Indian Council of World Affairs

Introduction 

Sudan has fallen into the shackles of catastrophe since the Rapid Support Forces (RSFs) took over Al-Fasher on 23 October 2025.^[1] However, the roots of the conflict lie deeper in ethnic fragmentation, militarised tribal politics and decades of marginalisation of the Southern Sudanese population, particularly Dinka and Nuer ethnic communities. Moreover, the major and regional powers are using this fragmentation to pursue strategic and resource interests in the Red Sea and gold mines of Sudan.

Satellite image showing bloodshed after the RSF attack on El-Fasher in October 2025.

Source: International Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)

Since the independence of Sudan in 1956, it has faced tremendous challenges in maintaining stability in a deeply divided society. Sudan’s fragility is shaped by social, political and geographical fragmentation that dates back decades, before the current war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAFs) and the RSFs. The state institutions remained fragile and unevenly developed due to the prolonged disempowerment of regions like Darfur, Blue Nile and South Kordofan.^[2] The removal of President Omar al-Bashir in 2019 brought hope for political reforms, but the transitional authorities also inherited a deeply entrenched and fragmented security apparatus. The RSF, which has its roots in Janjaweed militias, maintained a parallel framework and economic self-determination. The rivalry exploded into a full-scale war after efforts were made by both domestic reform coalitions like Forces of Freedom and Change Central Council (FCC-CC) and SAF, as well as the international mediators to merge the RSF into the national army in 2023.^[3] This has led both factions to maintain military power without civilian oversight. 

Today, Sudan faces overlapping crises: a militarised struggle between two power centres, a deeply tribalised civil conflict, intense geopolitical competitions among major and regional powers, and one of the world’s most disastrous humanitarian crises. Understanding the trajectory of Sudan requires examining the historical development of tribalism, the militarisation of the political authority and the eco-strategic motivations driving external interference, which can help shape the future of Sudan. 

Internal Fault Lines: Tribalism, Militarisation and State Collapse

The internal fragmentation within Sudan has its roots in the colonial period, particularly the British administrative policies that institutionalised and divided tribal identities.^[4] The structured governance around ethnic differentiation further created segmentation in the Sudanese society. Colonial powers fuelled the segregation of the North-South divide and tribal differences by politicising the Arab, African and tribal identities.^[5] The British confided in the ‘Native Administration’ system to delegate authority to tribal chiefs to maintain indirect rule and order at minimal administrative cost. The formalisation of ethnic homelands, the allocation of economic privileges to certain groups and restriction of mobility and political participation further deepened tribal division. Colonial governance cultivated competing tribal loyalties instead of fostering a unified national consciousness to prevent any unified solidarity movement against the British rule.^[6]

After independence, Sudanese leaders failed to reform this segmented order and rather inherited it. Successive governments manipulated tribal identities to maintain power rather than building inclusive institutions. Leaders such as Gaafar Nimeiry and Omar al-Bashir relied on western patronage networks that empowered specific tribal groups and marginalised the rest. During the 1980s and 1990s, this divide was further deepened with Islamisation policies under Nimeiry and Al-Bashir, particularly in Darfur.^[7] For instance, the 1983 Sharia-based ‘September Laws’, introduced under Nimeiry, marginalised non-Muslim populations and imposed strict sharia laws over other Christian and tribal populations.^[8] Al-Bashir strengthened these policies through selective land allocations, administrative restructuring, and arming tribal militias. These policies intensified the division between Arab and non-Arab communities, including the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa. ^[9] However, 2020 reforms discontinued this era, but debates over legal and social impacts on religious freedom continue. There was a surge in ethnic polarisation under Bashir’s regime, which armed Arab militias (later known as Janjaweed) to suppress any kind of non-Arab uprising. This normalised militia violence as a political tool. Later, the transformation of the Janjaweed militia into the RSF, under the leadership of Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo Musa, popularly known as ‘Hemedti’, regularised an authoritarian paramilitary that expanded beyond Darfur into national politics.^[10]

The majority of RSF commanders belong to Darfuri Arab tribes, and recruitment is largely based on identity networks. However, both the SAF and the RSF exploit tribal loyalties by offering patronage, arms and protection in return for youth recruits and influence. While the young men fall into the trap of proving their loyalty to tribal groups, their leaders reap financial and political benefits at their expense.^[11] The RSF finances itself through resource extraction, particularly gold, and this is reinforced by Sudan’s broader economic fragmentation, in which key resources and trade networks operate outside the state’s authority and are instead controlled by competing military and tribal groups. This helps RSF to bypass the state mechanisms entirely. This parallel ‘war economy’ further strengthens the militia organisations and weakens any mechanism for national reconciliation.^[12]

Militarisation and tribalism in Sudan have hollowed out the civilian state infrastructure. The RSF is not limited to being a militia but is also operating as a de facto quasi-state actor with territorial control and economic operations. Moreover, it has consolidated its powers through foreign ties, which further sidelined the already fragile civilian institutions. As the public services collapsed in Sudan, many displaced Sudanese are compelled to rely on militias for basic needs and security. ^[13] This further reinforces their power base and foothold over the population of Sudan. The prolonged conflict has shattered civic trust, which has left Sudan’s social and administrative order deeply fragmented. The failure of transitional agreements after 2019 further aggravated these cracks. The fragility of Sudan’s security architecture and absence of a unified national military were exposed after continuous efforts to integrate the RSF into the SAF escalated tensions rather than resolving them.

External Interference: The New Great Game in Sudan

The strategic value of Sudan to foreign powers lies both in its geography and rich resources. Due to its location at the Red Sea, Sudan holds access to maritime chokepoints that are vital for trade and energy flows. ^[14] The resource reserves, particularly gold reserves, make the country attractive to foreign investors and strategic actors. As a result, the internal conflict has become deeply intertwined with a broader geopolitical contest among regional and global powers.

Strategic location of Sudan

Source: https://tinyurl.com/2t23hbtw

Russia has emerged as a central player in Sudan’s conflict by leveraging the divide between the SAF and RSF. Africa holds significant strategic importance for Russia. It has emerged as a key player primarily through its security networks and mining activities. Russian actors, most notably the Wagner Group and its successor formations, have supported the RSF militia in Sudan in exchange for privileged access to gold mining sites and securing potential naval base rights in Port Sudan to access the wider Red Sea coast. ^[15] Sudan is a strategic gateway for expanding the influence of Russia across the Middle East and Africa. 

Another significant actor in the conflict in Sudan is the United Arab Emirates, which is constantly accused of supplying weapons to the RSF through channels in Chad, Libya, Uganda, the Central African Republic, and Kenya.^[16] The United Arab Emirates’s involvement in the crisis is driven by economic interests in gold and geopolitical ambitions in the Red Sea corridor. In contrast, Egypt supports the SAF and views it as the only institution capable of maintaining territorial coherence and preventing instability from spilling across its long shared border. ^[18]

Western powers, such as the United States and the European Union are more focused on humanitarian and diplomatic assistance, like funding UN relief operations, imposing sanctions on commanders from both sides and supporting the Jeddah and AU-IGAD mediation tracks to preserve the stability of the Red Sea region.^[19] However, their influence is limited.^[20] They advocate for a civilian-led transition, but the constant competition among the regional powers halts meaningful pressure. Neighbouring states, such as Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia and South Sudan are deeply captured in the crisis due to shared ethnic groups, economic interdependence and security spillovers. These external interests have intensified the conflict as foreign powers back their preferred factions, which, in turn, undermine coordinated peace efforts.^[21]

The Road Ahead: Can Sudan be saved?

The future of Sudan can unfold in several ways, shaped by evolving political, military and regional dynamics. One trajectory can be a possibility of a power-sharing agreement negotiated between SAF and RSF. This would resemble the 2019 transition era, where efforts were made by external mediators to establish a joint governance framework.^[22]  However, the experience of previous arrangements that were marked by repeated breakdowns, mutual distrust and competition over economic control shows the limits of such a model today.

The outright victory of one faction is another possibility, with its consequences. If SAF triumphs, Sudan might return to a form of centralised military rule resembling that of previous regimes, such as those of Al-Bashir and Nimeiry. It would also cut down any prospects of democratic governance. Similarly, if RSF emerges victorious, the country risks becoming a militia-dominated state with strong dependence on foreign backers such as Russia and the United Arab Emirates. Either of these outcomes could produce prolonged instability and protracted conflict. The victory of any of these factions will cost high civilian casualties and territorial fragmentation. The legacy of resource exploitation will continue in both cases. 

The third possible scenario might be that Sudan falls under international trusteeship administered by the UN under its stabilising and peacebuilding missions. This would require external involvement, demobilising existing militia structures and guiding the country towards elections through restoring institutions. Although it seems that it may offer a structured path towards peace and reconciliation, such a solution might face resistance from both armed factions and raise concerns over sovereignty. Moreover, it will demand substantial financial and logistics support from the international parties involved. Perhaps the most alarming scenario is the final one, which is the de facto partition of Sudan into separate spheres of control. Under this scenario, RSF could consolidate its rule over Darfur and the Kordofan region, and SAF may retain dominance in the northern and eastern parts of the country with its capital in Khartoum.

Conclusion

Sudan stands at historic crossroads. The current conflict in Sudan is a result of its decades of politicisation and militarisation of tribalism, fuelled by British colonial powers and Sudan’s modern leadership. Governments from Nimeiry to Al-Bashir and later the transitional authorities repeatedly empowered tribal militias and failed to reform the fragmented security apparatus. All of this contributed to the present crisis of Sudan. The confrontation between SAF and RSF represents both a continuation and an escalation of these structural loopholes. The conflict has grown more complex and intractable due to constant penetration and exploitation by foreign powers for their own resource and strategic needs. A sustainable resolution will require complete disbandment and rehabilitation of militia groups, reducing regional interference and empowering civil society institutions in Sudan. The question of whether Sudan can be saved remains uncertain, but the path forward depends on recognising that the cost of continued fragmentation is far greater than the investment required to rebuild a stable, inclusive, and unified Sudan.

*****

*Azra Shahab, Research Intern, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal. 

Endnotes

1. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). November 7, 2025. “Sudan: UN Experts Appalled by Reports of Mass Atrocities, Unlawful Killings and Sexual Violence in El Fasher.” Accessed November 2025. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/11/sudan-un-experts-appalled-reports-mass-atrocities-unlawful-killings-and
2. International Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI). April 30, 2025. Armies, Militias and the Quagmire of Politico-Military Alliances. Accessed November 2025. https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/armies-militias-and-the-quagmire-of-politico-military-alliances-207389
3. Ibid.
4. Mamdani, Mahmood. 2020. Neither Settler nor Native: The Making and Unmaking of Permanent Minorities. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Galaleldeen, Abdalla (2025) "The Sudanese Identity in the Mirror of Colonial and Post-Independence History," The Journal of Social Encounters: Vol. 9: Iss. 2, 268-280. DOI: https://doi.org/10.69755/2995-2212.1377
8. Kalpakian, Jack. “THE SEPTEMBER LAWS AND THE ISLAMIST STATE IN THE SUDAN: WHAT WENT WRONG?,” n.d.
9. Damplo, Danica (May 2, 2024). United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM). 2024. “Imminent Risk of Genocide in North Darfur.” https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/blog/imminent-risk-of-genocide-in-north-darfur
10. International Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI). April 30, 2025. Armies, Militias and the Quagmire of Politico-Military Alliances. Accessed November 2025. https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/armies-militias-and-the-quagmire-of-politico-military-alliances-207389
11. Abdul Karim, Haider (October 6, 2025). ATAR Network. 2024. “Militarising tribes: Inside Sudan’s system of war mobilisation”
12. https://atarnetwork.com/?p=16121
13. SPARC Knowledge. October 2025. “The War Economy in Darfur”. https://www.sparc-knowledge.org/sites/default/files/documents/resources/Report_The%20War%20economy%20in%20Darfur-High-res_0.pdf
14. United Nations Press. (October 30, 2025). “El Fasher in ‘Even Darker Hell’, UN Officials Tell Security Council, as Delegates Decry Horrific Crimes Following City’s Capture by Rapid Support Forces”
15. https://press.un.org/en/2025/sc16203.doc.htm
16. Sugandhi (June 13, 2025). Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA). “Port Sudan in the Crosshairs: An Assessment of the Recent Attacks” /show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=13076&lid=7981#_ednref2
17. Abdalla, Salma (2023) Security in Context. “Emerging Stage for Great Power Competition: Russia’s Influence in Sudan amid Political Turmoil.” https://www.securityincontext.org/posts/emerging-stage-for-great-power-competition-russias-influence-in-sudan-amid-political-turmoil
18. Mahjoub, Husam (August 15, 2025). Spectre Journal. “The UAE’s Subimperialism in Sudan”.
19. https://spectrejournal.com/uaes-subimperialism-in-sudan/
20. France 24. (March 3, 2025). “What Is the UAE’s Involvement in War-Torn Sudan?” https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250308-what-is-the-uae-s-involvement-in-war-torn-sudan
21. Kara, Ayoob (October 23, 2025). Jewish News Syndicate (JNS). “Egypt’s Hand in Sudan’s War Only Deepens a Crisis.”
22. https://www.jns.org/egypts-hand-in-sudans-war-only-deepens-a-crisis/
23. Idris Ahmed, and Mutawakil Daqash, (August 19, 2024). Arab Center Washington DC 2024. “The Failure of the Jeddah and IGAD Mediation Efforts for Sudan.”
24. https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-failure-of-the-jeddah-and-igad-mediation-efforts-for-sudan/
25. Brundage, William (August 6, 2025). New Lines Institute. “The Case for U.S. Involvement in the Sudanese Civil War.” https://newlinesinstitute.org/political-systems/the-case-for-u-s-involvement-in-the-sudanese-civil-war/
26. Kottasova, Ivana (November 7, 2025). CNN International. “Sudan’s bloody conflict is plagued by foreign influence.” https://edition.cnn.com/2025/11/07/africa/sudan-conflict-foreign-influence-intl-cmd
27. International Crisis Group (ICG) (November 14, 2025). “After El-Fasher: Ending Sudan’s Atrocious War.” https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sudan/after-el-fasher-ending-sudans-atrocious-war