Indian Council of World Affairs

Abstract: The February 2026 general elections in Bangladesh marked a decisive political transition, with the BNP securing a two-thirds majority amid the exclusion of the Awami League and the approval of wide-ranging constitutional reforms under the July Charter. Emerging from the upheaval of the 2024 “Monsoon Revolution,” the polls signalled both democratic renewal and a structural transformation of the country’s long-standing political order. The article analyses the domestic implications of the BNP’s return, the rise of Jamaat-e-Islami as the principal opposition, and the broader regional ramifications, underscoring the opportunities and tests facing Bangladesh’s democratic consolidation. 

In a landmark development that signals a new chapter in Bangladesh's political landscape, the thirteenth general elections held on February 12, 2026, resulted in a decisive victory for the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), led by Tarique Rahman. The BNP secured approximately 212 out of 300 parliamentary seats, achieving a two-thirds majority that empowers it to form the government independently.[i] This outcome marks the party's return to power after nearly two decades, following its last tenure from 2001 to 2006. Notably, these polls were the first in three decades to be conducted without the participation of the Awami League and the two principal political matriarchs - former Prime Ministers Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia of the BNP - who had dominated Bangladesh’s political landscape since 1996. While Sheikh Hasina continues to reside in India following her departure from office, Khaleda Zia passed away on 30 December 2025, shortly after the return of her son and Acting BNP Chairman, Tarique Rahman. Within this transformed political landscape, strengthened by public sympathy and a wider aspiration for the BNP’s revival, the election ultimately crystallised into a direct contest between Tarique Rahman and Shafiqur Rahman, the chief of Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI).

Simultaneously, a national referendum on the proposed July Charter, a package of constitutional reforms designed to strengthen democratic governance; secured overwhelming approval, with more than 70 per cent of voters endorsing measures such as the establishment of a bicameral legislature, enhanced representation for women, greater judicial independence, and the introduction of a two-term limit for the prime minister, all aimed at improving the quality of governance.[ii] It remains to be seen, however, whether the new government, despite commanding a two-thirds majority, will move decisively to implement the provisions of the referendum. On 17^th February, while Tarique Rahman and his cabinet ministers took the oath of office; the BNP (unlike Jamaat) declined to take a second oath as members of the “Constitution Reform Commission” to endorse the “July Charter” referendum staged along with the general election, with the party saying, "No provision of the council is yet to be incorporated in the Constitution."[iii]

Voter turnout surpassed 60 per cent[iv], a notable rise from the 42 per cent recorded in the controversial 2024 polls, indicating a measure of renewed public engagement despite criticisms regarding the election’s inclusivity in the absence of the Awami League (AL). However, critics argue that without the participation of the AL, the contest could not be considered fully inclusive; by that logic, the last genuinely competitive and inclusive election was arguably in 2008, when Sheikh Hasina returned to power with a voter turnout of nearly 80 per cent[v] - approximately 20 percentage points higher than the most recent polls. The current decline may, in part, reflect abstention by segments of the AL’s support base. National aggregates also concealed pronounced regional disparities: in Gopalganj, Hasina’s former constituency and a longstanding AL stronghold, a significant proportion of voters reportedly refrained from casting ballots, with the proscribed party subsequently thanking citizens on X for rejecting what it described as a “voter-less” election.[vi]

JeI-led 11-party alliance emerged as the principal opposition, winning around 77 seats, a significant gain from its historical highs and indicative of its appeal among younger voters and those disillusioned with traditional politics.[vii] Although pre-election opinion polls appeared to favour the BNP, given its status as the more conventional governing alternative with prior administrative experience, the JeI remained a formidable contender.[viii] Since the lifting of the ban on the party prior to the January 2024 elections, the JeI has actively participated in anti-government mobilisations, capitalising on the growing traction of anti–Awami League narratives. It subsequently secured victories in student union elections at major public universities, including Dhaka University and Chattogram University, consolidating its influence among youth constituencies.[ix] Its tactical understanding with the National Citizens Party (NCP), formed by leaders of the July 2024 uprising, was widely expected to enhance its appeal among younger voters, who constitute nearly 44 per cent of the electorate. Over the past eighteen months, the party has also reportedly garnered external encouragement from several of Bangladesh’s key international partners.

Although the National Citizen Party’s (NCP) tally of six seats has been widely viewed as underwhelming, the result is notable for a party less than two years old. Significantly, BNP leader Tarique Rahman’s decision to meet both the Jamaat-e-Islami chief and NCP leader Nahid Islam at their respective residences following the polls[x] suggests that the BNP recognises the strategic relevance of emerging and allied political actors, and is keen to maintain channels of engagement.

The election, overseen by the interim government under Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus, was largely peaceful and deemed free and fair by international observers, though the exclusion of AL drew accusations of bias and incompleteness from critics.[xi] Reportedly, 394 international election observers and 197 foreign journalists had arrived in Bangladesh to monitor the election and referendum.[xii]

The following map provides a detailed constituency-wise visualization of the 2026 Bangladeshi General Election results, highlighting BNP's dominance in much of the country (predominantly blue), JeI's strong performance in select regions (green), and other scattered wins:

Map I : 2026 Bangladeshi General Election Result Map

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:2026_Bangladeshi_General_Election_Result_Map.svg

The Context: From Hasina's Ouster to Interim Governance

The 2026 elections cannot be meaningfully understood without revisiting the tumultuous events of July-August 2024, described in Bangladesh as the “Monsoon Revolution.” During that period, widespread student-led protests against job quotas and perceived government corruption escalated into a nationwide uprising, compelling Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to seek refuge in India after 15 years of uninterrupted rule. Hasina's administration, while credited with rapid economic growth and infrastructure development, faced mounting allegations of authoritarianism, electoral manipulation, and suppression of dissent. Her ouster marked the end of an era dominated by the AL, which had won successive elections amid boycotts and controversies.

In the aftermath, an interim government headed by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus was installed to restore order and prepare for credible polls. This period was characterized by efforts to depoliticize institutions, prosecute alleged perpetrators of the uprising's violence, including Hasina, who was sentenced in absentia to death by Bangladesh's International Crimes Tribunal in November 2025 and propose systemic reforms through the National Consensus Commission.[xiii] The July Charter, signed in October 2024 by over 20 parties (excluding the AL), emerged as a blueprint for these changes, emphasizing neutrality in electoral administration and curbs on executive overreach.[xiv]

However, the interim phase was marked by significant diplomatic and domestic strains. The eighteen months following Sheikh Hasina’s ouster witnessed considerable unrest and episodic violence across the country; what some observers described as a drift towards “mobocracy” underscored the fragility of institutional authority during this transition. The economic downturn during this period further compounded public anxiety, as inflationary pressures and uncertainty dampened investor confidence. Simultaneously, Jamaat-e-Islami recalibrated and expanded its organisational footprint, reportedly increasing its influence across segments of state and educational institutions. Attacks on religious minorities - particularly Hindus and members of the Ahmadiyya community - as well as on Awami League supporters, spiked intermittently, heightening concerns about law and order and social cohesion.

These developments carried diplomatic repercussions. Incidents of violence against minorities drew sharp reactions from India and injected fresh sensitivity into bilateral ties. Relations grew further tense over Sheikh Hasina’s continued stay in India and demands from sections within Bangladesh for her extradition under the India-Bangladesh Extradition Treaty.[xv] While New Delhi characterised her presence as a humanitarian matter, critics in Dhaka framed it as political sheltering. Combined with sharper media rhetoric and apprehensions in India regarding Bangladesh’s evolving political direction, these dynamics introduced a perceptible strain into what had otherwise been a closely coordinated partnership in recent years. As one analyst observed in a pre-election assessment, the polls constituted a “litmus test” for Bangladesh’s democratic resilience, reflecting broader shifts from linguistic nationalism towards strands of cultural nationalism shaped by regional and historical influences.[xvi] The elections thus represented a critical juncture, testing whether the post-uprising order could transition from protest-driven mobilisation to stable and institutionalised governance.

Key Takeaways: Opportunities, Challenges, and the China Angle

For India, the BNP’s electoral victory presents both an opportunity for recalibration and a reminder of enduring structural sensitivities in the bilateral relationship. Prime Minister Narendra Modi was among the first leaders to congratulate Tarique Rahman, signalling New Delhi’s readiness to engage a post-Awami League dispensation and to re-anchor ties around shared historical and cultural linkages.[xvii] Notably, moderate voices have thus far emerged from both the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami regarding relations with external partners. In his post-election press conference with international media, Rahman underscored that “the interests of Bangladesh and its people will determine our foreign policy,”[xviii] clarifying in response to a question on India that Dhaka would adhere to multilateralism rather than a country-centric alignment. His articulation of a “Bangladesh First” approach seeks to balance ties with neighbouring powers such as India, China and Pakistan, signalling strategic autonomy rather than overt realignment.[xix]

The BNP’s return offers scope to stabilise cooperation with India on border management, connectivity, trade, and pending water-sharing arrangements such as the Teesta issue, while reinforcing subregional initiatives under India’s Act East policy and the BIMSTEC framework. At the same time, New Delhi will closely monitor the expanded parliamentary presence of Jamaat-e-Islami, particularly its gains in constituencies bordering West Bengal and Assam (See the Map I), given India’s security sensitivities in the Northeast and concerns relating to radical networks and minority protection. The evolving political landscape underscores the importance for India of adopting a broad-based, institution-oriented approach that prioritises democratic processes, institutional resilience, and long-term stability in bilateral engagement.

Equally significant is the China dimension. As Bangladesh’s largest trading partner and a major infrastructure investor, including projects such as the Payra Port, China has maintained outreach across party lines, including to the BNP and Islamist formations. Beijing promptly welcomed the new government and expressed willingness to “scale up ties”.[xx] A BNP administration, however, is likely to pursue a calibrated balancing strategy amid intensifying Indo-Pacific contestations.

For India, this underscores the need for sustained economic engagement, development partnerships, and enhanced energy and connectivity cooperation to prevent strategic drift. At the same time, New Delhi would be well advised to avoid placing all its eggs in one basket by relying excessively on any single political formation; instead, cultivating broad-based linkages across the political spectrum, state institutions, and civil society will be critical to insulating bilateral ties from domestic political fluctuations. Managing the transition with diplomatic sensitivity, encouraging moderation within Dhaka’s coalition politics, and avoiding rhetoric that could fuel anti-India narratives will be essential to ensuring that bilateral ties remain resilient despite political change.

Conclusion

The 2026 general elections mark a new chapter in Dhaka’s political trajectory. Emerging from the turbulence following Sheikh Hasina’s ouster, the polls signified not just a transfer of power but a structural shift in Bangladesh’s political order. The BNP’s decisive mandate, Jamaat-e-Islami’s consolidation as the principal opposition, and the approval of constitutional reforms together reflect both democratic renewal and systemic transition, signalling a departure from nearly three decades of two-leader dominance. Yet the durability of this moment will depend on the government’s ability to translate electoral success into institutional consolidation, restoration of law and order and economic stabilization. The 2026 elections thus represent both an opportunity for recalibration and a critical test of Bangladesh’s democratic resilience.

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*Dr. Anwesha Ghosh, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal. 

Endnotes 

[i] “ত্রয়োদশ জাতীয় সংসদ নির্বাচন ২০২৬” [13th National Parliamentary Election 2026]. Prothom Alo, February 13, 2026. Available at: https://election.prothomalo.com/ (Accessed on 16.2.26) ;  “Bangladesh election results 2026: Who won, who lost, what’s next?” Al Jazeera, Feb 13, 2026. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/13/bangladesh-election-results-2026-who-won-who-lost-whats-next(Accessed on 16.2.26)

[ii] “70% Bangladeshis Voted 'Yes' To July Charter. What Does It Mean?”NDTV World, Feb 14, 2026. Available at: https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/70-bangladeshis-voted-yes-to-july-charter-what-does-it-mean-11001022(Accessed on 16.2.26)

[iii] “Tarique Rehman’s Oath Taking Ceremony Highlights”. NDTV, Feb 18, 2026. Available at: https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/bangladesh-pm-oath-taking-2026-live-updates-bangladesh-pm-tarique-rahman-bnp-government-swearing-in-dhaka-om-birla-11015273

[iv] “Bangladesh sees strong voter turnout, early counts show tight race between BNP and Jamaat”. The Telegraph Online, Feb 12, 2026. Available at: https://www.telegraphindia.com/world/bangladesh-sees-strong-voter-turnout-early-counts-show-tight-race-between-bnp-and-jamaat/cid/2147076#goog_rewarded

[v] “80% Turnout in Bangladesh Polls”. Times of India, Dec 29, 2008. Available at: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/south-asia/80-turnout-in-bangladesh-polls/articleshow/3910191.cms

[vi] In Hasina’s hometown in Bangladesh, voters face an unfamiliar ballot”. Reuters, Feb 6, 2026. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/hasinas-hometown-bangladesh-voters-face-an-unfamiliar-ballot-2026-02-06/(Accessed on 16.2.26)

[vii] “ত্রয়োদশ জাতীয় সংসদ নির্বাচন ২০২৬” Prothom Alo, February 13, 2026. Ibid.

[viii] “Who Is Gonna Win The Bangladesh Elections 2026? Surveys Predict Close BNP vs Jamaat Contest As Nation Prepares For Historic Vote.” The Sunday Guardian. Feb 11. 2026. Available at: https://sundayguardianlive.com/world/who-is-gonna-win-the-bangladesh-elections-2026-surveys-predict-close-bnp-vs-jamaat-contest-as-nation-prepares-for-historic-vote-169793/(Accessed on 16.2.26)

[ix] “Islamists Sweep Students’ Union Elections in Key Universities in Bangladesh. ”The Diplomat, Sep 27, 2025. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2025/09/islamists-sweep-students-union-elections-in-key-universities-in-bangladesh/(Accessed on 16.2.26)

[x] “BNP's Tarique Rahman Meets Jamaat's Chief Two Days Before Taking Oath As Bangladesh's PM” News 18, Feb 15, 2026. Available at: https://www.news18.com/world/bnps-tarique-rahman-meets-jamaats-chief-two-days-before-taking-oath-as-bangladeshs-pm-ws-l-9905629.html

[xi] “Foreign observers praise peaceful voting, strong turnout in Bangladesh polls.”Dhaka Tribune, Feb 13, 2026. Available at: https://www.dhakatribune.com/(Accessed on 17.2.26)

[xii] Ibid

[xiii] “Bangladesh's ousted leader Sheikh Hasina sentenced to death.” BBC, 17 Nov 2025. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cpwvg99e8vdo (Accessed on 17.2.26)

[xiv] “The July Charter: A New Beginning for Bangladesh’s Democratic Future.” The Diplomat, Oct 27, 2025. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2025/10/the-july-charter-a-new-beginning-for-bangladeshs-democratic-future/(Accessed on 17.2.26)

[xv] TREATY BETWEEN THE THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA AND PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH RELATING TO EXTRADITION, High Commission of India, Dhaka, January 28, 2013. Available at: https://hcidhaka.gov.in/press?id=eyJpdiI6ImwzN2MwUXZjd204Rmtielp0RHlHVXc9PSIsInZhbHVlIjoiYVNnWHJ1d0dJR2U5ZGNWTVpqWkc1dz09IiwibWFjIjoiZmFkY2UyZDliODQxOTk1MjBiMGU2MzViMWNiMDdhMjY5YjcxNWQ0OWY5MGJhNWQ0YTY2MzQ4YmZmYWFmZjU5ZCJ9(Accessed on 17.2.26)

[xvi] TCA Raghavan, ”A Litmus Test”. The Telegraph, 11 February 2026. Available at: https://www.telegraphindia.com/opinion/a-litmus-test-bangladesh-election-is-of-immense-significance-prnt/cid/2146819

[xvii] “PM congratulates Tarique Rahman on Bangladesh election victory; reaffirms India’s commitment to bilateral ties.” PMINDIA, Feb 13, 2026. Available at: https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/pm-congratulates-tarique-rahman-on-bangladesh-election-victory-reaffirms-indias-commitment-to-bilateral-ties/?comment=disable(Accessed on 18.2.26)

[xviii] “'Bangladesh First': Tarique Rahman's Reply To Query On Ties With India.” NDTV, Feb 15, 2026. Available at: https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/bangladesh-comes-first-bnp-chief-tarique-rahman-on-his-foreign-policy-11004456(Accessed on 18.2.26)

[xix] Ibid

[xx] “China says ready to work with new govt in Bangladesh to scale up ties.” Daily Excelsior, Feb 14, 2026. Available at: https://www.dailyexcelsior.com/china-says-ready-to-work-with-new-govt-in-bangladesh-to-scale-up-ties/(Accessed on 18.2.26)