Indian Council of World Affairs

Introduction 

The first “Italia-Africa: A Bridge for Common Growth” Summit was held in Rome on 28–29 January 2024.[i] It saw the formal launch of Italy’s Mattei Plan for Africa (MPA), which proposes a model of engagement aimed at promoting cooperation based on “mutual benefit” and “equal partnership”.[ii] Both the Italy-Africa Summit and the launch of MPA reflect Italy’s growing interest in fostering more structured and future-orientated ties with the African continent. This paper examines the background, objectives, and driving factors of MPA by situating it within the context of Italy’s foreign policy and broader geopolitical trends.

Background

The MPA was first introduced by Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni in October 2022 during her inaugural address in the Chamber of Deputies.[iii] At the time of the announcement, the MPA was presented as a broad vision, without a clearly defined strategy or a detailed framework for implementation.[iv] The initiative evolved into a more structured proposal in the following year, leading to its formal launch at the Italia–Africa Summit in January 2024.[v] The initiative is named after Enrico Mattei, founder of the Italian energy company Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI). ENI has built an extensive economic network across Africa.[vi]

Energy security concerns, intensified by the Russia–Ukraine conflict, are the primary driving force behind the MPA.[vii] It aims to diversify Italy’s energy sources by increasing access to African oil and gas reserves, positioning Italy as a central energy supply hub for Europe.[viii] Italy seeks to implement this plan by leveraging the existing networks in Africa that were established by actors like ENI and other civil society organisations working out of Italy.[ix] Equally central to the plan is Italy’s need to reduce irregular migration from Africa by tackling the underlying factors driving immigration, such as poverty and unemployment[x]

Objectives of the MPA  

The plan is structured around six core pillars, each representing a sector deemed central to sustainable development: Education and Training, Agriculture, Health, Energy, Water, and Infrastructure – Digital and Physical.[xi] To support these objectives, the Italian government has allocated an initial budget of approximately EUR 5.5 billion. This includes EUR 3 billion from the Italian Climate Fund and EUR 2.5 billion from development cooperation resources.[xii] The plan also encourages multilateral collaboration, with the involvement of international financial institutions, development banks, and other donor countries in its subsequent phases.[xiii] Furthermore, it promotes active private sector engagement as a means to foster a more sustainable investment environment, in cooperation with the government.

Italy has also increased its commitment to International Development Assistance (IDA) by approximately 25%. It has launched a new partnership with the World Bank that focuses on African development, which aims to accelerate MPA.[xiv] Complementing this, the ENI has pledged to invest $26 billion in Algeria, Libya, and Egypt under the framework of the MPA.[xv]

The MPA seeks to follow a tailored approach. In its initial phase, Italy has identified nine African countries for pilot projects: Algeria, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tunisia, Morocco, and Mozambique.[xvi] These pilot initiatives are intended to be adapted to the specific developmental contexts of each country. For instance, the developmental areas identified in Congo are energy, water, and infrastructure, while in Mozambique, the areas are agriculture and infrastructure.[xvii]

Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has claimed that the MPA is “not a closed box”, emphasising its potential to adapt according to the needs of the recipient countries.[xviii] The plan is positioned as a framework that can evolve through dialogues with its African partners. It aims to follow an incremental approach whereby the projects will be gradually scaled and adapted to specific requirements. The MPA steering committee meeting, chaired by Prime Minister Meloni, on 19 May 2025, confirmed the inclusion of five more countries – Angola, Ghana, Mauritania, Senegal, and Tanzania – showing the incremental nature of the plan.[xix]

One Year of the MPA: Achievements and Limitations

The MPA reflects an effort to change from Italy’s traditionally reactive stance to a proactive one towards Africa. From 1950 to 2013, Italy had very limited bilateral engagement in the region. The major engagements during this period were by nonstate actors like ENI and Catholic missions.[xx] From 2013 onwards, the government of Italy has become more proactive in Africa, though it has focused primarily on areas like migration control and energy.[xxi] Previous policies like the Minniti Plan and Mare Nostrum were fragmented and engaged on short-term crisis containment rather than long-term development.[xxii]

In contrast, MPA claims to build long-term strategic partnerships in key developmental areas with a more autonomous and bilateral strategy.  With limited past state involvement, Italy now seeks to deepen bilateral ties, promoting a “non-predatory” identity while leveraging the local network built by the predominant nonstate actors.[xxiii] Italy has also strategically positioned itself to fill the vacuum left by the declining French influence. The plan tries to differentiate its role in Africa by separating it from any neocolonial tendencies and framing itself as a sustainable development plan.

This attempt to strengthen the bilateral engagement with Africa could be viewed within a broader geopolitical framework. Africa has emerged as a new arena for geopolitical competition, with China, Russia, and the Gulf states expanding their influence through investment, infrastructure development, and military cooperation.[xxiv] In this geopolitical race, the rhetoric of partnership, coupled with logistical advantages, could allow Rome to gain an added advantage. ENI’s operational experience across Africa could also help Italy to implement the plan effectively.

Initiatives such as the biofuel production project in Kenya, aiming to increase oilseed production from 44,000 to 500,000 tonnes annually through new infrastructure and technical assistance, are examples of its implementation.[xxv]

However, despite such preliminary efforts, much of the MPA remains in the realm of rhetoric. Many of its initiatives appear to be an extension of ENI’s existing operations across Africa. Increasing the number of projects that are directly funded and administered by the government and reducing private firms’ share could help Italy enhance the MPA’s credibility and separate it from private energy ventures. It was announced without any meaningful prior consultation with African governments. The absence of co-design in its initial stages undermines the credibility of the “bottom-up” narrative that it propagates.

Despite the claims of a “nonpredatory” approach, MPA has also faced backlash from African NGOs. In a joint statement, over 90 African organisations, under the “Don’t Gas Africa” campaign, criticised the plan for its neocolonial approach that prioritises fossil fuel extraction over inclusive development.[xxvi] The key player in the plan, ENI, has received multiple criticisms for environmental damages and human rights violations in Africa. In the year 2014 alone, ENI reported nearly 350 oil spills, despite operating in a smaller region.[xxvii] These instances, coupled with the delayed responses from ENI, could erode the credibility of the plan among the African civil society. 

Despite being a key state in the region, Nigeria abstained from participating in the 2024 Italy-Africa Summit. This may reflect a deeper mistrust, underscored by incidents like the Ikebiri community’s lawsuit against ENI for environmental damage in 2010.[xxviii]

Overall, the African leaders have cautiously welcomed the plan but have raised concerns regarding the absence of prior consultation. In his remarks at the 2024 Summit, African Union Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat emphasised the need for concrete delivery, stating, “You will understand that we cannot be satisfied with promises that are often not kept”.[xxix] Therefore, matching ambition with credible action would be critical to gaining sustained African cooperation for Italy in the years to come.

Conclusion

The MPA shows Italy’s willingness to recalibrate its engagements with Africa. By prioritising key sectors, such as health, education, infrastructure, energy, and promoting rhetoric of equal partnership, the plan aims to strengthen Italy’s role amid growing competition for African resources. However, the initiative’s heavy reliance on ENI, limited African consultation in its formulation, and the current aspirational nature of many projects raise questions about its inclusivity, implementation capacity, and long-term credibility. For the MPA to succeed and foster genuine cooperation, Italy still needs to demonstrate commitment through direct state-led investment, transparent governance, and collaboration with African partners to ensure a mutually beneficial partnership.

The MPA does, however, herald the proactive interest of the “government” of Italy (as against only its private sector or civil society organisation previously) in African affairs, which will have to guard against neocolonial tendencies, while at the same time working towards greater receptivity of a former colonial power by the African government and people. The MPA also represents a new age experiment of partnership between the government and the private sector for development. Its success can be a litmus test for cooperation against a backdrop of a history of mistrust and suspicion.

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*Merin Sara Shyjan , Research Intern, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.  

End notes

i Presidency of the Council of Ministers, “Italia-Africa. A Bridge for Common Growth,” Governo Italiano, January 29, 2024, https://www.governo.it/en/articolo/italia-africa-bridge-common-growth/24853

ii Giorgia Meloni. “President Meloni’s Opening Address at the Italia–Africa Summit.” Governo Italiano, January 28, 2024. https://www.governo.it/en/articolo/president-meloni-s-opening-address-italia-africa-summit/24861

iii Ibid

iv Ibid

v Darnis, Jean-Pierre. 2024. “The Meloni Government’s ‘Mattei Plan’: Towards an African Policy for Italy?” Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS). April 5, 2024. https://www.frstrategie.org/en/publications/notes/meloni-government-s-mattei-plan-towards-african-policy-italy-2024

[vi]Giorgia Meloni. “President Meloni’s Opening Address at the Italia–Africa Summit.” Governo Italiano, January 28, 2024. https://www.governo.it/en/articolo/president-meloni-s-opening-address-italia-africa-summit/24861

[vii] Ibid

[viii] Ibid

[ix] Ibid

[x] African Union. African Common Position on Migration and Development. International Organization for Migration, July 2018. https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl2616/files/2018-07/african_common_position_md.pdf.

[xi] Governo Italiano. 2024. “The Six Pillars of the Mattei Plan.” Governo Italiano. January 28, 2024. https://www.governo.it/sites/governo.it/files/Italia-Africa_MatteiPlan_6pillars.pdf

[xii] Meloni, Giorgia. 2024. “President Meloni’s Opening Address at the Italia–Africa Summit.” Governo Italiano. January 28, 2024. https://www.governo.it/en/articolo/president-meloni-s-opening-address-italia-africa-summit/24861

[xiii] ibid

[xiv] World Bank. 2025. “Italy Increases IDA Commitment, Launches Africa Partnership with World Bank.” World Bank. April 24, 2025. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/04/24/-italy-increases-ida-commitment-launches-africa-partnership-with-world-bank

[xv] Caines, Jaxon. 2025. “Eni To Invest $26 Billion Across North Africa.” Journal of Petroleum Technology. April 10, 2025. https://jpt.spe.org/eni-to-invest-26-billion-across-north-africa

[xvi] Meloni, Giorgia. 2024. “President Meloni’s Press Conference Introduction at the Italia–Africa Summit.” Governo Italiano. January 29, 2024. https://www.governo.it/en/articolo/president-meloni-s-press-conference-introduction-italia-africa-summit/24927

[xvii] Ibid

[xviii] Ibid

[xix] Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, “President Meloni chairs Mattei Plan steering committee meeting at Palazzo Chigi,” Governo Italiano, May 19, 2025, https://www.governo.it/en/articolo/president-meloni-chairs-mattei-plan-steering-committee-meeting-palazzo-chigi/28768.

[xx] Luca Guglielminotti. “The Evolution of Italian Presence in Africa: Towards an Innovative Policy Approach?” Fondation Méditerranéenne d'Études Stratégiques, February 5, 2025. https://fmes-france.org/en/the-evolution-of-italian-presence-in-africa-towards-an-innovative-policy-approach/.

[xxi] Bernardo Venturi. “Africa and Italy’s Relations After the Cold War.” In Africa and the World: Bilateral and Multilateral International Diplomacy, edited by Dawn Nagar and Charles Mutasa, 169–188. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320674353_Africa_and_Italy's_Relations_After_the_Cold_War

[xxii] Atlantic Council. “Italy’s Mediterranean Pivot: What’s Driving Meloni’s Ambitious Plan with Africa.” Atlantic Council, January 31, 2024. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/italys-mediterranean-pivot-whats-driving-melonis-ambitious-plan-with-africa/

[xxiii] Meloni, Giorgia. 2024. “President Meloni’s Press Conference Introduction at the Italia–Africa Summit.” Governo Italiano. January 29, 2024. https://www.governo.it/en/articolo/president-meloni-s-press-conference-introduction-italia-africa-summit/24927

[xxiv] Foreign Policy Research Institute. 2020. “Great Power Competition and the Scramble for Africa.” Foreign Policy Research Institute. April 2020. https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/04/great-power-competition-and-the-scramble-for-africa/

[xxv] International Finance Corporation (IFC). 2024. “IFC and the Italian Climate Fund Partner with Eni to Support Biofuel Production, Farmers in Kenya.” IFC. May 17, 2024. https://www.ifc.org/en/pressroom/2024/ifc-and-the-italian-climate-fund-partner-with-eni-to-support-biofuel-production-farmers-in-kenya

[xxvi] Don’t Gas Africa, “Africa CSOs Letter for Italy-Africa Summit,” Don’t Gas Africa, accessed May 22, 2025, https://dont-gas-africa.org/italy-summit

[xxvii] Amnesty International, “Hundreds of Oil Spills Continue to Blight Niger Delta,” Amnesty International, March 25, 2015, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/03/hundreds-of-oil-spills-continue-to-blight-niger-delta/

[xxviii] Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, “Eni Lawsuit (Re Oil Spill in Nigeria),” Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, May 1, 2017, https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/eni-lawsuit-re-oil-spill-in-nigeria/.

[xxix]  Moussa Faki Mahamat. “Speech by H.E. Moussa Faki Mahamat, Chairperson of the African Union Commission, at the Italy – Africa Summit: A Bridge for Common Growth,” African Union, January 29, 2024. https://au.int/ar/node/43449.