Indian Council of World Affairs

On 26 December 2025, Israel became the first United Nations member state to officially recognise the Republic of Somaliland as an independent and sovereign state. The Israeli government declared that the “decision is in the spirit of the Abraham Accords.” The government also invited the head of Somaliland, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi to pay an official visit to Israel.[i] Although Somaliland declared independence from Somalia in 1991, Israel remains the only state to grant formal diplomatic recognition to Somaliland. Experts attribute Israel's recognition of Somaliland to strategic considerations. These include the need for maritime protection of shipments in the Red Sea and Bab-el-Mandeb, efforts to counter Iran’s influence in the Horn of Africa, and a desire to deepen strategic alignment with Gulf partners, particularly the UAE. Additionally, Israel's approach appears to favour pragmatic recognition over formal legality, a strategy previously evident in its engagements with Kurdistan.[ii]  This decision may also be a response to Somalia’s pronounced pro-Palestine stance since 2023. For Somaliland, aligning with Israel offers increased diplomatic opportunities for security related investments and means to counter regional regional marginalisation. 

However, countries across the world, including multilateral organizations, such as the United Nations, African Union, Arab League, Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and European Union, have rejected Israel’s unilateral move that recognized Somaliland. At the same time, Somaliland has welcomed the recognition, while countries, such as Ethiopia, refraining from condemning Israel. Ethiopia’s strategy to access sea gained greater momentum through a close partnership with Somaliland. The deliberate silence was evident from countries, such as the UAE, due to its strong economic and security presence in Berbera Port in Somaliland, and its status as a signatory to the Abraham Accords with Israel. The USA has extended its support to Somalia without condemning Israel. Countries such as the UK, the Czech Republic and Hungary did not criticise the unilateral recognition of Somaliland, nor did they extend their support to Somalia. In contrast, the EU has taken a principled position in rejecting Israel’s unilateral move and extending support to Somalia’s territorial integrity and security. 

Somaliland holds significant strategic importance due to its geographical location, particularly its proximity to the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb through which around 12 per cent of global trade transits.[iii] Berbera port is a deep-water port that is attractive for commercial, naval and maritime surveillance activities. It’s strategic value has increased in the context of piracy threats and the Houthis attacks, contributing to broader security in the Red Sea, and facilitating trade diversification.[iv] Also, Somaliland’s stable governance system enables it to function as a reliable logistical and security partner. Therefore, Somaliland is emerging as a strategic maritime and geopolitical asset in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea arena. In this context, the paper aims to identify the causes behind Israel’s recognition of Somaliland and the consequences that have followed. 

Identifying the Causes behind the recognition of Somaliland 

The regionalisation of the Hamas-Israel conflict since 7 October 2023 has disrupted the smooth flow of the traffic in Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The Houthis had hijacked the Israeli MV Galaxy Leader in November 2023[v] and conducted missile and drone attacks on Israel-bound cargo and container ships, leading to the rerouting of Israel-bound cargo vessels via the Cape of Good Hope, increasing the shipping cost by 30–40 per cent.[vi] The resurgence of Somali piracy after 7 October increased the costs of shipping in the Gulf of Aden. Thus, this decision may pave the way for a deeper political and strategic foundation between Somaliland and Israel for cooperation in intelligence sharing, access to ports, and surveillance along the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Bab el-Mandab. 

Source: The Economist

It is also important to note that this move helps Israel counter Iran’s growing influence in the Horn of Africa. Iran’s strategic interests in the Horn of Africa are related to the protection of its oil exports through the sea lanes in Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea. Competition with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Israel and the US has further pushed Iran to expand its influence in the peripheral areas of West Asia and the Gulf region. Therefore, Tehran has provided defence and economic support to Houthis to exert control over the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb, thereby shaping the regional security dynamics in its favour without using its troops. Iran revived diplomatic relations with Sudan after October 2023 and supplied drones and military logistics to the Sudanese Armed Forces amid the civil war against the Rapid Support Forces, allegedly aided by UAE. Tehran expanded its cooperation with Sudan to counter the UAE and Saudi Arabia and strengthen its presence along the Red Sea. Iran has also expanded cooperation with Eritrea to increase its strategic foothold in the Red Sea, providing support to develop Eritrea’s ports, such as Assab. This has enabled Iran to project naval power and conduct anti-piracy missions in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.[vii] Also, analysts suggest that Iran has informal ties with non-state actors such as al-Shabab through Yemen’s Houthis. However, this connection remains diffuse and informal in nature.[viii] As a result, Iran has deepened its influence in the Horn of Africa through proxy alliances, military support, diplomatic partnerships, technical and economic engagement and traditional alliances. Owing to these factors, Israel’s move to recognise Somaliland is intended to curb the growth of transnational jihadism, including groups like Al-Shabaab. Somaliland’s political stability helps deeper intelligence and maritime cooperation. Additionally, the territory is not strategically dependent on Iran. 

In parallel, several analysts also outline that the unilateral recognition is an expansion of the Abraham Accords outside of the West Asia and Gulf region.[ix] The recognition further strengthened the scope of cooperation between the UAE and Israel outside the Gulf and West Asia regions. The UAE has already strengthened its control over the Berbera port through long-term port concessions and logistics control, emerging as a key security provider and commercial hub in the Gulf of Aden.[x] For Israel, the UAE plays the role of a stabiliser in the Berbera port. Thus, recognition can help contain Iranian influence, ensure the security of maritime routes, and avoid dependency on fragile actors, such as Mogadishu. 

Another cause is that since 7 October 2023, Somalia has taken a sharp pro-Palestine position. It has publicly condemned Israel’s military activities in Gaza[xi], fully supported United Nations General Assembly ceasefire resolutions, raised the issue of occupation, protection of Palestinians and implementation of international humanitarian law, and openly coordinated with the Arab League and Organisation of Islamic Cooperation on Gaza instead of taking a neutral stance. Two factors underpin Somalia’s pro-Palestinian stance: first, it follows a normative alignment, as it was under occupation in the past, and it is still facing political fragmentation.[xii] Second, Somalia is dependent on diplomatic and financial support from Arab countries. 

Notably, Israel’s recognition also reflects the broader erosion of the normative order in the global politics, where established norms are either selectively applied, undermined or disregarded. The Westphalian principle of territorial integrity has been bypassed by Israel’s unilateral decision. Recognition was grounded in diplomatic reasoning and a legal framework, while security considerations have been restructured through selective interpretation of international law and precedents. Somaliland is not the only case point to consider the question of sovereignty; sovereignty dilemma can be observed in Ukraine, Syria, Libya and Yemen, where authority remains fragmented and unresolved. It shows a transition from who is legally sovereign to who governs effectively and who has the capacity to align strategically. Therefore, the recognition has made Somaliland a testing ground for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and geopolitical interests. In addition, the recent face-off between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, following years of cooperation in Yemen to re-establish the internationally recognised government, has proven that the regional normative order of the West Asia region is also significantly disrupted, making a more compelling case for an interest-driven, pragmatic regional order. 

Consequences of Somaliland’s Recognition 

The recognition has explicitly violated Somalia’s territorial integrity, which has been struggling for years to reintegrate the separated region into its national territory. This decision reduced Somalia’s engagement with Israel. Moreover, this unilateral step risks emboldening the extremists’ voices in seeking a territorial claim within Somalia, exacerbating territorial, institutional, and diplomatic fragilities. For instance, Al-Shabab would seek to exploit the situation by claiming that the Somalian state is not capable enough to defend its sovereignty or “Muslim Lands”.[xiii]

At the same time, Somaliland’s recognition has conferred symbolic legitimacy and diplomatic leverage, as a UN member state has recognised it. It has enhanced its bargaining power with regional actors. It enables negotiation with Ethiopia over its access to Berbera port, a transit corridor for goods and security and defence cooperation. This expands the scope of engagement for Somaliland with Gulf actors, particularly the UAE, to strengthen economic and logistic cooperation. It has boosted the confidence of the local elites and strengthened their legitimacy to govern the separated land. 

There are also visible risks related to Israel’s decision. There is a growing risk of militarisation. As it becomes a close partner of Israel, it may evolve into an active geopolitical epicentre marked by increased of intelligence activity, security infrastructure and surveillance activity operations. It might get drawn into conflicts beyond its control, while offering no credible defence guarantee. Somaliland risks becoming another proxy in the Red Sea conflict. The risk is that it will be pulled into the conflict between Israel, the UAE, Western maritime security and Iran-led operations in the Horn of Africa.[xiv]

There is a near-universal institutional rejection of Israel’s move. The UN has reaffirmed Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) members, except the US, condemned Israel’s recognition of Somaliland. During the UNSC meeting, the Somali representative to the UN stated that “Israel’s recognition is part of a plan to force Palestinians to relocate to the northwestern region of Somalia.” At the same time, the US envoy Tammy Bruce compared the move to recognise Somaliland with Palestine by stating that “more than 150 members of the UN recognise the non-existent Palestine, and no emergency meeting has been convened,” alleging the “double standards” of the UNSC.[xv] The heads of the African Union, the European Union, the Arab League and the OIC have extended full support to Somalia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty while rejecting Israel’s decision to legitimize the existence of Somaliland. They have expressed that recognition sets a dangerous precedent with far-reaching implications for global peace and stability.

For Israel, this step provides a strategic depth and maritime access through intelligence and port cooperation near the Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint, strengthening Israel and its allies’ linked shipping routes. The regional actors in the West Asia region have outright rejected Israel’s decision. Egypt considers any new external security actor near the Bab el-Mandeb as a threat to its traditional role as a guardian of the Red Sea-Suez maritime security. Therefore, Egypt, at the session of the OIC Council of Foreign Ministers meeting held in Jeddah on 10 January 2026, described the move as “illegal schemes aimed at forcibly displacing Palestinians and deepening divisions in the Gaza Strip.”[xvi] Türkiye sees Israel’s move as the building block for expanding Israel-UAE security alignment, threatening the interests of Türkiye in the Horn of Africa. The Türkiye government, therefore, called that “the recognition is yet another example of the Netanyahu government’s unlawful actions aimed at creating instability at both the regional and global levels.”[xvii] The UAE has gained geopolitical weight through their investment in the Berbera port, following the recognition of Somaliland. It will expand the cooperation between the UAE and Israel in ports, shipments, logistics and maritime security. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have also realised the implications of granting acceptance and legitimacy to Somaliland on the regional stability. They have used the Arab League and the OIC platforms to voice their opposition to unilateral recognition. They rejected Israel’s decision to prevent precedents that could destabilise fragile African and Arab states.[xviii] In addition, Iran and the Houthis consider that Tel Aviv’s decision widens the threat landscape and increases the possibility that Somaliland’s associated maritime logistics could be targeted in the future. As a clear binary is emerging in the Gulf, the Horn of Africa is increasingly becoming the focal point of Gulf rivalry, which will directly impact trade routes, political stability, and maritime security in the Gulf.

Globally, the recognition is going to redefine how sovereignty and statehood are negotiated and determined. It normalizes a transactional approach recognition and weakens principles-based negotiated settlements under the regional governance systems and the United Nations. Thus, it shifts the focus from norms and principles towards strategic and security alignments, drawing conflicts closer to the classical realist paradigm, and eroding multilateral consensus-based mechanisms. It poses a higher risk in Africa, West Asia and Southeast Asia, where borders are fluid, ethnic conflicts are prevalent and government institutions are weak.

Conclusion

There is an almost universal rejection and condemnation of the move to recognise Somaliland by Israel. However, the recognition has occurred at a time when the global governance system is under strain, and its principles and norms are increasingly ineffective in shaping the decisions of the powerful countries. The declining authorities of the global governance mechanism risks emboldening other separatist and secessionist groups in the region, particularly the ongoing demand for nationhood in Western Sahara.

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*Dr. Arshad, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA)
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

[i] PM Netanyahu announced the official recognition of the Republic of Somaliland as an independent and sovereign state, Prime Minister’s Office: Government of Israel, Gov.il, December 26, 2025, accessed https://www.gov.il/en/pages/event-somaliland261225, December 28, 2025.

[ii] Israel’s Kurdish Dilemmas, The Institute for National Security Studies, January 1, 2026, accessed https://www.inss.org.il/publication/kurdish-dilemma/, January 3, 2026.

[iii] Global oil traffic at risk at five international maritime “chokepoints”, Rystad says, EUCI, September 23, 2025, accessed https://tinyurl.com/yc5kjfkt, December 29, 2025.

[iv] The Battle for Berbera: Inside the global scramble for Somaliland’s strategic Red Sea Port, The African Report, April 7, 2025, accessed https://tinyurl.com/38vey988, January 4, 2026.

[v] Yemen’s Houthis release crew of seized cargo ship Galaxy Leader, BBC, January 22, 2025, accessed https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c9d5q0jn067o, December 29, 2025.

[vi] The global economic consequences of the attacks on Red Sea shipping lanes, Center for Strategic & International Studies, January 22, 2024, accessed https://tinyurl.com/46pudjpu, January 2, 2026.

[vii] Eritrea breaks West’s Red Sea chokehold, pivots to Iran, Russia, China, Janata Weekly, May 25, 2025, accessed https://tinyurl.com/yvkcdffu, January 4, 2026.

[viii] Regional power struggles fuel simmering tensions across the Red Sea, ACLED, December 11, 2025, accessed https://tinyurl.com/3jmf2jvz, January 5, 2026.

[ix] Israel, Turkey, Somalia and Somaliland Recognition, The Times of Israel, January 7, 2026, accessed https://tinyurl.com/yd26tfv4, January 9, 2026

[x] The UAE’s long game in East Africa, RANE, September 15, 2025, accessed https://tinyurl.com/3ryfxzs3, January 6, 2026

[xi] Press Statement, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Federal Republic of Somalia, April 14, 2024, accessed https://tinyurl.com/5t486f43, January 3, 2026.

[xii] Somalia urges Gaza ceasefire and aid access at OIC Emergency meeting, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Somalia, August 25,2025, accessed https://tinyurl.com/55wfu2zw, January 8, 2026

[xiii] Hundreds in Somalia’s capital protest Israel’s recognition of breakaway territory of Somaliland, AP, January 9, 2026, accessed https://tinyurl.com/3r48ym8z, January 12, 2026.

[xiv] Why is Somaliland strategically important? Reuters, January 6, 2026, accessed https://tinyurl.com/2saxnt4k, January 12, 2026.

[xv] UN Security Council members condemn Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, Al-Jazeera, December 30, 2025, accessed https://tinyurl.com/5h3e7wsn, January 12, 2026.

[xvi] Egypt rejects Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, Egyptian Streets, January 12, 2026, accessed https://tinyurl.com/4a6ndujm, January 13, 2026.

[xvii] Statement of the Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkiye on Recognition of the Independence of the Somaliland Region, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 26, 2025, accessed https://tinyurl.com/277vtj23, January 13, 2026.

[xviii]Joint statement by 21 Arab, Islamic, and African nations stressing their unequivocal rejection of Israel’s recognition of the Somaliland region, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Qatar, December 27, 2025, accessed https://tinyurl.com/2ep9hhj5, January 14, 2026.