Indian Council of World Affairs

Dr. Samatha Mallempati: Good afternoon. I welcome you all to the Indian Council of World Affairs for the panel discussion on Port Led Development, Connectivity and Geo-politics in India's Neighbourhood. Today's panel discussion is chaired by Ambassador Ashok Kantha, Subhash Chandra Bose Chair Professor on International Relations, Chanakya University, Distinguished Fellow Vivekananda International Foundation and former Ambassador of India to China and High Commissioner of India to Sri Lanka. 

The four eminent panellists who joined today's discussion are Professor Mahendra P. Lama, Centre for South Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University who has joined us virtually. Ms. Sulochana Wijayasinghe, Researcher at Lakshman Kadir Gamma Institute of International Relations and Strategic Studies, Colombo. Dr. Athaulla Rasheed,, Head of Centre, Centre for Security and Strategic Studies, Maldives National University. Captain Sarabjeet Singh Parmar, Distinguished Fellow, Council for Strategic and Defense Research, Australia-India Institute as well as an Indo-Pacific Studies Centre. The discussion will be followed by Q&A which will be moderated by the Chair. 

With this may I now invite Ms. Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, Acting Director General and Additional Secretary ICWA to deliver her welcome remarks. Thank you. 

Nutan Kapoor Mahawar: Thank you Distinguished Chair, Distinguished Speakers and all those who are joining us online. A very warm welcome to our panel discussion today. Well, let me begin by saying that the Christmas is coming and we see a little thinning of crowds in discussions, but still I am encouraged by the presence of experts as well as budding scholars in this room. 

Friends, ports are essential for human connectivity. This has been true since ancient times and it is true more so for the past century which has witnessed many fold increase in global commerce. Their development, their modernization has however lagged significantly in the Global South, in the developing countries. India has embarked on its own ambitious Sagarmala program to develop infrastructure of sea and riverine ports alongside its program for developing airports and related infrastructure which, as you know, has more salience for people-to-people connectivity these days, as compared to seaports.

Modern seaports are important for India, though their importance is not necessarily linked only to export-led growth. They are equally, if not more, important for connectivity and commerce within India, for building linkages along our coastline, for greater integration of our two island chains, the Lakshadweep and the Andamans, with the mainland, and for connectivity and commerce within our region and in our immediate neighbourhood.

We often hear that the South Asian region is least integrated. Development of ports will promote and facilitate national integration as also intra-regional integration. It will promote the principle of regionalism as an essential pillar of our foreign policy. And when we talk of transport connectivity and improved logistics within India, we are talking of port-led development. Just as when a new road or an upgraded road passes through a village, a district, it changes the entire profile of the area, whether economic or social.

A modern port, an upgraded port, can have an impact on its entire hinterland, its entire socio-economic life, in a positive way. This is really the thinking behind the port-led development framework of the Sagarmala program. This is quite distinct from, say, the Singapore kind of model, where the small city-state derives disproportionate political power, regionally or globally, by being an entrepreneur. We are not seeking to be transshipment hubs. We are seeking to link ports with manufacturing, production, and livelihoods.

As regards our development cooperation in ports in our neighbourhood, we see it as an investment, not only from the economic point of view, but as an investment in strengthening relations and building India's goodwill among the peoples of these countries. So whether it is Chittagong or Mongla in Bangladesh, or Sittwe in Myanmar, or Colombo West Container Port, or Thilafushi in Maldives, Port Louis redevelopment in Mauritius, or Duqm in Oman, and Chabahar in Iran, the first reason for investing in them is to build linkages and ties, and for bringing the peoples closer.

Of course, there are a lot of comments by analysts on the strategic nature of these development cooperation projects. This is not without reason. Here, it helps to remind ourselves that when it comes to strategy in statecraft or in diplomacy, everything can be made to be dual use if the need arises. Our SAGAR, Maritime Vision, now upgraded to MAHASAGAR, provides a sound basis to proceed with our relations in the maritime sector with countries in the immediate neighbourhood, with the island states of the Indian Ocean region, and with the countries in our extended neighbourhood. I look forward to a thoughtful panel discussion, and I wish the panelists all the best. Sir, the floor is yours.

Ashok Kantha: Thanks. Let me begin by thanking Acting Director General ICWA for inviting me and other panelists to discuss this very important subject, and for setting the stage for our discussions with our opening remarks. Nutan has already brought out why ports are important for India, for the region, and what kind of policy we are pursuing as part of Sagarmala, SAGAR, SAGAR, MAHASAGAR initiatives. But important thing to note here that ports are not only nodes of infrastructure, they're also nodes where economic security, diplomacy, and local livelihood intersect.

So when we look at the subject, we'll have to keep in mind that a broader framework. Let me just flag four issues as pointers for discussion, apart from what has already been put out very succinctly in the concept note. First point I would like to highlight is that port-led development and connectivity are closely interlinked. Ports are strategic nodes, no doubt about it, but they are effective only when they're designed and integrated properly, when they catalyze industrial clusters, reduce trade costs, and anchor regional supply chains. If you don't do that, sometimes they become white elephants, sources of fiscal stress and vectors for external influence and interference.

So it's important to bear in mind the nature of port and importance of ports being embedded in a larger connectivity agenda. So we must look at port projects and connectivity as inseparable. They're not two different subjects, because a port without a hinterland, and hinterland links, whether it be power, pipelines, rail, road, ferry, and air services, cannot deliver promised economic transformation. And conversely, connectivity projects without port capacity to absorb and transship goods will remain underutilized and expensive networks. And there are specific examples, I don't want to go into both categories, where ports have not delivered or where connectivity projects have not delivered because of the absence of this interlinkage.

Now, connectivity creates mutual stakes. This is where diplomacy also comes in. When neighboring economies are linked by power, pipelines, ferries, air routes, distal customs, the cost of antagonism rises. Because they have sort of shared stakes in working together. And shared infrastructure, particularly ports, also creates recurring commercial flows, interdependent supply chains, and constituencies with a stake in stability. Now, this is particularly important for a region, because as Nutan brought out, ours is one of the least integrated region.

So we need to do a lot more in terms of power grid connectivity. We have been discussing power grid connectivity between India and Sri Lanka for a long time. But we have made progress in terms of grid connectivity involving India, Nepal, and Bangladesh with good outcomes. Oil and gas pipelines and fuel logistics, ferry services, and short-sea shipping. Some of these things happened in the past, but they are less effective today in our part of the world. Civil aviation links, some good news, but not enough. Digital and customs connectivity. This is going to be a big area. A lot of possibilities are there. This is one set of issues we can discuss.

Second issue is a problem of ports undertaken without adequate due diligence and community buy-in. Very often, large projects are launched because they're visible, headline-grabbing, and politically attractive, rather than because they fit into a realistic regional logistics and demand assessment. The result is projects that underperform commercially and create long-term fiscal burden for host states. You are all aware of resultant debt overhang, OPEC terms, sovereignty concerns. So this is one thing which is important. A link to this is importance of full buy-in by community because that reduces political risk. And in a way, that also works as a guarantor of fair due diligence and more efficient functioning of ports and linked connectivity agenda.

Third issue I wanted to flag is a misalignment of ports with national development strategies. Now, ports must be embedded in a country's broader economic plan. What purpose are they going to serve? I think that should be a starting point. For that, you have to take into account industrial policy, export strategy, urban planning, labor markets. If they're conceived isolation, well, we often refer to Hambantota as a sort of cautionary tale because I've seen it firsthand, how for an extended period, it could not be utilized at all because there was no market.

Finally, in fact, vehicle carriers were forced to start using Hambantota port. But even now, it's underutilized. And there's also a linked problem of elite capture and local backlash, which is, unfortunately, again, rampant in our part of the world. This results both in becoming a vector for external interference and for arriving at decisions which are not based on due diligence, so going to projects which are not required or which are not properly thought through.

Fourth and last issue I wanted to raise is geopolitics of ports and connectivity in the Indian Ocean region, literals. Now, this is going to be already, in fact, particularly defining strategic issue of our time because ports are no longer being seen as neutral commercial assets. They are instruments through which states project influence, secure supply chains, and shape regional alignments. In a region where maritime routes carry the bulk of global energy and trade, control over port infrastructure, its financing, operation, and security protocols translates into long-term strategic leverage.

For smaller South Asian states, ports offer both pathways to economic modernization and global integration, but also exposes them to geopolitical competition among larger powers seeking footholds along critical sea lanes. Now, here, without going into detail, I'd just like to flag China's approach, which is particularly consequential because China has been pursuing control over ownership and operation of port terminal as a strategic objective. When I checked today, I found that at least 115 active ports which are either owned or owned and operated by Chinese entities.

In our neighbourhood, also, we have investments in Hambantota, Colombo South Terminal, and linked Colombo Port City, Gwadar, Chapo. So there are a number of examples. In all these cases, large-scale financing, relatively rapid construction, long-term operational control arrangements, they become sort of common features. And they're often bundled with highways, industrial zones, power plants, and digital infrastructure, creating vertically integrated ecosystems that tie host economies to Chinese supply chains and standards.

And as Nutan mentioned, is always concerned about dual use. When a port becomes something different, in terms of utilization, it morphs. Now for India, expanding Chinese footprint poses a complex challenge, no doubt about it. Issue is not really trade or investment per se, but the strategic implications of ports that may evolve into dual-use facilities, political influence generated through debt-linked financing, and reshaping regional connectivity patterns in ways that bypass or marginalize India.

So India also has its own strategy of developing port terminals, though certainly nowhere close to scale China has achieved. But task for India is to offer credible alternatives, alternatives which are grounded in partnership, non-reciprocal arrangements, which are seen to be transparent in their terms and conditions, and which provide sustainable connectivity arising out of due diligence of projects. And here, for us, Hambantota becomes a learning experience, how not to do certain things, which will get us and host countries also into a whole lot of problems.

In conclusion, let me emphasize that portlet development can be transformative when it's conceived properly, but only when it's linked with connectivity. In isolation, it can play only a limited role. So you have to look at power, pipelines, ferry, aviation links, digital networks. All that has to be taken into account. So connectivity has to be prioritized. There has to be full buy-in from partners. It's extremely important to avoid getting these port projects run into political controversies. And buy-in from local community ensures that fact that terms of investment, details of contract are transparent and not kept confidential. And importance of avoiding costly delays.

So objective for India is not to grab port terminals. It's creation of more connected economies and geographies where shared prosperity becomes the strongest guarantor of regional stability. With these remarks, I will now invite. We have three panelists joining us online. I'll begin with Professor Mahendra Lama, Center for South Asian Studies, SIS, GNU. Over to you, Professor Lama.

Mahendra P. Lama: Thank you very much, Ambassador Kantha and DR ma'am Mahawar and Dr. Athaulla, the distinguished speakers. I'm going to primarily concentrate on the land and not the seaports. Because we think that in South Asia, for a country like India, land ports are emerging to be very, very critical in a plethora of contexts. Contexts like activist policy, India's neighbourhood first policy, BIMSTEC, SARC, BBIN, Mekong Ganga Cooperation. Definitely different from the seaports, land ports are definitely different. In again, many contexts. And they are pretty old historically. We started with pilgrimage, then trade, then several other connectivity projects.

Unlike sea and airports, the land port is pretty complex. You can see the other side of the border. You have a contact eye to eye, face to face, 24 hours and direct. And you can physically cross the border, touch the borders, interact with the nature, people, community, the environment there, and again, mingle with them. So some of us, we have been working on the land ports. We have developed four, but the first matrix is about, we call it VWT matrix, visibility, walkability, tangibility, and exchangeability. And the second matrix, set of matrix is about four ways of connectivity, roads, airways, railways, and waterways.

And in our 15,000 plus kilometers of land borders, we already have almost, there have been five operational land ports and nine plus integrated check posts. And that shows that these are going to be very, very critical points. And these land ports are spread over absolutely contrasting topography and demography. You have land ports in the mountain regions, in the plains lands, in the hill regions. For example, we have Shipki La in Himachal Pradesh, Lipu Lake in Uttarakhand, and there we interact basically with the Tibet Autonomous Region of China. And Ambassador Askho Kantha knows very well that we are deeply involved in reopening the Nathula trade route in 2006 after 44 years of its closing down.

Then you have a second set of land ports basically concentrated in the plains land. You can see Sutarkandi, you can see Petrapole Benapole in Calcutta for Bangladesh and India, Birgunj and Raxaul in Nepal and India. Then you have a very interesting trilateral arrangements as far as the land ports are concerned. And some of these trilateral arrangements are again interlinked or interconnected with what you call it the sea ports. For example, the Darjeeling District in Siliguri is a kind of a quadrilateral land port that where India, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal actually interact at Phulwari, Bangladesh. And from where one can access what you call Chittagong, Bangla and of course the emerging Matarbari ports.

And the fourth set of land ports which are really that constitutes the core of India's activist policy that is Moreh or Tamu in Manipur, Myanmar or even Pangsau, the second world war route, the still well road between Arunachal Pradesh and Myanmar and of course Dawki between Shillong, Meghalaya and Bangladesh. These are all major trading points far away from what you call the glares of the economist or other analysts. But again, they are at the core of India's geopolitical agenda. They constitute a significant portion of bilateral trade between India and Nepal. Between India and Bangladesh, almost 50% to 60% of trade between India and Bangladesh, sorry, Bhutan and India, and almost 50% or 55% of India-Bangladesh.

There are very interesting phenomenon, which we have noticed since we have been conducting several studies, the last being for the UNESCAP and the Ministry of External Affairs. We have seen the multiple players coming into what the partner in the entire land ports-related theaters, including Asian Development Bank, you have seen AIIB, World Bank, UN, JICA. And we have also noticed that these interconnections through the land borders to a large extent stand as geopolitics, even if something big happens, as far as political shocks or international conflicts are concerned, very little happens as far as, these points of exchange remain to a large extent unaffected, say, between India and Bangladesh, India and Nepal.

But again, these land ports require absolutely different tools of handling, to a large extent even a new or a kind of a varied set of diplomatic instruments to be more effective as far as international relations are concerned. And thirdly, it requires a kind of a different set of social, economic, cultural, and political tools to engage the neighboring countries. Today, the debate, as far as the land ports are concerned, are we going to do border trade or we would gradually move to land-based trade route? The border trade is a very, very restricted trade regime, whereas land-based trade route is something like seaports, where everything is traded except the items in the negative list.

The second, are we going to again put land borders in the orthodox border as a geometric line framework, or we put it in a much larger framework of borderland, where immediately when you move from geometric line to borderland, you have exchanges of all varieties, educational health, tourism, environmental injuries, to trade, to investment, to pilgrimage, anything like that. This is a kind of a new phenomenon we are trying to grapple with. The facilities in the borders or the land ports, we found that they are still the, what you call it, not even the first-generation. Whereas you find in the seaports, you have the second-generation facilities.

In terms of technology use, as far as communications are concerned, they are deployed there, quarantine and testing facilities, services like banking, insurance, and many other facilities which you find so prominently and so sophisticatedly in the seaports that are not available in the land ports. But despite all these, you have started witnessing multiple flows seconded by multimodal connectivity. Energy is growing, trade, tourism, education, health, all are taking place.

Then you have another, quite a critical issue because essentially these are located in a particular states or provinces' frontiers. What will be the roles of the states and the provinces in this particular geography on that side of the border and this side of the border? And a payment system, currency use would be done in order to really strengthen the process. But more importantly, we have also seen that land ports are facing a new set of or a new variety of non-traditional security threats, starting from the impact of climate change, something like glacial lake outburst flood, or to gene piracy, to invasive diseases, such as cross-border environmental injuries, to smuggling and all kinds of things.

And how are we going to deal with this when we really have a more sophisticated modern land ports which are very, very critical to India's national interest and national security, national power and national security interest. The transit agreements are absolutely varied. We have 10 different varieties of borders. You have open border, you have a port fence border, you have a border demarcated by national systems, including rivers and mountains and rocks. And in such situations, what kind of transit agreements we have. For example, we have a transit agreement with Nepal, which gives us access to Nepal in more than 20 points, whereas the same agreements with Bhutan would give us very, very limited access.

So Bangladesh, you have border hubs, you have free access and sometimes you are totally fenced access, so it has to be really discussed. The other aspect which is very, very critical in this juncture is what kind of arrangements we have as far as border crossing is concerned. For example, security. What kind of security checks? So we have developed two varieties of double-line security checks and various forms where we have to very clearly distinguish between micro-level exchanges, that is purely local exchanges, and macro-level exchanges, where exchanges would take place in a much, much larger scale, setting up of frontier economic zones instead of what you call the export processing zones in the coastal areas.

And of course, what kind of arrangement to border crossing like the motor vehicles agreement, and things like that. And we have also realized that we are at a fairly nascent stage as far as our land ports are concerned. If you just cross the border and see what is happening between China and Myanmar, or what is happening between Thailand and Myanmar, the Musu-Ruili border in China and Myanmar, when we visited last, in normal times the exchange of goods would be $1 million. Between Myawaddy and Mae Sot in Thailand-Myanmar border, it would amount to almost $3 billion. And in third-country immigration facilities, in Musu-Ruili, it is again oil pipeline, gas pipeline entering into Pakistan, brought from Kyaukphyu, entering into Kunming and Yunnan, brought from Kyaukphyu and Sundari Island, and entering into other mainstream markets.

Does it require India to change, to shift like what the Chinese did in the beginning of this century when they moved from what you call it the 14,000 kilometers coastal area projects two 35,000 kilometers land frontier projects? Where again, what they did was very consciously move to geography and 23% of its total population and it started developing massive cross-border connectivity projects in places like Tibet, Xinjiang and Yunnan. So what it requires for India to really engage the neighboring countries through very crucial land ports, we have been discussing about it and one of the crucial issues that has been raised in many of our studies is does India need to have an exclusive land port policy. Thank you very much.

Ashok Kantha: Thank you Prof. Lama for focusing on land ports and bringing out a host of very important issues. I'll now turn to Ms. Sulochana Wijayasinghe. She's a researcher with Lakshman Kadirgamar Institute of International Relations and Strategic Studies in Colombo. Sulochana, over to you.

Sulochana Wijayasinghe: Good afternoon, Chair, fellow panelists and distinguished guests. First of all, I want to thank the Indian Council of World Affairs for giving me this opportunity to share our perspectives on land port development, connectivity and geopolitics in the Indian Ocean region. So for Sri Lanka, the concept of land port led development and connectivity, these are not just mere abstract theories. To us, these are closely linked to our geography, our destiny, our destiny means in terms of achieving our long-term economic goals, as well as our national security.

So in responding to this theme, I will provide my responses under several discussion points. First of all, like how Sri Lanka views geography and any strategic importance of it. To us, Sri Lanka's geographic location is our biggest strategic asset. So we are an island nation near the center of the Indian Ocean with very close proximity to India, as well as some of the world's busiest international shipping lanes, plus very close to our shores, connecting African, European and Middle Eastern markets with South Asia, Southeast Asia and East Asia.

So because of that reason, Sri Lanka has been historically playing a significant role in the regional and global trade. So with the continuing trends like today, I think Sri Lanka's relevance in this regard has become even more significant. So if we look at like global oil trade, so 80% of global trade pass through the Indian Ocean. So this fact alone give us the importance of the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean. So the supply chains linking Middle East, Far East and Africa all depend on the safe sea routes, freedom of navigation and the reliable deep water ports.

So next I will briefly talk about how Sri Lanka views and observe the change in geoeconomic landscape in the Indian Ocean region. So we all know that a lot of structural changes are happening in the global order and the changing global economic gravity shifting toward Asia has been like one major, the dynamic we are experiencing in the world today. So if you look at into micro like micro factors like China is the second largest economy, India is among the top five economies, countries such as Japan, South Korea remain as major economic powers in the region and the same time like emerging economies in South Asia, Southeast Asia and Africa are experiencing a rapid growth and like increasing middle class in the region across like Indian Ocean region, give us a more demand for trade, energy, logistic and connectivity.

As a result, Indian Ocean today has not only nearly an economic corridor, but a central theater for economic engagement and strategic engagement among major powers and like regional powers. For an island country like Sri Lanka, port led development is one of the most effective ways to benefit from these changes and integrate more deeply into the regional and global value chains. So how like other perspectives on ongoing major power rivalry in the Indian Ocean region. So the Indian Ocean has become a theater for increasing major power competition.

So the port led development and connectivity has been like one arena where this geopolitical competition has been become most visible. And they are in like major powers are competing among themselves for security and trading rules, protect energy supplies, as well as expanding their strategic influence among island nations and small rural states. So for Sri Lanka, this environment force both opportunities as well as challenges. When Sri Lanka approached to engage with external actors, so our approach has been a mix of realism and idealism.

When we partner with external actors, our objective is not to take sides, but to promote our economic growth, safeguard territorial integrity, and ensure long-term stability of the Indian Ocean region. So in this content I kind of tried to set the context, like how Sri Lanka view this, what is the kind of the theater and the context all these development are happening. Now, I directly jump into how Sri Lanka view the port led development and connectivity. So port led development is central Sri Lanka's long-term economic vision.

So if you carefully assess the policy rhetoric coming from Sri Lanka, you can clearly see that developing Sri Lanka into a major maritime logistic and trans-shipment hub in the Indian Ocean region is a long-term strategic goal for this small Indian Ocean nation. So if you look at Colombo Port, which is already the South Asia's leading trans-shipment hub with a significant share of cargo linked to Indian trade. As an example, 70% of trans-shipment trade happened to India. So currently the Colombo Port is like operating in its optimal capacity, but the growth in India means like there's a need to expand and upgrade these port facilities. And at the same time, regional trade continues to grow Sri Lanka for itself.

So if you look at the regional trading picture, so we know that the regional trade among the South Asian countries are around 5%, it's very, very low compared to other region. But if you look at the overall economic picture, the RCEP, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the largest free trading block is in this region and in the IMEC corridor. So all these economic activities highlight that enormous scale of economic integration is taking place in Asia. And Sri Lankan ports are well placed to support these economic activities and benefit from these dynamics.

So, however, developing and modernizing and upgrading port needs funding and investment. For a small country like Sri Lanka, which has a fragile economy, this is something we cannot do alone. We need help, we need investment and we need to partner with other countries. So therefore the partnership with regional and extra regional players is necessary in this endeavor when it comes to the Sri Lanka situation. So in addressing partnership with regional and extra regional actors. So Sri Lanka, strong partnership with regional, Sri Lanka has been like partnering with regional and extra regional actors for the port-led development and increase the connectivity. Sri Lanka has partnered with a range of countries, largely including India, China, Japan and other Western countries to develop its ports and connectivity infrastructure.

If you look at India, India remains Sri Lanka's most strategically important partner of us, not just for like port-led development. So our engagement in India is like multifaceted. If you look at the recent economic crisis, so India's helping hand was the most visible. And even during the few weeks ago, we faced one of the most devastating climate calamities in the country. India came forward as the first responder in the region.

So to us, Sri Lanka remained grateful to India and Indian people for this timely assistance. And if you look at China, it's a strategically important development partner of Sri Lanka. At the same time, relations with United States, Japan, and European Union also play a vital role, particularly in the area of trade, investment, technology, and maritime security. Maintaining a careful balance among these relationships allow Sri Lanka to preserve its strategic space, I mean the strategic autonomy, as well as ensure long-term stability.

However, if you look at the Sri Lanka's port-led development with external partners, that's a topic which surrounded a lot of inaccurate facts and misconception. If I take Hambantota port as an example, the Hambantota report is often cited in discussion of geopolitical rivalry. But from Sri Lanka's point of view, their project has always been focusing on economic development and improving connectivity. It is important to emphasize that.

So actually, when Sri Lanka leased the Hambantota port to Chinese private entity, the country has only handed over commercial operations. It hasn't handed over the ownership of the port. So the ownership remained with the Sri Lankan government. The claims that the port is intended for military use up, therefore, so that's a major accusation against the Hambantota port that this is the potential military use of the Hambantota by third parties. But the mere fact that the ownership lies with the Sri Lankan government support the claim that these perceptions are like mere baseless accusations.

At the same time, Sri Lanka's cooperation with India when it comes to the port development remained very strong and central to our strategy. The best example is the West Container Terminal of the Colombo Port of Colombo developed by Indian private sector participation, the Adani Group, and the Trincomalee Energy Hub project. These are like examples of mutually beneficial cooperation that also respect regional security concern. So too often, Sri Lanka's engagement with external partnership view as a matter of choosing side. So such interpretations often overlook Sri Lanka's agency and long-term national interest. But to us, our partnerships are carefully considered and aligned with our development goals and regional responsibilities.

So, if you look at our approach to port-led development and connectivity as well as our engagement with external partners in this endeavour, so it's a careful balancing of like development, sovereignty and security. So, if you look at a lot of policy statement coming from Sri Lanka, there are no black hand letters saying like this principle, but you can clearly identify like key principles. So, one is that in engaging with this endeavour, Sri Lanka always emphasize that Sri Lanka is willing to work with external partners as long as such partnership doesn't jeopardize our national sovereignty and territorial integrity and such partnership should serve our long-term national interest, as well as importantly, Sri Lanka remains sensitive to India's legitimate security concerns, given our close proximity and shared maritime environment.

So, in conclusion, geography strongly shapes Sri Lanka's approach to port-led development and connectivity. Our location on major shipping routes offer significant opportunities, but also important responsibilities. Ports are not only economic assets right now, they are strategic assets. To carefully plan development and balance partnerships, Sri Lanka seeks to achieve economic growth, support regional trade, as well as contribute to the stability in the Indian Ocean region. The Sri Lanka's experience show that all small island state can effectively use their geography to achieve growth and the relevance in this current geo-strategic environment, when development is pursued with strategic foresight and balanced diplomacy. Thank you so much.

Ashok Kantha: Thank you, Sulochana, for bringing out Sri Lanka's approach on development of ports and related facilities. Considerations go into decisions to partner with country X or country Y. Let me now turn to Dr. Athaulla Rasheed, Head of Center for Security and Strategic Studies, Maldives National University. Over to you, Dr. Rasheed.

Athaulla A. Rasheed: Thank you, Ambassador, and I'd like to first start by thanking the Indian Council of World Affairs for the invitation and the opportunity to take part in this very important conversation. I think you can have a view of the presentation slides. There's a technical error that actually happens when I like the sharing, so I will just share the videos, I mean, the slides manually, if that's okay.

So, I'm going to talk about Maldives and bring a security lens through the experience of a small state. Let me just start by telling us…

Ashok Kantha: Dr. Rasheed, can you make your slides full screen because difficulty seeing it otherwise.

Athaulla A. Rasheed: Just give me one second. Sorry about that.

Ashok Kantha: No, actually, it will become two slides, so you just need to go to… on bottom from right side, it will be full screen will be shown there. So just not there, just go to the bottom of the… yeah.

Athaulla A. Rasheed: I think I've just selected the wrong because there's two screens here. So, like I said, I think I'm going to talk focus on small state security. And through the lens of the experience of an island country with large ocean, where the maritime security becomes one of the key focus of development as well as to say something on today's talk on port.

As you know, I mean, Maldives would consider maritime security a very important factor of national security. And one of the key aspects or one of the drivers of maritime security is linked to multi-faceted aspects or things that actually happen around the islands at sea.

So in a rough weather day, the Coast Guard will be very busy operating around the islands, attending to local boats as well as commercial ships or any other activity that happens that actually asks for any help. During this time, when the numbers increases, I mean, the Coast Guard also would actually run out of resources and then would need to strategize how to operate in the bad weather condition. So this is a particular and also a very common situation that the maritime security agencies face every day.

Just to give you an idea why Maldives becomes an important place for Maldives as well as its regional partners, lies with the geographic location as well as the economic aspects of Maldives as it positions in the Indian Ocean. Maldives is a small island state with about 1,900 islands scattered across archipelagic formation and it actually has a relatively small land size compared to the water or the ocean that it has as part of its territory and this means that ocean becomes an important part and important aspect of security.

And going back to the story I told about the Coast Guard, when the Coast Guard operates in the rough waters, it is important that we place good infrastructure as well as secure space for the Coast Guard or any other maritime objects or vessels to find a secure place. So this is where the ports become an important aspect of Maldives. We have important larger ports, about four, and then there are harbors. For us in the local context, it doesn't make a difference unless at the government or at the business or commercial level, there is a high value put on managing a bigger or larger infrastructure that we name as ports.

So the term port has become more visible in our literature as well as our discourse more recently when it has been embedded in geopolitical debate and stories and policies. One of the important factors that shape our national policy as well as foreign policy is climate change. Climate change actually affects every other aspect of things that we do around the sea and also on land. But when you look at ports, if climate change affects through sea level rise or sudden changes in weather, the islands become vulnerable. And the ports that we develop are also placed on those vulnerable islands, whether it's a big port or a small harbor, they are situated in similar size small lands. That means climate change must be incorporated into our security as well as development strategies.

So this also becomes a driver of our foreign policy thinking as well as foreign investment approaches that we must adopt if we want to survive. Like I said, when the coast guard stretches its resources and the other infrastructure that we all have put in place locally, we need to find support from external sources. This is where development cooperation comes in and aid cooperation comes in. Maldives is a development-driven country, but with that, building climate resilience becomes part of security strategy as well, which becomes embedded in our development and security policy.

So we can't have a development policy without considering security aspects. It actually comes down to a place more than thinking of traditional security. There are multi-faceted aspects, several issues that we deal with at sea, not only climate change, the transnational crimes to local issues that are actually grown out from those transnational crimes. That means that the country we develop as a climate resilience country becomes an important factor that has been embedded in our foreign policy and also development cooperation.

So when we talk about ports, or when we talk about any infrastructure that supports our vulnerable communities or the sea or the security infrastructure that we develop at sea, how we navigate our development engagements or regional cooperation becomes an important element of our national strategy. So this is where I wanted to actually stop and also prepare any conversation that I might be able to contribute to in this conversation today. And also would be happy to talk more on the individual or separate aspects of development cooperation related to ports or maritime related port issues.

Ashok Kantha: Thank you very much for that presentation. But the last issue that you raised but left unaddressed in a tantalizing manner, I would like you to come back later.

Athaulla A. Rasheed: Yes, definitely. Thank you.

Ashok Kantha: Now we turn to our last panelist, Captain Sarabjeet Singh Parmar. Over to you, Sarabjeet.

Sarabjeet Singh Parmar: Thank you, Ambassador. First of all, thank you to ICWA again for this invite. It's always a pleasure to discuss critical issues in the same conference hall. So let me start out by making a statement that the power balance is shifting from land to the seas. And the sooner we accept that, the better it is. So since we're talking about port development, let me ask a generic question. What makes a port attractive? What is it that brings trade to a port? What is it that boosts the coastal, the regional, the global, and the national economy through trade, whether it's port connectivity or, again, back to the nodal question of what makes a port attractive.

So let me argue a certain case in this. So what do ports give you? They give you connectivity. We've discussed that. But then there has to be an element of sustainable development. And along with sustainable development, you have to look at environmental safeguards. You have to look at climate change. You have to look at what is called climate disaster resilient infrastructure, which is being guided through the CDRI organization. You have to look at what is the impact on the community. You have to look at what is the regional cooperation element, which Professor Rashid had, Dr. Rasheed had mentioned. So these are issues that come about.

But more importantly, how does a port survive? So when you look at, say, ports within India, there is a healthy competition that occurs. Since we spoke about Sri Lanka and I have this dialogue with many Sri Lankan friends of mine, and I'm sure Sulochana would like to jump in on this, is that Colombo and Hambantota, why would Colombo Port Trust permit trade to go to Hambantota and lose its revenue or its earning capability. The same would apply for ports that are being built in India. Abhay would say a certain port, say when JNPT came up, Mumbai Port Trust had to actually get their act together to ensure that they continued attracting that right amount of trade.

So the efficiency of a port, the connectivity, the hinterland connectivity is important, and this varies. The larger the land mass, like, for example, in the case of India, your connectivity has to be that much more important. It reduces in scale as the land mass reduces, but then there are other challenges that also come in. So you have connectivity at the national level, you will have it at the coastal level, and you will also have it at the intra-regional level, the inter-regional level, and the global level.

So if you are going to develop ports with the idea that the whole region will thrive together, whether you call it SAGAR, or MAHASAGAR, the element of competition should also bring in the element of productivity, and that is where the regional cooperation element comes in. Examples were given of the container terminal in Colombo, there is, Trincomalee has been mentioned, Kankesanthurai, which is the northernmost port of Sri Lanka, and it's actually just swimming distance from the southern tip of India, all this will enhance your regional cooperation. It will enhance your intra-regional coastal trade.

But what about the trade element that is intra-regional, inter-regional, or global? Just to give you an example, with the rerouting of shipping due to the Huthi issue in the Red Sea, the port of Singapore, the ports of Sri Lanka, and the southern ports of India saw a rise in 30% extra demand, ships calling in for fueling due to rerouting via the Cape. Well, it's good for the ports, but the ports were running out of fuel, they didn't have that much fuel to sustain. So if we are looking at the tempo of operation, then there has to be a sustainable methodology of running a port, catering for all sorts of instability that may happen in the region.

Now, this requires a regional cooperative mechanism, and say with ports coming up again in Maldives, and then of course the revenue of Maldives will go up, but will that be subtracted from the southern ports of say India or from Sri Lanka? This is where the competition and the efficiency factors will increase. So I just thought I will put this on the table, and this is something we need to accept and we need to recognize.

But having said that, let me look at how India is looking at it. In October, 27th to 31st, we had the India Maritime Week. I think it was a five-day jamboree, and a lot of things came out of the India Maritime Week. And just to take you down history, the first was in 2016, the Maritime India Summit, 2021 was virtual, and then we had the Global Maritime India Summit in '23, and now we had the 2025 Maritime Week. And the theme was uniting oceans and one maritime vision. And the focus was on developing maritime manufacturing value chains.

So the value chains, the supply chains, were all taken into focus. And just to give an example, the total amount of investments that were looked at during this 2025 India Maritime Week. Only 30% looked at port development and modernization. Interesting fact. 20% looked at sustainability, which we just discussed. 20% looked at port-led industrialization. So back to the factor comes, is that what is the proximity of the concerned industries that thrive on the connectivity that the ports provide in close proximity to the ports?

Again, the more distant the industry, of course, the less is the connectivity, but still that umbilical cord remains, especially where a country like India, we definitely need to look at it. And I endorse the thing about the land ports. And just for information, all our landlocked neighbors are signatories to UNCLOS, including Afghanistan. They're not ratified yet, but they're all signatories, because UNCLOS provides that landlocked nations have a right of access to the sea. So apart from land ports, the seaports are also important for regional connectivity, whether you go through BIMSTEC or IOR, whatever you want. But that is how the global economy will build on.

So now we are looking at what is called the MAKV 2047. Let me get this full name correct. I think it was mentioned. Maritime Amritkal Vision of 2047. That is looking at a shift from piecemeal projects to multi-decade strategic planning. And this is going to be the approach of, say, India, then through SAGAR, MAHASAGAR. We're looking at developing a full network of ports that ensures competition, and therefore enhances, maybe, productivity and efficiency. And I think that should be another issue.

A word on Sagarmala, and then I will hand back to the chair so that we can have discussions on this. So Sagarmala started way back in 2015. Have we made progress? I think we have. Just reading out some facts and figures. Out of the 839 projects that were envisaged over this time period, at a cost of some INR 5.79 lakh crores, 272 have been completed at a cost of INR 1.41 lakh crores. Nine Indian ports now occupy positions among the top 100 ports. Way back in 2010, 2011, when you looked at the total container traffic that came to all the 12 major ports of India, Singapore beat us all off. One single port.

But today we have nine ports of India among the top 10, and Vizag is among the top 20 global container ports. And this is only set to increase. And this is a push given not only by the center, but the emphasis led by the nine coastal state governments, and some are like Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh. They understand the requirement of becoming a maritime coastal state. They are also pushing at the state level. So what are we looking at? And what do ports need to look at if you want to develop connectivity, including geopolitics and regional cooperation?

There's just certain points, and we can discuss them. So one is you need to streamline logistics. Is that if you're going to have your container, sorry, port connectivity, then your logistics have to be sort of streamlined. Just to give you an example, what about railways? What are the size? What are the tracks of the railways required? What sort of roads do you need for the containers to come in? And just to give you an example of JNPT, if you ever have a chance, you must go there. You see a long line of trucks standing in the line. And I think JNPT was one of the first mechanized ports of India, and they will come in the line. The crane will pick up, put it straight on the truck. From the jetty, the truck moves out. And you have a long line of trucks. It's never ending.

Similarly, the rail requirement. Do you have that sort of infrastructure? Do you have those sort of trucks? Do you have that sort of roads that cater for that sort of a load? Then, of course, you need to reduce the cost. So the efficiency part comes in. And the Ennore port, if I remember, was the first Indian port that was based on the landlord methodology of working, which many ports are now adopting. It increases efficiency. Then you have the enhancement of international trade and competitiveness, which I've covered.

Then the shift to efficient coastal and waterway networks. So if you have land ports, you will also have waterways. And those countries who have rivers, Bangladesh, India, the best examples I can give you, that inter-land connectivity can connect your coast to coast also. Then you need to look at port modernization. It has already been spoken about. Industrial growth. If you are doing this, how do you enhance? How do you make ports more attractive? Industrial growth, industrial belts nearby those. Set up industries that thrive. You reduce the cost by reducing the distances. These are many issues that can be looked at.

And then, of course, there is always the issue of jobs. There is always this debate that AI is costing jobs. So modernization, mechanization will reduce the number of human beings that are required. That may be the case. But the more ports you develop, the more skill sets you develop, you can either use them within your own country, or you can export that skill sets for regional cooperation, especially where manpower is lacking, or there is less manpower available or skilled manpower available. And the last point is then, of course, you need to have sustainability, whether you look at island nations or coastal nations or even national development.

So there will always be a trade-off, or there will always be a conflict between your national policies and your international outreach. But I think in the better development or the better upliftment of the area through SAGAR and MAHASAGAR, I think we all need to work together and this is where at the national level, at the state level or whatever, however the country's governance system goes, we all need to work hand in glove. And I will stop here.

Ashok Kantha: Thank you very much, Sarabjeet. What you talked about efficiency, it reminded me of a conversation I had with the head of major Malaysian port, this was about, well, almost 20 years ago and he made exactly the same point that ports flourish on inefficiency of other ports in the neighbourhood and he gave example of Singapore and Dubai, that point of time, our ports were not doing that well. Since his port was very close to Singapore, he said we have to find niche areas of efficiency where we can out-compete Singapore, actually doing quite well and they continue to do well.

Well, we have some time now for Q&A, so who would like to start, yeah, please go ahead.

Smiti: So, first of all, yes, I will introduce myself, so my name is Smiti and I am a research associate from TICE, so my question, yes, so this year only I completed my masters from Symbiosis School of International Studies, Pune as well. So my question is open to all the panelists, so my question is how can India navigate the sabotaging of undersea cables in the Indian Ocean region in order to strengthen the sea lanes of communication in the South Asian region and I would also like to have the perspective from the Sri Lanka as well as Maldives as well.

Ashok Kantha: We can pull some questions and then we can come, okay, Dr. Rasheed, we will give you a chance to elaborate on the last slide of yours. So whenever you like, yeah, okay, who is the next, yeah, please go ahead, yeah.

Shreyas Sriram: Good evening, my name is Shreyas, I am from Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics and I am in my second year of masters, so my question is that we focus on the geopolitics of ports, ports are usually big infrastructure and the problem is the lack of funding that is not being provided by the west and even in India for certain cases that we are able to provide the required funding for countries in Africa and other underdeveloped countries and that kind of becomes a place where China steps in and is able to provide and plus India and West's insistence on providing it for democracies rather than places where autarky or maybe autocratic rule is there. So it becomes a problem. Whereas Russia and China don't have such hesitancy in providing funding there. So that becomes a challenge on how to provide funding to these states because they also have the coastline required to build ports and that's why China is able to leverage. So how can we step in in these situations where we have a demand of democracy to be there?

Ashok Kantha: Who would you like to respond to your question?

Shreyas Sriram: Sir, you.

Ashok Kantha: Me? No, I'm not a panelist. We will delegate it to Sarabjeet in that case.

Alashika Kumari: Good evening to the panelists. I'm Alashika Kumari from TICE and my question is, I'm a dropper, I'm a clad aspirant. Lawyer aspirant, I'm sorry. My question is, what should policy maker be most cautious about when pursuing port-led development in the region? Actually, it's an open question. Anyone can answer.

Ashok Kantha: Sulochana, so you are designated to answer that question later. Any other questions? Yeah, please go ahead.

Mayuk: Good evening everyone. I'm Mayuk and I'm a PhD research scholar healing from BITS Pilani. So my question is for Dr. Rasheed and the expert from Sri Lanka. So I just wanted to talk about the Small Island State Agency that you guys were talking about. Like how you would be talking about the Small Island State Agency using the ports as a method in order to cater the geopolitical aspirations that you have in the larger Indian Ocean region. So that's it from my end.

Ashok Kantha: Okay. I will add one question from my side for Professor Lama. He referred to it, but didn't quite well on it. When it comes to border trade, the model we have opted for is a very conservative one, which is not based on MFN-linked trading, whereas China, for instance, is doing very large trade across borders, say, with Russia or with the Central Asian republics. What is holding us back in terms of using, especially I'm referring to China there, but it can refer to other countries also, using trans-border trade across land borders more sort of aggressively rather than depending largely on maritime trade. So we'll now start with Dr. Rasheed, then Sulochana, Prof. Lama, and then Sanapjeet, in that order. So please go ahead.

Athaulla A. Rasheed: Thank you very much, Ambassador. If you don't mind, I'll just very, very quickly share this. You can see the full screen, right? Ambassador, can you see the full screen?

Ashok Kantha: Yeah, we can see. Please go ahead.

Athaulla A. Rasheed: Okay. So I thought I'll just put this up to answer, I think, two questions. One on undersea cable and the role of small states and how I could address this through a regional engagement lens. And also the second one on small states agency, how we are navigating it as small states in the regional domain.

So to speak to what Maldives has actually done over the years in terms of navigating its interests in regional domain that falls onto maritime security or any other issue, and especially focusing on port development, which also relates to the other question, which I'm not going to answer. And the role that Maldives actually plays and has in regional ports comes from the national interests, driven by an urge to create a better infrastructure that supports a climate resilient economy.

So this is the basic formula the Maldives has been using over the years to navigate its interests, to communicate with the regional partners to achieve what it wants. But along the journey, of course, you must have come across different political changes have shaped and also disrupted the way in which Maldives has communicated its interests with closer partners like India, as well as engaging with new partners like China. These things have come down to a need for better understanding the domestic situations.

So the examples that I put up here like for example DOSTI joint exercises, military modernization and engagement and also more recently the strategic engagements with Indo-Pacific partners. I'm referring to mostly the Quad members India, Australia, US and Japan and they are like-minded partners. When we engage with these countries one of the key priorities of the foreign policy is to understand what the political where the political interests actually lie in Maldives. When the political interests change there's a tendency that the government aligns with a country that actually helps like more in achieving its political goal.

So when we have a government that actually follows more democratic or maybe rules-based engagements respecting regional setups like regional security frameworks then we align more with India and its regional partners like-minded partners. But when we shift to a more stronger like independent thinking government its development focus basically focuses on trying to maximize the benefits that it can get from the outside partners or anyone who is going to support. This is where the Maldives started to closely partner with China because the formula the economic calculus that they use in order to invest in a foreign country is very different from what we have been following traditionally through the international loan systems or aid system.

So these are the domestic factors that we need to consider when we talk about what a country could do in order to maintain or support regional cooperation. As far as Maldives is concerned going to a specific question like undersea cable sabotage or any issues that has been faced by this underwater infrastructure. We have a very little knowledge as far as I come from a very broad research background to access what actually is happening underwater, I mean, under the sea because the surface level, the Coast Guard and the operations that we do is very commonly understood by the researchers as well as the policy makers.

But then this means that our engagement with the regional partners becomes more and more important. We have better resources that actually by engaging with them doesn't undermine the existing regional frameworks. But if we bring new partners that does not actually respect the existing system, that means there's another question that we need to deal with through our foreign policy and defense cooperation.

And when you look at island agency and through ports, Maldives for me and my assessment doesn't show has a strong agency when you look at ports. Agency means it's a country's ability to actually navigate the international system to influence international policy or regional policy in order to maximize its political or maybe national interests. Maldives has not come to a position to navigate with that level that we have communicated our climate issues in the international climate negotiations. Of course, small states actually became one of the highlights of this island agency or maybe small state agency during that time, 80s, 90s and now in a broader sense, small states can be ignored in climate policy making.

But when it comes to security that actually crosses between traditional and non-traditional security, there's more to do in order to understand what security actually means in the local level as well as domestic and national level before we intelligently or as a state craft design our strategies to navigate. So Maldives is in that space in the learning process and I think the more we engage with larger partners who are involved in regional security community development or as security community architecture, then along the coming years I think we'll have more engagement, more responsibility in that aspect. Thank you very much.

Ashok Kantha: Thank you. Sulochana can we come to you now?

Sulochana Wijayasinghe: Actually, sir, I would first like to give my response with regard to funding, the funding in terms of like for development and connectivity. So in the case of Sri Lanka if you look at who are our major partners, right now it's India, China and Japan. So the western countries kind of play a minimal role. So to us, we are very keen to work with more partners. To us, actually, when the helping hand comes, so our main concern is like as long as such partnership doesn't affect our territorial integrity, as well as sovereignty. And the other major factor is our engagement with external factors doesn't affect legitimate security concerns of India. As well as the partnership helps the long-term national interest of the country.

So as long as we can meet these three criteria, Sri Lanka is willing to work with and keen to work with any partners to achieve its long-term economic interest. It could be like for development, infrastructure development, could be anything. So that's our approach to funding, I mean, in terms of achieving, because we are willing to meet more partners, like over-reliance with few means, like it kind of shrink our strategic space for like, maneuvering. So more partners means we also get more space for our autonomy, as well as strategic maneuvering. So that's my response with regard to funding.

And my response with regard to agency of the state is like, actually, so one thing like, if you look at Sri Lanka's foreign policy moves, such moves often portray as like, okay, Sri Lanka is like aligning with India, aligning with China, like in a very simple way of like explaining those accounts, like in a very linear way. So my understanding is like, if you look at Sri Lanka's foreign policy moves, so more than look at those actions through one prism, you have to look at what are the ingredients like Sri Lanka balancing in case of like, so like, as I said, our ingredients are, whatever the foreign policy move, so you always emphasize that we don't want to take sides. So neutrality is like one key principle for us.

And then the second is like, so the India factor. So whatever the decisions we take shouldn't be concerned for legitimate security concerns of India. The other thing is like, the very strong factor is the local agency. What I mean by local agency is like domestic factors, domestic imperatives, and our long-term economic interest. As an example, if I give the example of Hambantota, so it's often like Sri Lanka's fortress, like, okay, Sri Lanka is like aligning with China and like, Sri Lanka is like this passive actor, a capital actor of state of China. We had no any agency in deciding fate of this port, this and that.

But actually, I will give you like three basic factors which kind of give you a idea what happened. When it comes to Hambantota port, the original demand actually didn't come from China. It came from Sri Lanka. So it even didn't come during the Rajapaksha regime. It even preceded the previous presidents, like the original demand came during the President Kumar Tunga's period. And Sri Lanka first approached India as well as some of the Western countries, but Sri Lanka was not able to secure funding to develop this, get loans to build this port. So that's how we ended up partnering with China in terms of like developing this port in Hambantota.

The other thing is like the narratives often portray this lease as a debt-to-equity kind of a step. It was not like that. Actually, Sri Lanka leased the Hambantota port and we received funding. During this transaction we didn't really receive any debt reliefs. Those fundings were used to boost foreign currency reserves in the Sri Lankan Central Bank. So that's also like, we don't get to hear those facts very often. The other thing is like Sri Lanka's percentage of debt at the time of the transaction. Actually out of total debt stock, the loans took for Hambantota port was like only 4.8 or 4.9, like a very minimal loan.

So at the time, Sri Lanka owed more to India and to Japan than China. So this simple example shows that. So to us, Hambantota was actually, it's about our economic development. It's our long-term interest to engage with regional trading networks. And we want to present Sri Lanka as a major economic hub in the Indian Ocean region. So those are the domestic imperatives, those are the places where we have played our agency. So to us, actually, we play our agency, but not the agency alone, we have to balance other factors as well. So that's the case of Sri Lanka. Thank you. In terms of addressing the undersea cables, I'm not sure I'm the best person to give an answer because I'm not an expert on domain awareness. So I'm very sorry about that.

Ashok Kantha: Okay. That's fine. Prof. Lama?

Mahendra P. Lama: Well, thank you very much. I think that was a very relevant question as to why China does so much of business through its border points and why we are not able to do so. You'll be surprised that eight Northeast states have 99% of their borders with the neighboring countries, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and China. And it contribute not even 1% of India's total exports even today. That shows that how we lag behind. More than that, Chinese have a very, very clear policy as far as it's trading exchanges with the neighboring countries through its border points.

First, they have adopted a title, which we have adequately written about it, that whenever they see a border, anyway, you can say, talk about Karakoram or Nepal border or Afghanistan border, or they have first a very, very local integration. That is a part of the tight rent approach. Then second, they have a bilateral approach, larger than that, and they approach the same border through. So all these three are so integrated, they feed each other so well, that it works pretty well.

The second way they look into it is they treat border as borderlands. We have adequately discussed this particular issue in one of our books published by Michigan University Press on Rethinking Borders in 2016, I think. Whereas we are still not, what is the deviation point between border and borderlands? And we did discuss when I was a member of the National Security Advisory Board, we did raise this issue very, very clearly as to why we should gradually move from border as a geometric line to larger concept of borderland, where you have so much of exchanges, and Chinese are very, very clear about it.

And the third is, in that, Chinese really integrate the borderland activities in 10 different matrices. Say for example, in Musi-Ruili border, which is now one of the, of course, very sensitive borders, but how they integrate, they do trade, they do tourism, they do exchange of raw materials, like what you call it, metals, rare earth, they do electricity exchange, oil, gas, so many exchange points. And on top of that, what they do is besides the connections, they do create infrastructures on that side of the border also. So, it complements so well that the policy harmonization happens, institutional, what you call it, linkages happen because infrastructure border on the borderland created by a common factor like China, and they also have same kind of softwares used in the exchange.

And the last point which they do very consciously is they give a lot of freedom to the local provinces, like Yunnan. If you see what Yunnan was 20 years back, and what Yunnan is today, and that freedom, that autonomy of geographies are not there in India at all. Say, for example, I would still feel that none of the northeast states today also have any department related to borders and borderland activities. So they don't have any ownership. If there is a project in Dawki, if there is a project in Pangsau, or there is anything project like in Phulbari, the local province has got nothing to do with it. And our federal units level policies and a very local level policies do not integrate. And that's where we find that exchanges do not happen efficiently and profusely. Thank you.

Ashok Kantha: Thank you, Prof. Lama. Now we come to...

Sarabjeet Singh Parmar: I'll be quick. I do realize we're running out of time. Okay, funding. So there is a difference between owning and developing and operating. The three different terms, right? The Chinese methodology of assistance is linked with the debt trap. I think nations have learned that lesson. As far as India is concerned, we are looking at operations in Colombo. We are looking at operations in Chabahar. We're not owning them. We also have operations in Haifa.

And to give an example, the Chinese also wanted a small piece of the pie of Haifa, but the area they wanted was overlooking a sensitive part, which the US objected to. So China was shown the door and India is still there. Sittwe in Myanmar, we have developed. Kyaukphyu has been developed by China. So you can see that the competition is on. And we are not very strict on the debt trap part. So we give assistance. And therefore, it's more friendly terms, I think, than China. The question is, how much assistance can you give? And then, of course, the competition with deep pockets with China. We can discuss that over a cup of tea. So I thought that sort of answers your question out there.

I'm giving a shot at submarine cables. Your question was security of submarine cables? Undersea cables. All right. So let's call them seabed lines of communication. All right. You have a valid question. Is any nation doing anything about it? No. Why? Because cables are laid by corporates. Security is looked after by governments. And corporates and governments rarely see eye to eye. And then you have the issue of sovereignty, that when you come into the territorial sea, if there's repair of a cable, then various nations have different timelines. India has one of the longest though we have cut down quite a bit and the main issue comes on the issue is of it's a foreign flagship, there are foreign nationals so security clearance is required.

So I was in an interesting conversation with the submarine cable companies in one of the think tanks and I asked them, I said, why do you expect the government to hold your hand for everything? Why can't all of you, there are around 20 companies sitting and get together, buy a ship, have it manned and trained by Indian personnel. Your security issue is sorted out. You don't, you just need permission from the concerned telecom department that let me repair the cable. There are solutions, but somebody has to bite the bullet. And UNCLOS is very clear on submarine cables, and there is a very old ancient international convention on submarine cables, but I think that needs revision. I'll just stop there.

Ashok Kantha: Well, we have exceeded time given to us quite significantly. So I will just hand over to Samitha for a vote of thanks.

Dr. Samatha Mallempati: Thank you, sir. On behalf of ICWA I would like to take this opportunity to thank the chair, Ambassador Ashok Kantha and the panelists for sharing their valuable views on the theme. I also take this opportunity to thank the audience for their valuable participation. I invite you all to join us for high tea at the foyer. Thank you.

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List of Participants

1. Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, Acting Director General & Additional Secretary, ICWA
2. Ashok Kantha (Chair), Subhas Chandra Bose Chair Professor on
3. International Relations, Chanakya University, Distinguished Fellow, Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF), Former Ambassador of India to China & High Commissioner of India to Sri Lanka
4. Mahendra P. Lama, Centre for South Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi (Online)
5. Sulochana Wijayasinghe, Researcher, Lakshman Kadirgamar Institute of International Relations and Strategic Studies (LKI), Colombo (online)
6. Athaulla A. Rasheed, Head of Centre, Centre for Security and Strategic Studies (CSSS), Maldives National University (MNU), Male (online)
7. Sarabjeet Singh Parmar (Retd), Distinguished Fellow, Council for Strategic and Defense Research, Australia India Institute & Indo-Pacific Studies Centre