Indian Council of World Affairs

Abstract: Syria and Iraq have agreed to revive the Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline in August 2025. The pipeline, which has been dormant for the past 22 years, can give a much-needed boost to their economies as well as forge closer ties between Syria and Iraq. The pipeline will give Syria revenue in the form of transit fees, as it will host the pipeline from Kirkuk to the Mediterranean. On the other hand, the pipeline gives Iraq direct access to the Mediterranean and, by extension, to the European market. However, several challenges need to be overcome, as the revival plan faces a tough road ahead. 

Introduction 

On 11 August 2025, Iraqi Prime Minister Shia al-Sudani and Syrian Energy Minister of President al-Sharaa’s transitional government and former Prime Minister in the Syrian caretaker government, Mohammad al-Bashir, agreed to revive the Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline during the Syrian Minister’s visit to Baghdad. The pipeline was first built in 1952 and went through several challenges, including the Iran-Iraq War from 1980 to 1988. The pipeline has been out of service since the 2003 Iraq invasion. The decision to revive the pipeline after twenty years comes against the backdrop of major changes in both Iraq and Syria and in the broader West Asian geopolitics. This paper seeks to outline what the pipeline is and how it is relevant today, together with the challenges that it may face in revival.

Historical Overview

The Kirkuk-Baniyas Pipeline was built in 1952 from Iraq’s Kirkuk province to the Mediterranean port of Baniyas in Syria.^[i] During that time, the pipeline had a capacity of 300,000 barrels per day.^[ii] It stretched for more than 800 kilometres from the K1 pumping station in Kirkuk, Iraq, up to Baniyas in Syria, with a transit hub in the K3 pumping station in Iraq's Haditha.^[iii] A parallel pipeline connected the oilfields in Kirkuk to Tripoli in Lebanon.^[iv]

Infographic made by the author using Napkin AI 

 
The image has been generated by the author using Google Earth. The data has been sourced from the US Library of Congress “Map of the Near East”, available at https://www.loc.gov/resource/g7420.ct003746/. 

However, the pipeline had been affected by multiple conflicts, shutting down in the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq War as Syria sided with Iran.^[v] The pipeline restarted briefly in 2000 when Iraq was trying to bypass the UN sanctions following the Kuwait crisis in 1990. But it incurred severe damage during the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and has remained out of service since then. 

There have been attempts to restart the pipeline. In 2007, Russian oil company Gazprom made a bid to repair the pipeline.^[vi] However, the project failed to make headway until 2009 due to financial considerations, and constructing a new pipeline was too expensive.^[vii] A subsequent plan was made in September 2010 to construct two different pipelines, but that was also shelved.^[viii] The latest rounds of talks began towards the end of 2024 after the ouster of the al-Assad regime in Syria, with the two sides formally agreeing at their August 2025 meeting to begin work on possible reconstruction. 

Importance for Iraq and Syria 

Iraq 

Being the second-largest oil producer in the Oil and Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) after Saudi Arabia, Iraq has depended on routes going through the Persian Gulf.^[ix] The Strait of Hormuz being one of the most vulnerable strategic chokepoints, any disruption in the Strait means significant losses for the Iraqi economy that draws around 90 per cent of its revenue from oil export. In this regard, the Kirkuk-Baniyas Pipeline can offer an alternative route northwards for Iraqi oil exports. 

Earlier, the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline had offered an alternative route, but this too has been marred by disruptions in Iraq-Turkey relations. This pipeline carries an average of 450,000 barrels of crude oil per day,^[x] giving Iraq a route other than its southern ports of Al Basrah Oil Terminal and Khor al Amaya Oil Terminal. However, since 2023 this pipeline has been out of service when an International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) arbitration ruling  ordered Turkey to pay $1.5 billion as a penalty for illegal export of Iraqi oil by the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) between 2014 and 2018.^[xi] Moreover, the deal between Iraq and Turkey regarding this pipeline is set to expire in July 2026^[xii], leaving Iraq with even more limited options to sell its oil resources. The Kirkuk-Baniyas Pipeline can potentially fill this void and be a better option for Iraq considering its efforts to diversify oil routes. 

Kirkuk has historically been a flashpoint between the Iraqi government and the Kurdish forces. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) claims the city as its capital, but since 2017, when Iraqi forces took over, it has been under Iraqi control.^[xiii] However, the tussle between Kurds and the Iraqi state is not over and continues today as they fight over Kirkuk, primarily because of its oil resources.^[xiv] The Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline was an important source of revenue for the KRG.^[xv] The reopening of the Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline can give the Iraqi state an upper hand over the Kurds and the KRG. 

Syria 

Prior to the civil war, Syria was largely self-sufficient in meeting its energy needs and was also able to export oil, constituting 20 per cent of government revenue.^[xvi] However, the long-drawn war damaged key oil and natural gas fields. Moreover, groups like the People’s Protection Units (YPG), which is a US-backed Kurdish militant group, gained control over Syrian oil resources.^[xvii] These factors made Syria dependent on oil imports. During the time of Bashar al-Assad’s rule, Iran fulfilled a large part of Syria’s oil needs.^[xviii] But following his ouster, Iran has stopped its oil supply and demanded $30–$50 billion as fees for oil supply and investments undertaken to support Assad’s rule since 2011. However, the al-Sharaa government has declined to pay and has demanded $300 billion for damages that Iran had caused during the war.^[xix] This also shows a decline of Iranian influence in Syria post-Assad. 

The pipeline is one of the ways in which the new al-Sharaa government is trying to place Syria in the regional economic and geopolitical map, and oil has become one of the strategies in which this objective can be achieved. While the al-Sharaa government is trying to regain control over Syrian oil fields and has had some success in doing so, the Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline can give Syria cheaper oil as well as transit fees that are vital for economic reconstruction. Moreover, following the announcement to revive the pipeline, the Syrian government announced in September 2025 that it would undertake a large-scale modernisation of the Baniyas refinery beginning next year.^[xx] The pipeline will also reduce Syrian overreliance on maritime routes for oil imports, which come at a heavier price and remain vulnerable. 

Having Syria as a transit route also reemphasises its geopolitical significance as an entry point to the Mediterranean market and, by extension, to the lucrative market of Europe. The European market has been the centre point for Iraqi crude. In 2024, Greece imported approximately $5.4 billion worth of Iraqi crude, making it the largest European consumer of Iraq’s oil.^[xxi] This registered a 21 per cent rise in Greek oil imports from Iraq compared to 2023.^[xxii] Another important destination for Iraq’s oil is Italy, which imported $2.44 billion worth of oil from Iraq in 2024.^[xxiii] With the reopening of the pipeline, the volume of oil exports from Iraq can be expected to increase, as the distance and cost of exports will be significantly reduced. Moreover, other European countries, like Spain, Austria, and Serbia will be able to get Iraqi crude much more easily and at a relatively low cost. As a result, Syria stands to benefit significantly from increased transit fees, which is a crucial aspect for the country as it navigates a period of transition and seeks to reaffirm its importance on the global stage. 

For both Iraq and Syria, the pipeline holds relevance not only at the state level but also at the bilateral level, given the fact that the two countries did not have a smooth relationship historically. During the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam Hussein cut off ties with Syria, then under Hafez al-Assad, owing to Syria’s support of Iran.^[xxiv] Ties were restored only in 2006, but relations were not smooth. Ahmed al-Sharaa’s coming to power in Syria initially made Iraq more apprehensive due to his background. These apprehensions are somewhat receding in the way Syria’s transitional government is shaping up. Also, because they share a 599-kilometre-long border, it is only imperative that the two countries forge closer ties. The revival of the Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline can be a step in that direction, as it assuages common points of vulnerabilities. 

Challenges 

However, several challenges need to be overcome before the Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline begins functioning again. Given that the pipeline has remained defunct for over two decades, infrastructure is one of the most pressing challenges.^[xxv] Repairing the pipeline will require a substantial amount of funding, and estimates suggest that the project may cost up to $8 billion.^[xxvi] Given the economic strain in both countries, repairing the pipeline will be a difficult task. Another important challenge is to navigate the sanctions regime that is in place in both Syria and Iraq.^[xxvii] While the Syrian sanctions regime has seen considerable easing due to the US initiative and since al-Sharaa took over, the sanctions regime in Iraq has not seen a similar trajectory and remains complex. 

The question of Kurdish people also needs to be factored in when it comes to rehabilitating the pipeline. The pipeline will give the Iraqi state greater control over Kirkuk's oil, which can threaten the KRG’s economic base in Iraq. Kirkuk’s oil resources have been a major reason for the continued tussle between Baghdad and the KRG. The KRG, following an independent oil policy,^[xxviii] controlled a significant portion of the oil exports from Kirkuk and had used the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, which generated revenue. The revival of the Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline would mean that the KRG will no longer be in control of Kirkuk's oil resources. Such an outcome can create a significant hurdle in the revival of the pipeline in the form of resistance and refusal from the KRG to cooperate with Baghdad. Concurrently, al-Sharaa will need to navigate the YPG and take over the oil resources. While Kurdish areas in Syria do not fall along the route of the Kirkuk-Baniyas Pipeline, the situation with Iraqi Kurds may have an impact on how the Kurds in Syria react to the pipeline. This challenge is further compounded by Iran’s involvement in northern Iraq through support for paramilitary outfits like Kata’ib Hezbollah, which can cause disruptions in the reconstruction of the pipeline. 

The pipeline will replace Iraqi oil routes through the southern Gulf ports. This means a loss of revenue for Gulf States, including the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Moreover, political instability remains a concern with the new Syrian regime in its nascent stages and the democratic future of the country remains somewhat uncertain at present. 

Conclusion 

The reopening of the Kirkuk–Baniyas pipeline represents more than an infrastructural project; it signifies a geopolitical statement. It symbolises an effort on behalf of Iraq to diversify export routes, lower exposure to chokepoints in the Gulf, and exert more authority over Kirkuk’s oil resources. It also signifies a much-needed economic lifeline for Syria in the form of cheaper oil supplies, transit revenues that can help underwrite reconstruction efforts, and a resumption of its Mediterranean energy gateway role. 

Nevertheless, the hurdles are great. Financing the $8 billion rehabilitation of the pipeline in the two war-hit economies is a daunting task; sanctions against both states obfuscate foreign investment, and the Kurdish issue, which encompasses Kirkuk in Iraq as well as Syria's YPG, risks introducing political instability into the project. To this can be added regional adversaries' destabilising influence as well as the entrenched influence of Gulf exporting powers. 

If achieved, the pipeline can change trade routes, redistribute regional alignments, and provide Iraq and Syria with deeper strategic depth in foreign policy. Its success, however, will depend on whether Damascus and Baghdad can manage internal conflicts, endure external forces patiently, and summon the resources required for the project. In that regard, the Kirkuk–Baniyas pipeline project represents more than an oil project; it is a litmus test for political willpower and statecraft, the delicate equilibrium of power in West Asia as well as for the potential European beneficiaries of the project to invest capital, both political and financial, in it.

*****

*Stuti Gogoi, Research Intern, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal. 

Endnotes

^[i] Mahmoud, Sinan. 2025. “Iraq and Syria Discuss Revival of Kirkuk–Baniyas Oil Pipeline.” The National, August 12, 2025. https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2025/08/12/iraq-and-syria-discuss-revival-of-kirkukbaniyas-oil-pipeline/.

^[ii] Ibid.

^[iii] Shafaaq News. 2025. “Kirkuk&Ndash;Baniyas Pipeline: Iraq&Rsquo;S Direct Oil Lifeline to the Mediterranean - Shafaq News.” Shafaq News, August 11, 2025. https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Kirkuk-Baniyas-Pipeline-Iraq-s-direct-oil-lifeline-to-the-Mediterranean.

^[iv] Ahmed, Fatma. 2025. “Iraq Considers Exporting Oil Through the Historical Syrian Baniyas and Lebanese Tripoli Pipelines | Egypt Oil & Gas.” Egypt Oil & Gas | Connecting the Pieces. August 13, 2025. https://egyptoil-gas.com/news/iraq-considers-exporting-oil-through-the-historical-syrian-baniyas-and-lebanese-tripoli-pipelines/.

^[v] Mahmoud, Sinan. 2025. “Iraq and Syria Discuss Revival of Kirkuk–Baniyas Oil Pipeline.” The National, August 12, 2025. https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2025/08/12/iraq-and-syria-discuss-revival-of-kirkukbaniyas-oil-pipeline/.

^[vi] Salih, Diyari. 2019. “Russia and the Geopolitics of the Kirkuk-Baniyas Pipeline.” The Geopolitics. September 29, 2019. https://thegeopolitics.com/russia-and-the-geopolitics-of-the-kirkuk-baniyas-pipeline/.

^[vii] “Iraq Explores Revival of Kirkuk-Baniyas Pipeline.” n.d. https://www.intellinews.com/iraq-explores-revival-of-kirkuk-baniyas-pipeline-378308/.

^[viii] Ibid.

^[ix] ​​Öğütçü, Mehmet. 2025. “Kirkuk–Baniyas: The Oil Pipeline Project That Could Sideline Türkiye - Yetkin Report.” Yetkin Report. April 30, 2025. https://yetkinreport.com/en/2025/04/30/kirkuk-baniyas-the-oil-pipeline-project-that-could-sideline-turkiye/.

^[x] Discovery Alert. 2025. “Iraq Oil Exports via Turkey Resume After Year-Long Shutdown.” August 6, 2025. https://discoveryalert.com.au/news/iraq-oil-exports-turkey-importance-2025/.

^[xi] Soylu, Ragip. 2025. “Why Turkey Abruptly Cancelled an Iraqi Oil Pipeline Agreement.” Middle East Eye, July 22, 2025. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/why-turkey-abruptly-cancelled-iraqi-oil-pipeline-agreement.

^[xii] Ibid.

^[xiii] “Competition Over Kirkuk: Between Internal Conflicts and Regional Rivalries.” n.d. The Washington Institute. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/competition-over-kirkuk-between-internal-conflicts-and-regional-rivalries.

^[xiv] Ibid.

^[xv] Öğütçü, Mehmet. 2025. “Kirkuk–Baniyas: The Oil Pipeline Project That Could Sideline Türkiye - Yetkin Report.” Yetkin Report. April 30, 2025. https://yetkinreport.com/en/2025/04/30/kirkuk-baniyas-the-oil-pipeline-project-that-could-sideline-turkiye/.

^[xvi] Aozen. 2025. “Syria’s Energy Sector and Its Impact on Stability and Regional Developments - Atlantic Council.” Atlantic Council. January 17, 2025. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/syrias-energy-sector-and-its-impact-on-stability-and-regional-developments/#:~:text=8,aid%20during%20the%20Assad%20period.

^[xvii] Ibid.

^[xviii] Ibid.

^[xix] Ibid.

^[xx] “Syria to Launch Major Modernization of Baniyas Oil Refinery - Shafaq News.” Shafaq News, September 14, 2025. https://www.shafaq.com/en/Economy/Syria-to-launch-major-modernization-of-Baniyas-oil-refinery.

^[xxi] Shafaaq News. 2025a. “Greece Ranks Among Top Buyers of Iraqi Oil - Shafaq News.” Shafaq News, June 9, 2025. https://shafaq.com/en/Economy/Greece-ranks-among-top-buyers-of-Iraqi-oil#:~:text=Greece%2C%20along%20with%20Italy%20and,the%20first%20quarter%20of%202025.

^[xxii] Ibid.

^[xxiii] TRADING ECONOMICS. n.d. “Italy Imports From Iraq of Crude Oil - 2025 Data 2026 Forecast 1997-2024 Historical.” https://tradingeconomics.com/italy/imports/iraq/crude-oil-petroleum-bituminous-minerals.

^[xxiv] Tran, Mark. 2018. “Iraq and Syria Resume Diplomatic Ties.” The Guardian, April 14, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/nov/21/iraq.syria.

^[xxv] "Syria Attempts to Revive Oil Pipeline with Iraq." Iraqi News, September 26, 2023. https://www.iraqinews.com/iraq/syria-attempts-to-revive-oil-pipeline-with-iraq/.

^[xxvi] Ibid.

^[xxvii] The New Region. 2023. “The New Region,” October 10, 2023. https://thenewregion.com/posts/1274/iraq-eyes-revival-of-kirkuk-baniyas-oil-pipeline-to-diversify-export-routes.

^[xxviii] The Fate of Kurdistan Region’s Oil Between Ceyhan and Baniyas, Draw Media https://drawmedia.net/page_detail?smart-id=17275.