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The EU’s Strategic Energy Pivot to the GCC Post-Russia-Ukraine War
Introduction
The first European Union (EU)–Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Summit took place in Brussels on 16 October 2024.[1] The summit aimed to strengthen the EU-GCC Joint Cooperation Programme, which had also taken place in Brussels on 21 February 2022.[2] Both of these cooperation programmes seek to foster EU-GCC economic and regional ties as well as to advance their cooperation in the energy sector. This paper focuses on the background and drivers of EU-GCC cooperation against the backdrop of the EU’s deteriorating relations with Russia since the onset of the Ukraine war in February 2022. These tensions have catalysed the EU’s renewed interest in the Gulf region for energy diversification.
Background: The EU-GCC Cooperation
A cooperation agreement signed in 1989 forms the basis of EU-GCC relations. It established regular dialogue on diverse issues, such as economic and energy relations, climate change, and environmental issues, among others.[3] An EU-GCC Council was also established as part of the cooperation agreement to ensure regular dialogue at the level of foreign ministers. In February 2022, the 26th session of the EU-GCC Joint Council was held in Brussels, where a joint cooperation programme for the period 2022-2027 was endorsed.[4] The programme outlined enhanced cooperation in the spheres of trade and investment, climate change and green transition, people-to-people initiatives, and counterterrorism. In May 2022, the European External Action Service (EEAS) released a joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council on a “Strategic Partnership with the Gulf.”[5] The document was endorsed by the Council in June 2022. It provides a roadmap for EU-GCC cooperation in diverse spheres which include, “increasing trade and investment, fighting climate change, ensuring energy security and a smooth green transition, safeguarding global health, meeting growing global development and humanitarian needs and promoting peace and stability, including the de-escalation of tensions, in the broader region.”[6] Since then, the EU has initiated several high-level engagements to broaden the scope of EU-GCC cooperation. Notable developments include the appointment of former Italian Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio as the EU’s Special Representative (EUSR) for the Gulf region in June[7] as well as the EU-GCC Summit that took place in October last year. These initiatives reflect the EU’s renewed interest in the Gulf region since 2022.
Recent Developments
The EU-GCC energy relationship, historically grounded in a trade dynamic, is undergoing a notable transformation into a more strategic and structured partnership. Recent developments, particularly following the EU-GCC Strategic Partnership 2022, have prompted both regions to broaden the scope of their cooperation.
A key driver of this shift is the EU’s push for diversification following the decline of its energy partnership with Russia since the Ukraine war began in 2022. As a result of Ukraine-related sanctions, Russian LNG supplies to Europe have dropped from 41% in 2022 to approximately 18% by 2024. This has prompted a shift in the EU’s overall energy policy. Internally, the EU has outlined a framework to switch towards a clean and green transition (REPowerEU plan) to reduce reliance on imported fuels. At the same time, the EU has also pushed for cooperation with the Gulf, among other regions, to increase the diversification of its imports in order to maintain its energy security. As a result, the EU’s energy cooperation with Gulf countries has seen notable progress in the last three years. Qatar, for instance, has emerged as a key LNG supplier, accounting for 14% of the EU’s LNG imports in 2023. These shipments are primarily routed through the Suez Canal, a crucial maritime chokepoint linking the Red Sea to the Mediterranean and a more efficient and cost-effective delivery route to Europe.[8] However, during regional disturbances, longer and more costly routes — such as via the Cape of Good Hope — are used to ensure the security of energy supplies. Similarly, Saudi Arabia exported crude oil to the EU worth approximately $35.76 billion in 2024.[9]
Though fossil fuel energy continues to be at the centre of EU-GCC cooperation, there has been a recent push towards renewable energy resources. The dual pressures of the EU’s energy crisis and the Gulf States’ need to diversify their hydrocarbon-dependent economies have driven both parties to embed renewable energy cooperation within their broader energy partnership.
GCC countries initially resisted climate policies, primarily due to concerns that such measures could undermine their oil- and gas-dependent economies. Over time, the GCC has adapted itself to the evolving global energy trends, recognising the multiple benefits of renewable energy. By 2030, the region aims to reduce water withdrawal by 11 trillion litres by using solar resources for power generation and water desalination, save 400 billion barrels of oil in the power sector, create 2,000 direct jobs and lower its per capita carbon footprint by 8%.[10]
The Clean Energy Network (CEN) and its successor CEN-II marked the beginning of EU-GCC collaboration aimed at strengthening energy relations, with climate change integrated across all areas of cooperation.[11] These efforts progressed with the launch of the Green Transition Project in 2023, focusing on the implementation of tripling renewable energy capacity, doubling energy efficiency and creating a robust infrastructure for solar energy, wind energy, hydropower and green hydrogen.[12] The updates on the Green Transition Project are yet to be released officially.[13]
Green hydrogen has emerged as a central component of the EU’s clean energy strategy. The growing focus on green hydrogen, clean energy networks, and sustainable infrastructure marks a clear shift towards joint energy transition efforts. Produced by splitting water using electricity from renewables, such as wind or solar, the green hydrogen emits no carbon, unlike regular hydrogen.[14] Its high flexibility allows it to generate power, fuel vehicles, store energy and balance the electricity supply when renewables are unavailable.[15] Nevertheless, the widespread adoption of green hydrogen remains constrained by the high costs and infrastructural demands associated with its production, storage, and distribution.
Despite such progress, the partnership faces several challenges. Before the 2024 Summit, The GCC has criticised the EU for lacking political gravitas and being overly bureaucratic, failing to dedicate resources to match their ambitions in the Gulf.[16] As mentioned earlier, the foundational document for the current strategic roadmap has also faced criticism from the Gulf region. For instance, the EU has tied trade benefits to human rights commitments, which has caused resistance from the GCC countries, who view it as interference in their internal affairs.[17] Another point of disagreement lies in the divergent positions on export duties, i.e., the GCC depends on export duties; in contrast, the EU seeks to remove such duties.[18] This reflects the broader challenge the EU faces in promoting its norms and values beyond its borders. For instance, in December 2024, tensions between Qatar and the EU rose over the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDD). Starting in 2027, the CSDD law, aligned with the 2050 climate neutrality objective, requires large companies to ensure human rights and environmental standards in their supply chains, with penalties up to 5% of global income. In response, Qatar threatened Europe with a halt in its LNG supply.[19]
Conclusion
The outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war in February 2022 marked a turning point in the EU’s energy policy, driving a strategic pivot towards alternative partners for the security of its energy supplies. The EU has adopted a series of internal and external measures to ensure its energy security. This includes a recalibration of its ties with the GCC. The EU-GCC joint cooperation programme, the appointment of a special representative to the GCC, the release of the EU-GCC strategic partnership document, and the EU-GCC Summit reflect the EU’s growing interest in cooperating with the GCC. In the last three years, the partnership has witnessed progress in several spheres, such as cooperation in green energy initiatives of the EU, growth in trading and investment, rising development of renewable energy infrastructures, and cooperation in policy framing with respect to each other’s political interests. Notwithstanding the progress made, several challenges to this cooperation persist. Among these are the GCC’s apprehensions regarding the adoption of the EU’s norms and values in their interactions with European partners. In addition, the crisis in the Middle East also raises challenges for the EU as it looks to diversify away from Russia. Deepening this partnership would require navigating persistent challenges through negotiations to achieve mutual benefits.
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*Abhishikth Singh, Research Intern, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.
Endnotes
[1] European Council, Council of the European Union, “First EU-Gulf Cooperation Council Summit, October 16, 2024,” https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2024/10/16/.
[2] European Council, Council of the European Union, “Co-Chairs' Statement - 26th EU-GCC Joint Council and Ministerial Meeting” https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/02/22/co-chairs-statement-26th-eu-gcc-joint-council-and-ministerial-meeting/.
[3] European Parliamentary Research Service, “A Strategic Partnership with the Gulf: Old Ties, New Impetus” https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2022/739228/EPRS_BRI(2022)739228_EN.pdf.
[4] European Council, Council of the European Union, “First EU-Gulf Cooperation Council Summit, October 16, 2024,” https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2024/10/16/.
[5] Legislative Train Schedule, European Parliament, “Joint Communication on the Partnership with the Gulf”, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-a-stronger-europe-in-the-world/file-partnership-with-the-gulf.
[6] Ibid.
[7] European Council, Council of the European Union, “EU appoints a new Special Representative for the Gulf region”, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/05/15/eu-appoints-a-new-special-representative-for-the-gulf-region/.
[8] Global LNG HUB, “Qatar’s role in LNG supply to Europe” https://globallnghub.com/qatars-role-in-lng-supply-to-europe.html.
[9] Trading Economics, “European Union Imports from Saudi Arabia” https://tradingeconomics.com/european-union/imports/saudi-arabia.
[10] IRENA, “Renewable Energy Market Analysis: The GCC Reign” https://www.irena.org/publications/2016/Jan/Renewable-Energy-Market-Analysis-The-GCC-Region.
[11] CEPS Project, “EU-GCC Clean Energy Network II (CENII)”, https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-projects/eu-gcc-clean-energy-network-ii-cenii/.
[12] European Union External Action, “European Union Launches ‘EU-GCC Green Transition Project’ at the World Future Energy Summit”, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/european-union-launches-%E2%80%98eu-gcc-green-transition-project%E2%80%99-world-future-energy-summit_en#:~:text=Future%20Energy%20Summit-,European%20Union%20Launches%20'EU%2DGCC%20Green%20Transition%20Project'%20at,counterp.
[13] Interreg Next Med, “Extended Deadline for the Call for Green Transition Projects,” March 28, 2025, https://www.interregnextmed.eu/extended-deadline-for-the-call-for-green-transition-projects/.
[14] Science Direct, “Mapping Europe Renewable Energy Landscape: Insights into Solar, Wind, Hydro, and Green Hydrogen Production”, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0160791X24000836.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Italian Institute for International Political Studies, “The EU-GCC Strategic Partnership in the Shadow of the Gaza War”, https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/the-eu-gcc-strategic-partnership-in-the-shadow-of-the-gaza-war-187401.
[17] Gulf Research Center, “Beyond the Stalemate: Rethinking EU-GCC Trade Engagement”, https://www.grc.net/single-commentary/244.
[18] Ibid.
