Indian Council of World Affairs

Dr. Dhrubajyoti Bhattacharjee: Good afternoon, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen. Before we start the discussion today, the Council sends out condolences and support to all the family members and loved ones of the deceased and injured in yesterday's grievous plane accident in Ahmedabad. It is my pleasure to welcome you all to the Indian Council of World Affairs for this panel discussion on the theme Operation Sindoor Starting a New Narrative. May I request you to keep your phones on the silent mode, please. Thank you. 

We will start this afternoon's program with Ms. Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, Acting Director General, ICWA, delivering her opening remarks. The panel discussion will be chaired by Ambassador Satish Chandra, former Deputy NSA and High Commissioner to Pakistan. The discussion will be followed by a brief question and answer session, moderated by the Chair.

May I now request Ms. Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, Acting Director General, ICWA, to kindly give her welcome remarks, ma'am.

Nutan Kapoor Mahawar: Distinguished Chair and panelists, members of the diplomatic corps, students and friends, six months ago, in January, ICWA organized a panel discussion to assess the ongoing crisis in Pakistan. The discussion focused on the trends of the last 15 years, especially post-President Musharraf, in Pakistan's domestic political, security and economic environment and their external implications. The discussion expressed the view that Pakistan's polity, since its inception, has provided fertile soil for the breeding of religious radicalism, and ferment, military adventurism, deceit, and has pursued a unifocal policy of hate towards its larger neighbor, defining its existence and external relations, as well as the indoctrination of its people on that basis.

Pahalgam was yet another brutal instance of Pakistan's consistently errant and demonic behavior, which received the response that it ought to. With the rising severity of terror attacks since the past decade and a half, and learning the lessons of 26/11, which you all recall, including the young students, there has been a compelling need for India to alter its geo-strategic posture in response to Pak-sponsored terrorism, opting to escalate its response to terror attacks, an approach which was avoided in the past. Yes, to alter its geo-strategic posture and approach to Pakistan.

Initiating with the surgical strikes on terror pads in PoK after the Uri terror attack, striking terrorist camps post-Pulwama in Balakot, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Operation Sindoor is a natural progression of India's evolving new posture. Operation Sindoor saw the taking down of nine terrorist infrastructures, as you have all heard on TV, including the JEM and LET headquarters and numerous terrorist camps and 11 military air bases inside Pakistan. Operation Sindoor showed to the world the nuclear bluff and rhetoric that Pakistan banked on till date and the general weakness of Pakistan's military defense, even in protecting its own military infrastructure, including its nuclear arsenal.

Operation Sindoor was a resounding military success, backed by the full support of the people of India. India has long spoken about the connivance of the Pakistan military with terror groups in international and bilateral fora. Operation Sindoor has not only exposed the ineffectiveness of Pakistan's military, but has also reinforced its perception as a parasite on Pakistan's society with its strong linkages to terror and unlawful activities and its deep-seated, rent-seeking behavior.

Friends, our discussion today is meant to focus on starting a new narrative in our approach to Pakistan, beginning with Operation Sindoor. What must be the elements of this new approach? The following come to mind. 1. Inflicting punishment for conspiratorial behaviour politically and economically. 2. Using full-state machinery to counter Pakistan's evil designs. 3. Full demonstration of India's might. 4. Zero tolerance to terrorism, implying destroying hardcore terrorists and terror infrastructure within Pakistan, accompanied by credible threat of use of force for every act of terror on Indian soil. 5. Inflicting pain where it hurts the most, namely, suspending the Indus Water Treaty. 6. Firm policy of no talks.

Puncturing Pakistan's nuclear blackmail tactics. 8. Exposing the insincerity of Pakistan's strategic restraint regime, as also of its international exponents. 9. Calling the bluff of nuclear flashpoint theorists within and outside Pakistan. 10. Obliterating Pakistan's dubious distinction between state and non-state actors, serving as fountainheads of terror and nuclear proliferation emanating from Pakistan. 11. Destroying any linkage between weapons of mass destruction and terror. 12. Rethinking and reviewing the existing CBMs – Confidence Building Measures – metrics with Pakistan in the backdrop of India's evolving new posture. 13. Continuing to expose Pakistan's compulsive hostility to India with renewed vigour.

Friends, with Operation Sindoor, we finally stand de-hyphenated from Pakistan. When I joined the Indian Foreign Service nearly three decades ago, we were told at our training school, our alma mater, that Pakistan is India's Achilles heel. Today, that sounds totally anachronistic. We can firmly say that those days are well past us. Pakistan's misdemeanour, dishonesty and conspiracies have been completely vanquished by India's rise, its resilience, its civilizational strengths and the honesty, sincerity, capability and hard work of its people. No force in the world can keep us boxed in South Asia and locked into persistent hostility with Pakistan and this really is the true meaning of de-hyphenation from Pakistan.

The world is India's oyster and Pakistan a mere speck and irritant. And yes, India has only just announced a strategic pause in Operation Sindoor. I look forward to a thought-provoking discussion and I wish all the panelists all the very best. Thank you.

Thank you ma'am. May I now request Ambassador Satish Chandra to give his remarks and conduct the proceedings. Ambassador, sir.

Satish Chandra: Thank you very much. At the outset, I would like to say what a pleasure it is for me to be here at ICWA. And this is all the more so because around six decades ago, I started my probationary period at ICWA. We used to have our training here. So for me, this is alma mater. And it's a particular pleasure for me to be here. And I'm grateful that you have thought it fit to invite me to this event to chair it. 

At the very outset, I would like to commend ICWA and to Ms. Mahawar for the very detailed comments she has made summing up the main aspects of Operation Sindoor and what it means so very well. At the risk of being a bit provocative, I would suggest that many in India, and it's unfortunate because Pakistan is a neighboring country, still don't fully understand the ugly nature of Pakistan. And I think, think tanks like ICWA should be more proactive in filling this gap of understanding Pakistan. This is a deliberately provocative comment which if asked in the question answer session I would be happy to elaborate upon. I won't do so right now because I want to remain within my five minute time. 

I think the points for discussion are very clear from what Ms. Mahawar mentioned, and from the very good concept note that has been put out. I'm sure the distinguished panelists who are here with me, and it's a well-chosen panel, because you have representation from the military, from media, and from academe, will be able to appropriately address these issues. I would, however, like to mention six points which stand out for me in terms of Operation Sindoor and I'll be very, very brief. 

First. Op. Sindoor was a short, sharp, swift example of modern non-contact warfare ending in an emphatic Indian victory. Pakistan pleaded for ceasefire. India agreed because our primary objective, namely getting at the terrorists, was fulfilled. 

Two, and Ms. Mahawar has made this point, and it is important so I would repeat it, the operation successfully called Pakistan's nuclear bluff and as we all know that this bluff has rarely been called in the past. 

Three, it demonstrated very clearly that India had come a fairly long way, both in preventing any damage to itself by Pakistani retaliatory action. And you all saw visuals of the many drones, UAVs, etc., that came at us. Damage on the Indian side was minimal. And along with that, we were able to cause fairly considerable damage on the other side with pinpoint accuracy. 

Four, we came through as an extremely responsible state taking great care to minimize collateral damage and not escalating the conflict. Our objective was to strike at the terrorists. We did so. However, when Pakistan went further, we reacted and caused the sort of damage we felt was necessary to prevent them from going further. 

Five, as stated by the Prime Minister and it needs reiteration, acts of terror will be treated by India as acts of war. 

Finally, the sixth point, which is, I think, very important and an allusion was made to this already. There will be no business as usual with Pakistan as long as it does not end its use of terror. And I think this cannot be better symbolized than by our having decided to keep the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance till Pakistan stops exporting terror. In my view, this is our Brahmastra, even more telling than kinetic action. 

I'll conclude here and turn to our eminent panelists, who I would request to kindly, strictly abide by the 10-minute timeline, as suggested by the organizers, so that we can have time for a meaningful discussion. The first speaker is my good friend,  General Syed Ata Hasnain.

Syed Ata Hasnain: Thank you, sir. Thank you very much. And am I audible at the back? Thank you. 10 minutes under the sun. Very, very difficult and challenging assignment, no doubt. Ambassador Satish Chandra, thank you so much for chairing this session. It's an honor always to be with you on any panel. My friend Aditya, with whom I have spoken so many times on television panels, and of course, other academic panels, it's always a pleasure to be with you too. And thank you, ICWA, since I'm also a member of your governing council, it's a double pleasure for me to come and be here and join you for this session.

This discussion has used one term in the concept paper also, and being used all the time since 22nd of April, all the time it's been in the media. The term is called narrative. I'm not sure how many people academically in India understand the meaning of narrative. So I chose to define it. Let me define it the way I picked it up. In conflict terms, narratives can be of all kinds. In conflict terms, in post-conflict terms, which is what we are looking at here, a narrative is a structured and often a contested account that societies construct in the aftermath of a violent conflict to explain the causes, the consequences, the role of various players and the way forward. That's what is a narrative.

It brings in legitimacy, it brings in the issue of blame, issue of who were the perpetrators, whether any reform is required in the post-conflict period, who was the victor and who was the defeated, and the possible and the potentiality of resurgence. All this comes into narratives, I can keep going on and on. It is crafted for domestic and international consumption. And rarely do you ever find a single narrative, narratives will be multiple across the board.

So, keeping this aspect in the back of your mind, so far we have seen 13 issues, 6 issues by Ambassador Satish Chandra, now I'll come down to something somewhere nearby, 10 issues. 10 questions I will ask myself and indirectly asking you. Should India have executed Operation Sindoor on the 23rd of April, considering that 22nd of April was Pahalgam? A day after the Pahalgam massacre and not waited till the 7th of May? That's a question that lots of people should be asking. I would say what we did, waiting 15 days, no doubt, we followed the same old practice during the surgical strikes, we also waited I think 14 days and the other one was 15 days too. A pattern has been set, but it was the minimum period required.

And remember, especially when two nations are both nuclear armed, a suddenness of a decision, despite a terrorist act or anything, a suddenness of a decision can cause a certain degree of turbulence, psychological, mental turbulence. And therefore, chances are rarely taken in this circumstances of surprise is a very important factor of which is there in war. But despite that, when you have a nuclear angle attached to it, normally most states would desist from it. So I think we did the right thing, absolutely the correct thing.

Second thing, a build up. You can't stay in a state of mobilization forever. You can't say the Indian Air Force must keep the assets exactly at those places from where they're going to attack is physically not possible. And it's very, very expensive to stay in that state. What happened in Parakram, you had the army in state of mobilization for almost 15 months and it affected us so deeply as far as our budget was concerned. So I think the decision was absolutely bang on, intelligence wise also, planning wise also. You can't always be planning for a decision or for a strike the very next day or the very same night when something has happened.

Why was Pahalgam executed at all? Knowing that Pakistan could not have sustained an inevitable conflict which would follow or that economically Pakistan was in a position to continue with it after having provoked it or from an internal security angle or from the western border angle, what was happening on the Duran line. So why would Pakistan decide to suddenly all of a sudden one fine day provoke India in this particular manner? And the answer to it lies in two issues. Number one, the irrational character of the Pakistani nation. There's nothing rational. You can never apply rationality there.

To say, Pervez Musharraf, why did he decide to do Kargil at that time? Brilliant conflict initiation, deciding to go into Kargil. Where did he ever think of conflict termination? Where would that conflict take him? He never looked at it. Similar here. Brilliant initiation. You go in and good tourist season going on, 8 lakh people having visited the Tulip Garden, etc. And suddenly you do this provocative act. Good. You have done whatever you wanted to try and achieve. Where will it take you? That issue was somehow, has never been explained correctly. And I think a lot was dependent upon Asim Munir's personal ambitions. To be seen to be different, to be seen to be Pervez Musharraf plus. That was one of his things.

And if you've seen his background, he's a Hafiz. Very, very deeply religiously ordained. Otherwise, he's the kind of guy who thinks he's different. And he was suffering from a bit of a setback with the events which happened on the 9th of May last year. When the core commander's house was raided and you had biryani being taken away from his refrigerator and things like that. It set the army back in terms of reputation and internally within the army, there were problems taking place. So he wanted to show himself up again. Most Pakistani chiefs or senior functionaries are those who have served in Kashmir. Those who have stayed and commanded 10 Corps. Asim Munir has not commanded 10 Corps, he's commanded 30 Corps down below in Sialkot.

And besides that, he rose to be the chief from the quartermaster general's appointment, which is usually a very rare thing. So his self-esteem is also a question thing, which was in question. To show yourself as a hero, all of a sudden, obviously, the irrationality factor was very strong. Did India achieve its political and its military objectives by launching Operation Sindoor? I think militarily, we succeeded in disrupting the terrorist infrastructure. We're striking deep for the first time in the center of gravity, right there in Punjab. We had our strikes, which were precision strikes. And as damage assessment showed subsequently, we never had any damage assessment available to us after Balakot. We did not have it after surgical strikes.

This is the first time when we had actual damage assessment available to us, which we could put out to the whole world. It reaffirmed our proactive action, forceful but measured retaliation, including the Indus Waters Treaty, the non-kinetic part of our response and retaliation has showed we could take extreme measures if required. Politically, I think it reinforced the political will, which seemed to have been acquired in 2016 at the time of the surgical strikes. Again, displayed in 2019 and this time, definitely displayed once again and reinforced. It reinforced affirmed proactive action also.

And besides that, one thing is quite certain that as far as success is concerned, we couldn't say that you have actually deterred Pakistan. A lot of people will ask you this question. Did India achieve deterrence against Pakistan? I don't think India ever set out to achieve deterrence. We know what is our military capability. We know what is the degree of asymmetry. It's not such an intense asymmetry that you can achieve deterrence in a limited conflict. This was a limited conflict, a limited war, you can say. To achieve deterrence, you have to go whole hog and probably fight a 22-day war or a 30-day war and destroy and degrade Pakistan's complete military machinery. Only then will you be able to achieve that kind of a deterrence.

The term to use here is dissuasion. What you achieved was actually dissuasion, which means the next time he decides to do it, he must think 100 times. He may have thought 10 times this time, but next time he must think 100 times. That is the cost which you have imposed on him. Were we ever close to a nuclear exchange any time during Op. Sindoor? Well, for the simple thing, I would say we didn't cross the international border. We didn't cross the line of control. We didn't carry out a blockade. Mostly, these are the issues which are considered as red lines, right? None of the red lines were threatened.

And I think that we kept escalation entirely under control. It's a contrived narrative which Pakistan may have put out that we were now, and a lot of people want to sort of believe into it, that we were hitting Kirana Hills where the nuclear facilities are, and that we were deliberately targeting them, etc. I don't think all that is entirely right from a professional angle. India was very clear, the red lines were not to be crossed. I have two, three minutes left.

What is the likely effect on Pakistan's Jammu and Kashmir obsession? Will it pull back from the proxy war? I think Pakistan has invested too much in Jammu and Kashmir since 1989. There's no question of pulling back. It will seek not to lose its relevance. If you ask me, the prime reason for Pahalgam, it was primarily to reestablish its own relevance. If Pakistan had not done something this year, and you had the most successful tourist season once again in Jammu and Kashmir, the relevance of Pakistan would have been halved to a great extent. And given the situation over the next couple of years, Pakistan would have been irrelevant in Kashmir. It is to regain that relevance, and I could always discuss this in greater detail.

From now onwards, what I anticipate you may not find too much of kinetics taking place in Jammu and Kashmir, but Pakistan will want to retain that so-called relevance it perceives that it has established. A sense of victimhood will be played, outreach to the youth, greater radicalization, using false flag kind of efforts to paint the Indian armed forces, try and target smaller targets like migrant labor or traffic policemen and things like that, so that a large number of such events act as if they are a big event.

The announced intent, the Prime Minister's intent, the Honorable Prime Minister's intent of every terror act being equal to war, which was alluded to just now by Ambassador Satish Chandra also, can this be sustained? To my mind, I think we are taking it too literally. The Prime Minister never intended to mean this, that for killing of a traffic policeman, we are going to go to war. No. What he said was he put Pakistan on notice. We will decide the time and place, the kind of provocation when we decide to go to war against you. And it was more rhetorical and more psychological.

After all, warfare conflicts are not just about kinetics. It's a lot to do with mind. And therefore, that psychological aspect was so important. There are nuclear risks involved, and the economics of being mobilized all the time. So I don't think the Prime Minister would ever look at it in a literal way. I think he has left it in the gray zone, which is exactly what it needs to be kept at.

My last point. What is meant by Op Sindoor has not ended. It's only on hold. Strategic pause, as was alluded to just now. Any operation, most of Indian army operations, Indian armed forces operations, do not end on a single fine day. They allow you to remain in a state of mobilization, readiness, etc., for whatever may come about. This is not a situation which is clear-cut, where everything is going to end on a particular day. You fall, July is the month when Pakistan is going to be chairing the UN Security Council. You never know what comes into the irrational minds of the Pakistanis at that time.

So that was my second last point, and my last point. Is it true that the post-conflict narrative of international support is in favor of Pakistan? That's a question I would definitely like to leave to my good friend Aditya to answer. But let me be provocative. There is a sense and feeling here everywhere in India, we won the war but lost the peace again. Is that true entirely, we can discuss that in questionnaire.

I will stop here and thank you very much for this opportunity.

Satish Chandra: Thank you very much, General sahab. Well, you had General Ata at his best, combining beautifully the military aspects of Op Sindoor with the political developments. I have a few differences with what he said and  many points of agreement but it was very good. Thank you very much. And now I turn to Mr. Raj Kaul, please.

Aditya Raj Kaul: Yeah, thank you very much. Firstly, thank you to ICWA, Nutan ji. And of course, it's a mighty challenge for me to speak after Satish Chandra ji and General Hasnain, two veterans and two people who have mastered Pakistan, in many ways to understand Pakistan. But as someone who has covered Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan for more than one and a half decade, and someone who comes from Jammu and Kashmir, I can speak just briefly about the past and present of Operation Sindoor, of what happened really, and what might happen, or how we need to prepare ourselves.

From the very beginning, the Pahalgam terror attack took place in April. And immediately, there was this news of how religion of those people was checked. And on the basis of the religion, this was done. And there was panic, there was a lot of fear, fear psychosis all across the country, globally as well. Because perhaps for the first time, on headlines, you had that on the basis of religion, such attacks were taking place. But to my friends here, I should tell you that this is not new. This has been happening for a very long time. And I'm telling you this, because you need to understand the background of how this happened.

A week or 10 days before the Pahalgam terror attack happened, we had the Pakistan Army Chief Asim Munir addressing Pakistanis in Pakistan. And he said, we are not like Hindus, we are very different. And that was seen as almost a call given to the proxy groups of Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir, and in Pakistan occupied Kashmir, to launch an attack. There are a lot of these sleeper cells of Lashkar-e-Toiba, of Jaish-e-Mohammad, of Hizbul Mujahideen over the years who have established themselves in Jammu and Kashmir. Currently, figures say that there would be perhaps 80 to 150 Pakistani terrorists hiding deep inside Jammu and Kashmir.

So this speech was directly linked to what happened in Pahalgam. Religion was checked and specifically, male members were targeted and killed. And the female, the spouses, were told to tell the Prime Minister that we are sparing your life and this is a message for the Prime Minister. And the message was taken and there was a response that was given. The response, with the name itself, Operation Sindoor, for the respect of the women who lost their husbands, their brothers, their sons, and their fathers.

But you need to understand the kind of radicalization that has grappled Pakistan completely. And you need to also understand the kind of security situation that's been happening in Pakistan, of course, over the last many decades, but especially over the last two, three years. In Baluchistan, there has been a complete rebellion that has picked up by the Baloch rebellion groups. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, there is the Pashtun Tahafuz movement that is leading a very peaceful march against the Pakistani regime. And on the other hand, there is the TTP, linked with the Taliban in Pakistan, with Afghanistan as well. And they are trying to strike the Pakistani army, the Frontier Corps, almost on a daily basis.

Unfortunately, we do not get this news very regularly, because the Pakistani media is moderated to a great extent by the Pakistani ISPR. Even during Operation Sindoor, we may have had midnight press conferences by Ahmed Chaudhry, the chief of the ISPR, the spokesperson of the Pakistan army, but we weren't given the real figures. Now, what is the most striking difference between Operation Sindoor and earlier operations that India did most recently in 2019, the Balakot air strikes, and 2016, the surgical strikes? At that time, there's this huge political debate in India about where is the proof? Where are the images? Where are the videos that have come out?

Now, this time, not only did we have satellite images and cockpit images of what really happened out there, we had proof coming in from the Pakistani public. Pakistani public immediately put out videos of what was happening all across, which was completely undeniable. The initial phase of the Operation Sindoor was very meticulously, very calculated, and in a very strategic fashion done to target only the terror epicenters in Bahawalpur, which is the headquarters of the Jaish-e-Mohammed, in Muridke, which is the headquarters of the Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Muzaffarabad, that's been a hotbed of terror launchpad for three decades or more now. It was very strategically said, and very openly and publicly said that we have nothing against the Pakistani public. We are not even attacking the Pakistan army. Our fight is against terror. And we have a linkage between the Pakistani terror groups, the proxy groups and the Pakistan army. But we are hitting the epicenters of terror. And we did that.

And when the retaliation came in, we went in for the air defense, and of course, for the airfields and the command control centers. Of course, there's a debate and I'm also of the opinion that India perhaps should have hit the air defenses much earlier, when the airstrikes were actually happening on the airfields, and before that before the terror launch pads, but militarily many would disagree and they would say that, if there was an attack on the air defenses in the initial phase of the operation, that would have been a blatant call for war.

But, my friends, as General Hasnain said, that one of the questions that we have been grappling with post-Operation Sindoor is also the narrative, is also whether we were successful. We were successful militarily, but were we successful in gaining peace, in gaining the narrative to make the international community understand the reality of the Pakistani terrorism and what has been happening. I think there's a marked shift again, because now we have ambassadors of India, especially in US, UK, Australia, and Israel, openly going to TV studios there, being questioned, and answering to the public out there, representatives of the public through media, as to what happened, why India was forced into this military confrontation.

But I also believe that India needs to engage much more with think tanks locally in global capitals, with the diaspora out there, and try to make not just a case, but an understanding of what Pakistan has been for the last many decades, and what we Kashmiris have been facing as civilians in Jammu and Kashmir for last more than 35 years. Now, this DNA of Pakistan Army, the Pakistani deep state, is not going to change. As General Hasnain again said, that yes, we were not there to deter, we were there to dissuade them. And that is, again, we've not crossed the nuclear threshold. But we have done something much mightier, but bigger than Balakot, and something which was purely visible to everyone to see.

Again, another question that we've been grappling with is of the ceasefire that happened on May 10. But you need to understand that Pakistan, after being attacked on the air bases and military command control centers and facing that embarrassment all across, was looking for an off ramp, was desperately looking for an off ramp. And that off ramp was provided when Pakistan Army and the Pakistani diplomats reached out to US, UAE, Turkey and China, asking them to mediate immediately. And that's how that off ramp happened. India was very categorical, because I was also briefed by the Ministry of External Affairs and others, I can tell you, that when JD Vance and Marco Rubio spoke to Indian leaders, they of course, asked for a dialogue. But India was very clear that we will go for a dialogue only when Pakistan requests us and says that they will end fire and we will agree to that limited dialogue that will happen. And that's what happened.

The DGMO of Pakistan on May 10 at around 1 p.m. reached out at 3.30 that dialogue happened and finally at 5 p.m. or later that ceasefire was achieved. Now will Pakistan change? I don't think so. Is Pakistan emboldened? I feel so and that's because you will have to understand the character of the Pakistan army and Asim Munir specifically. As General Hasnain again said that Asim Munir is a Hafiz. If you see his videos, he asks his soldiers that you are leading a Jihad against India. You're not Pakistani soldiers, you're soldiers of Allah leading this battle. The Allah is not on the side of India, Allah is on the side of Pakistan.

If this is the kind of brutal radicalization and indoctrination that is happening, if there is no professionalism, unfortunately in the Pakistan army, what else will you expect? When we attacked the Pakistani terror centers, one thing that happened was family members of a very dreaded terrorist, Maulana Masood Azhar, were killed in Bahawalpur. Next day we had funerals that happened all across in Muridke in Bahawalpur with the presence of the Pakistani military, the Pakistani police officers and district administration.

What more proof does the international community want of a direct linkage between the Pakistan army and their puppets, the Jaish-e-Mohammed and the Lashkar-e-Taiba? Now many feel what will happen now? I feel that terrorism will continue. I feel that terrorism will not be unfortunately restricted to Jammu and Kashmir, but perhaps in other parts of the country, because if you study the pattern of Jaish-e-Mohammed, it has not only attacked the Indian parliament or conducted attacks in Jammu and Kashmir, it has conducted attack in Pathankot, in Punjab, in several other areas. And if you have killed the family members of Masood Azhar, and nobody knows if Masood Azhar is alive, is he there or not, because perhaps since 2019, there's been a shadowy absence of his audios, etc. that have come up. But if you've done so, Jaish-e-Mohammed would want revenge.

And if you again study the Al-Kalam weekly that comes out from the Jaish-e-Mohammed, you would see that their attacks, their propaganda, their narrative is mostly against Prime Minister Modi, is mostly against Hindutva, is mostly against the RSS, is mostly against the Ayodhya. So you could imagine what could be coming for. You also saw that immediately in the retaliation that came in from Pakistan, there were temples that were attacked. And one very important thing that many people are not talking about is that over the last six years, ever since the abrogation of Article 370, there's been a paradigm shift with the way things have happened in Jammu and Kashmir.

There's been a relative peace and that's why when the common Kashmiris for the first time in last more than three decades tasted this peace, tasted this kind of a change happening on ground, there was tourism, there was a boom in economy, there was infrastructure development that was happening, flyovers, trains now coming in, you saw the Prime Minister with the Vande Bharat recently. They felt that this is the new normal and this is how we want to live in India very peacefully. But Pakistan was frustrated, Pakistan was desperate that this peace should not continue for a very long time and that's why this attack and there was this understanding as General Hasnain has served in Baramulla, in Srinagar, all across, he would know that there was this kind of an understanding or perhaps this understanding that there was, there will be no attack on tourists, there'll be no attack on tourism places.

But that is the rules of this engagement, this proxy war have completely changed with this brutal terror attack that has happened in Pahalgam. Nobody would have expected this. Last year, I was at the same location where this happened with my family members. And I actually motivated many others to visit the same place. I would urge people to go to Kashmir because that would be the strongest kind of response that we as a nation can give to bullies, to Pakistan sponsored terrorism.

I think, finally, I would say that militarily, we have achieved our target militarily, we wanted a limited kind of a answer to this kind of a terrorism that has come in, I think we've achieved our objectives. But when it comes to larger narrative, there's much more we need to do. And of course, when India plans to be a world power, India aims to be a world power, and India thinks that we can take an independent position that is in our national interest, when it comes to Russia-Ukraine conflict, or Israel-Hamas war, then we would have to be prepared that the Western countries or countries that matter, will perhaps put out a very balanced statement and not something that would be in our favor entirely, even if it is terrorism, even if it is something that needs to be condemned at a global level.

Finally, last point is the role of the United Nations. I think, over the years, United Nations has completely failed, unfortunately, to counter terrorism, to bring the international community together. When it comes to terrorism, you can't be only asking for a ceasefire all the time, or just issuing condemnation, or paper statements, you need to rise to the occasion. This is a UN that is mentally and physically 50 years behind. And there need to be reforms in the United Nations. If that does not happen, I think these are testing times for the UN. I mean, I don't think that a larger peace could be achieved when the UN looks the other way. Thank you very much.

Satish Chandra: Thank you very much, Mr. Kaul. You would agree with me that this was not only a passionate exposé, but a brilliant summing up of developments. Thank you very much. I think, as was said, the Pahalgam attack was an attack both on Insaniyat and Kashmiriyat.  As regards the UN, when has it ever worked actually? Patel in 1948-'49 said that it's the UN insecurity council, not the UN Security Council. So, this is a rather old story. But now we have the third speaker. I think he is joining us online. This is Dr. Tanvir Arshed from Presidency University, Kolkata. So, he would be speaking now.

Tanwir Arshed: Hello. Yes. I hope I'm audible.

Satish Chandra: Yes, you're audible and you have 10 minutes. Do stick to that, please.

Tanwir Arshed: Yes. I'm sorry. I mean, good afternoon to the distinguished chair and all my respected panelists and audience on and off the dais. Before I begin, let me take this opportunity to express my gratitude and thankfulness to the council for organising such an insightful discourse on decoding the narratives of Operation Sindoor. And I especially convey my regards to Dr. Bhattacharya, Dhrubajyoti Bhattacharjee, for inviting me to share my thoughts on the same.

Now, as the distinguished chairs has reminded me that I've been allotted with 10 minutes to put up my comments on the broader theme of today's discussion, I prepare myself mentally to limit my arguments and understanding of the post-Pahalgam terror attack in 10 major themes or sectors, if I may say. So, see, as a student and a scholar of world politics, we believe that narrative building in international relations are very crucial in mapping and reading the discourse of foreign policy analysis.

Now, usually these narratives, as Mr. Hasnain has talked about, are built when we see that there is a threat to override the existing status quo or existing order. And these are primarily done by state or non-state actors. In fact, the Pahalgam terror attack and the aftermath can be considered as one such really significant geopolitical or geostrategic development which, in fact, not only changed the ontological nature of the state-sponsored terrorism, but simultaneously gave a new epistemological thrust in analysis of any nation-state response towards the aggressor. However, if we analyze carefully, we see that Operation Sindoor and its aftermath can be analyzed and narrated in three different levels.

I divided my presentation in three different parts, the impact on the global, the sub-regional politics, and the domestic politics. And my presentations will basically try to encompass all these three levels of analysis. So firstly, at the sub-regional level, India's response after the terror attack is for substantial narratives. First, we were clear about setting new red lines of counterterrorism policy, especially with regard to the longstanding and recurrent sub-conventional state-sponsored strategy of terror, which has been constantly adopted by Pakistan since '47. Through this operation, India gave a bold and a definite stand against terrorism.

In fact, I would say that the successive round of, I mean, the strides, military mobilization on Pakistan's terror installment marked a new kind of India's counterterrorism approach by treating and leveling any kind of terror attack as act of war. Now, it has set a new narrative that henceforth, any terrorist provocation by our neighboring state is supposed to be met with a full-scale conventional response by India.

The second aspect, which I would like to focus on, is India's effective and robust deterrence posture. India succeeded in striking the targeted terrorist strike from distance. Our layered air defense system effectively intercepted the waves of incoming troops and missiles. Our air power suppressed the adversary's attacks. And finally, our missile proficiency was evident in precisely hitting on Pakistan's terror outplay, which actually showcased the new and effective deterrence posture, which was very clear. That simply we need to escalate to de-escalate these sort of developments.

The third was we were clear and bold in bashing the stability and stability paradox of Pakistan nuclear bomb. From swift cross-border surgical strike, which was just now mentioned in 2016, to the airstrike which we had in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region in 2019, and the recent Operation Sindoor, we have progressively expanded the scope of our operations. And this has exposed the emptiness of Pakistan's non-narrative nuclear threat, which it has always tried to give up in a form of a catastrophic escalation. And it made it very clear for our troubled neighbor that terrorism in any form and any type will always be met with a calibrated military response without inviting a nuclear holocaust.

The fourth aspect which I feel that this Operation Sindoor has set is reinforcing Pakistan's shadow and secret games with terror house fit. There has been a lot of evidence in the past and in present, which was just mentioned by my previous speaker, where the evidence of funerals of terrorists attended by high-level Pakistani military, ISI and police officials reiterated once again Pakistan's deep link to harbor and give a safe haven to terrorist outfit. In fact, post Abbottabad, it was very clear that Pakistan still remained constantly in its policy of providing a safe haven for all form of fringe, fundamentalist and terrorist outfit with a single agenda of destabilizing the regional status quo and peace process.

Moving to the global level, if I try to analyze, we'll see that first of all accepting the proposal to keep Operation Sindoor in an abeyance or I would like to reframe it as a strategic pause for the time being, especially at a point of time when we were at the zenith of an advantageous position in the war, yet again showcased India's long-term civilizational commitment for a peaceful and a rule-based world order. We didn't want to give birth to another Ukraine or Syria or Palestine or Israel. Rather, the strategic pause in Operation Sindoor reflects India's mature strategic calculus, which is deeply rooted in our civilizational philosophy of Buddha, of non-violence of Gandhi, of Nehru and Tagore.

If also analyzed carefully, we'll see that India's response through Operation Sindoor, in fact, was very carefully crafted and calibrated. And henceforth, globally, we bring a new form of a precision-based warfare, which in fact added a new debate in the existing literature of limited warfare under any nuclear umbrella. We were ethical, we were responsive, we were very well designed, and we tried to avoid collateral damage to military, civilian, and government establishment as much as possible. A highly commendable yet a morally virtuous move of voicing our grievances, which I say is nothing but a sheer marker of a true Vishwa Guru, which India is actually proceeding forward.

The third aspect of India's global impact of decoding Operation Sindoor narrative is reflected in India's firm commitment to negate the two-nation theory. When, as an academician, we analysed the configuration of the global delegation which was sent for voicing out India's stand on terrorism, it not only projected India's mature diplomatic move, but was also interesting in a way that the convoy had 10 Indian Muslim leaders, which in fact reiterated our continuous non-commitment to a two-nation theory, which is the basis of Pakistan. In fact, if I try to analyse South Asia, one aspect of South Asian nation was born because of religion, another region on the extreme east is born out of civilisation language, but we were groomed and birthed and our establishment is based on our civilisation, rich heritage, and that got further reiterated.

Fourth aspect, I would like to mention that what we did because of Operation Sindoor was also we bashed the Western gender-biased masculine discourse of foreign policy. The language, the sophistication, the humbleness, and yet the sheer commitment to uphold the nation's pride and interest, which was reflected by our spokesperson, especially Wing Commander Gyomika Singh and Colonel Sophia Qureshi. It not only bashed the Western narrative of hegemonic masculinity that dominates the understanding of foreign policy, but in fact brought forth a new understanding of a gender-neutral, unbiased foreign policy narrative, which is nothing but carrying forward the legacy of bloods of Rani Lakshmi Bai and others. This is something which I would romanticise at what Tagore would say, that anything is right as long as chitto jata bhai sunno utcho jata shir, when the hell is high and the mind is without fear.

Lastly, in the democratic parlance, we witness that this Operation Sindoor has reiterated a new form of cooperative para diplomacy. Or, let's say a non-western way or an Indian way of understanding how diplomacy works. For instance, the All Party Delegation for Global Diplomacy, which was a hallmark of Indian democracy. We saw opposition leaders coming in. We saw that irrespective of ideological or political commitments, people and our leaders coming forward, giving priority to our national interests, voicing out our grievances, it's something which has set a completely new narrative of understanding how diplomacy works in a present globalized world order.

Although this is nothing new, I mean, because if we remember that Mr. Vajpayee was sent to Geneva by Prime Minister Narsimha Rao once long back when he was trying to talk about our stand. So this is something which has brought an Indian way of looking things forward or which I would say reminds us of what once our former Prime Minister, Prime Minister Vajpayee reiterated "that it is our Indian parampara that sarkare aayenge aur jaayenge, satta aayenge aur jaayenge, but desh zinda raana chahiye, desh ka lok tantra zinda rahna chahiye." So, simply putting it forward, Operation Sindoor yet again brought forward boldly the narrative that for Indian nation comes first.

What would be the repercussion of it and what would be the aftermath of this Operation Sindoor on the geopolitics of the region and tracking how Pakistan is going to respond to it. It has been beautifully explained by my previous speakers, but I would like to just comment and end my arguments by saying this word that, this is nothing new that Pakistan is doing in. Pahalgam was one of an incident, which is expected from a troubled failed state like Pakistan, a state whose GDP is sliding down, a state who is going down in the poverty level, a state who has no match but only a single agenda of destabilizing the peace process, rule-based world order of the region or the global foray. Incidents like this is something which is bound to take place. What we need to do is we need to adopt a very cautious, very strategically, stringent move, simply escalate our power to ensure that...

Satish Chandra: May I request you to end as we are running out of time. Thank you for ending and it was interesting to hear an academic point of view on this development and now we will open up the discussion. I will take three questions and then you can kindly identify yourself, make the questions brief and if you want a particular panelist to answer it, please mention that.

Preet Malik Jaffray: Sir. Thank you. My name is Preet Malik Jaffray. I'm a retired diplomat so I suppose my questions would be slightly simpler. First question to the entire panel. Nobody has touched among you on the factor of intelligence. If I understood everything that you have pointed out, that is an extremely important element and I have a feeling that there we have a weakness. So I would like to have a comment from whichever one of you feels that you can offer something in that.

The second question is nobody has touched upon the fact that in the process of our revealing our technological strengths in the military side, what lessons would the Chinese have got? And what will they likely to make use of against us whenever the occasion arises? In that context, would they continue to utilize the facility that Pakistan provides for their testing out whatever weaponry and equipment and technology they would like to put. No one has touched on that and the impact of Operation Sindoor in that context.

The third element, a third question, if I may, is in the context of the American president's consistent position and this is not new. Even in his first term he had offered mediation. We have a situation developing now where Pakistan is openly requesting for the American intervention. India has been resisting that but taking in particular the context of the Indus waters treaty and its being held in abeyance. Will there not be further pressure on us, if even in terms of the weather itself, there's a shortfall in water flows into Pakistan, with a request for the Americans to intervene? So these are my three questions.

Satish Chandra: Yes, please.

Atul Aneja: My name is Atul Aneja, former Strategic Affairs Editor of The Hindu.

Satish Chandra: Yes, I've read you.

Atul Aneja: Thank you. I have a quick question for General Hasnain. You mentioned that we have been able to impose dissuasion, rather than deterrence, following off Sindoor. Just following up on that thought, that if we have imposed dissuasion, if I were a Pakistani, what would I look at? Would you think that the theatre may be shifting here, from Kashmir to Bangladesh, given the fact that there is, I would say, an anti-India government over there? And perhaps opening also entry for China and Pakistan together, looking more at Siliguri Corridor and the Northeast, as a response to what we have done in Absinthe.

And just quickly a second one, on the outreach by Pakistan to the United States this time. Do you think Pakistan will be able to balance its relations between the US and China? Because of the earlier question as well, you mentioned about the Americans coming in after Afghanistan. This is the first time they are back in the region after 2021. That's all. Thank you.

Satish Chandra: Yes, the gentleman there in red.

Sameer:  Yeah. Thank you. My name is Sameer. Since we are talking about narrative, narrative needs consumer. And for that, we give proofs. We sent a parliamentary delegation for more than 30 countries. So what is going to be the posture of international community when it comes to Pakistan? Is it going to be silence? Critical? Or call them friends and partners in terrorism and give them drudge, as it happened recently in US? Thank you.

Satish Chandra: Thank you. Now, we'll answer. We've taken these three questions. It's good seeing you, Preet. Your questions, are direct and straight  and I'll attempt to answer them. 

Look, this was something which I had planned to say that, in fact, what Sindoor has brought out is a near perfect sync of all of government action that was taken. And it goes without saying that the targeting, the pinpoint targeting that was done would not have been possible without intelligence. And taking on from what my friend Ata had said, is that in fact, if I look back, why was there that delay of 15 days between the Pahalgam attack and our reaction? It is because you have to update your information. We had the targets. These were available. We all knew these, but it was necessary to be sure of the latest situation which can only be provided by intelligence. We needed to be sure not only of the place to be hit but also as to who was there. 

So, intelligence played a critical part and it was excellent. In terms of revealing strengths any conflict is a learning experience and an opportunity to upgrade. You reveal certain things because you have to use your weapons. You have to use your systems. The other side learns, you will learn also. We have also learned in the process. And as someone was saying on another discussion the other day about China using Pakistan, we used to talk about it as a two-front war. It's not a two-front war. It's an extended front. 

Pakistan is being used by China and increasingly will be used by China. And it is really one entity. That's how I look at it at any case, that they are going to work hand in glove. In fact, the other day, I learned that there is a permanent presence of a senior Pakistani official in the PLA and vice versa. So, they are working in tandem. No question about it. 

About Trump, the less said the better. You can’t take him seriously. Yes, he stated that he mediated. But I think the proof of the pudding is in the eating of it. We are not and never have been interested in mediation even when India wasn't what it is today. Mr. Kaul mentioned this. He was privy to certain briefings which I wasn't privy to. 

So the question of our asking or wanting mediation is out of the question. It doesn't arise. For me, as an outsider and I'm a total outsider, I'm not as active as Preet is though he's a little bit older, but the point is, who telephoned whom for a ceasefire? It was the Pakistani DGMO. We didn't ring up. They were the ones who were asking for a ceasefire. 

The final point, and this is something which is very close to me, because I've been working on it for more than two or three decades is the Indus Waters Treaty and what could be the consequences of our declaration that it will now following the Pahalgam attack be kept in abeyance? The fact is that the Indus Waters Treaty was a badly negotiated treaty by us. It is highly unfair to us. We get only 20% of the waters in terms of the eastern rivers. The actual fair share of India is in excess of 40%. So the Treaty is bad. 

Now the fact is that since more than two years ago, we had been notifying Pakistan for a renegotiation of the treaty on a number of issues. They did not even want to talk to us about it. Today, when we have said Treaty will be held in abeyance they are crying but I hope we don't give in easily on this one and I don't think we will because it is very clear from what the government has said that until there is a clear indication that Pakistan will not involve itself in export of terror to India it will be kept in abeyance. Governed have couched this in much more elegant language than what I am using but in effect it is that. 

Now you may say Pakistan will go to court and they are making all sorts of noises about going to the International Court of Justice. Let me tell you very clearly that under international law and practice, that in case situations arise which are completely contrary to what existed at the time when the treaty was negotiated it need not be observed. In the case of the Indus Waters Treaty we were supposed to work in goodwill and in a cooperative spirit, much less go to war. Accordingly , since we are in near war like situation we have every right not to continue to adhere to the treaty and to observe its provisions. 

So we are actually on a very strong wicket. In any case, which upper riparian even listens to the lower riparian. I discussed it with the Turks when I was there two decades ago and I explained to them not only the IWT but also the  Farakka Agreement. And they were astounded at the magnanimity shown by India in the matter. 

I will now turn to General Ata Hussain who may wish to add or subtract to what I have said and respond to the other two questions.

Syed Ata Hasnain: I'll first of all address your question, sir. Firstly, to be fair, sir, 10 minutes would you not expect that everything which you perceive right or important is going to be covered by the speaker. It will be mostly as per the perception of the speaker. So I will bring out a lot of important aspects which you have just covered. Intelligence, strategic intelligence already covered by Ambassador Satish Chandra to a great extent. It's the tactical intelligence that we're going to talk about.

Are you aware, let me give it to you anecdotally. 25 years ago I was a Colonel General staff of the Victor force in South Kashmir. In the morning at 5:30, I used to get a Potha that's big of intercepts. Every morning was riffled through it to see what could possibly happen in our area and I could I can tell you I could almost determine where the terrorists are going to strike on what day at what time. Today none of that is possible because technologies have changed. All communications are being spoofed. WhatsApp, you can't break WhatsApp. I hope you're getting those messages on WhatsApp that everything you're speaking is private. We're not being able to break it.

So communication today, communication intelligence, signal intelligence is almost zero. Pahalgam, no one had any idea of anything like this happening around. That is one of the major disadvantages with which the security forces in Kashmir are working today and I would say all over the country today. Human intelligence because the strength of terrorists has come down to as what Aditya was saying 80 to 130. We stopped investing in human intelligence in a bigger way. It always happens when conflict starts drawing down and therefore today we are now having that problem of not having enough human resources, not having enough human and therefore I think this is an issue which needs to be revisited completely.

Second thing, the Chinese lessons. We didn't cross the national international border, we didn't cross the L.C. so it's nothing on ground warfare. What the Chinese definitely would be looking at is that the chances of something happening on the line of actual control is a limited war. I don't expect a general war against China anytime in the future, in limited war. He has probably looked at all the aspects of this four day 88 hour standoff and said these are the kind of situations which can happen on the LAC.

Now there, therefore all that which he has picked up would be from the air force, primarily air operations, the nature of air operations he would have observed. Now here also you found the air force didn't go all out. In 88 hours, we flew a couple of sorties here and there and remained grounded for some time and then flew again. I'm not sure that the Chinese could have picked up too much technical intelligence from what has happened here. Of course the Pakistanis were very, very hyper on trying to pick up things.

I'm waiting for a gentleman called Air Commodore Kaiser Tufail from the Pakistan air force who wrote a brilliant analysis of Kargil, if you remember, and also wrote a brilliant analysis on Balakot and the standoff after Balakot which happened with the MiG-21 bison. He will come out with something definitely technical in the near future, next couple of days you'll find a brilliant essay coming out, each time he does that. So that is something which the Chinese would obviously be looking at.

My second last point, the issue of dissuasion, sir. I would say the policy of 1,000 cuts has to continue. I'm looking at myself, putting myself into the shoes of a Pakistani planner and saying what can I do, which he is trying to dissuade me from doing. I must somehow continue this whole doctrine of a 1,000 cuts, which means let me extend it into other parts of India, let me do it in Jammu.

Jammu and Kashmir is a challenge today. Kashmir particularly is a challenge. Jammu region, Kathua region is still relatively easier to do it. Extend it into Punjab and very correctly brought out your second part of the question on this issue of Bangladesh. Extending it that side because you can make out that what had dried up in the northeast was support for the terrorist groups. Now if you're suddenly bleeding here in Punjab or in Kashmir and suddenly you start bleeding in Nagaland, Manipur and Meghalaya, that is a major challenge for you.

As far as the Siliguri corridor is concerned, I don't think that's a major threat. It happens, comes up as a major threat in an all-out war. In limited wars, I don't think this Lal Munir heart and all these things, this is all grey zone warfare. Putting it into your mind, doubts into your mind, it really doesn't have many great major significance.

My last question, this question which you asked about the international community's narrative on Pakistan, will it change? What Pakistan is really good at and is better than us is that strategic communication. Take it from me. Someone who has studied strategic communication for many years, right? I'll give you an anecdotally, went to Israel for the Herzliya Summit Counter-Terrorism Summit, was to speak on Jammu and Kashmir.

First time ever India was speaking at the Herzliya Summit on Kashmir. I said, here is a place I can speak openly. No one from Pakistan will be here because they don't even have diplomatic relations between Pakistan and Israel. At the breakfast table in the morning when I had to speak, three Pakistanis joined me for breakfast. They are everywhere, from Sydney to Singapore, to Manama, to Brussels, to Atlanta, to San Francisco. They are everywhere. And one of, we have been crying hoarse, sorry, sir, the Indian Foreign Service is here. We have been crying hoarse on this to say, let us ensure that all think tanks of the world, the important things out of the world are all sensitized to the Indian narrative.

Let us go and speak there regularly on a regular basis. It's not happened all this while. And it needs to happen. We need a strategic communication body in India like the ISPR, the Inter-Services Public Relations, which was raised in 1949, for your information. We haven't raised such a body till today.

Aditya Raj Kaul: Just briefly comment on two points. One is on the intelligence question. Often what happens in Jammu and Kashmir is that you have a general intelligence, but you do not have a specific intelligence. And over last two years, if you see, most of these terror attacks have been happening near forest areas. So what they do is they do recce, particularly in Jammu area, Jammu division.

And finally, after conducting the terror attack, they exfiltrate back to Pakistan. This happened over the last two to three years very often. What has also happened is that you mentioned technology. There is an app called AlpineQuest app, which the Pakistanis are using, made by China. And this is an offline app, works like Google Maps. You enter anything in advance. And the same was being used by the Pahalgam attackers and a lot of terrorists that have conducted terror attacks in Jammu.

Apart from that, they're using something called the ultra sets. Now these ultra sets are not exactly sat phones, not satellite phones, but similar to that. You can connect an ultra set to a mobile phone and send a text and audio and communicate. And you cannot detect an ultra set when pinpointed location. What we found out, what I know so far, is that during the Pahalgam attack, also ultra sets were being used.

And while, for a while, there was a pinpointed location of 10 to 15 kilometers in the entire forest. And that's why we saw over 48 to 72 hours, there were massive combing operations that were underway in those forests. But they either managed to exfiltrate, but my guess would be that the local OGWs would have been helping them to hide somewhere in Peshmerga.

Secondly, on the narrative aspect, you know, what has happened is that I divide this narrative into domestic narrative and international narrative. While domestic we have, we are always out there and you there's much success. But when there's international narrative, there are problems that we face because there's been a sustained campaign against India, particularly in some parts of the Western press, and some parts of the press in the Middle East as well. For instance, Al Jazeera, for instance, the Washington Post, etc, who have come in with, you know, articles, particularly from on Jammu and Kashmir, without any factual basis really coming in.

But I think there's been a drastic change as well, that we have, I completely agree with General Hasnain that we need a kind of a command center on strategic communications out there, we need to be learning from our adversaries. Not just that, I will go a step further, we need a Pakistan Studies Center, within the Ministry of External Affairs, we have a PYDESC.

But we do not have just like we have the Chinese study center, we do not have a Pakistan Studies Center. And we also need an intra communication within the government of India, MHA, MOD, MIB, and MEA, other ministries. At such very sensitive times, critical times, the communication is of essence. What I noted, and I've spoken ad nauseum about this is during the Pulwama terror attack, and later we did Balakot. And our pilot was taken by Pakistan.

During those period of 12 to 24 hours, there was complete silence by North Block and South Block during that time. This time, we did course correction to a greater extent. But I think when your adversary is on a communication mode 24/7, when your adversary has its complete media in his fist, and he controls what will go out in the Pakistani media, he controls what will happen, what will not happen. Journalists are kidnapped, journalists are abducted, journalists are forced to flee from Pakistan, you have to be prepared. And I would look inwards, I represent the media out here. Some of the reporting, unfortunately, that happened during that particular was unfortunate and sad.

So I'm not saying that the government should really go out with a stick to the Indian media and say that you need to report responsibly. But I think this needs to come within ourselves, particularly for the TV channels, that you cannot report in such a fashion where you your sovereignty, your national interest, your national security is compromised.

Satish Chandra: The lady yes.

Nandini Khandelwal: Thank you, panelists. I'm Nandini Khandelwal, research intern at ICWA. I have two questions. The first is that in the aftermath of the post-operation Sindoor, we could see hyphenation or re-hyphenation of India and Pakistan, if we see Trump's US, President Trump's statement as well. So this also points towards Pakistan not being held accountable for its actions. So is that a setback for India's foreign policy? And what should be the plan of action to secure India's image or narrative as to how world perceives it?

My second question is related to the abeyance of Indus water treaty. There are some debates ongoing about the apprehensiveness about India's dam capacity, like for how long will we be able to hold on to the waters? Is it enough? So can you touch upon that and tell us about the ground reality?

Satish Chandra: Thank you. Next one. Anyone else? Yes, the lady there. I'm partial to ladies.

Sakshi: Hello, good afternoon. Good afternoon, sir. This is Sakshi. And because my question is around journalism, so I would like regarding journalism and the background of the operations in news. All right, so it's open then. How does a modern military operations, like that of Operation Sindoor navigate a thin line between operational secrecy and democratic transparency in media and narrative building?

Satish Chandra: Okay, anyone else? The gentleman there.

Jal Trivedi: Good afternoon, sir. I am Trivedi Jal, a research analyst at TISE. So, sir, my question is to you that given that Pakistan has close coordination with China, and as we have seen during the Operation Sindoor as well, and our recent engagement with Beijing, particularly since and our recent engagement with Beijing, particularly since the Kazan summit that happened in Russia in 2024. So, sir, what do you think about the future of Indo-China TISE, given that China has continued to support Rawalpindi?

Satish Chandra: Sorry, I didn't hear that.

Jal Trivedi: So, sir, what do you think about the future? of the Indo-China TIES, given China's continued support to Rawalpindi?

Satish Chandra: Okay. So we'll take that and we'll close it. Let's start with the journalist question and that you go with first.

Aditya Raj Kaul: I'll just briefly touch on the first two questions about a false equivalence that is put in between India and Pakistan. I think that continued from Clinton to Obama to even Trump to a certain extent. But I'll just read for you a tweet that Donald Trump did on January 1st, 2018, at 5:42 p.m. He says the United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than USD 33 billion in aid over the last 15 years. And they have given us nothing but lies and deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools. They give safe haven to the terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan with little help, no more.

Now, this is what happened in 2018. And we know what happened later. We also know what happened when Taliban tried to take over Afghanistan. And there was this Doha talks that were underway. And how US faced a miserable embarrassment on the Hamid Karzai airport when you saw those US aircrafts actually flying in and people flung all across. So the reality of the matter is that there is an hot and cold approach that Trump has. I think Trump uses these kind of statements that he makes as leverage in many ways.

I think our diplomatic heft would come under test with such statements, with changing of the statements that are coming in from Trump and Washington, D.C. But I think whatever we saw, Trump going across and saying that trade was used, etc., was not the reality. Trade was never discussed when Rubio and JD Vance actually spoke. Trade never actually came under talks. And yesterday also, when Trump spoke, he said that I've been, I was the one who got the peace done and ceasefire done. And I haven't seen even a single story out there.

But the reality of the matter is that trade was never discussed. Yes, maybe they spoke to the Pakistan Army chief and told him that if you agree to a ceasefire, then probably you will get the IMF loan and probably you will get the World Bank loan and we'll be easy on you in that regard. Who knows? Perhaps we'll know in future.

Secondly, on the aspect of our reportage when it comes to military conflicts and secrecy to be maintained, I think firstly, I would urge our Indian media to conduct conflict training exercises, because what happens at the level of the Associated Press or Reuters or BBC, etc., is not very much visible when it comes to conflict reportage out here. I haven't seen any major media house in India giving firstly, training conflict training, both in terms of reportage in terms of secrecy, etc. To the journalists, or war reporters or correspondents. 

And secondly, I think to the from the government side, I think the most important thing is engagement you have to keep journalists engaged always when there is a military conflict ongoing, of course, whoever owns the story, will actually rule the story will rule the social media will rule the media all across. And this is what happened during Balakot as well. Our strikes were a paradigm shift, really, we had never seen something like that for years. But we had a gentleman called Asif Ghafoor on the other side, who was going on a press conference, and his press conference was being televised live all across while we were standing at the North Block, waiting for some kind of a development or some information.

So I think basic training, conflict reportage, engagement from the government side, as General Hasnain said, very importantly, strategic communications is of essence in many ways, when such military conflicts happen, you have to preempt that this will happen and you have to be ready for that. I think our DGMOs are officers like Qureshi, Colonel Qureshi was a brilliant exercise that a woman face bravely putting across details of Operation Sindoor. And on the other hand, DGMOs before they speak, putting out a one minute clip of what has happened the reality of terrorism, which is age old and the international community must realize.

So I think we have learned a little and I can tell you that on 11 years of Modi government, I was on a lunch with a senior minister, I won't name him. But he agreed the first statement that he made to me, just two days back was that on narrative, we need to do much more. I think there needs to be a course correction. Thank you.

Syed Ata Hasnain: I'll address this in 30 seconds, the issue of media, that's essentially Aditya's domain. But I'll say, if anything, to understand between secrecy or otherwise, the media is equally nationalist, patriotic and nationalist. And the media has to must be made to realize what is national interest. The best way of making the media realize what is national interest is to ensure that you have closer interaction between the media and the armed forces in particular, because they are the ones who have to work together during conflicts.

I find we introduced war correspondent courses, if you remember, information warfare courses, but I don't think these are taken seriously enough. We need to invest much more in this. The manner in which Gulf War I started with embedded journalism in 1990. That's the kind of way you got to take this by the throat in a transformational kind of way. It can't work transactionally at all.

Having said that, the issue of hyphenation. I'm not going to look at hyphenation side of it, but I will definitely say one thing from my experience. I've done a couple of courses in the United States of America also. This I can say that if I was standing with a Pakistani officer here, or two Indian officers and two Pakistani officers were standing here, and a US Army general walked in, you can take, you can bet anything, he will first shake hands with the Pakistani. He won't come to me. No, he won't come. SEATO, CENTO, you got to remember the age old relationship of the 50s, the military to military relationship, when the Americans were deep in trouble in Vietnam, in Korea, etc. It was Pakistan which was joining in.

Now, let's look at other investments. Are you aware, last year when Ukraine ran out of ammunition, there was not a not a bomb left in Ukraine. Where did the ammunition come from? It came from Pakistan. USD 600 million worth of ammunition was airlifted in C-17s by the American armed forces straight to Ukraine. That's why this kind of a relationship exists. And there's no question of hyphenation or anything in that case.

This relationship has been age old, and each time you perceive that is breaking down, it seems even better. Why? Yesterday morning's news, Asim Munir going to the United States, visit, he's a part of that for the celebrations of the US Army or whatever it is. So we have to invest much more in these things. We have not done perhaps enough of it. Was there any other question for me? Thank you.

Satish Chandra: So first on the Indus Waters Treaty about dam capacity. Actually, it is correct that in the short term, one will not be able to do too much in terms of affecting water supply to Pakistan. But if the Treaty is kept in abeyance, we will over time be able to undertake projects on the western rivers which are currently prohibited and thus will be able to enhance our  utilization capacity. Incidentally, we have still not exhausted the water utilisation permitted to us under the Treaty. 

As of now, we are not required to give Pakistan any water from the three Eastern Rivers, but actually some water continues to flow to it from these  rivers. Similarly, on the Western Rivers, we have not fully utilised the capacity  permitted to us under the Treaty. 

Thirdly, on Western Rivers, people don't know this well enough, many projects permitted by the Treaty and proposed by us which would actually be of direct benefit to Kashmir, like the Tulbul navigation project, have been stymied by Pakistan. They can be resumed pretty fast. And even existing projects, like Salal, etc., which is on the Chenab, they, because of the restrictions imposed by the Treaty, are not functioning optimally and their life has decreased. For instance, we are not allowed to open the sluice gates for flushing operations essential for desilting. Now, those can be done. In fact, we have started doing this already after keeping the treaty in abeyance. 

So, actually, by keeping the Treaty in abeyance not merely can we impose costs on Pakistan but we can also improve the situation in India, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir. 

On the question of collusion between China and Pakistan this is an old story. It hasn't started today. It's been building up over the decades. In fact, their nuclear capability, is a Chinese product. Their missiles are Chinese. So, this game has been going on. 

As to military build up Pakistan first received support from the Americans and not it is from China. We are aware of it and will have to manage our relations with both these countries. It is difficult for India, but doable. 

Now, just very quickly, we are running out of time. I'll be brief in my closing comments. I particularly want to address two issues. I won't go over various things which have been stated in the course of the discussions. 

One is, why did Pakistan do Pahalgam? And what was the rationale for that? And we spoke about it being an attack on Insaniyat and Kashmiriyat. Absolutely correct. The other point which is very, very important is we must keep in mind the timing. Pakistan is in deep trouble and was in deep trouble when this happened. Asif Munir was not a very popular general. In fact, his name was mud in Pakistan. Pahalgam was devised to revive him. That's why this is perhaps the first instance in history where a General has been made a field marshal after having lost in a conflict. 

And as Mr. Kaul pointed out, the other thing which is very bad for Pakistan is that many parts of it are in virtual revolt. In Baluchistan, we have all seen and heard about the Jaffer Express incident. It's not just that. Incidents are happening even as I speak. Every day there is an incident in Baluchistan and the Army is in deep, deep trouble. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, it's the same story at a lower level but the movement is intense. The Pathans and the Punjabis have never got on historically and this has got exacerbated. Sindh is deeply upset now because the Pakistan army is doing a project entailing the diversion of  water, the Cholistan project. 

So, Pakistan is in very, very deep trouble. When in trouble, it turns around and attacks India in one way or another. And here I would like to say what I started off with that people in India don't understand Pakistan well enough. There are two exceptions on both my sides. I think they know Pakistan and the reality of it very well. But to put it very clearly and here I disagree a little bit in nuance in terms of ideology. 

Yes, Mr. Kaul is right that Pakistan has over the years from Zia's time onwards been radicalized. This is a process which is continuing. It is now at a much higher level than ever before. But it isn't ideology per se. From 1947 onwards, it has been Pakistan's leitmotif, if I may say so, to undermine India. India is the enemy. There is a wonderful book written by BK Nehru in which he relates an incident and this dates back to 1948 when he was in Pakistan. He was a member of the Indian Civil Service. The Pakistan Cabinet Secretary was also from the Indian Civil Service. They were all buddy-buddies, very good friends. And he had gone for negotiations on financial matters. Though the discussions were successful, every morning in Dawn, which was then a much more radical paper than it is today, there was an article bashing India. Deeply upset at this he took raised this matter with the Cabinet Secretary over good old scotch, whisky. The Cabinet Secretary asked him to have another drink and urged him not to be upset pointing out that Pakistan needed an enemy to keep itself united and that there could be no better enemy than India and hence the India bashing. So BK Nehru asked as to how long do you need to have this enemy? He said the next few years. The book was written in 1998. And BK Nehru states that this still holds good to this day. 

Now, if you look deeply, and I'm doing a book on this, where I've detailed from 1947 till today, the extent of magnanimity shown by India to Pakistan, not only on the Indus Waters Treaty, but on many other things, of how much we have bent over backwards to try and help Pakistan to develop a better relationship, but have failed totally. Every time they have come back and sought to undermine us. 

So my take on Pakistan is that their inimical approach to India is a part of their DNA, it is written into their D&A. It's not even ideology. Ideology has been used. But in fact, Pakistan  will always seek to undermine you in every way possible. And that is why I say that Pakistan will use terrorism against you from time to time. My solutions to that are there, but I will not talk about those here. We can have another discussion on that. 

The last point I wanted to make is on strategic communication which we spoke of and which I have experience in my dealings with Pakistan on human rights in  Geneva in the 90s. I agree with both my colleagues here that we need to do better and in fact need to look at it in an institutionalized manner. 

But Pakistan will always be ahead of you. And I'll tell you why? Because when Indian diplomats or India media talks, we like to talk with facts, with rationality. Pakistan is not constrained by facts and rationality. If you want facts, you will need a little time to know what is the damage done. The first day you've done the damage, you won't know. You'll have the photographs, you need to analyze them. It'll take three days before you analyze it to see what is the damage. 

Here, while Pakistan is engaging you, they've said we've shot down X, Y, Z number of aircraft. How do they know? They were not shot down on their territory. Whatever was shot down, if it was shot down. So they will tell lies, lies, lies. And there is no constraint on them. On us, rightly, there is a constraint. There should be a constraint. Whatever we speak we should be upfront and correct. And that is why that takes time. So you will not be first off the mark. They are first off the mark. And the reason they are first off the mark is because they are going to tell lies. 

So that is a problem you face. Indian media. I agree with Ata on this point also. Again, my Geneva experience. I had two excellent Geneva based Indian journalists who were good friends of mine. They wrote pieces echoing the Pakistani line. So I spoke to both of them separately about the matter pointing out that what was written was not really correct and not in the national interest as it echoed the Pakistani line. They did not take my point and argued that journalism was above national interest. This is the line that I got. And that's why I have a problem sometimes with the media. But I think what both my colleagues here have said is correct. We need to improve our performance. We need to try and educate people who are involved in media.So that we act in a manner which is much more responsible than what it has sometimes been and which is in the national interest and promotes India's cause. After all, that is the ultimate object. So with those few words, I'd like to finish and to thank the organizers and my colleagues who made this discussion very useful. Thank you very much.

*****

List of Participants in the Discussion

1. Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, Acting Director General, Indian Council of World Affairs

2. Ambassador Satish Chandra, Former Deputy NSA and High Commissioner of India to Pakistan; Chair

3. Lieutenant General Syed Ata Hasnain, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SM, VSM & Bar and presently the Chancellor of the Central University of Kashmir

4. Mr. Aditya Raj Kaul, Executive Editor, TV9, New Delhi

5. Dr. Tanwir Arshed, Department of Political Science, Presidency University, Kolkata (Online)