Indian Council of World Affairs

ABSTRACT: As evidenced by the recent trends of truce agreements in intrastate conflicts, ceasefires are being used to manage conflict rather than resolve it. In contemporary times, they might reduce violence in the short term but frequently fail in producing lasting political outcomes. This failure is because they are negotiated and implemented in contexts where the authority is fragmented, with no central accountability and often backed by external patrons. This highlights that the effectiveness of a ceasefire depends on political will, credible enforcement and complementary political processes. In this context this special report analyses the shifting role of ceasefires from peacebuilding mechanisms to strategic tools for geopolitical leverage through looking at the intra-state conflicts in Yemen, Libya and Sudan. 

INTRODUCTION

Ceasefires have always occupied a central position in the architecture of war termination. They are an important feature in both international and intrastate peace processes. Ceasefires are traditionally conceived as temporary cessations of hostilities designed with the aim of creating space for negotiations, humanitarian access and breaking a political deal for resolution. So far, ceasefires have been treated as essential instruments of diplomacy. They are understood as transitional mechanisms and bridges between active warfare and political settlement in both international law and the practice of conflict mediation. Ceasefires play a crucial role in reducing violence and building confidence and trust among the conflicting parties.^[1] Usage of ceasefires in contemporary times also highlights their potential to address humanitarian needs and open political space.^[2]

However, it is important to note the drastic shift in the global landscape of armed conflict while analysing the role of ceasefires in modern peacebuilding. Intrastate conflicts now dominate the global landscape. Intrastate conflicts are basically the conflicts within states that commonly involve multiple armed groups, fragmented authority and a weak or contested sovereignty in a country. Under these circumstances, ceasefires are increasingly detached from straightforward processes of peacebuilding. Ceasefires often become technical pauses that regulate violence rather than serve as a bridge to a comprehensive settlement. This shift raises a crucial question: are ceasefires still reliable instruments of conflict resolution in intrastate wars, or has their role shifted to political and strategic tools for conflict management and strategic recalibration? ^[3]

This paper examines emerging shifts and the transformation of ceasefires in intrastate conflicts by examining the cases of Yemen, Libya, and Sudan. It also argues that in such situations, ceasefires function less as mechanisms for peacebuilding and more as geopolitical tools for the strategic gains of interested parties. Ceasefires give conflicting parties breathing space to restrategise, regroup, rearm, and recalibrate alliances while preserving the existing power balances. In this way, ceasefires serve as instruments for conflict management rather than conflict resolution. Furthermore, this paper challenges the reliability of ceasefires in resolving protracted conflicts, as in Libya, Yemen and Sudan.

From De-escalation to Deadlock: Yemen’s managed war

The civil war in Yemen presents one of the most multifaceted and protracted intra-state conflicts of the early 21st century. The conflict in Yemen largely began as an internal uprising but evolved into a tangled struggle strained by deep historical fault lines, major external interventions and a weak central authority. ^[4] This has created a situation in which ceasefire agreements have repeatedly been negotiated but failed to be translated into a political resolution. In this scenario, ceasefires have served contradictory functions by functioning less as instruments of peacebuilding and more as strategic pauses for giving breathing space to conflicting parties. ^[5] This creates room for internal and external actors involved in the conflict to regroup, recalibrate and preserve the status quo without addressing the political and social causes of the conflict.

The roots of the conflict in Yemen are an amalgamation of tribal, sectarian and state fragmentation. These complex dynamics long predate the current civil war in Yemen. The north of Yemen was historically dominated by the Zaydi Shia sect.^[6] Zaydism is followed by about 40 per cent of Yemen’s population, who are also known as Fivers. Zaydi represents one of the branches of Shia Islam, distinct from Twelver Shia Islam practised in Iran and elsewhere.^[7] The Zaydi imamate ended in Yemen with the 1962 revolution, followed by the marginalisation of northern areas of Yemen, mainly the Sa’ada governorate. This later gave rise to the Houthis, who largely identify with Zaydism and have been fighting the Sunni-majority government in Yemen for the last two decades. While the current civil war started in 2015, Ansar-Allah first launched its armed rebellion against the Yemeni government in the Saada governorate in 2004, led by Hussein al-Houthi.^[8] This historical layering of Houthi identity and political exclusion created fresh grounds for insurgencies and grievances in Yemen.^[9]

The Houthi movement, or Ansar Allah, translated as the ‘Party of God’, emerged in northern Yemen in the 1990s with grievances against political marginalisation and economic neglect but also as a reaction to the rising financial and religious influence of Saudi Arabia.^[10] During the 1980s and 1990s, Saudi Arabia heavily invested in tribal networks of Yemen by providing financial patronage to tribal leaders through its ‘Special Committee’ on Yemen.^[11] In 1994, during the secessionist conflict between the southern separatist movement and the republic’s government in the north, Riyadh supported the southern government with munitions during the war and increased aid in the north after hostilities ended. It also supported Salafi religious schools in traditionally Zaydi-majority areas of northern Yemen.^[12] The transformation of the Houthis from a local resistance movement into a fierce armed group was driven by a history of periodic confrontations with the internationally recognised government (IRG) of Yemen in the 2000s that escalated further after the 2011 Yemeni revolution, followed by the civil war in 2012. This further weakened the central authority, which makes any resolution to the conflict more complicated.

Source: Sana’a Centre for Strategic Studies

The political fragmentation in Yemen was consolidated by the inability of post-revolutionary governance structures to incorporate competing demands from tribal networks, southern separatist movements and other Islamist factions such as AQAP and ISIS.^[11] It is important to note that the tribal rivalries in Yemen are often overshadowed by the sectarian and external interference; however, tribalism has greatly fuelled the crisis in Yemen. The misaimed focus on the conflict being a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran hinders the study of the root causes of the conflict, ultimately stalling its resolution and prolonging the humanitarian crisis.^[12]

External Interference and Proxy Dynamics

While internal factions have made Yemen fragile, external interference has also intensified the already fragmented conflict after the Houthis seized the capital, Sanaa, in 2014. Soon after they took over, a Saudi-led coalition supported by the United Arab Emirates and other Western powers, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Canada, attempted to restore the internationally recognised government of Abd-Rabbuh Mansur Hadi.^[13] In March 2015, a Saudi-led coalition began airstrikes and imposed a naval blockade against Yemen while indiscriminately killing the civilian population. The Western powers were not directly involved in the initial 2015 military intervention, but they provided logistical, weapons and intelligence support to the Saudi-led coalition aiming to reinstate Hadi. This intervention framed the war as part of a broader Shia-Sunni geopolitical contest in which the Houthis allegedly received political backing and military support from Iran. On the other hand, the Saudi-led bloc sought to counter the potential Iranian influence on its southern flank.^[14]

As a result, there has been a proxy warfare setting in an already fragmented civil strife, which complicates both negotiations and ceasefire efforts. External actors have strategic motivations to sustain the pressure without resolving the conflict. The absence of a strong central authority increases the prominence of external interference.^[15] The Houthis maintain influence in Yemen and resist marginalisation by leveraging external support from Iran and its proxy Hezbollah.^[16] On the other hand, Saudi Arabia, along with its allies, the UAE, and other Western states, seeks to contain Iranian influence in Yemen.

Ceasefires and Peace Efforts

The persistence of ceasefire failures in Yemen has also failed to produce durable political outcomes. This is mainly due to the fragmented intra-state conflict structure of the country and the absence of a single sovereign authority competent enough to enforce agreements. Unlike inter-state conflicts, where ceasefires are often regulated through state institutions and clearly defined chains of command, internal ceasefires in Yemen operate in a context where authority is dispersed among multiple armed factions. These include the Houthis, the internationally recognised government, southern separatists, tribal militias and terror groups. This fragmentation has left ceasefires in Yemen episodic and unevenly implemented. This reflects that the transformative nature of the ceasefire has been politically instrumentalised.

The most frequent form of de-escalation in Yemen is comprised of humanitarian ceasefires. These subtle pauses in hostilities are often facilitated by the United Nations or international humanitarian organisations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Yemeni Red Crescent Society (YRCS). Humanitarian pauses were originally designed to allow the delivery of aid in dire humanitarian conditions. While such ceasefires delivered some success in enabling limited humanitarian access, they failed to transform the trajectory of the conflict and generate political incentives. Humanitarian ceasefires in Yemen have operated largely independently from political negotiations, which allows violence to resume once immediate humanitarian objectives are fulfilled.^[17] The isolation of humanitarian pauses from political resolutions highlights the structural loopholes of ceasefires that prioritise short-term relief without a broader de-escalation framework for peace.

These patterns are further illustrated by the chronological study of the crisis in Yemen. From early mediation efforts during the 1994 civil war to post-2015, peace initiatives mainly led by the UN have consistently failed to address underlying power struggles and governance drawbacks.^[18] The nationwide truce brokered by the UN in 2022 marked the most significant reduction in violence since the Saudi-led intervention in 2015 began. It eased fuel imports and reopened Sana’a airport. Yet the truce was not much help in yielding progress on core political issues such as power distribution, territorial governance, or state reconstruction.^[19] The continuation of war reflects the extent to which ceasefires have performed as strategic pauses rather than pathways to settlement.

Diplomacy has repeatedly failed in Yemen because ceasefire negotiations have substituted political dialogue between the conflicting parties. This has exacerbated the ongoing neglect of issues related to legitimacy, representation and sovereignty. ^[20] Also, instead of resolving the political contradictions between the competing authorities, external mediation efforts are also largely focused on managing the violence. Moreover, aid operations remain constrained by insecurity, restrictions on access and political interference. This has directly deepened the humanitarian crisis in Yemen as civilians are exposed to persistent displacement and deprivation.^[21]

Stabilising Fragmentation: Libya’s Frozen Political Order

The contemporary conflict in Libya is strained by sectarian division and the systematic dismantling of state institutions, driven by relentless competition among the elites to control and regulate the Libyan economy. Though short-lived, Italian colonisation in Libya relied on forced pacification and suppressing the resistance movements led by figures like Omar Al-Mukhtar, the Italian colonisation left behind a legacy of militarisation without state-building.^[22]  Libya was declared free in 1947 but became an independent state in 1951. However, independence did not resolve the fragility of state institutions; instead, Libya remained a highly rentier state with weak political participation and significant regional imbalance.

Since independence, Libya’s trajectory has been shaped by the absence of flexible political institutions and the persistence of the militarisation of identities. The governance system after independence fluctuated between monarchy and authoritarian rule. The four-decade rule of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime deliberately dismantled formal state institutions in favour of personalised networks, informal modes of control and revolutionary committees. This systematic erosion of institutional authority left Libya with politically marginalised regions and a lack of mechanisms for the peaceful negotiation of interests and identity.^[23]

Source: BBC

The mass uprisings of 2011 triggered the collapse of Gaddafi’s regime, but they did not result in a unified political transition. Instead, the absence of a regulated political process and the proliferation of armed groups resulted in the fall of Libya into civil conflict. The armed groups aligned themselves with local, regional and ideological identities. Moreover, by 2014, competing governments and military coalitions, each with their own militia proponents, started contesting for the control of Tripoli, Benghazi and other strategic territories such as Sirte.^[24] This created a highly fragmented political order in Libya. Libya is currently controlled by two rival governments and other militias operating in a few parts of the country. The northern part is controlled by Gen. Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA), while the southern part is, however, controlled by the UN-backed and internationally recognised Government of National Unity (GNU) based in Tripoli. A few parts in the south are under the control of militia groups.

The Ceasefire Logic in Libya   

In the intra-state conflicts, as in the context of Libya, where sovereignty remains diffused and institutional authority is constrained by contestations for control, ceasefires lose their credibility. For instance, in Libya, ceasefires have functioned less as tools for conflict resolution and more as instruments to formalise elite bargains for power and legitimacy. It has also contributed to halting shifts in the military balance between conflicting parties. One of the most noteworthy ceasefires, formalised in October 2020 under the auspices of the United Nations, temporarily reduced the intensity of urban combat between the two most prominent rival blocs, the UN-recognised GNU in Tripoli and the LNA aligned with Khalifa Haftar. However, the ceasefire failed to dismantle the underlying militia frameworks and unify Libya’s security apparatus.^[25]

The ceasefire, which should have resulted in demobilisation or integrated governance, instead froze territorial control lines and allowed armed actors to further entrench themselves as political stakeholders. Militia groups that operated as shifting alliances once found themselves embedded in local governance, security provision and revenue control. Thus, the ceasefire acted as a mechanism for the consolidation of political power and the preservation of the existing political landscape. It enabled the armed groups to negotiate influence without committing to institutional reforms or national reconciliation.^[26] Moreover, the absence of a unified chain of command within the competing factions has reinforced this dynamic. On one hand, the authority of GNU remains contingent on coalition support from various armed groups, while on the other hand, LNA maintains influence through its network of commanders and regional allies despite periodic power shifts. LNA is supported by the international actors who have indirectly stabilised rather than resolved the conflict by formalising ceasefires without addressing these distributional structures of power. 

The recent assassination of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, the son of Muammar Gaddafi, on 3 February 2026, reflects the intensity of political sensitisation in Libya even in contemporary times.^[27] The killing of Saif al-Islam marks the end of a political era, with consequences for both elite politics and the future of conflict management. It marks the end of an era in Libya where remnants of the Gaddafi regime’s networks could perfectly be mobilised to influence national politics.^[28] However, the death of Gaddafi’s son has made factional divergence more prominent rather than consolidating a new national consensus. Various armed commanders and regional actors are seeking to fill the symbolic and strategic vacuum.

The case of Libya demonstrates that in intra-state conflicts, characterised by the absence of a legitimate sovereign authority and fierce competition over governance claims, a ceasefire can become a tool for maintaining the status quo rather than conflict resolution. Moreover, the international actors have often prioritised stability over transformation by supporting the temporary arrangements for reducing rather than abstaining from initiatives that could challenge the entrenched power holders. This also reflects the nature of contemporary diplomatic engagement in intra-state conflicts, which frequently seeks calm rather than change. Libya’s experience complements the similar patterns of ceasefire failures as studied in the case of Yemen, which illustrates the need to rethink how ceasefires should be redesigned, implemented, and linked to political transformation.

Violence without End: Managing Civil War in Sudan

Source: Centre for Middle Eastern Studies

The contemporary conflict in Sudan is rooted in a deep history of militarised governance, marginalisation of peripheral groups and repeated failures to establish sturdy civilian authority. Sudan gained its independence in 1956. Since then, it has witnessed the oscillation of power between military regimes and fragile civilian governments. In Sudan, armed forces are not positioned as neutral state institutions but as political actors who cut deeply through economic and ideological networks. The continuous civil wars in the South, the war in Darfur in 2011, and the conflict over South Kordofan and the Blue Nile show a pattern in which violence has become a routine mechanism of governance. Since 2023, approximately 400,000 have been killed, 11 million displaced and 30 million require humanitarian assistance.^[29]

The overthrow of Omar al-Bashir in 2019 raised hopes for a democratic transition, but the transitional process led by a joint military-civilian partnership failed to dismantle the military’s dominance over the state. Instead, power got concentrated within the conflicting parties, notably the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The competition between SAF and RSF over resources, authority and legitimacy provided a justification for renewed conflict.^[30]  Moreover, the absence of a unified civilian centre of power meant that the transition remained vulnerable to military intervention from the outset. However, the roots of the conflict are much deeper, ingrained in ethnic fragmentation, tribal militarisation and decades of marginalisation of Southern Sudanese groups such as Dinka and Nuer communities.^[31]

The Nature of Ceasefire in Sudan

The nature of the ceasefire in Sudan has been performative, frequent and temporary. Ceasefires in Sudan primarily function as a diplomatic show of goodwill rather than as functional mechanisms to constrain violence. Though international and regional mediators repeatedly announce ceasefires, we rarely see them actually implemented on the ground. For instance, multiple ceasefires have been adopted since the outbreak of civil war between the SAF and RSF on 15 April 2023. Interestingly, none of these ceasefires lasted more than  a day. Immediate ceasefire violations have been recorded as both SAF and RSF continue air raids, artillery strikes, and ground offensives even during the ongoing negotiations.^[32] Most of these ceasefires were brokered by the United States, Saudi Arabia, the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development.^[33]

In Sudan, ceasefires serve as tools for claiming legitimacy and control, in which armed actors act as politically responsible while they remain engaged in military campaigns. Both the RSF and the SAF have exploited the ceasefire agreements to reposition their military forces, secure supply lines, and consolidate territorial control, particularly in Khartoum and Darfur. Both internal fragmentation and external interference have shaped the conflict in Sudan. Mediation efforts by external actors often prioritise access to dialogue and negotiations over accountability or the enforcement of agreements.^[34] The conflicting parties use the breathing space provided by the ceasefire agreements to restrategise and carry out their military operations against each other. In this context, a ceasefire offers a mechanism for international actors to remain engaged in the resolution process without confronting the deeper fact that neither RSF nor SAF is willing to cede coercive power.

Furthermore, the marginalisation of civilian actors has also compounded the persistent failure of mediation efforts. Ceasefire proceedings in Sudan have largely excluded pro-democracy groups. Instead, it has reinforced a militarised negotiation framework that treats armed actors as the only legitimate stakeholders.^[35] Rather than challenging this, ceasefires are reproducing the very power structures that generated this conflict in the first place.

Humanitarian Pauses without Humanitarian Protection

Ceasefires are frequently justified on humanitarian grounds, but their impact on civilian protection in Sudan has been quite limited. The United Nations has repeatedly warned that ceasefire failures have intensified food insecurity, displacement and civilian casualties.^[36] Darfur particularly has been one of the most badly affected regions, as ethnic violence and mass atrocities have continued regardless of truces. Unlike Yemen, where ceasefires at least enable some humanitarian relief, Sudan rarely experiences even temporary humanitarian relief. This is because of the absence of enforcement mechanisms and deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure. Therefore, ceasefires operate more as rhetorical devices for spreading the peace narrative than as actual operational tools for peacebuilding.^[37]

Despite their continuous collapse, ceasefires in Sudan are persistent. This underscores the core argument of this paper: that ceasefire agreements continue to play a major role in conflict, not because they work but because they are politically useful. On one hand, they allow international actors to claim their involvement in the peace process, and on the other, regional powers hedge their interests through them. Most importantly, it provides an avenue for the domestic armed groups to negotiate from positions of force. In this case, ceasefires do not fail accidentally, but they fail structurally.^[38] This is due to the fact that they are never embedded within a credible political roadmap for peace. Also, the lack of enforcement by a single legitimate sovereign authority contributes to this crisis.

Sudan becomes a critical case for understanding the limits of ceasefire-centric conflict management in intra-state conflicts. The periodic announcements of ceasefires and their regular failure do not only reveal a lack of true diplomatic effort but also the absence of political will. The political urge to address the fundamental question of civilian authority and state sovereignty is missing. The case of Sudan illustrates that ceasefires in this setting function less as instruments of peace and more as an apparatus to defer accountability, normalise protracted instability and prolong militarisation.

Characteristics of Contemporary Ceasefires in Intra-state Conflicts

The application of ceasefires in the context of Yemen, Libya and Sudan demonstrates that ceasefires in contemporary intra-state conflicts no longer function as transitional mechanisms for peace. They are instead used as tools for tactical motives, political bargains, violence management, humanitarian access and international and regional mediation. The temporary reduction of hostilities without resolving core political disputes, ceasefires can consolidate territorial controls and allow parties to regroup militarily and politically. This, in turn, freezes the conflict and territorial control and prolongs the peace process. It also contributes to preserving the underlying power structures that generate these conflicts in the first place. This pattern reflects a broad shift in how ceasefires are practised. The recent scholarship identifies that ceasefires increasingly prioritise short-term cessation of hostilities, diplomatic signalling and coordination among external stakeholders over a transformative framework for political settlement and consolidation of sovereignty and related institutions.^[39]

Across Yemen, Libya and Sudan, the ceasefire did not fail primarily due to weak compliance by state and non-state actors but because they are embedded in a political framework that complements fragmentation, militarised authority and elite bargaining. As a result, the ceasefire becomes a constant process that sustains and reproduces instability rather than establishing peace through temporary political resolutions. The three cases demonstrate that ceasefires perform three overlapping functions. First, regulating the violence; second, consolidating and preserving the power in the hands of the elite and militias; and finally, fuelling the mistrust between the parties because of the spurious design of agreements. These functions align with the fact that ceasefires are often successful tactically but fail strategically in intra-state conflicts, especially with no single sovereign authority.^[40]

First, ceasefires modulate violence in intra-state conflicts rather than terminating it. They regulate the rhythm, geography and visibility of fighting without dismantling the military capacities of armed actors. Ceasefires are increasingly used as “pauses without peace” that help armed actors to regroup. However, it does signal a restraint in tensions with the international audience,^[41] thereby serving as a strategic tool for interested parties in the conflict. The humanitarian pauses in Yemen, territorial freezing in Libya, and repeated violations of truces in Sudan perfectly fit this logic of controlling instability for strategic gains.

Second, ceasefires facilitate power preservation, particularly in contexts where none of the sides or actors can claim absolute victory over the others. Ceasefires consolidate existing asymmetries by freezing the war rather than easing the way for compromise. It institutionalises parallel authorities and normalises militarised governance. This confirms that when ceasefires emerge from stalemates rather than mutual exhaustion, they are the most fragile and politically useful tools.^[42]

Moreover, according to experts, spurious ceasefire agreements in intra-state conflicts cause mistrust between the conflicting parties. Spurious agreements are mainly agreements where one or more of the parties agree due to international pressure but without any further intention of withholding the agreement. The durability of a ceasefire agreement largely depends on its ownership by the conflicting parties. It can lead to an illusory peace when it compels the parties involved in a civil war to sign peace agreements that they have no intention of honouring. This creates a lack of trust among the parties towards each other, which again results in the violation of ceasefires.^[43]

Source: Image created by the author using Napkin AI

While Yemen, Libya and Sudan have distinct historical and conflict trajectories, they converge around the shared structural logic of ceasefires. This convergence supports the argument that the failures of ceasefires should not only be treated as breakdowns of implementation but should also be understood as different manifestations of the same underlying ceasefire regime. The one orientated towards managing disorder rather than resolving it. However, ceasefires have also shown remarkable success in conflict-hit countries. For instance, the Dayton Agreement effectively ended the war between Serbia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in November 1995. Similarly, the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, signed between the British and Irish governments, including several Northern Ireland parties, is also a notable example under which power-sharing arrangements were established between unionists and nationalist parties.^[44] Regardless, it is important to note the reason behind the success of these agreements, as they defer difficult political questions, reduce external pressure and keep the channels for negotiations open without redistributing power.

CONCLUSION

Collectively, these three cases challenge the dominant assumption that ceasefires are neutral or inherently peace-promoting instruments. It reveals that ceasefires in the context of intra-state conflicts are politically manipulated instruments of governance that shape their trajectories. Ceasefires do not necessarily promote the war but unintentionally become mechanisms for prolonging it when they are deployed without political conditionality, enforcement, or a sincere commitment to resolution from the parties. Moreover, the absence of a central authority and the lack of a sovereign political structure are some of the main hurdles towards negotiating peace in states like Yemen, Libya and Sudan. In contemporary times, ceasefires do not fail primarily because they are poorly designed but also because they are strategically aligned with the interests of armed elites and external parties in favour of stabilising the war. The continuous use of ceasefires, despite the repeated violations, not only reflects their ineffectiveness but also their political utility in maintaining the status quo. Yemen, Libya and Sudan illustrate different trails through which this alignment operates, but they all lead to the same outcome: the normalisation of protracted conflict disguised under the language of peace. 

The failure of contemporary ceasefires is not because the mechanism of ‘ceasefire’ is intrinsically flawed, but it is rather a sign of the times that we are living in, where transactional approaches to diplomacy and quick-fix approaches to armed hostilities for instant political mileage rule the roost. So long as such a scenario, that is devoid of mutual trust, accommodation and cooperation, continues, the performance of ceasefires cannot be expected to be any better. A transformation in the global geo-political environment in favour of an architecture where rules are respected and followed, especially when it comes to armed hostilities and violence is necessary in this regard. In fact, ceasefires should they be effective can prove to be tools of such a transformation. It is also important to remember that ceasefires and lines of control are not an end in itself, comprehensive settlement, peace and stability, mutual trust, accommodation and understanding, cooperative relations, and enduring human security are the final objectives of a transitional measure like ceasefire necessitating approaches that look beyond political exigency and expediency.

*****

*Azra Shahab, Research Intern, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal. 

Endnotes 

1. Shane Smith. 2016. “Ceasefire.” Beyond Intractability. July 13, 2016. https://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/cease-fire.
2. “GUIDANCE on MEDIATION of CEASEFIRES.” 2022. United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/default/files/document/files/2022/11/ceasefire-guidance-2022-0.pdf.
3. Sticher, Valerie, and Siniša Vuković. 2021. “Bargaining in Intrastate Conflicts: The Shifting Role of Ceasefires.” Journal of Peace Research 58 (6): 002234332098265. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343320982658.
4. Helal, AbdulHakim. 2026. “The Yemeni Crisis: More Complexity and Many Repercussions.” Al Jazeera. January 5, 2026. https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/1/5/the-yemeni-crisis-more-complexity-and-many-repercussions.
5. “When Aid Succeeds Where Politics Fails: Humanitarian Ceasefires in the Yemen War – Yale Journal of Medicine and Law.” 2020. Yale.edu. 2020. https://campuspress.yale.edu/yjml/2026/01/30/when-aid-succeeds-where-politics-fails-humanitarian-ceasefires-in-the-yemen-war/.
6. Laurent Bonnefoy, and Cynthia Schoch. 2018. Yemen and the World: Beyond Insecurity. London: Hurst & Company.
7. “Zaydi Shi’a in Yemen.” 2025. Minorityrights.org. December 2025. https://minorityrights.org/communities/zaydi-shia/.
8. Laurent Bonnefoy, and Cynthia Schoch. 2018. Yemen and the World: Beyond Insecurity. London: Hurst & Company.
9. ibid
10. Glenn, Cameron, Garrett Nada, and Mattisan Rowan. 2022. “Who Are Yemen’s Houthis?” Wilson Center. July 7, 2022. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/who-are-yemens-houthis.
11. “Yemen’s Al-Qaeda: Expanding the Base | International Crisis Group.” 2017. Crisisgroup.org. February 2, 2017. https://www.crisisgroup.org/rpt/middle-east-north-africa/yemen/174-yemens-al-qaeda-expanding-base.
12. Albasoos, Hani, and Buthaina Al-Hinai. 2020. “Understanding the Root Causes of the Conflict in Yemen.” Bussecon Review of Social Sciences 2 (2).
13. Carl Waldmeier. 2023. “The Saudi-Led War in Yemen: Frequently Asked Questions.” Friends Committee on National Legislation. 2023. https://www.fcnl.org/issues/middle-east-iran/saudi-led-war-yemen-frequently-asked-questions.
14. Center for Preventive Action. 2025. “Conflict in Yemen and the Red Sea.” Global Conflict Tracker. Council on Foreign Relations. March 26, 2025. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen.
15. Gil, Grzegorz. 2026. “The Yemen Security Complex in the Middle East: Continuity and Change since 2004.” Stosunki Miedzynarodowe - International Relations, January.
16. Glenn, Cameron, Garrett Nada, and Mattisan Rowan. 2022. “Who Are Yemen’s Houthis?” Wilson Center. July 7, 2022. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/who-are-yemens-houthis.
17. “When Aid Succeeds Where Politics Fails: Humanitarian Ceasefires in the Yemen War – Yale Journal of Medicine and Law.” 2020. Yale.edu. 2020. https://campuspress.yale.edu/yjml/2026/01/30/when-aid-succeeds-where-politics-fails-humanitarian-ceasefires-in-the-yemen-war/.
18. Montgomery, Marcus. 2021. “A Timeline of the Yemen Crisis, from the 1990s to the Present.” Arab Center Washington DC. Arab Center Washington DC. February 19, 2021. https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/a-timeline-of-the-yemen-crisis-from-the-1990s-to-the-present/.
19. Loft, Philip. 2025. “Yemen in 2025: Changing Balance of Power in the South.” House of Commons Library. December 28, 2025. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10427/.
20. Young, Michael. 2022. “The Failure of Diplomacy in Yemen.” Carnegieendowment.org. October 17, 2022. https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/diwan/2022/10/the-failure-of-diplomacy-in-yemen?lang=en.
21. Mahecic, Andrej. 2009. “Yemen: Humanitarian Situation Dire as Ceasefire Fails | UNHCR India.” UNHCR India. September 22, 2009. https://www.unhcr.org/in/news/briefing-notes/yemen-humanitarian-situation-dire-ceasefire-fails.
22. Gulbargavi, Talha Hussain. 2022. “Remembering Omar Al-Mukhtar, the Lion of the Desert.” The Cognate. September 16, 2022. https://thecognate.com/remembering-omar-al-mukhtar-the-lion-of-the-desert/.
23. Lobban, Richard, and Christopher H. Dalton. 2014. Libya: History and Revolution. Praeger.
24. Center for Preventive Action. 2023. “Civil War in Libya.” Global Conflict Tracker. January 6, 2023. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-libya.
25. ibid
26. Mansour-Ille, Dina. 2024. “Libya’s Political Crisis: A Legacy of Failed Interventionism” Prismeinitiative.org. June 2024. https://prismeinitiative.org/publications/libyas-political-crisis-dina-mansour-ille/.
27. Al Awsat, Asharq. 2026. “Thousands Attend Burial of Seif Al-Islam Gaddafi.” Aawsat.com. February 6, 2026. https://english.aawsat.com/arab-world/5237797-thousands-attend-burial-seif-al-islam-gaddafi.
28. Tim Eaton. 2026. “The Killing of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi Is the End of a Political Era in Libya.” Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank. February 5, 2026. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/02/killing-saif-al-islam-gaddafi-end-political-era-libya.
29. Center for Preventive Action. 2025. “Civil War in Sudan.” Global Conflict Tracker. Council on Foreign Relations. April 15, 2025. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/power-struggle-sudan.
30. ibid
31. Shahab, Azra. 2026. “Can Sudan Be Saved? Internal Fault Lines, External Interference and the Future of a Fragmented State”. Indian Council of World Affairs. January 7, 2026. /show_content.php?lang=1&level=1&ls_id=14104&lid=8558.
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