Indian Council of World Affairs

Abstract: Amidst the US-China trade war, Xi Jinping visited Vietnam, Malaysia and Cambodia to court these countries towards China. During the visit, he emphasised that China, like the Southeast Asian countries, is a “victim” of the US tariffs. 

Introduction 

Xi Jinping visited Vietnam, Malaysia and Cambodia from 14 to 18 April this year. This comes at a time when Beijing is trying to deepen its economic ties with Southeast Asia and lessen its dependency on the US. During the trip, Xi Jinping stressed: “A small boat with a single sail cannot withstand stormy waves; only by working together can we sail steadily and far”. This metaphor emphasises that only by promoting multilateralism can there be peace in the world. The paper analyses the outcome of Xi Jinping’s three-nation tour to Vietnam, Malaysia and Cambodia. 

The Visit

Xi Jinping commenced his three-nation tour by first visiting Vietnam, followed by Malaysia, and concluded his trip in Cambodia. He was given a grand welcome in all three states. In Cambodia, he was welcomed by King Norodom Sihamoni in Phnom Penh, breaking with standard diplomatic protocol.[i]

Bilateral Cooperation

The signing of various bilateral agreements was the main highlight of Xi Jinping’s tour to Vietnam, Malaysia and Cambodia. Around 113 bilateral agreements were signed, with Vietnam signing 45 agreements, Malaysia 31 and Cambodia 37. These bilateral agreements focused on infrastructure, green technology, agriculture, the digital economy and artificial intelligence. In Cambodia, both sides signed the declaration of “All Weather Cambodia-China Community of Shared Future in the New Era” by signing this declaration, Cambodia joined Pakistan and Russia as one of the countries considered China's closest partners.[ii] Amidst ongoing global uncertainty exacerbated by the US-China trade war, signing these bilateral agreements demonstrates China’s intent to expand its bilateral partnership with these three Southeast Asian states.[iii] 

Economic Aspects of Xi Jinping’s Visit to Vietnam, Malaysia and Cambodia

During the visit, Xi Jinping reiterated China’s vision of “mutual economic benefit”. All three nations have China as their largest trading partner. China’s bilateral trade with Vietnam is $260 billion, with Malaysia at $212 billion and Cambodia at $15 billion.[iv] Xi Jinping’s visit comes when China seeks to diversify its economic partners and reduce its dependence on US exports, amidst the ongoing tariffs imposed on China by the current US administration.[v] This positions Vietnam and Malaysia as strategic partners for China, as both nations have excellent economic collaboration with the US and China. Vietnam and Malaysia, therefore, have been among China’s highest foreign direct investment recipients in recent years.[vi] In addition, Cambodia has also received assurances from China to boost its current free trade agreement with China, which was initially signed in 2022.[vii]However it needs to be said that relations of “mutual economic benefit” have natural limitations in frameworks of power asymetrics.

Defence Cooperation

Bilateral defence cooperation between these countries and China was also discussed. While Vietnam and Malaysia agreed to enhance their defence ties with China, China’s partnership with Cambodia has reached new heights. Defence cooperation with Cambodia gives China a strong foothold in the region. Cambodia is strategically placed in the Gulf of Thailand, the connecting point between the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean region.[viii] The Ream Naval Base near Sihanoukville is a Cambodian naval base built with the help of Chinese engineers and officers from the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.[ix] Construction began in 2022 and was eventually inaugurated on 5 April 2025.[x] China pledged to expand the “2+2 dialogue” between China’s and Cambodia's foreign and defence ministers to enhance China-Cambodian defence cooperation.[xi]

Reinstating the Belt and Road Initiative 

During the visit, Xi Jinping took the opportunity to review the status of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects. In Malaysia, discussions were held on the progress of BRI projects, such as the East Coast Rail Link and the Kuantan Industrial Park (MCKIP), a Malaysian Chinese joint venture.[xii] While in Cambodia, China promised to support Cambodia’s ambitious “Fish and Rice Corridor initiative”, a part of Cambodia’s pentagonal strategy to boost food security and rural productivity.[xiii] In Vietnam, Chinese President Xi Jinping promised to provide technical and economic cooperation to Vietnam on three standard-gauge lines and the Hai Phong innovative port project.[xiv]

South China Sea Disputes and Economic Pragmatism

Despite China having strong economic and defence partnerships with the three countries, Vietnam and Malaysia have contesting claims with China in the South China Sea region. With Vietnam, the dispute is over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, while with Malaysia, there have been disputes over the Luconia Shoals.[xv] Though not a direct party to the South China Sea dispute, Cambodia has taken a pragmatic stance of promoting dialogue amongst the concerned parties to solve disputes.[xvi] Putting the South China Sea dispute on the back-burner, China has chosen to advance its economic ties with the three countries which it perceives as advantageous to itself and pragmatic in nature.

Analysis

Xi Jinping scheduled the visit at a crucial time when the Indo-Pacific, particularly Southeast Asia, has become the focal point of great power competition between the US and China. As a result, the geopolitical significance of Southeast Asia is on the rise.

Xi’s visit to Vietnam, Malaysia and Cambodia comes with China’s ambition to establish itself as the primary economic, diplomatic and defence partner for Southeast Asian nations. Notably, this visit comes amid the US administration’s tariffs on several Southeast Asian countries, including China. The US imposed a 46 per cent tariff on Vietnam, 24 per cent on Malaysia and 24 per cent on Cambodia. On China, the tariffs were 145 per cent.[xvii]

Tariffs Imposed by the Current US Administration on China, Vietnam, Malaysia and Cambodia

Xi Jinping’s diplomatic outreach to these three Southeast Asian states showcases China’s well-crafted strategy of statecraft to increase the economic dependence of Vietnam, Malaysia and Cambodia on China. China’s intention to offer infrastructure development and technological investments makes it an indispensable partner to these three states, which are essential to them in times of global uncertainty. Meanwhile, Beijing also seeks to play a more active role in the Southeast Asia region and increase its cooperation with these three ASEAN states. 

China aims to position itself as a benevolent leader rather than a hegemon. China wants to promote the idea of a “shared Asian home”[xviii] and aims to position itself as an advocate for regional autonomy and diplomacy. Chinese officials have stressed the significance of multipolarity and the importance of avoiding a zero-sum game. Additionally, China has supported Vietnam’s bid to join BRICS as a step to promote a multipolar world and also backed Vietnam’s desire to boost ties with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.[xix]

China seeks to be seen as a reliable partner, engaging with various nations regardless of their governments. China’s collaborations with Cambodia, Malaysia and Vietnam aim to expand its influence in the Gulf of Thailand, a key link between the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. It further enhances China’s economic and defence leverage over the US vis-à-vis these countries.[xx] Lastly, Xi Jinping's visit to Vietnam, Cambodia and Malaysia highlights China’s effort to strengthen its soft power in Southeast Asia by invoking terms such as “Shared Asian Home” and “Multilateralism”.

Conclusion

Xi Jinping’s visit, thus, illustrated how China is willing to blend diplomatic overtures with strategic depth to further its foothold in Southeast Asia. It is willing to portray itself as the primary anchor of regional partnerships amidst the ongoing US-China trade war. This shows how China has evolved its diplomatic approach with Vietnam, Cambodia and Malaysia from being traditionally based on economic transactions to one based on deep diplomatic and defence cooperation. However, China has to go a long way before it can actually be seen as a benevolent power rather than a hegemon. It has to demonstrate through actions that it can meaningfully lead in a world full of uncertainty and strife, including through pursuing non-reciprocity.                                                                       

*****

*Rohon Patra, Research Intern, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

[i] President Xi Jinping's State Visits to Vietnam, Malaysia, and Cambodia: Itinerary and Reception Details," April 2025. (Accessed on May 28, 2025).

[ii] Xinhua, "China and Cambodia Elevate Ties with 'All-Weather Community of Shared Future'," April 18, 2025. (Accessed on May 28, 2025).

[iii] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "China’s Southeast Asia Strategy Post-Tariffs," 2025. (Accessed on May 28, 2025).

[iv] “China’s Trade with ASEAN Countries Hits Record Highs,” China Daily, January 17, 2025; “Malaysia-China Trade Hits Record RM993.26b in 2024,” The Edge Malaysia, January 19, 2025; “Cambodia-China Trade Reaches $15 Billion in 2024,” Khmer Times, January 15, 2025. (Accessed on May 28, 2025)

[v] Peterson Institute for International Economics, "US-China Trade War Timeline and Tariff Impacts," May 2025. (Accessed on May 28, 2025).

[vi] "Malaysia Economic Monitor: Embracing the Digital Economy," World Bank Reports. (Accessed on May 28, 2025).

[vii] Chinese Ministry of Commerce, "China-Cambodia Free Trade Agreement: Implementation and Future Commitments," Ministry Briefing, April 2025. (Accessed on May 28, 2025).

[viii] Cambodia, The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, last updated May 14, 2024. (Accessed on May 28, 2025). https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/cambodia/.

[ix] "China’s Maritime Strategy and Dual-Use Infrastructure," RAND Corporation. (Accessed on May 28, 2025).

[x] "China and Cambodia Inaugurate Ream Naval Base," April 6, 2025. (Accessed on May 28, 2025).

[xi] Xi Urges Stronger China-Cambodia Security Ties," Xinhua News Agency. (Accessed on May 28, 2025).

[xii] Overview of BRI Projects in Malaysia," National Development and Reform Commission (China). (Accessed on May 28, 2025).

[xiii] Cambodia’s Fish and Rice Corridor Gains Momentum under BRI," April 2025. (Accessed on May 28, 2025).

[xiv] China to Support Standard Gauge Rail Projects in Vietnam," April 2025. (Accessed on May 28, 2025).

[xv] "Malaysia’s Position on South China Sea and China’s Growing Presence," May 2025. (Accessed on May 28, 2025).

[xvi] Cambodia’s Foreign Policy and South China Sea Dispute," 2024. (Accessed on May 28, 2025).

[xvii] US-China Tariff Tracker: Southeast Asia Implications,” CSIS Briefs, April 2025. (Accessed on May 28, 2025).

[xviii] China’s Diplomatic Framing of the ‘Shared Asian Home’ Concept,” Lowy Analysis Brief, December 2024. (Accessed on May 28, 2025).

[xix] China Backs Vietnam’s Closer Ties with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation,” Xinhua, April 17, 2025. (Accessed on May 28, 2025).

[xx] China’s Dual-Use Port Strategy and Defence Expansion in the Gulf of Thailand,” IISS Asia-Pacific Defence Review, May 2025. (Accessed on May 28, 2025).