Indian Council of World Affairs

Abstract: Sanae Takaichi officially becomes the first elected woman Prime Minister of Japan after a landslide victory, winning over two-thirds supermajority in the Lower House elections. Amid geopolitical headwinds, she creates an opportunity to shift Japan toward a new direction. 

Introduction

The pre-election surveys had predicted that Sanae Takaichi was well-positioned to lead the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to secure a majority on its own.[1] The final results declared on 9 February confirmed these projections, as LDP achieved a decisive landslide victory, securing 316 of the 465 seats, earning a two-thirds supermajority by itself.[2]

In total, the ruling coalition of the LDP and the Nippon Ishin no Kai (Japan Innovation Party) holds 352 seats, giving the bloc unprecedented legislative power to push through its agenda without opposition roadblocks.[3] It now appears that, after the last three Prime Ministers since 2020, the LDP will finally be able to stabilise and perhaps begin its post-Abe era.[4] The last time the LDP won a majority on its own was in 2012, under Shinzo Abe's leadership, when it won 294 seats of the then 480-seat lower house.[5]

Significance of the Landslide Victory

The February 2026 snap general elections mark a watershed moment in Japan’s political history. Takaichi is the first woman to secure the Prime Minister’s post through a popular electoral mandate since Japanese women gained the right to vote and stand for public office in 1945.[6] Additionally, Takaichi takes office as the first elected woman Prime Minister of Japan, a position established in 1885 during the Meiji era with the appointment of Ito Hirobumi as Japan’s first Prime Minister.

There was a wave of “Sana-mania”[7], “Sana-katsu”[8] and “Takaichi oshi”[9] trends that had gripped Japan during the election campaign, which formed expectations that Takaichi would secure a leading mandate. Furthermore, her affinity for motorcycles, playing drums, ease of forming relationships with foreign leaders and strong work ethic presented a charismatic combination of a tough and playful image. This stood out as a break from the traditional uptight, workaholic label for Japanese politicians.[10]

Takaichi’s electoral success now raises expectations as to how the LDP, under her leadership, will pursue reforms to rejuvenate the country.

Domestic Changes

One of the foremost areas of change is expected to be in the domestic arena, with the public facing a sluggish economy, low wages, rising prices and high consumption taxes. Takaichi, after her victory, announced plans to form a “cross-party national council to pursue a proposed two-year suspension of the consumption tax on food items”.[11]

Earlier, with a minority government, key posts in the Diet were held by the opposition, and the LDP was restricted in moving its policies forward. With a mandate that gives the ruling bloc majority control of the lawmaking process in the Lower House, it will be a surprise if Takaichi still does not take steps to deliver on promises of prosperity, security, and reform.

The only roadblock that faces the ruling coalition of the LDP and the Nippon Ishin is the Upper House, where they still do not have a majority and the elections for the Upper House are expected in 2028. However, even without a majority in the Upper House, any legislation voted down there will eventually return to the Lower House, where the LDP coalition can pass it.[12]

Nonetheless, since the LDP coalition does not have a controlling stake in the Upper House, it poses an obstacle for passing constitutional amendments. Article 96 of the Japanese Constitution[13] requires the support of two-thirds of both houses to enact changes, including amendments to Article 9, which is rooted in Japan’s pacifist principles.

Thereafter, amendments must be “submitted to the people for ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote of a majority of all votes cast thereon, at a special referendum or at such election as the Diet shall specify”.[14] Takaichi expressed her readiness to work towards amending the pacifist Constitution, and the ruling LDP coalition “aims to introduce an emergency clause into the constitution that would give the government greater powers in the event of a major disaster or armed attack”.[15]

Attempts to revise the constitution, especially during Shinzo Abe's tenure, even with majorities in both houses, encountered strong public backlash.[16] The outcome was the reinterpretation of Article 9,[17] where the Abe government issued a cabinet decision that Article 9 permitted limited rights of collective self-defence and allowed their Self-Defence Forces (SDF) to engage in overseas combat or military action under certain conditions.[18]

Given the legacy of problems within the Diet and from the public regarding any move to revise the pacifist Constitution, it may not be an easy path forward for the Takaichi government either. Any negative feedback from the public may also result in difficulty winning a two-thirds majority in the Upper House elections to be held in 2028. Nevertheless, the two-thirds majority in the Lower House still allows a proposal on constitutional reforms, which the LDP has long campaigned for.[19]

Immigration and Foreign Labour

Amid a hardening public reaction to foreigners and immigrants due to migration and an excessive tourist influx, the LDP coalition government under Takaichi introduced a comprehensive policy package in January that made it tougher for foreign nationals to receive public assistance.[20] According to the new policy, the Takaichi Cabinet has focused more on maintaining order over foreign nationals rather than accepting them as members of the community.

There is also the Sanseito party, which is achieving success by riding the anti-immigration wave. The Sanseito party, known for advocating stricter controls on foreign residents under its “Japanese First” agenda, increased its seats from 2 to 13, signalling that its ideals are gaining public acceptance.[21] Perhaps not wanting to miss out on the growing anti-immigrant sentiment, the LDP began passing regulations for tougher screening of visa applications and renewals, as well as increased visa fees, effective April 2026.[22]

However, Japan’s declining and ageing population creates a paradox: as the country tightens immigration rules, it will be difficult to offset labour shortages in agriculture, healthcare, elder care facilities, blue-collar sectors, and other business services.[23]

Neighbours China and South Korea

In its immediate neighbourhood, Japan’s relations with China have soured in recent months due to Takaichi’s comments made in November 2025, suggesting military intervention in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.[24] Her stance, which signalled a hawkish approach towards China, prompted Beijing to dispatch coast guard vessels to the disputed Senkaku island under a “rights enforcement patrol”.[25] China also advised its citizens against travelling to Japan, targeting the Japanese tourism industry, and announced a halt to seafood imports from Japan.[26]

Takaichi’s overwhelming victory in the recent elections could enable her to pursue an even more hawkish stance with China. Her position on revising the pacifist Constitution in line with her vision for strengthening Japan’s national security will likely prompt a stronger response from China. Beijing is likely to continue applying economic pressure on Tokyo, along with a diplomatic freeze, to test Sanae Takaichi’s threshold.[27]

With Japan-China relations currently strained, Takaichi has seemingly moved closer to South Korea. The state visit of South Korean President Lee Jae-myung to Nara, Japan, for a Summit meeting with Takaichi on 13 January 2026, signalled a recalibration of ties between the two countries. Like China, South Korea too has historical disputes with Japan, and relations between Tokyo and Seoul have fluctuated. However, the Nara Summit in January 2026 demonstrated a chemistry between Japan and South Korea’s leaders that highlighted a genuine effort to cement strong personal and bilateral ties.[28]

Apart from the historical differences, Japan and South Korea have valid areas of security concern converging over the North Korean nuclear proliferation and ballistic missile threat. Tokyo and Seoul, having refrained from adopting nuclear weapons, are at the forefront of any misadventures by Pyongyang. Conventionally, both have been vocal about the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.

In fact, Japan and South Korea have been at the forefront of diplomacy and multilateral talks, such as the Six-Party Talks, which included Russia, China and the US, to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear programme. Since the last round of talks in 2008, Russia and China’s approach to North Korea has changed significantly. Russia is now a signatory to a mutual defence treaty with North Korea,[29] whereas China has shifted its stance from denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.[30]

In such a precarious situation, Japan is perhaps relying on South Korea, the only democracy and a like-minded country in its immediate neighbourhood, to cooperate on maintaining peace and security in the region. This will entail Japan, under Takaichi, making every effort to build trust with South Korea, and if possible, propose to even create a flexible quasi-alliance framework with Seoul. In April 2025, Takaichi, then a senior Diet member, proposed a framework at a Taipei seminar that linked Japan, Europe, Australia and India.[31]

The Japan-US Alliance

This brings us to one of the most important factors in Japan's security outlook: its alliance with the US. With Donald Trump’s second term in office, the expense of maintaining alliances, partnerships and cooperation has significantly increased due to transactional costs. The Japan-US tariff deal was reduced from a 25 per cent tariff to a 15 per cent tariff in September 2025, with the condition that Japan committed to invest USD 550 billion in US strategic sectors.[32]

In addition, Takaichi’s visit to the US is pending for 19 March 2026.[33] To avoid retrospective tariff hikes, the Takaichi administration will need to develop an alternative, instalment-based investment approach to keep the Trump administration momentarily satisfied. The Takaichi government may also invest heavily in the defence sector with the US, aligning with her vision for a more proactive national security agenda.

It was indicated by the Japanese trade minister, Ryosei Akazawa, that the finances for investments will largely be made up of bonds and loans from the Japan Bank for International Cooperation and credits guaranteed by the Japanese state.[34]

The agreement, which was finalised at the end of Shigeru Ishiba’s term before he stepped down, is likely to be a challenge awaiting Takaichi in managing the alliance. Prior to the Lower House elections in Japan, the Trump administration expressed its dissatisfaction with Tokyo’s delay in investing the USD 550 billion pledge.[35]

There is a visible concern that the US transactional approach in maintaining partnerships could compel its allies to consider alternatives independent of Washington’s influence. One must pay heed to how US actions can lead to an alliance fatigue in a fragmented geopolitical environment.

Japan-India Special Strategic and Global Partnership

Takaichi’s earlier close association with the late Shinzo Abe, whom she considers her mentor,[36] creates expectations in Indian policy circles given Abe's legacy. Shinzo Abe was the forebearer of the Indo-Pacific concept since his early days of Prime Ministership in 2006–2007, and his speech at the Indian Parliament titled “Confluence of the Two Seas” is all part of the rich history between India and Japan.[37] Shinzo Abe also revived the idea of the Quad in 2012, through the “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond”, while recognising and acknowledging India’s significant role in the Indo–Pacific oceans.[38]

India, which has been observing the many changes in the domestic polity of Japan, is expected to approach the new administration under Takaichi with renewed vigour, to perhaps even elevate the Special Strategic and Global Partnership to greater heights. In November 2025, during the G20 Summit in Johannesburg, the leaders of India and Japan held a bilateral meeting at the sidelines of the Summit, where they “discussed ways to add momentum to bilateral cooperation in sectors like innovation, defence, and talent mobility”.[39]

One of the core agendas between India and Japan will likely be the earlier commitment made by the Shigeru Ishiba government in August 2025 under the “Action Plan for India-Japan Human Resource Exchange and Cooperation”, where Japan announced a target of facilitating a two-way movement of more than 500,000 personnel in the coming five years.[40]

Of the overall target, 50,000 skilled personnel and potential talent from India are expected to work in Japan, addressing manpower shortages in IT and other sectors. Whereas India will be aiming to boost skill development and strengthen its manufacturing sector.[41] Takaichi’s domestic agenda of industrial policy, technology investment and defence production, if aligned with this Action Plan for India–Japan, will create a natural convergence with India’s priorities.

On the security front, India will require a proactive Japan as a strong partner in the Quad and in the supply chain and technology agenda to reduce dependency on adversarial countries. With the majority secured by Takaichi’s ruling coalition of the LDP and Nippon Ishin, India will look forward to stability in long-term projects, whether in maritime connectivity and cooperation or in technology frameworks within the Quad.

Conclusion

Japan’s first female Prime Minister, Sanae Takaichi, has earned a historical chance to transform her country. This comes long after the revolving doors of Prime Ministers in Japan, especially after the Shinzo Abe era. She has a supermajority mandate in the Lower House and a high public approval rating, which creates strong expectations that she will address the key challenges facing Japan.

Given her conservative nature, it is likely that many historical issues with Japan’s neighbours may re-emerge, and these will need to be managed without confrontation. Also, the public in Japan is awaiting governmental measures to reduce their burdens while keeping the sluggish economy afloat. Consequently, Takaichi has to manage Japan’s traditional ally in Washington amidst the global tariff turmoil and ensure that Japan does not incur losses as part of the trade deal.[42]

The stage is set for Sanae Takaichi, and she needs to dive straight in at the deep end. As long as there are no further corruption allegations or actions deemed negative by the public, Takaichi can hope to hold onto her seat at least longer than any of her previous three predecessors (Yoshihide Suga 2020–21, Fumio Kishida 2021–24 and Shigeru Ishiba 2024–25).

Takaichi has proven her detractors wrong by achieving this historical milestone victory in the Lower House. With the glass ceiling broken, she projects the capability to remain steadfast in the current geopolitical upheaval, to step forward and bring Japan back to a period of political stability and re-emerge as a proactive contributor to global security.

***** 

*Dr Tunchinmang Langel, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA)
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

[1] The Asahi Shimbun (2026), “Survey: LDP may ride Takaichi’s popularity to big Lower House win”, February 2, 2026, https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/16325557 (Accessed February 9, 2026).

[2] Kanako Takahara, Francis Tang and Gabriele Ninivaggi (2026), “LDP secures two-thirds supermajority in Lower House election victory”, The Japan Times, February 9, 2026, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2026/02/09/japan/politics/japan-2026-lower-house-election/ (Accessed February 9, 2026).

[3] Nippon.com (2026), “A Landslide for Takaichi’s LDP: House of Representatives Election Results”, February 9, 2026, https://www.nippon.com/en/japan-data/h02703/ (Accessed February 9, 2026).

[4] Tunchinmang Langel (2024), “Japan’s Transformative Prime Ministerial Election: Ishiba Formally Re-elected, Forms a Minority Government”, Indian Council of World Affairs, November 18, 2024, /show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=12018&lid=7317 (Accessed February 9, 2026).

[5] Sandro D'ANGELO and Yan LUO (2012), “After a landslide victory, Japan's LDP returns to power”, European Parliament, December 18, 2012, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/briefing_note/join/2012/491467/EXPO-AFET_SP(2012)491467_EN.pdf (Accessed February 9, 2026).

[6] Dixie Dean Dickinson (2023), “Japanese Constitution Grants New Rights to Women”, EBSCO, https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/history/japanese-constitution-grants-new-rights-women (Accessed February 9, 2026).

[7] Justin McCurry (2026), “‘Sana-mania’ grips Japan as ultra-conservative Takaichi expected to secure election landslide”, The Guardian, February 6, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/feb/06/sana-mania-grips-japan-as-ultra-conservative-takaichi-expected-to-secure-election-landslide (Accessed February 9, 2026).

[8] Sandeep Goyal (2026), “Politics goes Pop as Japanese PM ignites Sana-Katsu”, ET Brand Equity, February 7, 2026, https://brandequity.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/the-people-report/politics-goes-pop-as-japanese-pm-ignites-sana-katsu/128019401 (Accessed February 9, 2026).

[9] The Asahi Shimbun (2026), “‘Takaichi oshi’: How fan fervor brought voters back to the LDP”, February 9, 2026, https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/16342551 (Accessed February 9, 2026).

[10] The Associated Press (2026), “A charismatic straight talker, Japan’s Takaichi is poised to expand her power in Sunday’s vote”, The Asahi Shimbun, February 7, 2026, https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/16339137 (Accessed February 9, 2026).

[11] Riyo Kiyomiya (2026), “Takaichi expects interim report on 2-year tax repeal before summer”, February 10, 2026, https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/16343960 (Accessed February 10, 2026).

[12] The Asahi Shimbun (2026), “Takaichi should not push policy that could split nation in two”, February 9, 2026, https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/16341795 (Accessed February 10, 2026).

[13] Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet (n.d.), “The Constitution of Japan”, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html (Accessed February 10, 2026).

[14] National diet Library (n.d.), “The Constitution of Japan”, https://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html (Accessed February 10, 2026).

[15] The Mainichi (2026), “Ruling party's election victory gives mandate for policy shifts: Japan PM”, February 10, 2026), https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20260209/p2g/00m/0na/047000c (Accessed February 10, 2026).

[16] Linda Sieg (2015), “Japan protesters rally as contentious security bills near passage”, Reuters, September 16, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/japan-protesters-rally-as-contentious-security-bills-near-passage-idUSKCN0RG0DZ/ (Accessed February 10, 2026).

[17] Rupakjyoti Borah (2015), “Japan’s Controversial Security Bills Pass in the Upper House. Now What?”, The Diplomat, September 19, 2025, https://thediplomat.com/2015/09/japans-controversial-security-bills-pass-in-the-upper-house-now-what/ (Accessed February 10, 2026).

[18] Katsuyuki Yakushiji (2015), “Abe’s Hollow Victory? Public Uproar over Collective Self-Defense”, The Tokyo Foundation, October 8, 2015, https://www.tokyofoundation.org/research/detail.php?id=486 (Accessed February 10, 2026).

[19] Rin Ushiyama (2026), “Japan’s ruling party secures historic election victory – but challenges lie ahead”, The Conversation, February 9, 2026, https://theconversation.com/japans-ruling-party-secures-historic-election-victory-but-challenges-lie-ahead-275279 (Accessed February 10, 2026).

[20] The Asahi Shimbun (2026), “Government shifting away from inclusion of foreigners”, January 24, 2026, https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/16306997 (Accessed February 10, 2026).

[21] The Mainichi (2026), “Japan's populist Sanseito set to more than double lower house seats”, February 9, 2026, https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20260209/p2g/00m/0na/002000c (Accessed February 17, 2026)

[22] Himari Semans (206), “Government unveils tighter policies on immigration and foreign residents”, The Japan Times, January 23, 2026, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2026/01/23/japan/foreign-nationals-policies/ (Accessed February 11, 2026).

[23] Peter Chai and Willy Jou (2026), “The Paradox of Japan’s Anti-Immigrant Sentiments and Demand for Foreign Labor”, The Diplomat, January 10, 2026, https://thediplomat.com/2026/01/the-paradox-of-japans-anti-immigrant-sentiments-and-demand-for-foreign-labor/ (Accessed February 11, 2026).

[24] Justin McCurry and Helen Davidson (2025), “China and Japan are in a war of words over Taiwan – what happens next?”, The Guardian, November 17, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/nov/17/china-and-japan-are-in-a-war-of-words-over-taiwan-what-happens-next (Accessed February 11, 2026).

[25] Helen Davidson and Justin McCurry (2025), “China sends coast guard to Senkaku islands amid row with Japan”, The Guardian, November 16, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/nov/16/china-sends-coast-guard-to-senkaku-islands-amid-row-with-japan (Accessed February 11, 2026).

[26] Harold Thibault (2025), “China ramps up retaliatory measures against Japan, suspending travel and seafood purchases”, Le Monde, November 21, 2025, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/11/21/china-ramps-up-retaliatory-measures-against-japan-suspending-travel-and-seafood-purchases_6747692_4.html (Accessed February 11, 2026).

[27] The Times of India (2026), “Takaichi’s new mandate upends Asia’s power math: What it means for China, India and US”, February 9, 2026, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/rest-of-world/japans-prime-minister-sanae-takaichi-iron-lady-takaichi-liberal-democratic-party-japan-china-india-us-quad-donald-trump/articleshow/128117261.cms (Accessed February 11, 2026).

[28] Tunchinmang Langel (2026), “ South Korea’s Diplomatic Balancing Act between China and Japan”, Indian Council of World Affairs, January 22, 2026, /show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=14146&lid=8583 (Accessed February 11, 2026).

[29] Al Jazeera (2024), “North Korea ratifies landmark mutual defence treaty with Russia”, November 12, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/11/12/north-korea-ratifies-landmark-mutual-defence-treaty-with-russia (Accessed February 11, 2026).

[30] Kim Ji-won (2025), “China Drops 'Korean Peninsula Denuclearization' From Arms Control White Paper”, The Chosun Daily, December 6, 2025, https://www.chosun.com/english/world-en/2025/12/06/YKAKAG46GVBQDOMKM3X4C3LBZU/ (Accessed February 11. 2026).

[31] Focus Taiwan (2025), “Trump effect: Ex-Japan minister calls for regional security alliance”, April 28, 2025, https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202504280023 (Accessed February 12, 2026).

[32] USA Congress (2026), “U.S. Tariffs and the 2025 U.S.-Japan Framework Agreement”, January 30, 2026, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IN12608 (Accessed February 12, 2026).

[33] Mari Yamaguchi (2026), “Takaichi’s election victory sets the stage for a rightward shift in Japan’s security policies”, AP News, February 10, 2026, https://apnews.com/article/japan-takaichi-security-economy-immigration-0d87101569c8ae10bca5435a731ae3bf (Accessed February 12, 2026).

[34] Agence France-Presse (2026), “Is Japan’s US$550-billion promise to Trump just a ‘signing bonus’ with strings attached?”, South China Morning Post, February 12, 2026, https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/3343314/japans-us550-billion-promise-trump-just-signing-bonus-strings-attached (Accessed February 12, 2026).

[35] Takeshi Kawanami (2026), “Trump's support for Japan's Takaichi masks fury over investment delays”, Nikkei Asia, February 10, 2026, https://asia.nikkei.com/politics/international-relations/trump-s-support-for-japan-s-takaichi-masks-fury-over-investment-delays (Accessed February 13, 2026).

[36] Mari Yamaguchi (2026), “A charismatic straight talker, Japan’s Takaichi expands her power after huge election win”, AP News, February 9, 2026, https://apnews.com/article/japan-election-takaichi-1df9580c5a018b28965cbed99565b4b7 (Accessed February 13, 2026).

[37] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2007), “Confluence of the Two Seas”, August 22, 2027, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html (Accessed February 13, 2026).

[38] Abe Shinzo (2012), “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond”, Project Syndicate, December 27, 2012, https://www.project-syndicate.org/magazine/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-india-by-shinzo-abe (Accessed February 13, 2026).

[39] DD News (2026), “Japan’s Takaichi thanks PM Modi, says looking forward to strengthen strategic ties with India”, February 9, 2026, https://ddnews.gov.in/en/japans-takaichi-thanks-pm-modi-says-looking-forward-to-strengthen-strategic-ties-with-india/ (Accessed February 13, 2026).

[40] DD News (2025), “India, Japan set target of 5 lakh personnel exchange in five years”, August 29, 2025, https://ddnews.gov.in/en/india-japan-set-target-of-5-lakh-personnel-exchange-in-five-years/ (Accessed February 13, 2026).

[41] PIB (2025), “Action Plan for India - Japan Human Resource Exchange and Cooperation”, August 29, 2025 https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2161975®=3&lang=2 (Accessed February 13, 2026).

[42] Ken Moriyasu (2026), “Japan says companies shouldn't take losses to join Trump trade deal”, Nikkei Asia, February 13, 2026, https://asia.nikkei.com/economy/trade-war/trump-tariffs/japan-says-companies-shouldn-t-take-losses-to-join-trump-trade-deal (Accessed February 13, 2026).