Indian Council of World Affairs

Since the early 2000s, rapid ice melt has thrust the Arctic into global focus by easing access to its potential resources and raising the prospects of new maritime routes. Today, as geopolitics intensifies and Arctic exceptionalism erodes, India has a narrow window to translate scientific engagement into geopolitical influence, while maintaining strategic autonomy. This essay argues that, guided by scientific diplomacy and strategic autonomy, India can serve as both the voice of the Global South and a constructive bridge between competing Arctic blocs. This commentary examines the geopolitical shifts in the Arctic, India’s evolving engagement, and the external and the internal strategy needed to shape a credible ‘Indo-Arctic’ role. 

Arctic Geopolitics 

The Arctic is undergoing profound environmental and strategic changes that are intensifying the competition in the region. Three trends stand out. First is the end of ‘Arctic exceptionalism.’[1] For much of the post-Cold War period, the Arctic was viewed as a zone of cooperation insulated from wider geopolitical disputes.[2] This has shifted significantly since the 2022 Russia-Ukraine conflict. Seven of the eight Arctic states are now members of NATO, creating a consolidated bloc opposite Russia. The suspension of Arctic Council collaboration with Russia on most projects has further disrupted established mechanisms for consultation.[3]

Second, the region is witnessing a growing strategic competition with new alignments. The United States, through its 2024 Arctic Strategy, defines the region as a strategic competition space.[4] Russia has increased military and energy-related activity in the High North, while deepening partnerships with China under the Polar Silk Road framework.[5] The alignment patterns now emerging raise concerns for regional stability, crisis management and governance continuity. At the same time, Nordic states, particularly Norway, have articulated a more nuanced posture. Norway’s updated High North Strategy of 2025 prioritises climate research, indigenous partnerships, and low-tension cooperation as elements of Norway’s High North approach.[6]  To quote a line from the strategy, “Norway’s policy towards Russia is based on pragmatism, interests and cooperation.” The Nordic perspective therefore adds strategic depth, reminding us that the Arctic is also a space for continued science diplomacy, sustainable resource governance and low-escalation engagement. This Nordic posture aligns naturally with India’s ‘science-first’ approach, suggesting that New Delhi can help maintain dialogue channels and cooperative research even as great-power relations remain strained. 

Lastly, the recent years have seen growing interest from non-Arctic states in the Arctic. At least 15 non-Arctic governments, along with the Faroe Islands and the European Union, have formally adopted Arctic or Polar policy/strategy documents.[7] Several Asian observer nations have expanded their engagement with the Arctic from scientific research to active participation in Arctic governance mechanisms, particularly through observer roles and working groups.[8] This growing roster of engaged stakeholders underscores a fundamental truth, the High North has become a global concern, scientifically, environmentally, commercially and strategically. These trends collectively mark the transition of the High North from a cooperative periphery to a strategic frontier.[9]

Asian Non-Arctic States’ (Outsiders) Perspective on Arctic Geopolitics[10]

Non-Arctic States (the outsiders) have varied interests and security concerns in the Arctic, shaped by their broader strategic objectives.[11] For most non-Arctic states, science serves as the key common denominator for Arctic cooperation. Among this group of nations, the Asian countries have emerged as the most engaged with the Arctic region.[12] It remains central to their engagement and legitimacy in the region. China’s growing interest in the Arctic, though framed as scientific and sustainable, has clear implications for regional security and governance.[13] For Japan and South Korea, the opening of new shipping routes to Europe and climate concerns are the key factors for engaging with the Arctic.[14] For India, the focus has been on how Arctic change affects the Indian monsoon, climate variability and in turn, agriculture and fisheries. Unlike China, whose Arctic narrative increasingly blends commerce and strategy, India’s engagement remains primarily science-led and climate focussed, more comparable to Japan and South Korea but shaped by its own Global South identity. For a global audience at large, the Arctic matters for what it signals in the climatic and geopolitical arena. Within this wider Asian outsider spectrum, India stands out for its climate-led, Global South-inflected, neutral approach.

India and the Arctic

The Arctic region is not new to India. Although India was linked to the Arctic with the signing of the Svalbard Treaty in 1920, the formal engagement with the Arctic began in 2007 with its first expedition to Svalbard.^[15] Geopolitically, India’s interest in the Arctic has evolved, with formal engagement intensifying in 2013 when India was granted observer status in the Arctic Council.^[16] India’s Arctic Policy, released in 2022, underscores its commitment to scientific research, climate protection, and sustainable development in the region.^[17] India’s presence has been anchored by the Himadri research station in Ny-Ålesund[18] (operational since 2008) and the IndARC underwater observatory deployed in Kongsfjorden[19] in 2014, both generating long term Arctic data. For India, the Arctic began as a distant geography, but climate interdependence is drawing it closer, transforming an outsider's curiosity into a neighbour’s responsibility. As India’s Arctic engagement moves beyond scientific curiosity to one that involves the region’s evolving landscape, it must navigate its strategic approach to the region.

How India Should Navigate the Arctic?

India’s engagement in Arctic geopolitics represents a natural extension of its evolving global role and civilisational ethos, rooted in the philosophy of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam, ‘One Earth, One Family, One Future.’[20] For India, the Arctic is not a battleground of rival ambitions but a shared climatic frontier where cooperation must prevail over confrontation. Even as current Arctic geopolitics tends to overshadow scientific and environmental priorities, India’s approach should remain anchored in science, strategic balance, international law and inclusive multilateralism. It must offer a principled model of engagement that prioritises collaboration, sustainable development and global equity. To convert policy into presence, India needs to undertake a two-pronged strategy - an external and an internal posture.

Within the external posture India has to ensure that it plays a greater role in Arctic affairs to strengthen its image as a responsible Arctic player. It can do so through four possible means. One, as a responsible rising power with global interests, India could engage with both the Arctic-7 (A7) and Russia to act as a bridge for negotiations and dialogue. India’s Arctic approach is rooted in strategic autonomy, allowing it to engage constructively with all eight Arctic states without aligning with any bloc. Unlike most observers, India maintains strong ties with both A7 and Russia, giving it a credible role as a neutral bridge in a polarised region. This balanced diplomacy positions India to promote scientific cooperation, facilitate dialogue, and help revive the collaborative spirit that once defined Arctic governance. In a fragile and warming Arctic, India’s most valuable contribution may be its ability to connect rather than compete. India could, for instance, host an annual ‘Indo-Arctic Science Dialogue’ in Goa under the aegis of NCPOR, bringing together A7 and Russian researchers under a neutral, climate- focused agenda. 

Secondly, India is a leading voice of the Global South having hosted three virtual Voice of the Global South summits (January 2023, November 2023 and August 2024),[21] positioning itself as a platform for the perspectives of developing nations. India can highlight the concerns of the Global South on to the High North.[22]India’s Arctic engagement must therefore also reflect a Global South lens. With Arctic warming driving sea level rise, monsoon instability and extreme weather risks, India can articulate the climate equity concerns of vulnerable nations. Rather than entering the Arctic as a rival power like China, India can model constructive participation, demonstrating how a developing country contributes through science, cooperation and climate-first diplomacy. In doing so, India’s voice becomes not just national, but a representative of much of the developing world. Towards this, New Delhi could convene a ‘Global South Arctic Forum’ to connect Arctic climate science with coastal and agricultural vulnerabilities across Africa, Asia and small island states. 

Thirdly, there is growing concern about China’s engagement with Russia in the Arctic.[23] As Russia advances its Arctic plans while moving further apart from the West, it increasingly depends on external partners to sustain infrastructure and energy projects.[24] China has become the principal collaborator, providing capital, logistics and shipbuilding capacity, especially through projects like Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG-2.[25]  Yet this growing reliance also brings strategic discomfort in Moscow, given China’s long-term ambitions in the region. India offers a credible diversification option, not as a competitor to China but as a neutral, science-focused partner with rising energy needs without a hegemonic posture in the High North. By expanding technical cooperation, environmental monitoring and joint research, India can offer Russia a diversifying alternative to excessive dependence on a single partner while advancing its own Arctic participation through pragmatic, climate-centred collaboration.

Lastly, India has to make ‘Indo-Arctic’ a reality. The term Indo-Arctic offers a timely parallel to the Indo-Pacific, but with a different purpose. If the Indo-Pacific is about maritime connectivity and security, the Indo-Arctic is about climate interdependence, partnership in scientific research and study and shared stewardship between India and the Arctic region. It reflects a new reality where the Arctic is no longer peripheral to India’s interests. The Indo-Arctic is rooted not in geography, but in principled engagement, cooperation and global responsibility. If the Indo-Pacific shaped 20th century strategic thinking, the Indo-Arctic may define the climate imagination of the 21st. Operationalising the Indo-Arctic would require India to build structured research partnerships with Nordic and Arctic Pacific rim states and to consistently advance the ‘Indo-Arctic’ frame in scientific and diplomatic forums. The Indo-Arctic lens therefore marks India’s transition from viewing the Arctic from afar to engaging with it as a connected neighbour in climate destiny. Yet these external roles will remain largely aspirational unless India builds the institutional and operational backbone to sustain them. 

Apart from the external posture, India’s Arctic strategy focuses on internal readiness. India’s Arctic Policy rests on six pillars namely: Science and Research; Climate and Environmental Protection; Economic and Human Development; Transportation and Connectivity; Governance and International Cooperation; and National Capacity Building.[26] To fully realize these, the country must transition from a predominantly science-led approach to a comprehensive multi-dimensional framework. This evolution, from policy to action, requires the development of key enablers that can support the ‘Indo-Arctic vision’. 

This transition can be understood through four enablers which convert an outsider’s approach into a distant neighbour’s commitment: -

1. Robust administration within and outside the country.
2. Capability development - Training a pool of SMEs,
3. Capacity building - Infrastructure development and
4. Operational readiness for Polar Engagement.

a.  Robust administration within and outside the country.

The foremost critical enabler is robust administration, since it is ‘sine qua non’ for an effective Arctic posture and it involves both internal and external coordination. Towards internal coordination, India’s 2022 Arctic Policy set up an inter‑ministerial “Empowered Arctic Policy Group” (EAPG) as the governance and review mechanism for its Action Plan, bringing together officials from no fewer than 18 ministries and agencies and charging them with setting timelines, budgets and deliverables for every pillar of the Arctic policy. Therefore, within the country under the aegis of National Maritime Security Council (NMSC) under the National Security Council, EAPG ensures cooperation, coordination and collaboration amongst various agencies. EAPG can also supervise international outreach by EAPG’s participating ministries as regards India’s Arctic Policy and the evolving Indo-Arctic vision.

b.  Capability development - Training a pool of SMEs

Secondly, capability development is indispensable for India’s Arctic engagement if it is to evolve from an aspirational strategy into sustaining operational capabilities. A strong inter‑ministerial framework, anchored domestically and interfaced through external diplomatic mechanisms, will ensure policy continuity, efficiency in resource allocation, and a streamlined voice in a multilateral polar forum. Towards this, Goa offers a uniquely favourable ecosystem to serve as the national convergence point of these efforts. The state already hosts the National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research (NCPOR), which functions as India’s official nodal agency and gate way for Antarctic and Arctic missions. It is supported by a robust scientific and maritime base that includes the CSIR-National Institute of Oceanography (NIO), the National Institute of Hydrography (NIH), and the Naval War College (NWC), each contributing complementary expertise across the scientific-strategic spectrum. Branding Goa as India’s “Polar Capital” would institutionalize this synergy. A visible, concentrated “Polar Capital” would project India’s seriousness in global polar affairs, balancing its Indo‑Pacific profile with a credible Indo-Arctic but also an Indo-Antarctic dimension.

For India to be recognized as a credible Arctic stakeholder, it must cultivate a deep bench of Arctic‑literate professionals spanning scientists, strategists, diplomats, naval and legal experts, capable of articulating national interests in multilateral settings and translating them into actionable outcomes. At present, however, India’s institutional base remains shallow. As of mid-2025, only five Indian universities are members of the University of the Arctic (UArctic), a strikingly low figure given India’s thousand-plus higher education landscape.^[27] This reflects a limited academic and training pipeline that must be rapidly expanded if India is to move from observer to influencer in Arctic affairs. Human capital (through capability building) is the strategic hinge of any future Arctic engagement. Training must therefore be viewed not as a compliance requirement but as a strategic asset. As rapidly retreating sea ice widens navigable windows along the Northern Sea Route and other trans-Arctic corridors, climate models suggest that standard vessels may be able to operate in these waters for nearly twice as long by mid-century.^[28] India must therefore prepare a cadre of officers certified under the IMO Polar Code, supported by environmental and maritime lawyers versed in polar jurisdictions, and negotiators skilled in indigenous rights, fisheries management, and Arctic governance mechanisms.

c.  Capacity building - Infrastructure development

Thirdly, capacity building is essential for a year‑round Arctic presence. India must therefore acquire ice‑class research vessels and a dedicated polar‑class icebreaker. At present India owns no ice‑class ship or icebreaker; every Arctic expedition charters foreign tonnage, constraining sailing windows and inflating costs. Although the National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research (NCPOR) received cabinet clearance in 2023 for a Polar Research Vessel (PRV) with DP‑2 dynamic positioning, the project is still in pre‑contract negotiations, and the earliest delivery date is 2028-29.[29] However, delivery may take longer since the keel is yet to be laid. To compress timelines, India must lease a vessel to gain expertise on ice navigation.

d.  Operational readiness for Polar Engagement. 

Lastly, the end state for all of the above is readiness for polar operations. India can translate its Arctic policy into real polar operations only when it can crew, sail, and sustain its own ships North of the Arctic Circle. The fundamentals required are still missing. India fields the world’s fifth‑largest seafaring workforce, about 285,000 active mariners in 2023, yet fewer than 600 hold the Polar Code certificates in basic or advanced ice‑navigation, well under 0.25% of the pool.[30]  DG Shipping has therefore urged training institutes to expand IMO-approved Polar Code courses, and in 2023 New Delhi signed an agreement with Russia’s Admiral Nevelskoy Maritime University to run simulator‑based Arctic modules for Indian deck officers.[31] Until that gap is closed, India must rely on foreign crews or ad‑hoc charters for every polar cruise. The Navy can help bridge the transition. It already mans and supports vessels for ONGC, NPOL, DRDO, and NTRO. Once the Ministry of Earth Sciences takes delivery or leases its planned Polar Research Vessel (PRV), the Navy could provide the inaugural crew. That arrangement would give naval personnel hands‑on ice experience while ensuring scientists have a reliable, Indian-flagged platform. Visits and port calls by Indian Naval ship to Nordic countries and ports such as Tromso and Reykjavik in the Arctic regions would facilitate stronger diplomatic relations, quietly reinforcing India’s maritime presence in Arctic littorals.

Recommendations

India’s Arctic approach, anchored in science, strategic autonomy and climate stewardship, is directionally sound. Yet, its ability to convert presence into influence will depend on three policy priorities:

a.  Accelerate Capability Development

India must reduce dependence on foreign charters and fast-track the Polar Research Vessel (PRV) while building indigenous polar-operational expertise across crew, scientists, and expedition leaders. Permanent capability and not episodic presence, would define credibility.

b.  Maintain a Balanced Geopolitical Posture 

India’s role as a constructive bridge between the A7 and Russia must be pursued with realism. In a climate of heightened Russia–West friction, India’s neutrality carries constraints that should be navigated with measured diplomacy, not overt positioning.

c.  Manage Strategic Risks with Foresight

As China deepens polar collaboration with Russia, India must proactively shape bilateral cooperation with Russia and the West to avoid marginalisation in a shifting Arctic power equation. Engagement should remain science-led, Global South conscious, transparent, and autonomy-preserving, ensuring that India is not side-lined in future polar frameworks.

Conclusion - A Call for Prudence

The Arctic is already grappling with one profound transformation, a climatic one, that alone demands urgent international cooperation. The resilience of the Arctic should not be tested twice. These changing trends clearly show that non-Arctic states need to engage with the Arctic more than before. India’s approach to Arctic geopolitics must continue to be balanced and forward-looking, rooted in science, guided by diplomacy, and focused on sustainability. In the Arctic, India may be an outsider by geography, but is a distant neighbour in shared responsibility and a vital neighbour by a common vision.

***** 

(The author is a serving Commodore in the Indian Navy and is presently posted at Naval War College. He is a research scholar focusing on Arctic geopolitics and India’s Arctic strategy.)

 Endnotes

[1] Pavel Devyatkin, "Arctic Exceptionalism: A Narrative of Cooperation and Conflict from Gorbachev to Medvedev and Putin," Polar Journal 13, no. 2 (October 2023): 336–57

[2] Roza Laptander, "From Gorbachev's Murmansk Speech to the Present: 37 Years of International Collaboration in Northern Russia," in A Fractured North: Journeys on Hold (Fürstenberg: Kulturstiftung Sibirien, 2024), 15–18.

[3] U.S. Department of State, "Joint Statement on Arctic Council Cooperation Following Russia's Invasion of Ukraine," March 3, 2022.

[4] 2024 Department of Defense Arctic Strategy, 2024.

[5] Elizabeth Buchanan, Red Arctic: Russian Strategy Under Putin (Brookings Institution Press, 2023),

[6] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Norwegian government’s High North Strategy. Aug 2025.

[7] Lassi Heininen, An Arctic Boom of Policies & Strategies: 32 and Counting, 2020.

[8] Andrew E. D'Ami and Michael E. Jones, "Outsiders Wanting In: Asian States and Arctic Governance," Belfer Center, July 7, 2023.

[9] Elizabeth Buchanan, "China's Arctic Strategy: Military and Security Implications," Asia Policy 15, no. 2 (2020): 65–70.

[10] The term ‘Outsiders’ is taken from the title of one of the panel discussions of the Arctic Security Conference 25 (ASC25) organized by FNI and held at Oslo, Norway in Sep 2025 where in all non- arctic states were called ‘outsiders’.

[11] Evan T. Bloom, “The Rising Importance of Non-Arctic States in the Arctic,” The Wilson Quarterly 46, no. 1 (Winter 2022)

[12] Lassi Heininen and James Kraska, "The Arctic Council and Asian Observers: A Call for Enhanced Cooperation," The Arctic Institute, June 6, 2023.

[13] “Geopolitical Competition in The Arctic Circle,” Harvard International Review, December 2, 2020, https://hir.harvard.edu/the-arctic-circle/.

[14] Nong Hong, “Non-Arctic States’ Role in the High North: Participating in Arctic Governance through Cooperation,” in Marine Biodiversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction, ed. Myron H. Nordquist and Ronán Long (Brill | Nijhoff, 2021), https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004422438_017.

[15]“Spitsbergen Treaty 1920, Archived,” accessed March 25, 2024, https://web.archive.org/web/20170702183404/http://emeritus.lovdata.no/traktater/texte/tre-19200209-001.html and Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Ministry of Earth Sciences, “Research Stations in the Arctic and Antarctica,” August 12, 2013, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID

[16] U. Sinha, “India in the Arctic: A Multidimensional Approach,” Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University: International Relations 12, no. 1 (2019): 113–26, https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu06.2019.107.

[17]  Northern (Arctic) Federal University named after M. V. Lomonosov et al., “India’s Arctic Policy: The Historical Context,” Arctic and North, no. 48 (September 2022): 48, https://doi.org/10.37482/issn2221-2698.2022.48.261. and India’s Arctic Policy: Building a Partnership for Sustainable Development, directed by IIC Programmes, 2022, 1:10:20, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mWw3RvAj8bk.

[18] Ministry of Earth Sciences (MoES). Himadri Arctic Research Station – Establishment Report, New Delhi, 2022.

[19] T. Nandakumar, “India’s Arctic Observatory to Aid Climate Change Studies: Will Help Understand Influences on Monsoon System,” The Hindu (Thiruvananthapuram), September 13, 2014, 4:16 p.m. IST.

[20] India in the New World Order: The Changing Contours of Her Foreign Policy Under Narendra Modi, Raj Kumar Kothari, Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, Vol. 33, No. 1/2 (JUNE-DECEMBER 2020) , pp. 134-136 (3 pages)

[21] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, "The 3rd Voice of Global South Summit 2024," press release, August 14, 2024, https://www.mea.gov.in/press- releases.htm?dtl/38161/The_3rd_Voice_of_Global_South_Summit_2024.

[22] “Voice of Global South Summit 2023 | Ministry of External Affair,” accessed July 3, 2025, https://www.mea.gov.in/voice-of-global-summit.htm.

[23] Nima Khorrami, "China's Arctic Strategy and Hybrid Warfare: Targeting Governance and Strategic Responses," The Arctic Institute, December 9, 2025; and Elena V. Gladun and Evgeny V. Zabusov, "The Polar Silk Road and the future governance of the Northern Sea Route," Leiden Journal of International Law 36, no. 1 (2023): 23-45.

[24] Papageorgiou, M., & Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira, A. (2024). Assessing the Changing Sino–Russian Relationship: A Longitudinal Analysis of Bilateral Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Period. Europe-Asia Studies, 76(4), 632–658. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2023.2276677

[25] ONGC Videsh Limited, "Annual Report 2023-24," (New Delhi: ONGC, 2024), 88; and Nidhi Verma, "India's ONGC Retains 20% stake in Russia's Sakhalin-1 Project," Reuters, December 5, 2025.

[26] Ministry of Earth Sciences (India), India's Arctic Policy: Building a Partnership for Sustainable Development (New Delhi: Government of India, 2022), https://www.mospi.gov.in.

[27] “Members,” UArctic – University of the Arctic, accessed June 21, 2025, https://www.uarctic.org/members/.

[28]  Mohamed Rami Mahmoud, Mahmoud Roushdi, and Mostafa Aboelkhear, “Potential Benefits of Climate Change on Navigation in the Northern Sea Route by 2050,” Scientific Reports 14, no. 1 (February 2, 2024): 2771, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-024-53308-5.

[29] “NCPOR Is Acquiring a New Ocean Research Vessel for Deep Ocean Exploration,” Press Information Bureau, accessed June 21, 2025, https://www.pib.gov.in/www.pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=2033981.

[30] Dr Deepak Shetty Former Director General, Shipping in his interview with the author at Naval War College on 12 Aug 2024.

[31] "Indian Seafarers to Receive Training in Russia for Arctic Navigation," Arctic Russia, September 13, 2023, https://arctic-russia.ru/en/news/indian-seafarers-to-receive-training-in-russia-for-arctic-navigation/.