Indian Council of World Affairs

Abstract: Under President Gustavo Petro’s leadership, Colombia is reshaping its foreign policy away from US shadows, reflecting ideological shifts, aspirations for middle-power status and domestic political calculations. For Washington, this presents a strategic dilemma between engagement and alienation. 

Introduction 

For over three decades, the Colombia–US partnership stood as one of the most stable and strategic relationships in the Western Hemisphere, rooted in counter-narcotics cooperation, trade, and security collaboration. However, under President Gustavo Petro, Colombia’s first left-wing leader, this relationship has entered a turbulent phase. Petro’s open criticism of US foreign policies, his engagement with China, and his push to join platforms such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the New Development Bank (NDB) have all contributed to a sense of drift. Yet beneath the ideological clash lies a deeper political calculation: Petro’s attempt to redefine Colombia’s foreign policy identity amid evolving domestic political dynamics. For Washington, the dilemma is clear—engagement or alienation.

Changing Foundation of Engagement

The traditional US–Colombia alliance was built on asymmetry. Washington saw Colombia as its closest ally in the fight against drugs and insurgencies, while Bogotá relied on US aid, intelligence, and market access. Plan Colombia, launched in 2000, made the relationship structured, binding Colombia’s internal security and economic development to US priorities. 

Petro’s 2022 election signalled the first major break in this pattern, resulting in a reassessment of Colombia–US relations and the country’s role in the broader international community. A former guerrilla and vocal critic of US interventionism, Petro has repeatedly invoked historical grievances, from the US-backed 1973 Chilean coup[i] to Cold War counterinsurgency, to frame Colombia’s current struggle within a broader historical narrative of resistance to imperialism. 

President Petro seeks to elevate Colombia’s status as an aspiring middle power through a ‘progressive’ foreign policy that prioritises life, climate action, and social justice while diversifying partnerships beyond the traditional US-centric framework. This was reflected in the remarks of former Colombian Vice Minister Jorge Rojas Rodríguez during his visit last year to the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), a think tank based in India, who observed that the earlier international order revolved around the North (particularly the US), while Asia and Africa remained marginalised and the European Union largely operated within Washington’s orbit. His remarks underscored the Petro government’s belief that Colombia must engage with a wider range of partners in Asia, Africa and the Global South to reflect the realities of an emerging multipolar world[ii].

For Washington, however, this multipolar aspiration raises concerns that Colombia, once a pillar of US influence, could become another node in China’s expanding regional network and part of a broader bloc challenging the US-led world order. Although President Biden viewed Petro’s position with unease, he was able to keep ties intact. However, tensions have heightened under President Donald Trump, who favours coercive measures in response to Colombia’s assertive rhetoric. 

Migration and Trade Issues 

The diplomatic rupture began on 26 January 2025, when President Gustavo Petro denounced Donald Trump’s deportation policy, describing him as a ‘fascist’, ‘racist’ and ‘bully’, and accusing Washington of criminalising entire populations. Bogotá initially refused to accept deportation flights carrying irregular Colombian migrants, citing the move as a defence of dignity and human rights. In response, Trump threatened to impose a 25% tariff on Colombian exports—a threat met with a reciprocal tariff warning from Petro. Although both sides eventually reached a compromise, allowing Colombia to repatriate its citizens using its air force, the episode exposed a deep clash of values. From Colombia’s perspective, Washington’s hard-line approach to migration ignores the humanitarian aspect behind it. For Trump, however, it was a matter of border control, fulfilling his campaign promises—and a test of loyalty from a long-standing ally that, for the first time in decades, dared to openly challenge US authority.

Trade tensions added another layer to the growing strain. On the energy front, Petro’s environmental policies have strained relations with the US, as he seeks to reduce Colombia’s reliance on fossil fuels and extractive industries. Since 2023, Petro’s administration has suspended new licences for oil, coal, and gas exploration and vowed to end hydrocarbon contracting altogether, officially banning hydraulic fracturing, or fracking. Petro ordered the state-run oil company Ecopetrol to cancel a joint venture with a US-owned company that was expected to produce around 90,000 barrels of oil per day, citing environmental concerns. He also announced plans to sell Ecopetrol’s fracking operations in the US,[iii] arguing that such ventures contradict Colombia’s commitment to a ‘just energy transition’. Petro’s approach starkly contrasts with that of Trump, who has dismissed climate change as a “hoax” and “con job,” withdrew the US from the Paris Agreement, and has consistently pushed for fossil fuel expansion.   

Petro also had expressed an intention to renegotiate the 2012 US-Colombia Free Trade Agreement during his election campaign and on several other occasions, arguing that it places certain Colombian products at an unfair competition, leaving the farmers vulnerable and forcing many to rely on illicit sectors or irregular migration.[iv] Petro’s wishes resonate with the Trump administration’s policy of reviewing all foreign aid and free trade agreements worldwide. As a result, economic integration between two countries have weakened. 

Issues over Approaches to Counter-Narcotics 

The most visible fault line remains in approaches to counter-narcotics. Petro has called the US ‘War on Drugs’, which prioritises the supply side (kingpin strategy, aerial fumigation and forced eradication), an ‘unmitigated failure’, arguing that decades of US-backed eradication campaigns devastated rural livelihoods without reducing cocaine production. He condemned the strategy as a means for the US to control poor countries. In his view, Washington’s approach has failed to address the root causes of the problem and has shown little sensitivity to Colombia’s broader developmental priorities. 

Petro’s government henceforth shifted its focus towards voluntary crop substitution, alternative livelihoods and harm reduction measures and has also initiated ‘Total Peace’ to end the country’s decades-long conflict, engaging in peace talks with rebel, paramilitary, and urban armed groups. For Petro, this represents both a moral correction and a political necessity. He argues that the militarised US anti-drug strategy has deepened inequality and sustained violence in Colombia’s marginalised regions, expressing frustration that Washington refuses to address or take responsibility for the demand side of the drug trade. 

Washington, by contrast, sees Colombia’s shift as weakening a key pillar of bilateral cooperation. US officials worry that Petro’s ‘Total Peace’ approach could embolden cartels, particularly as coca cultivation continues to rise under Petro[v] (data backed by the 2025 UNODC World Drug Report[vi]). Consequently, Washington decertified[vii] Colombia on 16 September 2025. This also marks the first such move in 30 years against a country that was once a key US ally in the war on drugs and one of the largest recipients of US foreign aid. In response, Colombia halted arms purchases from the US, its biggest military partner[viii]. 

From a strategic standpoint, Washington’s decision to decertify Colombia appears counterproductive. Although largely symbolic and intended as a signal of disapproval, as Colombia was decertified with a national security waiver allowing aid to continue, it risks alienating one of the US closest democratic allies in Latin America and undermining decades of security and intelligence cooperation. 

Foreign Policy Choices Fuels Tensions 

US–Colombia relations have also worsened due to recent foreign policy choices.

Petro’s foreign policy rests on the principle of morality, peace, human conscience, dignity and human rights. His administration argues that Colombia’s peace-building ethos should extend to global conflicts by promoting negotiation over militarisation, thereby charting an independent course.

Petro has described Israel’s actions in Gaza as ‘genocide’, severed diplomatic ties with Tel Aviv and condemned US diplomatic shielding of Israel at international forums. During his recent visit to the US for the UN General Assembly, Petro asked American soldiers to disobey Trump’s policies in Gaza during a protest outside the UN headquarters—remarks that led to his US visa being revoked.[ix]

Similarly, regarding the Russia–Ukraine conflict, Petro condemned the proposed US–Ukraine mineral deal as ‘stupidity’,[x] warning that it reduces Ukraine’s sovereignty and turns the war into a struggle over resources. He argued that Washington and its allies are prolonging the war by arming Kyiv instead of pushing for direct negotiations with Moscow. Petro also called out the hypocrisy of Western powers for condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine while remaining indifferent to the Palestine cause, emphasizing that Colombia should stand on the ‘side of peace.’”

Petro also criticised the recent US bombing of alleged drug-smuggling boats in the Caribbean, highlighting that it reflects a disregard for international law and human dignity, particularly when the victims are poor Latin Americans.[xi] Petro sees these actions as part of a broader pattern of the US exercising unaccountable global power under the guise of security and anti-narcotics operations. Similarly, Petro has condemned US sanctions on countries like Venezuela and Cuba, arguing that they deepen humanitarian crises.

Petro’s break from traditional alliances also extends to NATO,[xii] which he views as central to this global power structure. He perceives NATO as a platform that enables or overlooks crimes against humanity through unaccountable authority and has therefore expressed his intention to relinquish Colombia’s NATO Global Partner status.

• The China Factor: A Quiet Realignment

The most consequential, and perhaps understated, dimension of the current rift is China. While Beijing’s presence in Colombia has expanded gradually over the past decade, Petro’s administration has accelerated this engagement. 

President Petro’s first official visit to China in October 2023 resulted in both countries elevating their relationship to a strategic partnership, marking a significant diplomatic shift. During the visit, Bogotá and Beijing signed 12 cooperation agreements covering infrastructure, trade, and technology, while Colombia expressed interest in engaging with China’s global initiatives focused on development and connectivity.[xiii] Petro’s second visit in May 2025 further deepened this partnership, with Colombia formally joining the BRI and applying to join the BRICS Development Bank, which was later approved in July 2025. The two governments agreed to expand collaboration in areas, such as renewable energy, transport infrastructure, digital technology, and agriculture, reflecting Petro’s broader strategy of diversifying Colombia’s external partnerships and reducing dependence on the US. 

From Bogotá’s perspective, this diversification is pragmatic rather than ideological, one that offers new avenues for financial assistance, technological transfer, infrastructure development and credit. China provides financing for large-scale infrastructure and renewable energy projects without the conditions typically attached to the US, World Bank, or IMF-backed programmes. For Petro, this move aligns with his vision of ‘green reindustrialisation’, leveraging China’s global leadership in renewable technologies and its capacity to build sustainable infrastructure in Colombia, thereby advancing the country’s decarbonisation goals. He also seeks funding to realise his plan of connecting the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans through railways and interoceanic fibre-optic networks, a project he considers crucial to Colombia’s long-term economic transformation.[xiv] Lastly, this pivot reflects frustration with US policies, particularly under Trump, as USAID scaled back development support and Washington reduced aid to Colombia over perceived shortcomings in counter-narcotics efforts and trade-related tensions. 

For the US, Colombia’s increasing engagement with Chinese projects raises concerns about a potential shift away from its influence in Latin America. Washington worries that China’s expanding presence could undermine transparency, deepen debt dependency, and extend Beijing’s strategic reach in the Andes, a region long considered within the US sphere of influence. This concern is amplified by the fact that China now maintains strategic partnerships with 10 of the 11 South American countries,[xv] and Colombia has recently become the 22nd nation in Latin America and the Caribbean to join the BRI[xvi]. 

Petro’s Domestic Calculations and Washington’s Dilemma 

Petro’s assertive rhetoric towards Washington is not solely about redefining Colombian foreign policy; it also serves domestic political purposes. His approval ratings have declined amid inflation, stalled reforms, and growing public protests,[xvii] and confronting the US enables him to redirect attention to issues of national sovereignty and moral leadership. 

President Petro has accused the US of supporting Colombia’s right-wing factions, a stance reinforced by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s criticism of judicial rulings against former President Álvaro Uribe Vélez,[xviii] a key figure in the Colombian right and a close US ally in counter-narcotics cooperation. Petro has further accused the US of destabilising his leftist government, pointing to domestic episodes, such as the early 2025 ‘Nannygate’ scandal[xix][xx]. By positioning Colombia as a country asserting its independence from external pressures, Petro rallies his left-wing base and reinforces the Pacto Histórico- leftist coalition, ahead of the 2026 elections. 

Moreover, by joining BRI and the BRICS Developmental Bank, Petro hopes to achieve funding to advance stalled infrastructure and development projects that can help the government fulfil campaign commitments and bolster the party’s electoral prospects before the 2026 elections. 

However, Petro’s reactive strategy carries significant risks. Given the uncertainty of future Colombian governments, China may try to take advantage of the current window to secure long-term agreements involving strategic assets or territory. Henceforth, it will be crucial for Petro to resist such pressures and safeguard Colombia’s strategic autonomy by balancing immediate development needs with the country’s long-term interests. Petro also must ensure that these arrangements deliver tangible benefits to ordinary Colombians, not just the broader economy or China’s interests. On the other hand, Colombia should not isolate the US or rely solely on a single partner. Trade, remittances, and investment deeply intertwine Colombia's economy with Washington, which continues to be its largest trading partner. Petro’s challenge, therefore, is to assert Colombia’s autonomy while maintaining economic and strategic stability, which requires a delicate balancing act similar to that seen under Brazil’s leftist President Lula. 

For the US, Colombia’s evolution under Petro is a reminder that the post—Cold War model of hemispheric partnership is no longer sustainable. Washington must now deal with Latin American governments that seek diversified relationships. For Washington, the task is to re-evaluate its approach, to treat Latin American partners as equals in a multipolar world rather than as clients in a hierarchical order. This requires a relationship based on mutual respect and not dominance and submission, with a focus on Colombia’s developmental needs and aspirations. Adopting a confrontational stance can alienate regional partners, drive them closer to Beijing, and undermine US influence. For Colombia, the challenge is to exercise its new autonomy responsibly, ensuring that sovereignty does not slide into strategic vulnerability or be reduced to adhering to a rival camp. 

Conclusion 

Gustavo Petro’s confrontational rhetoric towards the US reflects both conviction and calculation, his belief that Colombia must break free from dependency and embrace multipolar cooperation, while also using anti-hegemonic language to strengthen his domestic legitimacy. For Washington, the frustration lies in seeing a once-reliable ally question and seek to redefine its role in the international order. 

The Colombia–US relationship is not collapsing, but it is undergoing a complex reconfiguration. Washington must adapt to a Latin America that increasingly has alternatives, while Petro must ensure that Colombia’s pursuit of autonomy does not result in overdependence on another power. The future of this partnership will depend not on nostalgia for old alliances but on how effectively both nations navigate a transformed global landscape, one where power is more diffuse and loyalty can no longer be taken for granted. Yet if both sides believe that yielding to each other’s demands would diminish their influence and encourage similar behaviour from others, genuine cooperation risks breaking down.

*****

*Dr. Girisanker SB, Research Associate, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal. 

References

[i] YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ym2QNKZ7jUM. Accessed October 15, 2025.

[ii] Transcript of Talk by H.E. Mr. Jorge Rojas Rodriguez, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of Colombia on ‘Colombia’s Foreign Policy: Strategic Global Goals and Advancing Partnership with India’, October 17, 2024 - Indian Council of World Affairs (Government of India). /show_content.php?lang=1&level=1&ls_id=11953&lid=7248.  Accessed October 17, 2025.

[iii] Feb 05, APLast Updated: “Colombia’s President Orders National Oil Company to Cancel US Venture over Environmental Concerns.” The Economic Times, 5 February, 5 2025. The Economic Times - The Times of India, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/colombias-president-orders-national-oil-company-to-cancel-us-venture-over-environmental-concerns/articleshow/117931247.cms?from=mdr.

[iv] Ghiotto, Luciana. Not Far Enough – the State of the Free Trade Agreement between Colombia and the United States | Transnational Institute. September 17, 2025, https://www.tni.org/en/article/not-far-enough-the-state-of-the-free-trade-agreement-between-colombia-and-the-united-states.

[v] “Presidential Determination on Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2026.” United States Department of State, https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/09/presidential-determination-on-major-drug-transit-or-major-illicit-drug-producing-countries-for-fiscal-year-2026/.   Accessed October 15, 2025.

[vi] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. World Drug Report 2025: Key Findings (WDR25 B1). 2025. https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/WDR_2025/WDR25_B1_Key_findings.pdf.

[vii] Note- Decertification refers to a formal decision by the U.S. government, (under the Foreign Assistance Act and Section 706 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act), that a country is not fully cooperating with U.S. counter-narcotics efforts. When a country is decertified, the U.S. can suspend most forms of bilateral aid, oppose loans from multilateral institutions like the World Bank or IMF, and it generally signals a loss of diplomatic confidence or partnership. Sometimes, the U.S. may issue a waiver for its decertification- symbolically expressing its frustration, yet allowing aid and cooperation to continue.

[viii] AFP, Agence France-Presse-. “Colombia Suspends US Arms Purchases amid Row over Anti-Drug Ally Status.” Daily Sabah, September 17, 2025, https://www.dailysabah.com/world/americas/colombia-suspends-us-arms-purchases-amid-row-over-anti-drug-ally-status.

[ix] AP. “US Revokes Visa for Colombia’s President after He Urges American Soldiers to Disobey Trump.” The Hindu, September 27, 2025. World. www.thehindu.com, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/us-revokes-visa-for-colombias-president-after-he-urges-american-soldiers-to-disobey-trump/article70102450.ece.

[x] Colombian President Blasts Ukraine-US Minerals Deal as “Stupidity.” February 27, 2025, https://www.intellinews.com/colombian-president-blasts-ukraine-us-minerals-deal-as-stupidity-369534/

[xi] “‘Bombed Unarmed, Poor People’: Colombian President Blasts Trump for Caribbean Strikes; Seeks UN Criminal Probe.” The Times of India, September 25, 2025. The Economic Times - The Times of India. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/rest-of-world/bombed-unarmed-poor-people-colombian-president-blasts-trump-for-caribbean-strikes-seeks-un-criminal-probe/articleshow/124081483.cms.

[xii] Alonso, Roberto García. “Colombia at a Crossroads: The NATO Exit and Its Consequences.” Latinoamérica 21, July 24, 2025, https://latinoamerica21.com/en/colombia-at-a-crossroads-the-nato-exit-and-its-consequences/

[xiii] “China-Colombia Relations Are Growing, If Slowly.” United States Institute of Peace, https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/11/china-colombia-relations-are-growing-if-slowly. Accessed October 15,. 2025.

[xiv] What Will Closer Ties Mean for Colombia & China? – Inter-American Dialogue. https://thedialogue.org/analysis/what-will-closer-ties-mean-for-colombia-china. Accessed October 15,. 2025.

[xv] February 24, Brenda Estefan | and 2025. “Latin America’s China Ties Won’t Be Easily Severed.” Americas Quarterly. https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/latin-americas-china-ties-wont-be-easily-severed. Accessed October 15, 2025.

[xvi] AFP. “Colombia Joins Belt and Road Initiative as China Courts Latin America.” The Hindu, May 14, 2025. World. www.thehindu.com, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/colombia-joins-belt-and-road-initiative-as-china-courts-latin-america/article69575994.ece.

[xvii] Falah, Natalia. “Colombia’s Petro Struggles with High Disapproval Rating.” Colombia One: News from Colombia and the World, September 3,. 2025, https://colombiaone.com/2025/09/03/colombia-gustavo-petro-disapproval/.

[xviii]Nick. “Colombian Politicians Criticise US Secretary of State Rubio’s Interference in Uribe Guilty Verdict.” Justice for Colombia, July 30, 2025, https://justiceforcolombia.org/news/colombian-politicians-criticise-us-secretary-of-state-rubios-interference-in-uribe-guilty-verdict/.

[xix] Note- The “Nannygate” scandal in Colombia, also known as the Sarabia-Benedetti scandal, erupted in mid-2023 and led to the resignation of two of President Gustavo Petro’s top officials. It involved a complex web of allegations, including a stolen briefcase of cash, illicit wiretapping and illegal campaign financing

[xx] “Who Is Gustavo Petro? Colombia’s Leftist Leader at Center of a US Trade Dispute.” The Times of India, January 27, 2025. The Economic Times - The Times of India, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/who-is-gustavo-petro-colombias-leftist-leader-at-center-of-a-us-trade-dispute/articleshow/117592476.cms.