Indian Council of World Affairs

A high-level Ethiopian delegation led by Chief of the General Staff Field Marshal Birhanu Jula Gelalcha met with senior Russian defence officials led by Deputy Defence Minister Alexander Fomin in Moscow on 27 May 2025, demonstrating the expanding strategic ties between Russia and Ethiopia (MoD, Russia)^[i]. The defence delegation of both sides emphasised military-technical cooperation, implementation of current agreements and enhancing military ties. Russia’s presence in the Horn of Africa has not been as significant as in the Sahel region, as the internal tensions, territorial disputes and resource-sharing issues within the Horn of African states have made an avenue for many middle powers and major powers to leverage the instability to gain position in the region and to their advantage. The acquisition of air bases, seaports and the stationing of troops by players such as China, the US, Turkey, the UAE, Japan, Italy and Russia have turned the Horn of Africa into a battleground for influence^[ii]. Russia has been making attempts at building its ties in the region. In particular, the strong relationship with Ethiopia is steadily growing. Ethiopia’s recent tilt towards Russia sprouts from the deteriorating relations with the West and a desire to protect its sovereignty. Russia’s increasing activities on the African continent manifest the favourability of Russia as a security partner. 

What makes Russia a favourable partner to Ethiopia?

Ethiopia aims to remain a non-aligned country and strongly upholds the principle of sovereignty^[iii]. With national interest in the forefront of their foreign policy, Ethiopia is working towards pulling their population away from poverty and underdevelopment. Dependence on Western institutions for emergency aid, infrastructure, health, food and education has led to repeated backlash. In 2020, the US cut aid^[iv] amidst the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)^[v] conflict between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia. The US sided with Egypt and criticised Ethiopia for the possible water scarcity that the project could bring for the lower riparian states. This led to Ethiopia’s growing disenchantment with the West led by the US.

Ethiopia’s accession to BRICS in 2024 is a major step towards moving away from the West especially the Western economic systems, as Ethiopia was strangled by the sudden withdrawal of aid and suspension from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)^[vi] by the US in 2022. Ethiopia has applied for membership of the BRICS New Development Bank, offering an alternative to the Western-dominated financial institutions^[vii]. The conditional nature of Western aid, often tied to prescriptive democratic and economic reforms and perceived interventionism, makes the US an uneasy partner for many.

Regionally, neighbouring states such as Egypt, Eritrea and Somalia, which have disputes with Ethiopia and the support of major powers, have pushed Ethiopia to seek backing from a strategic partner of its own. The Tigray conflict^[viii] in Northern Ethiopia from 2020 to 2022 strained relations with Eritrea,^[ix] prompting regional rivals, such as Egypt and Eritrea to strengthen their ties and put pressure on Ethiopia. Given the rivals are backed by the West, particularly the US being unfavourable to Ethiopia, Russia’s approach to Ethiopia is far more welcoming. Moreover, in February 2025, the US has made a deal approving $1 billion arms sales to Egypt^[x]. A month later, Somalia^[xi] made a public offer to the US for using its air bases and ports, which can be threatening to the security of Ethiopia, as Egypt and Somalia share a disruptive relationship with Ethiopia at the moment. In response to this, Ethiopia seeks to expand its military capability. A Russian Navy delegation, led by the Deputy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Vladimir Vorobyev, visited Ethiopian Navy facilities and a training centre in Bishoftu on 14 March 2025 to sign an agreement to train military personnel, build capacity and modernise the Ethiopian Navy. This agreement reflects Ethiopia’s intent to broaden its training partnerships for the navy^[xii]. Additionally, the delegation from Russia and Ethiopia engaged in discussions on 27 May 2025 to enhance military technical cooperation, implement existing agreements, and strengthen bilateral military ties. Thus, as an enterprising step to act upon the regional threats for security, Ethiopia seeks to strengthen better economic and military cooperation with Russia.

How does Russia benefit?

Ethiopia is surrounded by conflicting neighbours, such as Somalia, Eritrea, Egypt and Djibouti, which have benefitted from the aid and air and naval bases of the West^[xiii]. Djibouti monetises strategic diplomacy by hosting Western military bases. Cautious about the rivalries of major powers, it refused to give bases to Russia to avoid conflict between the opposing powers^[xiv]. Somalia and Eritrea are supported by the US, and the presence of Russia in Ethiopia counterbalances the power competition in the region. Though Ethiopia has lesser access to the sea ports in the Red Sea, it can prove to be a feasible partner for Russia to access air bases and serve as a logistics centre in the Horn of Africa. BRICS membership during Russia’s chairmanship and the recent delegation also emphasise significant moves by Russia, which added Ethiopia to the list of countries following Nigeria and Tunisia^[xv], allowing its banks to trade in roubles, which allows the countries to de-dollarise their trade. This makes Russia turn to Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa.

Conclusion

Given its fragile position circumscribed by major and middle powers, Ethiopia is turning towards Russia, for military and economic security is compelling. For Russia, Ethiopia is a state to extend its reach in the Horn of Africa. This presence balances the regional power concentration of the West and gives an alternative to the states to diversify for greater manoeuvring and to hedge against the US.

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*Samyuktha P R , Research Intern, Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA)
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal. 

Endnotes

^[i] Russia & Ethiopia Cement Military Alliance During Talks in Moscow, Sputnik Africa, May 27, 2025, https://en.sputniknews.africa/20250527/1073542253.html (Accessed June 03, 2025)

^[ii] Estifanos Balew Liyew. Geopolitics of the Red Sea: Implications of foreign military bases expansion to the Horn of Africa security, African security review, April 18, 2024;33(3):294-306, https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2024.2340015 (Accessed May 30, 2025)

^[iii] Sizo Nkala. No dog in this fight: Interrogating Ethiopia’s calculated neutrality towards the Russia-Ukraine war, Contemporary Security Policy, September 15, 2024;45(4):657-669, https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2024.2400871 (Accessed May 30, 2025)

^[iv] Yohannes Gedamu. Suspension of US aid to Ethiopia is yet another example of Trump’s disregard for Africa, Down To Earth, September 27, 2020, https://www.downtoearth.org.in/economy/suspension-of-us-aid-to-ethiopia-is-yet-another-example-of-trump-s-disregard-for-africa-73556  (Accessed June 02, 2025).

^[v] GERD is a hydropower project by Ethiopia on the Blue Nile sprouting conflict between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia. The US cut aid to GERD and pressured Ethiopia to submit to Egyptian demands.

^[vi] Klyszcz IU. Despite Everything: How and Why Russia Remains an Actor in the Horn of Africa, PONARS Eurasia, November 04, 2024, https://www.ponarseurasia.org/despite-everything-how-and-why-russia-remains-an-actor-in-the-horn-of-africa/ (Accessed June 03, 2025).

^[vii] Okafor C. New era for Russia-Ethiopia relations as defense, currency, and BRICS deals unfold, Business Insider Africa, May 27, 2025, https://africa.businessinsider.com/local/markets/new-era-for-russia-ethiopia-relations-as-defense-currency-and-brics-deals-unfold/tsby5zy (Accessed May 29, 2025).

^[viii] The Tigray conflict was between the federal government of Ethiopia and Tigray’s People Liberation Front (TPLF) was combated by both Ethiopian and Eritrean troops, yet the tensions began when Ethiopia did not involve Eritrea in the Peace talks with TPLF.

^[ix] Plaut M. Looming Ethiopia-Eritrea Tension: Is new cycle of armed conflict imminent? Martin Plaut, February 28, 2025, https://martinplaut.com/2025/02/28/looming-ethiopia-eritrea-tension-is-new-cycle-of-armed-conflict-imminent/ (Accessed June 03, 2025).

^[x] The Media Line. US approves nearly $1 billion in military sales to Egypt, The Jerusalem Post, February 05, 2025, https://www.jpost.com/international/article-840809 (Accessed June 02, 2025).

^[xi] Somalia offers US exclusive control of air bases, ports, Reuters, March 28, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-offers-us-exclusive-control-air-bases-ports-2025-03-28/, (Accessed June 02,, 2025).

^[xii] The Maritime Executive. Russia Agrees to Help Landlocked Ethiopia Rebuild its Navy, The Maritime Executive, March 16, 2025, https://maritime-executive.com/article/russia-agrees-to-help-landlocked-ethiopia-rebuild-its-navy, (Accessed June 03, 2025).

^[xiii] Melvin N. The Foreign Military presence in the Horn of Africa Region, SIPRI, April 2019.  https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-04/sipribp1904.pdf ,(Accessed June 03, 2025).

^[xiv] Ibid [2].

^[xv] Ibid [7].