Indian Council of World Affairs

 

Unidentified Speaker: Good afternoon, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen. It is my pleasure to welcome you all to the Indian Council of World Affairs for this panel discussion on the theme, Re-Arming Europe, Prospects and Pitfalls. Before we proceed, may I request you all to kindly keep your phones on silent mode. Thank you. We will start today's program with Ms. Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, Acting Director General and Additional Secretary, ICWA, delivering our welcome remarks. The panel discussion will be chaired by Ambassador Gurjit Singh, former ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, ASEAN, and the African Union, and Honorary Professor, IIT, Indore.

 

We have three esteemed speakers. Our first speaker is Lieutenant General Sanjay Verma, former Director General of Weapons and Equipment, Army Headquarters, Ministry of Defense, and Distinguished Fellow, Council for Strategic and Defense Research, followed by Professor Ummu Salma Bava, Chairperson & Jean Monnet Chair, Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, JNU, and Chairperson of Special Center for National Security Studies, JNU. Next we have is Dr. Aleksei Zakharov, Fellow, Strategic Studies Program, Observer Research Foundation.

 

May I now request Ms. Nutan Kapoor Mahawar to kindly give her welcome remarks.

 

Nutan Kapoor Mahawar: Distinguished experts on the dais and friends, Europe's armament strategies sank post-collapse of Soviet Union. Excessive reliance on the sole superpower, the US, for security, the foregrounding of economic agendas nationally and in external relations, and the proactive pursuit of normative agendas in Europe's relations with the rest of the world led to European slumberness in the defense and military sector. There is considerable variation in the militarization postures of various European countries, with France, Germany, the U.K. in the lead, and the smaller countries of Europe, like Albania and Malta, significantly lagging.

 

The status quo within Europe, and in its equations with other big powers, has significantly been ruptured with the Ukraine war. The Ukraine war has begun a transformative journey for Europe as far as its security and defense are concerned. Some are calling it a ‘geopolitical awakening’, which saw its first impulse in the Russia-Georgia war of 2008. Europe is now on a war footing. Thanks to this ‘geopolitical awakening’. The twin shocks of Russian action on Ukraine and an erratic White House administration have ended decades of complacency in Brussels and European capitals, and finally forced them to confront the realities of the day.

 

There has been a record increase in the overall defense spending in Europe, with countries like Poland, the three Baltic states, and Germany primarily driving this militarization. The April 2025 SIPRI report declared the ongoing European rearmament as the primary driver of the global increase in defense spending in 2024. With a 17% increase, driven by an overall increase in nearly all the European countries, Europe has even crossed the levels recorded at the end of the Cold War. The 76th NATO Summit in Hague, which set an ambitious target of 5% spending on defense, is also a step in this direction, with more than 23 countries already touching the earlier agreed 2% threshold.

 

Europe is now the primary supplier of military aid to Kiev, with most of the military hardware being transferred to Ukraine coming through Europe-led defense procurements, though there have been some countries, like Hungary, which have not been particularly enthusiastic about supporting Ukraine. There is a growing realization in Brussels that the EU must evolve from its traditional economic bloc into a more strategic actor. This is also being seen in how the EU is approaching its relations with India of lately. The public opinion in Europe largely backs this evolution, as seen in many surveys. The rearmament gives Europe an opportunity to emerge as an autonomous player in global geopolitics sans the crutches of the US.

 

However, the larger issue of the European integration project and peace and stability on the continent, independent of or at the expense of peace and stability in the rest of the world, remains to be sufficiently analyzed and addressed. We have put together an excellent panel to discuss this theme today chaired by Ambassador Gurjit Singh. I look forward to thoughtful discussions and I wish the panelists all the best.

 

Unidentified Speaker: Thank you, Ma'am. May I now request Ambassador Gurjit Singh to give his opening remarks and conduct the proceedings.

 

Gurjit Singh: Thank you, Madam Ambassador, Nutan Mahawar, for first inviting me and then giving such a pithy short address which raises all the main points. I'm very happy to be with my distinguished colleagues today. I have served twice in Europe. My happiest posting, Italy, all work and no play, the reverse actually, all play, no work, but a strong defense relationship with India. And then Germany, where there was no issue of defense. So all these issues that are in Europe concept note today were not discussed in the years I worked up to 2017. These are all new issues.

 

To my mind, what was important was can we work with Europe in general and Germany and France, in particular, in a multipolar world. That was more important to us. Strategic partnerships meant different things to them than they do in the Indo-Pacific. Today when they are called to re-militarize, they have a long way to go because the size of their armed forces is very small, their defense productions are very limited, and can they afford it at a time when European economies are stagnating, if not coming down?

 

The costs of welfare are very high in Europe and some of the countries you mentioned, all of them are having this domestic debate on increasing retirement ages to defer pensions. So there is an economic challenge at the same time that they want to raise their economic defense spending to 5%. In my time, the European Union was an economic functional organization which will tell other countries how to run their human rights. Today they are trying to not only spread money to all members but also spread money for the defense of all members. This change has happened.

 

Now leaving that aside, I am now going to go by the order given in this paper. So I am going to request Lieutenant General Sanjay Verma. I think the main objectives are to examine the militarization of Europe and is it only in the context of the Ukraine crisis or does it have a wider connotation? What are the key sectors where it works on? Is it only in response to Russia or will there be other challenges which Europe would be willing to undertake once they are militarized? And there are many other questions in this important paper which you could address. 10 minutes, sir. Thank you.

 

Sanjay Verma: Thank you very much, sir. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. A real pleasure to be here and in the midst of such august gathering, both on the stage, my chair and the panelists, and the audience. I think, I mean, this morning only, if you would have seen the Times of India, they covered the Indo-EU, the agreement, FTA, which we are looking forward. And along with that, while we've been talking about the FTA for long, this time they are also looking at a Indo-EU security and defense agreement. And like what the Ambassador just said, absolutely right, in our growing years, four decades back and down, even going back to one decade or two decades back, one was never looking at a relationship which would look at militarization from the perspective of Indian military, etc.

 

But having said that, let me use the word what the Ambassador used, the re-militarization. This opportunity, which the EU is looking at, in my mind, could not have come at a better time, where we are placed today, because I see a lot of convergence with our own initiatives of Atmanirbhar Bharat. There is a lot in common as far as the urge to re-militarize. They are driven by a vacuum which has happened because of the Ukraine war and, in fact, the drying up of arms ammunition totally. In fact, all the companies, all the defense supplies which are there are already full in their order books and do not have the capacity. Immediate outcome can be filled in that void. I'll come to that. I'll come to that.

 

But let's see, as on today, if you are talking about -- all of you must have read Resilience 2030, their plans, earmarking of the budgets which you have said, 5% spending, right -- I mean, the type of countries which are there, making sure that this expenditure which was earlier being done on social sectors now will be forcibly done in the defense. It's a legislation, something which has already happened in our budget where we say 60% to 70% of the Indian defense capital budget will be spent on buying from within the country.

 

So I think something same has come up that the 2024 European Defense Industrial Strategy proposes that by 2030 at least half of EU defense procurement comes from the European Defense Technology and Industrial Base, ETIDBP. So they have said that this is legislated. So that is where I was drawing certain parallels. Now, what is the nature of European militarization today? It is characterized by, number one, pumping in lot of funds. The figures are already there for us. It comes with a policy framework, a very well-thought-of, readiness 2030 or ReArm Europe, which clearly stipulates, in fact, it is something like a mandate, it gives a road map, what has to be done by each member state. So there is no ambiguity on that.

 

With the arsenal depleted, there is an urgent requirement to shift from an expeditionary crisis management mode in which European countries were there to looking at safeguarding their own territorial sovereignty threatened by the Ukraine, what is happening there. So now there is a stress on your territorial sovereignty. So what happens is now the focus is on ammunition, missile defense, air defense support systems, replacement of legacy platforms, which have been there for a number of times. There is another very interesting narrative which I think comes into face us also and that is reducing the dependence on United States, that is underlying statement which is there.

 

So there has to be a need for a stronger integration and cooperation between the EU nations. If that be the case, what are the opportunities which come for India? Before that, I will just say that there are certain barriers also like the EU schemes either exclude the non-EU contractors or require EU establishments. So we will have to manage that. There is an easy way to manage that also, I will come to that once I say what are the opportunities for India. In fact, this very legislation or this very barrier, which says it excludes non-EU contractors or requires EU establishment, comes as an opportunity.

 

Then, EU states will diversify some of the non-US sourcing, maybe for cost, maybe to diversify their supply chain. They want to diversify that. So what are the opportunities? The opportunities are the technologies which you are looking at, maybe drones, unmanned systems, AI driven command and control decision support systems, counter drones and integrated air defense, communication and space based solutions and long range precision weapons, munitions. The requirement of the inventory is similar. Here lies the opportunity for the Tier 2 and Tier 3 players which are very strong in our country. Therefore, this gives us an opportunity for joint ventures. The EU-based subsidiaries, Saab, has already established here. That is one of them. And there are more to follow.

 

Look at the way Saffron is doing Indian aerospace programme. So there will be a lot many such initiatives. And just to share, like what the ambassador said, at one point of time, we never used to talk about this. In the past eight, nine months, I have been to three countries, including Italy and Germany, for fostering relations and how to move ahead. So having said two takeaways, one is Tier 2, Tier 3 supply chain integration. Number two, joint ventures and European Union-based collaborations. Number three, collaborative R&D or emerging technologies. Why? Because these are all emerging technologies today are dual-use technologies.

 

So there lies an opportunity because certain European countries are reluctant to share defense-related issues. In fact, my recent trip to Germany did reveal that, that it will not be very convenient for them to look at all collaboration in the defense. So space, communication, materials, advanced materials, energy, all these sectors are readily available for us to have joint ventures. So with the Atmanirbhar Bharat and the type of policy shifts which have happened within the Indian defense procurement, having headed that for four years, about seven, eight years back, I see a phenomenal shift in what has happened in the last eight, 10 years.

 

So I think we need to negotiate ourselves very carefully and use this opportunity. So I will close here and then subsequently dwell more, depending on what is the time and the questions. Thank you.

 

Gurjit Singh: Thank you very much. Very disciplined, very precise, good things. And he led me to the question in my mind, can Indian companies buy companies in Germany or in Europe which are involved in these technologies? In the civilian space, there is much. When I was ambassador, I used to keep telling the Germans there's actually more Indian investment into Germany in the decade from 2005 to 2015 than the other way around. And we proved it through a report from one of the Big Four, which is true. So Indian companies were buying companies over there, technology companies.

 

Now in China, there is suspicion. India, there is none. So I think we should move this track, too, and see what our objectives are, and we can move. But thank you so much. I now have great pleasure in inviting my dear friend, Professor Ummu Salma Bava. And I am sure she will now enlighten us even further on what General Verma has so kindly already indicated. All to you, ma'am. 10 minutes.

 

Ummu Salma Bava: Thank you so much. Good afternoon, everyone. Good afternoon, Ambassador Nuton Mahawar, and thank you, ICWA, for this opportunity. We can't be discussing at a better time. ReArm Europe was launched this year. But let me just roll back and present what I intend to do in the next 10 minutes. One is just locate the background. Second, what is ReArm Europe? Let's just look at that, and then kind of prospects and challenges.

 

I think it's important to locate that in 2024, the European Defense Industrial Strategy was launched exactly in the month of March. And the backdrop for that, of course, is a war in Ukraine. So a fundamental question to ask in a security context is how did the event of 24th, February 2022, transform what Madam Ambassador said was a sleeping giant into being awakened to take on a far more military role? I think security in Europe for a long time has been defined through the lens of human security.

 

And economic prosperity contributed to standards of living, to extending benefits, covering an entire range, and making the European Union so attractive that in 1992, after the European Union came into being and the Cold War had come to an end, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe made an extreme turn to join the two important institutions which would guarantee economic security and also security from a military perspective.

 

But events kind of 20 years later would augur something else. It was not enough just to have economic security. And if Crimea was not the wake-up call, then definitely 2022 was the wake-up call. In the last three years, despite international efforts and more importantly, from Washington with President Trump having stated in his election agenda that he will try to get a peace deal done immediately, which was his first priority, things have not actually delivered in the way as a written script would. It's not a theater, but it has become a theater of the worst kind because the longer a war continues, the cost of coming back to peace is even more intense. And I think that's what Europe has encountered.

 

So Europe has had a series of wake-up calls, one could look at it, from the Strategic Compact which was launched in 2022, which was right at the heels of the outbreak of the war, to getting the industrial defense side going in 2024, and more importantly this year, the whole ReArm Europe shows you a critical series of steps which have been undertaken to kind of address the challenge of who provides for European security. The classic case, as Madam Ambassador, you had pointed out, was about NATO delivering it. NATO with its 32 members, and EU, with its 27 members, clearly sees an overlap in terms of the common countries over it.

 

But today, I think the 20th of January, 2025, probably delivered a far greater shock in trust to the transatlantic relationship, if anything has ever done, and one has had a long history of understanding the transatlantic, because the trust factor so important in bilateral relations took a beating of a kind which will never come back. Trump, 2.1 had already indicated that European countries are underperforming and underpaying into defense, and the 2% threshold should be crossed. Then what has been produced since 2022 is to increase the expenditure further.

 

So the 5% has been put forward. And if you look at ReArm Europe, then clearly the idea is that Europe has to take charge of its own security, even though a successful NATO summit earlier this year assured everybody that Article 5 would be available. But I think for the first time in the history of the transatlantic and since the NATO came into being in 1949, the efficacy of Article 5 has been put on the table. Nobody knows for sure where the fault line would be and whether Washington is willing to actually come through for its allies.

 

So I think in that context, let me draw your attention to five areas which have been identified in the ReArm program, which takes it a further step into delivering security for Europe. One is, of course, is to help national capitals to meet their defense expenditure. So that is about a fiscal instrument which has come into being. A second point over here is, it also is a new scheme of defense investment. Third, the commission wants to use unutilized funds of the EU for defense-related investment.

 

Fourth, it also seeks to bring in private capital into the defense purpose. And finally, it also wants to mobilize the European Investment Bank, or the EIB, into it. Clearly, if there is one thing in ReArm Europe, across the five points which have been emphasized, it is about more investment into defense, right? But does simply putting down that more investment into defense produce the kind of capability and the industrial readiness to actually deliver security is a fundamental question. And as we have -- General, you're here, it takes a long time between intent and action and the actual deployment of troops. And in this lag time, many things can happen. Many things which are politically, I think, going to be extremely important. And one of them would be, would President Trump push for a Ukraine peace plan, but then who is going to give securities for Ukraine for that peace plan in which we see Europe is partially in and not in at times? That is going to be extremely important.

 

So, keeping due deference to time, and since there's a good old friend chairing it and I would not want him to guillotine me, let me quickly come down to the prospects and the pitfalls. I think from a European perspective, there is the first real-time effort to actually address defense independently of what has come from the transatlantic. And that, purely from a European dimension, would be a welcome thing to say that, okay, for the first time, the Europeans will actually try to cater for their own defense. How does it translate into action?

 

The welcome step would be that increased defense spending would also mean that member states know that there is a backup available to them at the European level. And this is especially true for those countries who are not able to invest, trying to balance their welfare measures, economic aspects, and the fact, for the last three years, there's an energy diversification going on in Europe which has added to the burden of cost for the states, which means it has pushed up across the board the cost of production.

 

Second, ReArm Europe would add to the idea of strategic autonomy of Europe, a concept which has been put forward. It is a goal which is going to be very distant to realize, but probably the first step in which to shift the reliance away from a US military in order to develop an independent European defense capability. Third, I think ReArm Europe also addresses what we would call as the capability gap to which Europe has always been subjected to, and this will mean that identify important areas of air and missile defense, artillery systems, drone and military mobility and more importantly, in the case of hybrid warfare, we are looking at both cyber and electronic.

 

And a fourth positive side would be that the strategy promotes what is called as a more better together approach. Right in that, one can see what is the challenge. It means it has to overcome fragmentation in order to deliver collectively. So let me quickly enumerate what are the challenges of ReArm Europe which come through. First is the fragmentation, the challenge of replication across many countries, financial strain, the ability to manage tight domestic debates while addressing that.

 

Third, even if you declare a ReArm program, the fact is that there is an infrastructure deficiency and not all countries will be able to pick and run and immediately convert a policy into an industrial defense capacity which is augmented immediately. And fourth is, of course, the whole issue of procurement. Europe, with its multiple industries and used to what is called as a national preference mode, is going to find it difficult to quickly augment and provide what is called as a Europe-wide decision-making, where it would mean that national interest of one will have to be given up in order to provide for a collective interest.

 

And of course, managing the transatlantic tension and the geopolitical context is going to be extremely important. It would be useful to see that as we come into next March of 2026 and the war enters the fourth year, two years of back-to-back of an industrial defense strategy and the launching of ReArm Europe, would that really effectively produce something positive on the European continent in terms of actual deployment, actual capability augmentation and actual readiness to face what Europe identifies as an enemy? In the longer run, ReArm Europe and whatever challenges come would also have to see that Europe will have to find a way to navigate its difficult geography, because geography is the final master of everybody's destiny. Thank you.

 

Gurjit Singh: Thank you, Professor Salma Bava, a very precise definition of what the concepts we are discussing and where do you think they will be going. Your presentation led my mind to some questions. Has Brexit reduced the efficacy of Europe's defense organization? Because earlier with the British who were in, the British, French and Germans used to coordinate defense, but now British are not in.

 

The second, the increased defense spending, like in Germany, for instance, first goes to buying US weapons. So it is like a gift to the other side of the Atlantic. And the third part is that out of the 5%, 1.5% is actually meant for related infrastructure. Now, I think that is very important and that is something we also have a role, which is non-defense, non-lethal, but it has a lot of things you can do on tech, for instance.

 

And you spoke about how the companies need to be Europeanized. All Indian tech companies are Europeanized. So we have that advantage already on the ground. I have now great pleasure in inviting Dr. Aleksei Zakharov, a fellow of the Strategic Studies Program, ORF, and who I'm told is from Russia. So we should have a different view now. Sir, you have 10 minutes from now. Thank you.

 

Aleksei Zakharov: Thank you, Ambassador. I would like to thank ICWA for inviting me. And it's an honor to be among such distinguished experts on the panel. And the topic of discussion is really important, I think, and timely. So I would like to provide a Russian perception of the European rearmament. I think that if we use the term mobilization then we have to emphasize that these are early days of European militarization because in a comprehensive understanding I think that the militarization requires to intervene in different domains.

 

And if we look at the European political debates or social life then we will not, I think, track any signs of mobilization there, particularly if we take into account the recent debates in some European capitals like in France where there are different takes about Russia's threat including in response to the recent remarks of the Chief of Defense Staff, General Fabien Mandon. So I think it's a vivid example that there are different takes on how Europe should proceed and it's just probably a beginning, it's just an early stage of mobilization.

 

My second point is about the narratives that are emanating from both Europe and Russia. I think that sometimes they are conflicting in nature because if we trace the statements of different politicians in Europe, some of them are saying that Russia is a paper tiger and it's losing its war in Ukraine and that its political regime is unstable. If we take other statements then they are trying to, in a way, exaggerate Russia's threats saying that the war with Russia is imminent and even make some predictions for 2029 or 2030.

 

In Russia the situation is similar because I think that generally Europe is perceived and the European Union in particular is perceived as an incohesive organization, that there are a lot of fault lines between different countries and that the current attempt at increasing military expenditure would inevitably impact the political systems and their economies resulting in change in power and rise of alternative political forces that can be beneficial to Russia.

 

So I think that if we go to a more sober analysis then we will probably see that the current situation between Europe and Russia where the prospect of direct military clash has become almost inevitable if we listen to the statements, I think it's a little bit exaggerated. So if we look at the expert opinions and analysis then we will see that actually the European rearmament is currently, again, we are not talking about five to seven years or a long-term perspective, but currently it's less of a threat to Russian security, but more of an attempt to bolster defense capabilities and probably a response to Russia's mobilization itself.

 

And I think that there are two main objectives that are pursued by the European member states. The first is to boost defense against a potential Russia's invasion in one of the countries, particularly Baltic states. It's exemplified by different attempts to ramp up defense along the border, exemplified by anti-tank ditches, dragon teeth and other measures like minefields.

 

And secondly, to ensure more parity in military potentials for the future, because I think that both Russian and European military experts, they realise that there are some critical gaps to address in their current defense capabilities. I think that Lieutenant General Verma already referred to the systems that Europeans are seeking now, particularly they realise their shortage of production of shells and the recent measures announced, for instance, by the German enterprises to build new plants. They are good in intention, but I think that if we look at the output numbers then we will see that they are insufficient to sustain a serious, intensive military conflict.

 

And in this domain particularly, Russia has increased its production of shells and rounds significantly over the past three years. The same concerns the drone systems and counter-drone systems. I think there is a lack of focus not only on the production itself, but on training skills and tactics in this domain, which, as the war in Ukraine indicates, is a very important thing beyond the number of drones itself.

 

At the same time, of course, if we compare our military balances, Europe has an upper hand in several domains as well, like if we compare the number of fighter jets, for instance or their transition to the new generation fighter jets. Or if we take up maritime space, of course, in the maritime domain, especially with the surface vessels, I think that Europe benefits from superiority.

 

One next point is that Russia does not perceive a European threat without taking into account the U.S. capabilities. And I think that despite the unpredictability of the Trump administration so far and numerous foot lines in the transatlantic relationship, I think that there is belief that U.S. is still committed to its NATO obligations, including in military sphere. That's why I think that the Russian responses to the developments in the West, if we can say it like this, I think they are aimed at signaling not so much to Europe but to the United States.

 

And I would like to highlight the recent tests of different novel weapons by Russia like the Burevestnik missile or Poseidon, nuclear-powered, underwater vehicle and many other systems. I think that it's not only about Europe and it's not so much about Europe but more about the dynamics within US-Russia relationship. So here Russia is perceiving NATO as a whole, not separating European part of NATO from the larger alliance.

 

And my last point is that despite the prospect of any direct clash between Russia and Europe being as of now a far-fetched prospect, I think that there are still some scenarios where we can unfortunately see a major incident between the two sides. To my mind, there are two major risks or dangerous area. The first one is the continuation of war in Ukraine if the current peace attempts will not yield any tangible results. And if the plans for deploying any European troops in Ukraine would materialize, then, of course, we can see a prospect of a direct clash between Russia and some European members or NATO as a whole as more realistic.

 

And the second area of concern, I would say that the Baltic Sea, where there are actually heated tensions now, including in the trade domain and Russia is forced to send its naval vessels to escort its oil tankers. So I would say I would flag this area as another area of concern for any future dialogue and I will stop there. Thank you for your attention.

 

Gurjit Singh: I was very happy to hear your views because they are not something we usually hear in India, so it is good to hear, but I do hope what you said at the end, that there could be other wars coming. I hope that is not true. I think from my point of view, we really need Russia to end this war and take its rightful place in the international order as a major pole in a multipolar world. By the inconclusive war in Ukraine, that ability of Russia to play a role in a multipolar world stands diminished. The absence from the Indo-Pacific, the absence from BRICS Summit, the absence from G20 summit, this is telling.

 

So I need Russia back and for that you need to end the war in Ukraine and we hope that whatever you are doing now will happen. But again, your remarks led me to some questions in my mind and this comes to what you had said. If European companies start entering the defense, military, industrial complex, they will again become internalized. It is so difficult to externalize European companies to think about India that it will become very difficult. They will again start navel-gazing and saying, we have a big enough market in Europe, why should we go to India? That is one problem.

 

The second problem is, which I saw first hand when I was a few months ago in five Nordic countries. I found at the level of governments, everybody was good with this NATO 5% but if you talk to the people, they were not. They said our government is leading into this and now they will tell us that we will curtail your welfare measures, which we are not ready for. So in brief you take that equation, am I going to cut my pension to help Ukraine? Essentially it boils down to that and the answer was no.

 

So I think this is the big challenge for Europe, how to convince their people that what they are doing is right. The other thing was that we talk about European integration but in Estonia I could not use a euro or a dollar card. They were blocked. Why? When I came back they said that country is too close to Russia, physically. So any way close to Russia, your cards don't work. This is something I learnt. And the funny part was I had to pay for my lunch so I took out a EUR 50 note. That girl had never seen a EUR 50 note. I said, you are a euro country. She said give me EUR 10. I didn't have EUR 10.

 

So a lot of practical problems are coming up because of this war between these countries and this so-called European integration is not on the ground. The Eastern European, the Baltics are actually still where they were, with Russia as their enemy number one. That is the only difference. How they are integrated into Europe, I think there are a lot of questions to be asked.

 

So I think we have had a scintillating array of speakers. I am going to open, we have only ten minutes, so five questions or comments, keep them brief and then we will go for a last round of answers. And I certainly would like to give preference to the ladies. Yes, thank you.

 

Himanshi Mavi: Good evening. My name is Himanshi Mavi, a youth representative from TIES, a think tank research organization and media platform. As a youth representative, I am mainly aware of the historical anxiety associated with military exhalations. As Europe is currently facing an imperative for rearmament, my question directed to the entire panel, as it touches on strategy, diplomacy and communication.

 

For the military experts, my question is, what specific objectives must the narrative prioritise to distinguish deterrence from offence? I would like to repeat my question. What specific objectives must the narrative prioritise to distinguish deterrence from offence? And for the diplomatic and European studies experts, what is cohesive?

 

Gurjit Singh: One question. Okay, done. Thank you. Anybody else? Yes. Who is coming after him? Okay, here, lady here. Give her the mic, please. And after him, the gentleman.

 

Deepak Kumar Sharma: Greetings to the esteemed panel. My name is Deepak Kumar Sharma. I am a research associate with TIES only. My question is regarding the inner fractions within the EU. So within the rearming agenda, there was also mention of a drone shield for the entire EU. But there was several like the big players like the France and Germany were very structural, they were structural about it because they wanted to handle it themselves independently and not rely on Brussels for that drone shield.

 

And as well, similarly, the future combat aircraft system like the sixth-generation aircraft, has already collapsed and the partnership is not working because there were differences regarding the development partner in that scenario, right? So how do you resolve these inner fractions when coming to the rearming the whole Europe? And second, like resolve the last point.

 

Gurjit Singh: One question. Yes, ma'am. Mic here. Yes. Give the mic behind, please.

 

Unidentified Participant: Good evening, everyone. I'm a youth representative from TIES as well. I'm Sumera.

 

Gurjit Singh: Is there anybody who is not from that org?

 

Unidentified Participant: TIES is a student organization, but the students are from different colleges and universities in Delhi.

 

Gurjit Singh: Ah, okay, okay. Carry on. Thank you.

 

Unidentified Participant: So my question for today would be, can Europe truly modernize its defense system without becoming overly dependent on US for its technology and strategy?

 

Gurjit Singh: Thank you for keeping it short. Yes. You're also from TIES?

 

Unidentified Participant: No. So my name is Sameer and the question is, will Brussels wait and move slowly with this plan of rearming with the hope that there will be a new face in White House, let's say, in a few more years? Until then, it will assure, okay, we are doing something, but we will not do something constructive on ground.

 

Gurjit Singh: Thank you. There right at the back please. Sorry, that one and here and then we are done.

 

Unidentified Participant: Sir, one important question, in terms of defense technology, where are we standing right now in comparison of China, America and European Union countries?

 

Gurjit Singh: Yes, here. No, no behind you. Give it behind you.

 

Unidentified Participant: Thank you, chair. I would like to bring in an important point, we are talking about rearming Europe, but there was backlash against the term itself and then you have Readiness 2030. So when you are talking about Readiness and about defense integration per se, be it joint procurement initiatives and the European Defense Fund, I know it is too early to -- I am not judging it because it is still in a nascent stage and very early, but how do we talk about rearming when there is not consensus about rearming itself?

 

Gurjit Singh: Thank you. Okay, Uma. Old friend, I can't say no, and then you, all right, then we finish.

 

Unidentified Participant: Thank you, sir. Pleasure seeing you, chairing this panel. Well, everybody touched about the strategic rearmament of Europe, but my question is, I am going to the challenges part of it. When there is a strategic framework of protecting Europe, what about the national sovereignty, concept of sovereignty and then what is the issue of responsibility to protect the concept in the multilateral forums? It is a different connotation when it comes to this regional protection. What are the implications of international humanitarian law also going forward?

 

Gurjit Singh: That lady there. Last one. Thank you.

 

Khushbu Sharma: Hello, everyone. This is Khushboo. I am a PhD scholar at the JNU. I have this question, only one question to Professor Bava. How will European Union member states align their different strategic interests in order to develop a common strategy for rearmament?

 

Gurjit Singh: Thank you. So, now I am going to go back to the panel to try and address these questions and give your concluding remarks. Keep them brief, please. General Sir Verma.

 

Sanjay Verma: Well, the common thread running amongst the question was, is there a consensus amongst the nations? Fine, allocation of funds, making of a document, spelling out an intent, but does it transform into what they are looking at? This is a common thread. Yes, that is going to be a problem. But for the other reasons which, in fact, Professor Bava also raised, what are the pitfalls? Fragmented nature of these nations are there, there is a competition amongst these countries for the same technologies, so there will be problems.

 

I raise a fundamental question, while the whole argument is for collective defense against territorial sovereignty or against a particular block, any doctrine, concept or philosophy for deterrence, that question also came up, or for a war, comes out from an offensive capability as well. So it cannot be based only on collective defense, are they looking at a collective offence, definitely not, but the maturity of a weapon system and the actual intent of transforming this resilience will depend a lot on if there is a collective offence intent also, then they come together, as of now there will be fragmentation, there will be challenges, how this money is utilized.

 

And just one second sir, you had mentioned on what shift, how does the shift take place to India, the shift to India will take place on certain important issues which we have, we have reasonably skilled manpower, reasonably affordable labor, good manufacturing capabilities and a lot resurging private sector which is coming up, that can marry with these countries to bring into India.

 

Gurjit Singh: Thank you. Professor Bava.

 

Ummu Salma Bava: So I think the issue of consensus has been raised and I also alluded to it. I think one will miss the point if you don't understand the European Union in design is all about integration, it's about overcoming the national differences to construct something, it's about common. And once you've reached that threshold of moving beyond the difference, then what you do get is something very powerful because there is nothing in terms of common collective action anywhere regionally in the world as the European Union has produced.

 

But yes, the challenges that you're moving from an understanding on what we call in economics, where it was far easier to mesh national sovereignties and interest to defense, which at one level exposes geography to very different kind of challenges. So geography does not produce at a very territorial level the same kind of threat, but the minute you move to a cybersecurity domain it doesn't make a difference where a state is located.

 

And I think marrying these two kinds of looking at traditional threat and the new hybrid threats will produce an opportunity which Europe for the first time has seized on. The point would be of course, for leadership across Europe to really consistently work together to recognize that this is a strategic moment or what I would call as a point of inflection. The fact that, in the last three years, major documents have come out shows you about political intentionality. That is half the battle won. Because if you don't have a political intention, you cannot get a document out.

 

So the fact that defense industrial policy, ReArm Europe and Europe Readiness 2030 all point in the direction of converging and taking national preferences to collective action. Then would be the point what General Verma said, that defense is the first point. They have not identified offence at this point. That is something which will happen down the road. It requires a much greater degree of military capability.

 

But first is to get the house in order to assert European preparedness against what is called, and a point which Alexi said, for the first time, it tries to make a distinction between what is Atlantic contribution to defense and a European contribution to defense. And I think that is a very, very important distinction we need to hold.

 

Gurjit Singh: Thank you. Professor Zakharov, two minutes please.

 

Aleksei Zakharov: I will just second the idea of a lack of consensus within the European nations on the future path of bolstering defense capabilities. I think that European societies are not yet willing and ready to support this military push. That is why we are now observing disjointed efforts at the individual countries' levels that are not yet elevating to the level of the European Union. And of course, a lot of uncertainties within the transatlantic relationship does not help to facilitate this process of rearmament.

 

And just one minor remark about Russia in a multipolar world. I think that the effort is to be present there more actively. And I think that Russia's push has been actually very active to embrace the countries of the Global South, because I think that both Russia and the Western powers understand that it's really necessary to fight for the narratives and fight for their support, even if they're positive neutrality. That's why I would see that there has been actually more presence, at least from my perspective, more presence of Russia within this space. But it's up to a future debate, of course. Thank you.

 

Gurjit Singh: Thank you. So again, hearing the answers, my thought went back to something else I saw in Europe. And that was that when the Americans led forces into Iraq and to Afghanistan, many European countries contributed troops and suffered casualties. Denmark is one. Next time around, I don't think they are coming. So that is this cleavage between a European and an Atlantic response. Clearly, I got the message that this time our sons won't go, for not our objective.

 

So I think that is something that is sticking in my mind. I have no way of proving it, but this is something I heard. With that I conclude. I am sorry I am five minutes late from the time given to me, but thank you so much for having us and back to you ICWA. Thank you for having us.

 

Unidentified Speaker: I think we will all agree with what Professor Bava said about Europe being at a critical juncture at an inflection point. On behalf of ICWA, I would like to express my deep gratitude to the distinguished chair and speakers. My special thanks to Ms. Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, Acting Director General, ICWA and Ms. Nivedita Ray, Director of Research at the Council for their constant support and guidance.

 

I would also like to thank all my colleagues and audience for the engagement. To know more about ICWA's research work, events, outreach programs and publications, do visit our website and social media handles on Twitter, LinkedIn, YouTube and Facebook. Thank you, and please join us for high tea at the foyer. Thank you all.

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List of Participants:

1.  Ms. Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, Acting Director General & Additional Secretary, ICWA
2. Ambassador Gurjit Singh, former Ambassador of India to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, ASEAN, and the African Union, and Honorary Professor, IIT, Indore.
3.  Lieutenant General Sanjay Verma, former Director General of Weapons and Equipment, Army Headquarters, Ministry of Defense, and Distinguished Fellow, Council for Strategic and Defense Research, New Delhi
4.  Professor Ummu Salma Bava, Chairperson & Jean Monnet Chair, Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, JNU, and Chairperson of Special Center for National Security Studies, JNU.
5.  Dr. Aleksei Zakharov, Fellow, Strategic Studies Program, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi