Indian Council of World Affairs

Abstract: The first diplomatic trip of US President Donald Trump during the second term of his presidency to the Gulf states of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) may have been mostly about economic issues and business deals but one of the highlights of the visit was the lifting of sanctions on Syria which had been in place since 1979. This was the result of behind-the-scenes diplomatic efforts carried out by Saudi Arabia. The fact that the announcement was made in Riyadh reflects the Saudi effort for Syrian sanctions relief. While the sanctions relief is a breakthrough for Syria, it is equally a significant diplomatic win for the GCC. 

Introduction 

During his second term, Donald Trump visited Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE from 13 to 16 May 2025, his first diplomatic trip as the President of the United States. The visit was marked by several major deals with all three Gulf States including a $142 billion arms package deal with Saudi Arabia, which is the largest defence deal that the US has ever made.[i] Another significant deal was the $243 billion deal signed by Qatar for the purchase of 210 Boeing 787 Dreamliner and 777X aircraft, which is the largest order of aircraft in the history of Boeing.[ii] In the UAE, both countries signed a deal to build the largest artificial intelligence campus outside the US, spanning an area of 10 square miles with 5 GW power capacity.[iii] However, a major highlight of the visit was the announcement by Trump to lift the sanctions on Syria, which were in place since 1979. This announcement was made on the first day of his visit on 13 May 2025 during an event in Riyadh where he also quipped “Oh what I do for the Crown Prince” highlighting the crucial role that Saudi Arabia played in negotiating the sanctions relief for Syria. The next day Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa met with Trump in what was the first such high profile meeting between the Presidents of the US and Syria in 31 years. The last time this happened was when the former US President Bill Clinton met with his Syrian counterpart Hafez al-Assad in Geneva in 1994.[iv]

Given the long history of the Syrian sanctions and the strains in the US-Syria relations for decades, the meeting, the sanctions relief and the location of the announcement hold a great significance. For the GCC and Saudi Arabia in particular, this came as a major diplomatic win as they had been pushing for a Syrian reintegration since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. While it marks a new beginning for Syria, it will nonetheless take some time before the positive effects of lifting of the 46-year-old sanctions regime begin to show. 

History of the Syrian Sanctions Regime

The sanctions regime on Syria goes back to 1979, when the US designated Syria a “state sponsor of terrorism” due to its political and military support for terrorist groups including Hezbollah.[v] The erstwhile Assad regime had close ties with Iran and was a major source of financing Iranian proxies together with hosting the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the Syrian territory.[vi] The next round of sanctions came in 2003 when former President George W. Bush and the US Congress passed the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Act.[vii] This set of sanctions imposed, amongst other things, an arms embargo and the export of any item that appears in the Commerce Control List, which includes dual-use items like chemicals and nuclear technology.[viii] It also prohibited the export of American products to Syria with the exception of food and medicine.[ix] The third round of sanctions was imposed in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab Uprisings and were the most comprehensive and targeted sanctions. In April 2011, via Executive Order 13572, the US blocked property of selected Syrian officials and those responsible for human rights abuses.[x]

Then in May 2011, targeted sanctions were launched that blocked the property of additional Syrian officials, most notably that of Bashar al-Assad.[xi] Another round of sanctions came in August 2011 which blocked the property of the Syrian government, imposed a ban on the import of petroleum and petroleum products of Syrian origin and further prohibited US persons from getting involved in transactions related to Syrian petroleum or petroleum products.[xii] However, since transactions continued to take place owing to certain loopholes in the sanctions regime, another round of sanctions followed in April 2012 which specifically targeted individuals involved in transactions prohibited by the previous sanctions. As the repressions of the Assad regime continued, the Trump administration passed the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act 2019, which came into force in June 2020. This Act contains secondary or derivative sanctions on non-US entities that have been found to facilitate transactions or activities related to Syrian reconstruction that are in violation of UNSC resolution 2254.[xiii]

Apart from the US, the European Union (EU) has also imposed sanctions on Syria, although these sanctions began in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab Spring. One of the most important aspects of the EU sanctions was the oil embargo because it hit the Syrian regime the hardest as the EU was the largest customer of Syrian oil.[xiv] The EU sanctions also imposed travel bans on Syrian government officials and their allies. These sanctions were substantially expanded till 2013 whereby the number of people on whom travel restrictions were imposed rose from 13 in 2011 to 179 in 2013.[xv] This was followed by a thaw in the sanctions regime with a view to support the opposition parties in Syria. This included a relaxation in the oil embargo from territories controlled by the opposition and a relaxation in financial restrictions to empower the opposition forces. Along with that there are two sets of sanctions in place on Syria imposed by the UN: Resolution 1636 of 2005 which sanctions individuals suspected of involvement in the Beirut bombings in Lebanon which apply to Syria and Lebanon, and sanctions against ISIS and Al-Qaeda, which also included the current Syrian President Ahmad al Sharaa.[xvi] It is to be noted that the UN did not impose any economic sanctions on Syria primarily due to disagreements within the UN Security Council (UNSC); China and Russia have opposed stringent economic sanctions against the Assad regime in Syria since 2011.[xvii]

With the lifting of sanctions by the US, the EU has also begun relaxing its sanctions regime. The UN never really imposed a comprehensive sanctions regime but the sanctions on al Sharaa have been lifted following the Damascus takeover and solidification of his rule in the country.

What Does the Lifting of Sanctions Mean for Syria and the GCC?

Soon after the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, international actors including the UN and the GCC, called for sanctions relief in Syria. During its 46^th extraordinary ministerial meeting on 26 December 2024, the GCC released a statement calling for “all partners, nations and organisations” to provide support to Syria. Saudi Arabia had also been making concerted efforts to negotiate sanctions relief for the new Syrian regime, and its ability to get the US on board is a major diplomatic win.

Syria

Reeling under tough sanctions since 1979, the 13 May announcement gave the Syrians a new lease of life. While the sanctions were targeted against the Assad regime, they had hit the common Syrians the hardest. The lifting of sanctions will bring much-needed funds for the reconstruction of the Syrian state and investments to boost the economy. Furthermore, the removal of sanctions has promoted other countries, particularly the Gulf, to come forward more openly to help Syria rebuild its economy. For example, soon after the announcement, the UAE-based company signed a deal worth $800 million with the al-Sharaa government to develop the Syrian port of Tartus and establish industrial and free trade zones.[xviii] This also opens up opportunities for Syria to reengage in oil and gas trade which was the prime target of the sanctions. Before the country descended into a civil war, it produced around 40,000 to 80,000 barrels of oil per day. With foreign investment flowing in, more jobs can be created for the Syrians together with letting Syrians living abroad send remittances.[xix]

The sanctions relief may also act as a facilitator for many refugees who fled to neighbouring countries during the war to return home. Moreover, the much-needed humanitarian aid can also flow into the country. With close ties with the Gulf and consequently with the US, Syria might as well join the Abraham Accords in the near future, further consolidating it into the international system. The country made its first SWIFT transaction on 19 June 2025 since the civil war began, signalling a meaningful step in the direction of reintegration into the international economic system. One of the most important aspects is the possibility of close cooperation between Syria and the GCC because the latter has three prime things that Syria needs currently: money, oil and good relations with the US.

GCC

Syria under Assad had been a close ally to Iran, Saudi Arabia’s biggest regional rival. Iran viewed the Assad regime as a pivotal part of the so-called Axis of Resistance.[xx] The continued involvement of Iran in Syrian politics had pushed Saudi Arabia to the side. Now, with Assad gone, Saudis have regained leverage not only in Syria but also against Iran. The Islamic Republic had invested around $30-50 billion to protect the Assad regime, meaning that the fall of Damascus inflicted a major economic blow to Iran.[xxi] This works in favour of Saudi Arabia and the broader GCC to maintain a peaceful political environment in the region. Saudi Arabia acted swiftly in engaging with the new interim government in Syria when it hosted the newly Foreign Minister of Syria Asaad al-Shaibani in January 2025.[xxii] Thereafter, a meeting between Ahmad al-Sharaa and Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan took place on 24 January 2025.[xxiii] On 2 February 2025, al-Sharaa visited Riyadh which became a landmark meeting because it was the first foreign capital he visited since becoming the President. The meeting between the Saudi Crown Prince and al-Sharaa centred on diplomatic ties, economic cooperation and reintegrating Syria into the larger Arab fold.[xxiv] These overtures by Saudi Arabia show that the country is keen to not let any other actor fill in the power vacuum in post-Assad Syria and keep it under its influence. Soon after sanctions were lifted, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan visited Damascus on 31 May 2025 to discuss possible economic collaboration between the two countries.[xxv]

Similarly, Qatar had invested around $1 billion to $3 billion in funding opposition forces in Syria during Bashar al Assad regime. Since the fall of the Assad regime, Qatar has emerged as one of the most important backers of al-Sharaa. It offered to provide $87 million for three months to pay the salaries of public sector workers who were hit the hardest by the civil war.[xxvi] This was before the US announced the lifting of sanctions and Qatar was granted a sanctions exemption for providing the funds. Added to this, both Saudi Arabia and Qatar had paid off Syria’s World Bank debt worth $15.5 million that made the country eligible to take grants for reconstruction and economic recovery.[xxvii] The UAE played a major role in bringing the Assad regime back into the Arab fold. The abrupt fall of Damascus in December made the Emiratis wary of the unfolding situation, fearing a fall back into chaos. Nevertheless, it maintained engagement with the new regime, albeit with caution. The lifting of the sanctions has made the UAE deal with Syria with much more ease. Soon after the announcement on 13 May, the UAE-based Tiger Real Estate announced its intention to build a Trump Tower in Damascus.[xxviii] Thereafter, on 12 June 2025, the Emirates Airline announced that it will resume passenger flights to Damascus from 16 July 2025, a route that had been suspended since 2012.[xxix] This underlines the UAE’s growing confidence in the al-Sharaa regime that the Emirates is willing to let go of its security concerns and re-engage robustly with the new government.

The three other Gulf States of Oman, Bahrain and Kuwait, have likewise engaged with the al-Sharaa regime. Oman presents an interesting case because it was the only Gulf state that did not fully downgrade diplomatic relations with Syria during the civil war. The Sultanate’s position during the war was that it needed a diplomatic peaceful solution following Sultan Qaboos’ policy of strict non-intervention in regional matters.[xxx] A peaceful solution would not have been possible if all engagements with Assad were severed. While it did call back its ambassador from Syria in 2012 in keeping with the Arab League policy of isolating Assad, it was the first Gulf country to reinstate its ambassador to Syria in 2020.[xxxi] During the period from 2012 to 2019, Oman had kept open channels of communication with Assad, notably in 2015 when the then Foreign Minister of Oman Yusuf bin Alawi bin Abdullah visited Damascus to discuss peaceful resolution with his Syrian counterpart Walid al Mouallem.[xxxii]

Conclusion

While the sanctions relief is crucial for Syria, it must be noted that these are temporary measures that are effective for only six months. Permanent sanctions relief will take much more efforts than President Trump making a grand announcement from the podium in Riyadh. The power to grant such relief is vested only in the US Congress which can fully repeal the Caesar Act and the 2003 Syria Accountability Act, not just temporarily lift them. On 27 June 2025, a bill was introduced by US Representatives Ilhan Omar and Anna Paulina Luna for a permanent lifting of sanctions on Syria. On 1 July 2025, President Trump signed an executive order through which the sanctions relief promised on 13 May will formally come into effect. These are important steps because without these, the economic structure in Syria cannot get a meaningful boost. The Gulf countries have shown their diplomatic acumen in getting the temporary ease. It can be expected that they will continue to make efforts to get full and permanent sanctions relief for Syria. Al-Sharaa’s organisation Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) remains on the list of designated terrorist groups. Moreover, the prohibition on the export of all of the US’s products, with the exception of food and medicine, remains in place. Importantly, Syria’s designation as the state sponsor of terrorism has not changed. Therefore, the six month limited sanctions relief only gives a window for al-Sharaa to navigate and act in a manner that will convince the US and the rest of the world that Syria is well on its path to development and that there are no extremist’ threats that may trigger a return to chaos. To this end, the GCC countries can be a great ally for Syria through their investments and security recalibrations that would ensure stability and support for al-Sharaa. Despite this, Syria must demonstrate its resilience as the process of lifting sanctions progresses. Lifting of sanctions comes as a welcome respite for the Syrian population after decades of living under over-reaching US led sanctions. They are anticipating recovery of the Syrian economy, return of the displaced population and taming of rising inflation. Lifting of sanctions will help Syria become a centre of economic growth and shed its image of being a hub of illicit activities like drug trafficking and extremism.

*****

*Stuti Gogoi, Research Intern, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal

References

[i] Saba, Yousef, Gram Slattery, Pesha Magid, and Nafisa Eltahir. 2025. “Trump says US to lift Syria sanctions, secures $600 billion Saudi deal.” Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/trump-starts-gulf-visit-seeking-big-economic-deals-2025-05-13/. 

[ii] “Boeing and Qatar Airways Announce Historic Order for up to 210 Widebody Airplanes.” 2025. Investors. https://investors.boeing.com/investors/news/press-release-details/2025/Boeing-and-Qatar-Airways-Announce-Historic-Order-for-up-to-210-Widebody-Airplanes/default.aspx. 

[iii] Maccioni, Federico, Manya Saini, and Yousef Saba. 2025. “UAE to build biggest AI campus outside US in Trump deal, bypassing past China worries.” Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/uae-set-deepen-ai-links-with-united-states-after-past-curbs-over-china-2025-05-15/

[iv] J., Daniel. 1994. “Clinton Meets Assad: No Time to Appease Syria.” The Heritage Foundation. https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/report/clinton-meets-assad-no-time-appease-syria. 

[v] “Syria - United States Department of State.” n.d. State Department. Accessed June 10, 2025. https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2020/syria/

[vi] Ibid.

[vii] Seeberg, Peter. 2016. In The Levant in Turmoil: Syria, Palestine and the Transformation of Middle Eastern Politics, 101-122. N.p.: Palgrave Macmillan.

[viii] “Fact Sheet: Implementing the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003.” 2004. George W. Bush White House Archives. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/05/20040511-7.html. 

[ix] Ibid.

[x] “Syria Sanctions - United States Department of State.” n.d. State Department. Accessed June 10, 2025. https://www.state.gov/syria-sanctions/. 

[xi] Ibid.

[xii] Ibid.

[xiii] Tabler, Andrew J., and Matthew Zweig. 2023. “How the Caesar Act Restricts Normalisation with Syria.” The Washington Institute. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-caesar-act-restricts-normalisation-syria. 

[xiv] Seeberg, Peter. 2016. In The Levant in Turmoil: Syria, Palestine and the Transformation of Middle Eastern Politics, 101-122. N.p.: Palgrave Macmillan.

[xv] Ibid.

[xvi] Cirlig, Carmen C. 2025. Time to Lift the International Sanctions on Syria? N.p.: European Parliamentary Research Service

[xvii] Ibid.

[xviii] Hall, Natasha, and Ninar Fawal. 2025. Can Syria Recover: Why Sanctions Relief Is Not Enough. N.p.: Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/syria/can-syria-recover. 

[xix] Ibid.

[xx] Priya, Lakshmi. 2024. “Collapse of the House of Assad.” Indian Council of World Affairs. /show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=12150&lid=7408. 

[xxi] Grajewski, Nicole. 2024. “Why Did Iran Allow Assad's Downfall.” Carnegie Endowment. https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/diwan/2024/12/why-did-iran-allow-assads-downfall?lang=en. 

[xxii] Alghamd, Hannan. 2025. “GRC.” Gulf Research Center | GRC. https://www.grc.net/single-commentary/225. 

[xxiii] Ibid.

[xxiv] Ibid.

[xxv] Alsayed, Ghaith. 2025. “Syria and Saudi Arabia agree to boost economic cooperation after Western sanctions eased.” AP News. https://apnews.com/article/syria-saudi-arabia-economic-cooperation-sanctions-damascus-8e3695d2c3f60d6f31ca975d6a440f78

[xxvi] Mills, Andrew. 2025. “Exclusive: Qatari financing of Syrian salaries gets US go-ahead, sources say.” Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/qatari-financing-syrian-salaries-gets-us-go-ahead-sources-say-2025-05-07/.

[xxvii] Ward, Euan. 2025. “Gulf States Pay Off $15.5 Million Syrian Debt to World Bank.” The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/16/world/middleeast/world-bank-syria-debt-saudi-arabia-qatar.html. 

[xxviii] Alab, Rizik. 2025. “Trump Tower Project in Syria: Symbolic or Strategic?” The Jerusalem Post. https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-855411. 

[xxix] “Emirates to relaunch Syria services from July.” 2025. Aerospace Global News. https://aerospaceglobalnews.com/news/emirates-to-relaunch-syria-services-from-july/. 

[xxx] “Syrian Regime Change: The View From Oman.” January 9, 2025. Arab Center Washington DC. https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/syrian-regime-change-the-view-from-oman/ Accessed 30 June 2025.

[xxxi] ”Oman becomes first Gulf State to reinstate ambassador in Syria.” October 5, 2020. Aljazeera News. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/5/oman-becomes-first-gulf-state-to-reinstate-ambassador-in-syria Accessed 30 June 2025.

[xxxii] Ibid.