Abstract
Digital nationhood is defined as the use of digital media and communication to boost nationalistic emotions, feelings and preserve national identity. Tuvalu is pioneering in this initiative of digital nationhood as a response to climate-induced existential threats. It insists on legal reforms to accommodate deterritorialised states and preserve the rights and identity of the people even after the disappearance of the island.
Introduction
Tuvalu is a small island with three main reef islands and six other coral atolls located in the west-central Pacific Ocean, roughly halfway between Hawaii and Australia.[i] The islanders heavily rely on ocean-related activities for their livelihood. Tuvalu faces severe risk from rising sea levels, which have increased by 6 inches over the past 30 years, i.e., 1.5 times the global average. Projections indicate an 8-inch rise by 2050 and up to 40 inches by 2100, threatening to submerge significant land areas and critical infrastructure of Tuvalu.[ii] As rising sea levels continue threatening the physical existence of the nation, Tuvalu has initiated a concept of “digital nationhood” to preserve its sovereignty, culture and identity in the face of the climate crisis. One of the latest developments in this initiative is the introduction of the first-ever ATM on 16 April 2025, at the National Bank of Tuvalu’s headquarters in Vaiaku, Funafuti.[iii] This development represents a major advancement in Tuvalu’s financial system. The government is now moving forward with plans to introduce national debit cards, and there are ongoing efforts to enable Visa debit and credit card services, which will allow Tuvaluans to make international and online transactions for the first time.[iv] This step taken by the government adds on to the larger announcement made by the then Tuvaluan Minister for Justice, Communication and Foreign Affairs, Simon Kofe, at COP27 (2022), that Tuvalu will become the first digital nation.[v]
In another initiative, Tuvalu entered into a bilateral agreement with Australia in 2023 (Falepili Union Treaty[vi]) to secure long-term relocation and mobility options for its citizens, aiming to safeguard Tuvaluan identity and sovereignty amidst climate threats. But to what extent can this preserve Tuvalu’s sovereignty? This viewpoint highlights the latest initiatives taken by Tuvalu in the digital nationhood programme, evaluation of existing international legal settings mainly UNCLOS, and analysis of bilateral arrangements signed by Tuvalu.
Digital Nationhood
The concept of digital nationhood refers to a nation’s initiative to preserve its sovereignty, governance and cultural identity in a digital format, particularly when its physical territory is threatened by factors like climate change. In Tuvalu’s case, this concept was broadly introduced with the launch of the “Future Now Project” in 2021.[vii] This project was spearheaded by then Minister for Justice, Communication and Foreign Affairs, Simon Kofe, who emphasised the importance of safeguarding Tuvalu’s essential elements, i.e., its land, ocean, and culture, by transitioning them to a digital platform. Kofe stated, “Our land, our ocean, our culture are the most precious assets of our people, and to keep them safe from harm, no matter what happens in the physical world, we will move them to the cloud”.[viii] However, the specific strategy of transitioning to a digital nation was formally unveiled during COP27, held in November 2022.[ix]
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15 Nov 2022 COP27- Foreign Minister Simon Kofe announced the nation’s plan to become the world's first digital nation.[x] |
In early 2023-Tuvalu initiated the development of a blockchain-based national ledger to digitise citizenship records and governmental functions.[xi] |
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Mid-2023: Attempts to create digital twins of key infrastructure, including government buildings and cultural sites, using drone footage and topographical data.[xii] |
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On 1 October 2023, the Constitution of Tuvalu Act came into effect, redefining the concept of statehood.[xiii] |
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On 17 October 2023, USTDA funded Tuvalu Telecom and APTelecom to study a 15,900 km subsea cable for Pacific connectivity.[xiv] |
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Late 2023: 26 countries recognised Tuvalu's digital sovereignty.[xv] |
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In early 2024, Tuvalu expanded its digital preservation efforts by archiving cultural heritage, including traditional music, oral histories and environmental data, in the metaverse.[xvi] |
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May 2024: Tuvalu formalised a partnership with Atmo, a San Francisco-based AI weather forecasting firm, to enhance its climate resilience.[xvii] |
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16 April 2025: Tuvalu inaugurated its first Automated Teller Machines (ATMs).[xviii] |
Timeline of the initiatives taken under the Digital Nationhood Project from 2022 to 2025: (The table has been prepared by the author using multiple sources, given in the footnotes.)
International Legal Frameworks: Accommodating Digital Nationhood
The threat of sea-level rise presents several legal and geopolitical risks for Tuvalu. One of the significant concerns is the loss of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which is central to the country’s economy, especially for fishing rights and access to potential seabed resources, which contributes around 51.6% of GDP as of 2023.[xix] Without a legally recognised baseline due to submergence, Tuvalu stands to lose these entitlements, which could be claimed by other states or revert to international waters.[xx] Moreover, the challenge to Tuvalu’s sovereignty becomes critical under international law, including the Montevideo Convention (1933), which generally ties statehood to a defined territory and a permanent population. If Tuvalu becomes physically uninhabitable, its legal status as a sovereign state may be questioned.
The submergence threat faced by Tuvalu also exposes a critical and urgent inadequacy in current international maritime law, particularly within the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Under Article 5, maritime zones are measured from the low-water line along the coast, while Article 7 allows the use of straight baselines in special geographic situations like island fringes. Article 57 sets the EEZ’s limit to 200 nautical miles from these baselines. Article 121 defines what qualifies as an island, i.e., only land that remains above water at high tide and can sustain human life or economic activity can generate maritime zones, such as an EEZ or continental shelf.[xxi] The above articles collectively create a legal framework that is inherently dependent on the physical existence of landmass and habitable territory. For Tuvalu, whose highest natural point is less than 5 metres above sea level, rising oceans are threatening not only homes and communities but also the legal baselines that define its maritime rights. If Tuvalu’s territory is lost to rising seas, the disappearance of its normal baselines as currently interpreted by UNCLOS could mean the possible loss of its EEZs, control over fisheries, seabed rights and other sovereign claims tied to physical land. This raises questions about the future of its legal and diplomatic standing. In response, Tuvalu’s decision to digitise its government and cultural identity reflects a bold attempt to redefine what it means to be a nation. By securing its presence in the digital realm, Tuvalu is carving out a new path, one where sovereignty is preserved not just through territory but through data and digital continuity. This approach raises critical questions: Can a nation exist without a physical territory? How do international laws recognise such entities? Can Tuvalu act as a role model for other islands in similar situations?
Bilateral Arrangements: Sovereignty and Security Concerns
Most of the bilateral arrangements of Tuvalu are based on the physical representation of the territory, i.e., a change in the baseline would question the existence of the treaties. As of now, UNCLOS lacks explicit provisions protecting maritime entitlements of submerged states. This creates ambiguity around whether Tuvalu would retain rights to its vast maritime zones (~900,000 square kilometres[xxii]), leaving its previously defined treaty boundaries vulnerable to dissolution. Some of the notable bilateral agreements that Tuvalu has been involved in include the Tuvalu-France (Wallis and Futuna) Maritime Boundary Agreement (1985)[xxiii], the Tuvalu-Kiribati Maritime Boundary Agreement (2012)[xxiv] and the Tuvalu-Fiji Maritime Boundary Agreement (2014)[xxv]. All of these agreements are grounded in Tuvalu’s current land coordinates, which serve as the basis for defining its maritime boundaries, including its EEZs and continental shelf. But with the possibility of complete submergence, serious concerns arise about whether these treaties will remain valid in the long term. Some legal experts have proposed the idea of “freezing” maritime baselines to preserve the rights of disappearing states, but this concept has not yet been widely embraced in international law.[xxvi] Therefore, unless international legal norms evolve, Tuvalu risks losing sovereign rights over marine resources and previously negotiated maritime boundaries, undermining the original purpose and continued relevance of these boundary agreements.
Falepili Union Treaty
The Falepili Union Treaty is another bilateral agreement between Tuvalu and Australia, signed in November 2023. It exemplifies the immediate cooperation on climate resilience and the long-term existential threats to Tuvalu’s sovereignty as rising sea levels threaten its physical territory. Under this treaty, Australia committed to assisting Tuvalu during natural disasters and providing a special visa pathway for up to 280 Tuvaluan citizens annually.[xxvii]
However, Article 4(4) of the treaty mandates that Tuvalu must seek mutual agreement with Australia before entering into any security or defence partnerships with third parties.[xxviii] This provision has sparked significant criticism from Tuvaluan leaders and international observers, like former Prime Minister Enele Sopoaga, who warned that the clause effectively grants Australia veto power over Tuvalu’s foreign policy, undermining its sovereignty and reducing the nation to a quasi-protectorate amid intensifying regional rivalries between China and the United States.[xxix] In a broader geopolitical context, the agreement may constrain Tuvalu’s ability to pursue diverse strategic partnerships and could unevenly deepen its reliance on Australia. Although the treaty allows up to 280 Tuvaluans to relocate to Australia per year, it does not grant them automatic citizenship.[xxx] By comparison, New Zealand’s Pacific Access Category visa scheme offers a more stable system, allowing Tuvaluans to apply for permanent residency which opens the door to long-term settlement and rights.[xxxi] However, Tuvaluan migrants relocating under either scheme are at risk of becoming stateless or marginalised within host societies, with limited political voice or ability to participate in national decision making. Such a situation threatens to disempower the diaspora and erode cultural sovereignty.
Hence, without physical territory, the statehood of Tuvalu and, by extension, its treaty rights would be undermined, risking loss of international recognition. To address this, there is a pressing need for the international community to adopt and recognise digital nationhood, a sovereign state’s continued existence and governance exercised through digital platforms, enabling maintenance of legal identity, diplomatic relations and control over maritime entitlements despite physical submersion. This approach could provide a way for nations like Tuvalu to retain sovereign rights, uphold existing agreements, such as the Falepili Union, and preserve control over maritime zones using current coordinates as fixed reference points, a proposal already gaining traction among legal experts. By embracing this framework, the international system can offer a path for continuity and recognition in an era of climate-driven displacement.
Assessment
Given these legal gaps and Tuvalu’s existential vulnerabilities, there is an urgent need for international legal reform. This could involve amending UNCLOS to recognise fixed baselines despite sea level rise as advocated in the 2021 Pacific Islands Forum Declaration.[xxxii] Additionally, the UN General Assembly may also consider the possibility of affirming that statehood is not contingent on physical territory. The development of new legal instruments could help digital nations or deterritorialised states to be recognised under the International Law Commission.[xxxiii] Lastly, bilateral agreements should be upheld to consider Tuvalu’s maritime entitlements and sovereign continuity, even without physical land. The Falepili Union Treaty serves as a case study, illustrating the potential long-term repercussions of climate-induced relocation treaties, especially regarding sovereignty, strategic autonomy and the continuity of maritime entitlements under international law, offering lessons for other similarly vulnerable small island nations.
Conclusion
Tuvalu’s proactive embrace of digital nationhood represents a bold response to the challenges posed by climate-induced displacement. By digitising its governance, culture and identity, Tuvalu seeks to preserve its “nationhood” in the face of existential threats to the “state” of Tuvalu. This approach necessitates a redefinition of traditional concepts of nationhood and calls for international understandings, legal frameworks and bilateral arrangements to adapt accordingly. As climate change continues to impact vulnerable nations, Tuvalu’s model may serve as a blueprint for preserving “identity” in an increasingly digital world and for other vulnerable small islands in the region. In case the fears of submergence of the state of Tuvalu actually fructify, the people of Tuvalu will have to relocate to another friendly country under relevant bilateral, regional or multilateral arrangements; as has been the case with climate induced migration of peoples over millennia. When the physical state of Tuvalu ceases to exist, so does plausibly its legal status and resultant sovereignty; but the nation of Tuvalu and its people will continue to live as also its culture and traditions in other lands. There is a need to think about the rights of ‘disappearing’ states focused more on the people and less on existing legal arrangements which are unable to accommodate their concerns.
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*Christa Joy , Research Intern, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.
End notes
[i]WorldAtlas. (December 26, 2023). Tuvalu Maps & Facts. Retrieved from https://www.worldatlas.com/maps/tuvalu.
[ii] Brennan, P. (August 15, 2023). NASA-UN partnership gauges sea level threat to Tuvalu. NASA Sea Level Change Portal. https://sealevel.nasa.gov/news/265/nasa-un-partnership-gauges-sea-level-threat-to-tuvalu/.
[iii] Comerford, R. (April 16, 2025). Tuvalu unveils first cash machines in 'momentous' ceremony. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce3vyvdz1pko.
[iv] Jackson, L. C. (April 16, 2025). Tuvalu marks ‘momentous occasion’ with unveiling of its first ATMs. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/apr/16/tuvalu-first-atm-cash-machine-banking.
[v] Global Forum on Migration and Development. (March 25, 2024). Tuvalu: The Digital Nation State Programme. https://www.gfmd.org/pfp/ppd/19211.
[vi] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (May 8, 2024). Explanatory memorandum - Falepili Union between Tuvalu and Australia [Treaty text]. Australian Government. https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/tuvalu/australia-tuvalu-falepili-union-treaty/explanatory-memorandum-falepili-union-between-tuvalu-and-australia.
[vii] Yeo, S. (November 21, 2024). Tuvalu: The disappearing island nation recreating itself in the metaverse. BBC Future. https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20241121-tuvalu-the-pacific-islands-creating-a-digital-nation-in-the-metaverse-due-to-climate-change.
[viii] Chaturvedi, A. (February 27, 2023). Disappearing island nation of Tuvalu to replicate itself in Metaverse: 5 points. NDTV. https://www.ndtv.com/feature/disappearing-island-nation-of-tuvalu-to-replicate-itself-in-metaverse-5-points-3818619.
[ix] Kofe, S. [Tuvalu]. (November 15, 2022). Rising sea levels force Tuvalu to move to the Metaverse: COP27 speech [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lXpeO5BgAOM.
[x] Global Forum on Migration and Development. (2024, March 25). Tuvalu: The Digital Nation State Programme. Retrieved from https://www.gfmd.org/pfp/ppd/19211
[xi] Press Release. (2020, December 21). Tuvalu: World’s first national BSV digital ledger. BSV Blockchain. https://bsvblockchain.org/tuvalu-worlds-first-national-bsv-digital-ledger/
[xii] Hugo Hodge, “The backup plan: Tuvalu says the impacts of climate change have forced it to create a digital copy of itself in the metaverse,” ABC News, April 26, 2023, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-04-27/tuvalus-plan-to-create-digital-twin-metaverse-climate-change/102223008
[xiii] The Constitution of Tuvalu Act 2023, CAP. 1.02, Revised Edition, enacted by the Parliament of Tuvalu, commenced October 1, 2023, https://tuvalulegislation.tv/cms/images/LEGISLATION/PRINCIPAL/1986/1986-0001/1986-0001_2.pdf
[xiv] United States Trade and Development Agency. (2023, October 17). USTDA advances secure internet connectivity in the Pacific Islands. https://www.ustda.gov/ustda-advances-secure-internet-connectivity-in-the-pacific-islands/
[xv] Bushell-Embling, D. (2023, December 6). 26 countries recognise Tuvalu’s digital sovereignty. GovTech Review. https://www.govtechreview.com.au/content/gov-geospatial/news/26-countries-recognise-tuvalu-s-digital-sovereignty-764474170
[xvi] Rina Chandran & Md. Tahmid Zami, “Tuvalu preserves history online as rising seas threaten existence,” The Japan Times, March 4, 2024, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/environment/2024/03/04/climate-change/tuvalu-history-online-rising-seas/
[xvii] Tuvalu launches AI weather forecasting system with Atmo, Inc. and the Global Centre for Climate Mobility, Atmo, May 23, 2024, https://www.atmo.ai/news/tuvalu-launches-ai-weather-forecasting-system-with-atmo-inc-and-the-global-centre-for-climate-mobility
[xviii] Ruth Comerford, “Tuvalu unveils first cash machines in 'momentous' ceremony,” BBC News, April 16, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce3vyvdz1pko
[xix]Government of Tuvalu, & United Nations. (2023). Tuvalu country implementation plan 2023–2024. https://pacific.un.org/sites/default/files/202312/Tuvalu%20Country%20Implementation%20Plan%202023-2024%20%28Online%29.pdf.
[xx]United Nations. (1982). United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.
[xxi]United Nations. (1982). United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.
[xxii] Needham, K. (September 24, 2024). Sinking Tuvalu fights to keep maritime boundaries as sea levels rise. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/investigations/sinking-tuvalu-fights-keep-maritime-boundaries-sea-levels-rise-2024-09-24/.
[xxiii] United Nations. (2002). Exchange of Notes between France and Tuvalu constituting an Agreement concerning Provisional Maritime Delimitation between the two Countries, 6 August – 5 November 1985 [PDF]. Delimitation Treaties Infobase. https://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/FRA-TUV1985MD.PDF.
[xxiv] Agreement between Tuvalu and Kiribati concerning their maritime boundary. (August 29, 2012). FAOLEX Legal Database. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. https://leap.unep.org/en/countries/tv/national-legislation/agreement-between-tuvalu-and-kiribati-concerning-their-maritime.
[xxv] United Nations. (2014). Agreement between the Government of Fiji and the Government of Tuvalu concerning their maritime boundaries (with map). Suva, October 17, 2014. United Nations Treaty Series, No. 56867. https://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/Fiji-Tuvalutreaty.pdf.
[xxvi] Keen, H., & Nichol, C. (November 12, 2021). Sea level rise: The primary challenge to effective implementation of UNCLOS (Written evidence UNC0038). UK Parliament International Relations and Defence Committee. https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/40879/pdf/
[xxvii] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2023). Australia–Tuvalu Falepili Union Treaty. Australian Government. https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/tuvalu/australia-tuvalu-falepili-union-treaty.
[xxviii] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (May 8, 2024). Explanatory memorandum – Falepili Union between Tuvalu and Australia. Government of Australia. https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/explanatory-memorandum-falepili-union-between-tuvalu-australia.pdf.
[xxix] Tan, A. (September 24, 2024). Sinking Tuvalu fights to keep maritime boundaries as sea levels rise. The Straits Times. https://www.straitstimes.com/world/sinking-tuvalu-fights-to-keep-maritime-boundaries-as-sea-levels-rise.
[xxx] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2023). Australia–Tuvalu Falepili Union Treaty: Treaty text. Australian Government. https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/tuvalu/australia-tuvalu-falepili-union-treaty/treaty-text-falepili-union.
[xxxi] Immigration New Zealand. (March 29, 2010). S1.40 Pacific Access Category. Archived operational manual. https://www.immigration.govt.nz/opsmanual-archive/I29444.HTM.
[xxxii] Library of Congress. (September 2, 2021). International: Pacific Islands Forum declares fixed maritime zones in response to threats of sea-level rise due to climate change. https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2021-09-02/international-pacific-islands-forum-declares-fixed-maritime-zones-in-response-to-threats-of-sea-level-rise-due-to-climate-change/.
[xxxiii] United Nations. (2025). International Law Commission. Codification Division, Office of Legal Affairs. https://legal.un.org/ilc/.