russia that all is changing. So I think we got to start looking and deeply at transitioning multipolarity where you are probably going to have Russia and the US on one side and probably the Russians being mediators between the Chinese and the Americans and Iranians being accommodated if these talks go through. So I think we sort of need to realign and reboot our mindsets here because this is not the unipolar era, this is not bipolar era where Soviet Union and the United States were the two poles. We have new poles which have come in of civilizational states which are sort of beginning a dialogue with each other. The Americans also know this as I said Rubio himself has come out with a statement on multipolarity. So I think our mindset of rigid alliances was one alliance versus other needs to change. I mean, if you get the spirit of that, then probably you may not look at China, Iran, Russia as an axis on one side vis-a-vis the West. Thank you. 

DP Srivastava: Let me just wind it up. Let me add one point to the comment Mr Aneja made about this China, Iran, Russia axis or triangle, whatever you call it. This misses the point that China has much larger interest on the other side of the Gulf in Saudi Arabia. It buys much more crude from Saudi Arabia, I think three times than it does from Iran. And it is not going to sacrifice that interest. And in case of Russia, there's, you know, politically, they may be on the same side. But economically, there's no complementarity. Because Iran is an oil exporter, Russia is a much bigger oil exporter, and it also has gas. So there's no complementarity. So this triangular equation is overblown by people who do not really understand the ground realities. Now, let me try and sum up, it's a challenge, you know, we are running behind the clock. But if Madam, I may mention, the happy outcome is that there is a convergence between what Iran wants, and what US under Trump administration want. Iran has said it does not want nuclear weapons. As the IPIS representative pointed out, it's one of the few countries which have actually taken a moral, religious position and Supreme Leader has given a fatwa, US does not want Iran to have nuclear weapon. So on the policy issue, the positions can converge. So what remains is tying up the nuts and bolts, which is a job of the negotiators. And there are some very capable people on both sides, I had the privilege of knowing Mr Araghchi, and I'm sure the US team also is very experienced. The issues will be on one side, the enrichment level, which second will be the verification mechanism, perhaps the Americans will want a longer lasting mechanism on ground. And third is the duration of the agreement, they would, instead of an 8 year or 10 year, they would like this to have a longer thing. And in case, on the Iranian side, their expectation will be lifting of sanctions. 

Now, there are two parts. After JCPOA, US lifted secondary sanctions which allowed third countries to do business with Iran. But US did not lift US sanctions on American companies doing business with Iran. So, that left a degree of tentativeness. My discussions with my Iranian colleagues, they were quite keen that this should also be lifted. And this would have removed an uncertainty. We faced a lot of problems in clearing our dues. They were large dues. We owed up to Iran and it took some time because the banks were scared. And they were scared because the American sanctions were not quite lifted. So, this time around, if Iran is expected to make larger sacrifice, last time their enrichment level was around 20%, this time 60%. If they have to come down from 60% to 3.67%, they will not accept 0%. They will also expect that the sanction relief should be real. Because last time, it was very tenuous. And in fact, once the US pulled out, the Europeans also did not. They created a mechanism but it remained on paper. So, these are very substantive issues. But the overall matrix, I think, there is a convergence on both sides. And it is in the interest of everyone, including Israel, to have this agreement. Because the last round of exchanges has shown that Middle East airspace is contested airspace. And if the delivery systems are married with something more than conventional weapons, that will be dangerous for both sides. So, I think it is in the interest of all sides that this round of negotiations succeed. Thank you. 

Lakshmi Priya: This brings us to the conclusion of our panel discussion today. As you are all aware, His Holiness Pope Francis, Supreme Pontiff of the Holy See, passed away on 21st April 2025. As a mark of respect to the departed dignitary, state mourning is being observed throughout India. Consequently, there will be no refreshments today and we thank you for your understanding. For updates on our research papers and programs, please visit our X or formerly Twitter handle, Facebook and LinkedIn accounts and our website. Thank you everyone. Have a great evening.

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List of Participants in the Discussion

1. Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, Additional Secretary, ICWA
2. Amb. DP Srivastava, Former Ambassadsor of India to Iran: Chair
3. Prof. Reshmi Kazi, Department of Political Science, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi
4. Dr. Omid Babelian, Research Fellow, Institute for Political and International Studies, Tehran (Online)
5. Mr. Atul Taneja, Strategic Analyst, Former Strategic Affairs Editor, The Hindu, New Delhi
6. Dr. Lakshmi Priya, Research Fellow, ICWA