Introduction
On January 13, the US and Armenia announced an implementation framework for the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a multimodal transport corridor intended to improve connectivity and trade in the South Caucasus. The project seems to link Central Asia and the Caspian region with Europe, while connecting Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan met in Washington to present the framework, which outlines a comprehensive strategy to implement TRIPP and establish efficient multimodal transit in Armenia, fostering lasting peace in the South Caucasus.
A 27-mile stretch of land running through southern Armenia is poised to reshape the geopolitics of the South Caucasus. TRIPP is part of a broader US strategy to develop alternative transit lines across Eurasia. Northern routes through Russia are less reliable due to sanctions and security concerns, while transit through Iran is increasingly uncertain. TRIPP seeks to transform the Central Asia-Caspian-South Caucasus-Europe axis into a functional, institutionally integrated corridor.
However, the initiative faces geopolitical challenges. Russia and Iran view TRIPP as a geoeconomic and strategic challenge to their spheres of influence in the region. Moscow’s traditional dominance over security and transit networks in the South Caucasus is declining. At the same time, Tehran closely monitors changes that affect transit balances between the north and south and the east and west. The US has increased its strategic engagement by mediating peace talks and initiating connectivity drives such as the TRIPP.
TRIPP is probably the most unambiguously positive foreign policy achievement of the second Trump administration, precisely because it squares competing imperatives: connecting Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan while explicitly safeguarding Armenian sovereignty, strengthening the Middle Corridor and giving US companies and the US government a financial stake in success. However, the successful implementation of TRIPP faces major geopolitical challenges, including the slow normalisation of Armenia-Turkey relations, delicate border security along the Iran-Armenia border, intense Azerbaijan-Iran rivalry, and competing regional infrastructure projects that hinder streamlined transit. In this context, this special report examines US strategic engagement in the South Caucasus through TRIPP and its regional geopolitical implications.
TRIPP Initiative: A Brief History
TRIPP is a reformulation of the “Zangezur Corridor” (see Map 1), an idea dating back to Soviet times, when a railway connected Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan via Armenia’s Syunik region. After Armenia and Azerbaijan gained independence in 1991, the Zangezur region became part of the Republic of Armenia, leaving the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic as the only territory separating mainland Azerbaijan from it. During the First Karabakh War (1992–1994), the railway line between them was dismantled and overland travel ceased. Since then, people can travel from Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan only by plane or through Iran.[i]
MAP 1: ZANGEZUR CORRIDOR
Source: https://www.caspianpolicy.org/research/category/on-the-prospects-of-the-zangezur-corridor-for-central-asia
After the Second Karabakh War in 2020, Azerbaijan renewed its push to open the Zangezur Corridor. It demanded that customs controls be abolished along this route, but Armenia resisted due to concerns about its sovereignty. In 2021, the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, said that Azerbaijan is committed to creating the Zangezur Corridor. He explained that this would go ahead with or without Armenia’s approval. If Armenia cooperated, the process would be easier, but if not, Azerbaijan would use force. Consequently, with the participation of various third parties, including the EU and Russia, several rounds of negotiations took place between Baku and Yerevan.
In 2023, Nikol Pashinyan described the term “Zangezur Corridor” as “a designation for asserting territorial claims against Armenia”. Yerevan says the route should remain under the jurisdiction of the countries it passes through.[ii] In October 2023, Pashinyan proposed the “Crossroads of Peace” (see MAP 2) initiative as an alternative. Pashinyan outlined four main principles for the “Crossroads of Peace”. First, all infrastructure operates “under the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the nations it traverses”. Second, each country applies its border and customs rules within its territory. Third, the infrastructure is open for international and domestic transit. Finally, countries use each other’s infrastructure equally and fairly, which can help simplify border and customs checks. This project aims to enhance regional connectivity beyond linking Azerbaijan and its Nakhchivan region. Its main objective is to improve connections among Azerbaijan, Armenia, Iran, and Turkey using roads, railways, pipelines, cables, and power lines.[iii]
MAP 2: CROSSROADS OF PEACE PLAN
Source: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/how-armenias-crossroads-for-peace-plan-could-transform-the-south-caucasus/
On 8 August 2025, at the initiative of US President Donald Trump, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan signed an agreement establishing peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan.[iv] This agreement marks a significant step toward ending the longstanding conflict between the two neighbouring South Caucasus states. The agreement addresses all aspects of bilateral relations, including mutual recognition of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Simultaneously, with the signing of the agreement, the leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan and the US released a seven-point trilateral declaration during the negotiations. One of the important points of this declaration is the unblocking of regional communications.
The documents signed in Washington change the status of the transit route, as mentioned in paragraph 3 of the trilateral declaration: the parties confirmed that transport links with the Azerbaijani exclave Nakhchivan must be opened and that this must be done “based on respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and jurisdiction” of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Subsequently, under paragraph 4, Yerevan commits to cooperating with Washington and third parties to establish the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) on Armenian territory.[v]
Trump stated that the key issue preventing the signing of a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan had been resolved. Through TRIPP, both nations intend to open a transit route connecting mainland Azerbaijan with its exclave of Nakhchivan, with the participation of an Armenian-American consortium.[vi] Along with the trilateral declaration, Armenia signed bilateral memoranda of understanding with the US, in which both parties agreed to jointly develop the “Crossroads of Peace” project — an Armenian initiative to unblock communications in the region.
The Armenian Prime Minister noted the US’s “active desire to invest in the Crossroads of Peace”. He further said the US was very active in the negotiations, with President Trump and his team involved, and the option that emerged is what Armenia proposed to Russia and other partners.
Trump stated that TRIPP will become “a special transit zone that will allow Azerbaijan full access to its territory in Nakhchivan while respecting Armenia’s sovereignty”. He further said that American companies, which “are very eager to enter these two countries” and “spend a lot of money, which will bring economic benefits to all three of our countries,” would undertake infrastructure development in the region.[vii] According to the Armenian Prime Minister, TRIPP “will open up strategic economic opportunities that will bring long-term benefits” and "promote infrastructure investment, improve regional connectivity and strengthen US leadership as a champion of conflict resolution.”[viii]
TRIPP connects mainland Azerbaijan with its exclave of Nakhchivan via southern Armenia (Syunik/Zangezur Province), then continues north (Azerbaijan, Georgia) and west (Turkey). The route will eventually be integrated with the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), which links China with Europe. The length of the Armenian section is estimated at 27 miles (or 42 km) (see Map 3).
MAP 3: TRIPP CORRIDOR
Source: https://infra.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/logistics/new-economic-corridor-the-tripp-and-its-role-in-global-deal-diplomacy/123710974
TRIPP Implementation Framework: Structure, Goals and Challenges
The US and Armenia jointly released the TRIPP Implementation Framework, a regional transit initiative focused on enhancing connectivity and trade in the South Caucasus, in Washington, where US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan unveiled a definitive strategy for TRIPP. The framework outlines the establishment of a seamless multimodal transit corridor through Armenia, aiming to connect mainland Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan and integrate Armenia into the broader Trans-Caspian Trade Route. The initiative emphasises the core principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and reciprocity, with Armenia retaining full control over jurisdiction, security, and customs within its territory. For the US, TRIPP offers opportunities to access new markets, raw materials and rare metals while expanding trade routes with Europe and Asia. The project is positioned as a strategic platform for regional integration and long-term partnership.
A joint Armenian-American company “TRIPP Development” will oversee the project. The US will initially hold a 74% stake in exchange for funding, while Armenia will hold 26%. The company will have exclusive rights to plan, design, build, operate, and maintain infrastructure (roads, rail, energy, and digital) for 49 years, with an option to extend for another 50 years. During the extension, Armenia’s stake is expected to rise to 49%. The Framework explicitly states that it creates no legal obligations or liabilities for either Armenia or the US.[ix]
The farmwork stipulates that the route will remain within Armenian territory and operates under Armenian law, managed by the American-led consortium with ‘no Azerbaijani involvement’ in the administration. Security measures for the route will be implemented jointly by Armenia and the US. Armenia retains the right to deploy security forces along the corridor, while the US serves as a guarantor by providing technical and advisory support without deploying a permanent military presence.
Financing for TRIPP will be sourced from private US investors, government infrastructure funds and international financial institutions such as the World Bank and EBRD. Construction is set to begin in spring 2026, with the route expected to launch in late 2028. The implementation will occur in phases, starting with transport infrastructure, followed by energy and digital components and integration into Eurasian logistics by 2030.
Yerevan will supervise the company’s operations, with structural changes requiring approval from both governments. The framework underscores the project’s aim to foster uninterrupted multimodal transit links in Armenia, promoting regional peace and stability while upholding state sovereignty, territorial integrity and jurisdiction aligned to its “Crossroads of Peace” project. The corridor is expected to deliver mutual benefits by improving international and domestic transport for Armenia and creating a vital connection in the Trans-Caspian trade network.
A key highlight of TRIPP is its projected economic impact: handling up to 2 million tonnes of freight annually, reducing transit times by 30 per cent, and cutting tariffs by 15 per cent, significantly boosting regional trade. TRIPP aims to strengthen security in Armenia and Azerbaijan, expand American trade and improve logistics along the route connecting Central Asia, the Caspian Sea and Europe.[x]
The US’ Strategic Engagement in the Region
The US is strengthening its influence in the South Caucasus, asserting its geopolitical control by playing a peacekeeping role. Most notably, the US has assumed the role of structural architect of the peace agenda rather than merely an external facilitator, and for Washington, TRIPP emerges as a multi-layered mechanism designed to anchor regional security architecture in geoeconomic connectivity. The TRIPP route, in which the US is assigned a decisive role, is the first infrastructure project in the post-Soviet space in which Washington is not simply a participant but an effective principal stakeholder.
By securing US interests and presence through the acquisition of 74% of the TRIPP development company, Trump can assure Americans that they are reaping the economic benefits of US diplomatic engagement in the South Caucasus and that new opportunities are opening for American companies.
Earlier, the US government supported the Middle Corridor—a multimodal trade route connecting Central Asia with Turkey and Europe via the Caspian Sea and infrastructure hubs in Azerbaijan and Georgia through its Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) programme.[xi] Washington sees the Middle Corridor as a way to bypass Russia in overland trade with Asia, including the potential export of key minerals and rare earth elements from Central Asia. Another important dimension is that the US is strengthening this axis, thereby weakening Iran’s alignment with Russia, Azerbaijan and Turkey. For Washington, TRIPP represents a strategic effort to redesign Eurasia’s connectivity architecture. In this context, TRIPP constitutes the South Caucasus segment of a broader US strategy to build alternative transit routes across Eurasia (see Map 4).
MAP 4: US STRATEGY TO BUILD ALTERNATIVE TRANSIT ROUTES ACROSS EURASIA
Source: https://www.caspianpolicy.org/research/middle-corridor/iran-azerbaijan-and-the-geopolitics-of-escalation-in-the-south-caucasus
Regional Geopolitical Implications
Armenia
The TRIPP agreement offers Armenia improved access to regional and international markets, greater trade volume, lower costs and a more efficient movement of people and goods. TRIPP promises balanced growth in border regions and will draw increased foreign investment, particularly in the south. Full reopening will restart the Kars-Gyumri railway (see Map 5) and cement ties with neighbours like Turkey and Azerbaijan, firmly positioning Armenia as a key transit hub on routes from Europe to Central Asia, bypassing Russia and Iran. Building on these opportunities, Armenia is now positioned to leverage additional regional transit options.
MAP 5: KARS–GYUMRI (GJUMRI)–TBILISI (TIFLIS) RAILWAY LINE (IN RED)
Source: https://www.railwaygazette.com/infrastructure/baku-tbilisi-kars-railway-corridor-inaugurated/45406.article
Following the "Crossroads of Peace" principles, the Trump Route is crucial for Armenia, as it enables the use of Turkish and Azerbaijani transit routes to reach Russia and other members of the Eurasian Economic Union, such as Kazakhstan, via the Caspian Sea. This access reduces Armenia's reliance on a single corridor. By joining TRIPP, Armenia shifts its foreign policy from security and conflict to regional cooperation and integration.
The TRIPP project anchors PM Pashinyan's "Real Armenia" campaign for the June 2026 parliamentary elections. Its aims are to boost the economy, ensure peace and diversify foreign policy. Notably, economic gains especially increased US involvement and better connectivity, could strengthen PM Pashinyan’s political standing, while TRIPP further positions Armenia as a regional transport hub. However, stakeholders raise direct concerns, arguing that the 99-year lease agreement and foreign management could undermine Armenia's authority over the project. Some experts fear that foreign control may expose Armenia to external political or economic pressures, posing security risks, while others cite the lack of clearly defined oversight, which could reduce local input and control. These risks make TRIPP a key target for nationalist and populist groups. Furthermore, Azerbaijan's labelling of the Trump Route as the “Zangezur Corridor” heightens fears about TRIPP’s impact on Armenia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.[xii]
Azerbaijan
The “Trump Route” gives Azerbaijan direct access to its Nakhchivan autonomous region and Turkey, shortens logistics routes to Western markets, and creates an important land link between East Asia and Europe. Baku has always seen reopening communications as key to lasting regional security. With US support, TRIPP now gives this vision international recognition, turning it from a regional plan into a multilateral strategic platform.
Azerbaijan focuses on keeping a clear connection between the mainland and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. This shows how TRIPP integrates Azerbaijan’s Zangezur corridor into a broader international framework. This partnership helps move Azerbaijan’s connectivity goals forward within a formal multilateral setting. Baku sees peace not as a fixed compromise but as the result of economic ties, connectivity, and shared benefits. Building transport routes and improving logistics are the basis of this idea. TRIPP provides this vision with international support, helping the region move from conflict to cooperation and strengthening Azerbaijan’s belief that lasting peace relies on regional economic cooperation.
President Ilham Aliyev said that after making peace with Armenia, Azerbaijan removed all transport restrictions. This allowed cargo from Kazakhstan and Russia to pass through Azerbaijan to Armenia and gave Armenia access to important oil products at lower prices. He also noted that these changes demonstrate how connectivity and shared economic interests support peace and stability in the region. In October 2025, Azerbaijan removed transit restrictions to Armenia, allowing record rail shipments from Kazakhstan to Armenia through Azerbaijan and Georgia since Kazakhstan's independence.
By improving connections across the Caspian basin to European and Mediterranean markets, Azerbaijan increases its role as a transit hub and its influence in regional economic affairs. Still, it is important for Azerbaijan that the project includes clear guarantees that Armenia will keep the connection between western Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan open without obstacles. However, it would also depend on Azerbaijan’s support for Armenia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Russia
An agreement excluding Russia would substantially weaken its regional position and signal its gradual exclusion from the South Caucasus. The TRIPP project diminishes Russia's influence in the region and challenges its transit routes and strategic assets. Moscow has consistently criticised the initiative. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova emphasised that the involvement of non-regional actors in South Caucasus affairs should primarily reflect the interests of regional countries and their neighbours. She further noted that Armenia remains part of the Eurasian Economic Union's single customs space, the South Caucasus Railway operates as a subsidiary of Russian Railways, and Russian border guards, under an international treaty, maintain border security along the area through which the proposed route is expected to pass. Implementing the initiative within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is challenging without Russia's involvement.[xiii]
In response, Sargis Khandanyan, head of the Armenian parliamentary commission, stated that the new railway segment within the TRIPP project will not be recorded on the balance sheet of South Caucasus Railways (SCR); specifically, 43 kilometres of the railway within the "Trump Route" will be owned by TRIPP.[xiv]
Further elaborating on the regional implications, Zakharova reiterated that the new route aligns more closely with the interests of Turkic countries, primarily Azerbaijan and Turkey. Vadim Mukhanov, head of the Caucasus Sector at IMEMO RAS, stated that Armenia, as the losing party, is compelled to make concessions and is not the initiator of this route. Concurrently, Armenian authorities are reportedly preparing to withdraw Russian border guards from the Akhurik checkpoint on the border with Turkey, indicating a potential shift in Yerevan’s approach to border management and regional diplomacy.[xv]
Earlier, Russian border guards departed from Zvartnots Airport and the Armenian-Iranian customs checkpoint. Public sentiment in Armenia strongly supports efforts to reclaim control of national borders, with many viewing such measures as essential to restoring state authority and protecting the nation's interests.[xvi] For the government, regaining control over border management not only responds to popular demands but also strengthens its internal legitimacy, especially as it navigates a sensitive political climate. This process is expected to continue until no foreign troops remain along Armenia’s external borders. However, from Russia’s perspective, these developments likely represent a significant geopolitical shift, as Moscow gradually loses physical control over Armenia and the South Caucasus, position by position.
Iran
Despite welcoming the peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Iranian President fears that the Trump Route will threaten its interests in the region. President Masoud Pezeshkian has welcomed peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan but expressed concern about US involvement, emphasising that Iran’s strategic relationship with Armenia should not be subject to geopolitical bargaining.[xvii] The Iranian leadership has firmly opposed the corridor, arguing that it could alter regional geopolitics, redraw borders and threaten Armenia’s territorial integrity. Iranian officials see the possibility of redrawing borders not only as a local threat but also as a shift in the balance of power that could strengthen US influence in the South Caucasus at the expense of both Russia and Iran. These concerns mirror those previously raised about the Zangezur Corridor. In this context, the Trump Route is seen by Tehran as part of a broader US strategy to counter Russian presence and reshape regional alignments, much like previous American-backed transit projects in the area. Iran has declared its determination to protect its security interests in the South Caucasus, with or without Russian support.[xviii]
Diplomatic talks have led Iranian officials to acknowledge that their primary concerns were addressed as the project was reframed as a transit route under Armenian sovereignty rather than a corridor that could undermine Iranian and regional interests. Yet, Tehran remains cautious, wary that any new US-controlled route could marginalise its role in regional trade.
Iran’s economic concerns about the Trump Route are significant. The route would deprive Iran of lucrative transit fees and divert a substantial portion of traffic. This would reduce Iran’s share of South Caucasus trade and diminish its leverage over critical cargo flows. If implemented, the Trump Route could also lessen Iran’s strategic advantage over Azerbaijan. Tehran and Baku have often had strained relations, partly due to Baku's ties with Israel.[xix] These developments underscore the broader implications for Iran’s economic and strategic influence in the region.
Central Asia
The Trump Route in Central Asia offers important strategic and economic benefits. It provides a faster, safer land corridor that helps diversify trade and energy supply routes, reducing the region’s reliance on traditional routes through Russia and Iran. Compared to other corridors, such as the Northern Corridor through Russia or the Trans-Iranian Route, the Trump Route stands out for shorter transit times, better security and reduced risk from geopolitical issues.
Countries in Central Asia view the Trump Route as an important step towards greater prosperity and stronger connections to global markets. The route improves regional connectivity by providing a new transit route through the Caucasus, strengthening the transport network’s resilience and capacity. The expansion of the regional framework from C5 to C5+1, incorporating Azerbaijan, signifies a shift towards more intentional collaboration across the Caspian region.[xx] Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are investing in expanding their port infrastructure to handle more trade, boosting their roles as key regional logistics centres.
The Trump Route is also expected to lower shipping costs and speed up the transport of goods and key raw materials from Central Asia to Europe and other markets. This increase in efficiency should attract foreign investment, encourage industrial growth and create new economic opportunities across the region. Over time, the route could help improve regional cooperation, giving Central Asian countries more control over their trade and economic policies. However, achieving this depends on stronger institutions and aligned regulations among the transit countries. Applying similar reforms and regulatory alignment to the Trump Route would help Central Asian countries manage their trade environment independently and fully benefit from the new corridor.
Turkey
The Trump Route strengthens Turkey's role as a key logistics hub between Asia and Europe, reinforcing trade ties with Azerbaijan and providing direct access to the Caspian Sea and Central Asia. Furthermore, the Trump Route aligns with Ankara's objective of connecting with Turkic states and bolstering the "Middle Corridor," which facilitates East-West trade. Notably, improved relations between Armenia and Turkey could make the Middle Corridor a real alternative to Russian and Iranian routes. As a result, this development would widen Turkey's access to Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. By relying less on Iran and Russia for transit, Turkey gains an advantage over regional rivals in the South Caucasus. Currently, both Turkey and Armenia are working to reopen their land border and restore rail links, with a particular focus on the Margara-Alican crossing and the Kars-Gyumri railway.[xxi]
Armenia has invested over $2.5 million to modernise the Margara checkpoint for operation.[xxii] The ongoing construction of the Kars-Igdır-Aralık-Dilucu railway will increase energy, freight and fibre-optic flows, boosting Turkey's role in logistics.[xxiii] The route also helps normalise relations between Turkey and Armenia, potentially reopening their border. However, despite these benefits, Ankara remains cautious. A permanent US presence in Armenia under the 99-year mandate could, over time, limit Turkey's strategic depth.
Conclusion: Challenges and Prospects
The Normalisation between Armenia and Turkey, achieving peace with Azerbaijan, and the TRIPP initiative have the potential to transform the region into a key transit hub. However, the successful implementation of the Trump Route remains uncertain due to ongoing regional conflicts, security challenges, and complex logistical hurdles, which could lead to further operational delays and increase risks for investors and local communities. Despite progress in the peace process, Armenia and Azerbaijan have yet to sign or ratify a comprehensive, legally binding peace treaty. After the White House initialled the agreement in August 2025, focus shifted to Armenia's constitutional revisions, which have since become the main obstacle.
Azerbaijan asserts that amending Armenia's constitution is an essential prerequisite for finalising a peace treaty, which is crucial to its comprehensive implementation. The lack of a ratified peace treaty leaves the legal framework weak, increasing the risk of renewed tensions. In this context, the results of Armenia's June 2026 parliamentary elections are significant, as if constitutional reforms stall further, the peace process could face a prolonged deadlock. Consequently, the unresolved debate over sovereignty, US operational rights, and local control could undermine trust in the Framework. Although the Framework guarantees Armenia's sovereignty, concerns remain about control arising from the grant of US operator development, operating, and revenue rights.
However, TRIPP's success depends on effective institutional management and political coordination. If realised, it could transform the South Caucasus from a geopolitical faultline into a stable and prosperous corridor, anchoring the United States in the region’s economic future. Its sustainability will rely less on infrastructure and more on political will, particularly considering local and regional power dynamics.
*****
*Dr. Punit Gaur, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.
End Notes
[i] Council on Foreign Relations “Tensions Between Armenia and Azerbaijan”, February 18, 2026, Accessed February 25, 2026, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/nagorno-karabakh-conflict.
[ii] Onnik James Krikorian (2025). “Armenia Balances Between the TRIPP and Zangezur Corridor”, Eurasia Digest, Volume 1, Issue 31, pp, 8-13.
[iii] Minoyan Hoory (20234), “Pashinyan presents “Crossroads of Peace,” pursuing regional connectivity”, Armenia Weekly, November 1, 2023, Accessed February 28, 2026 https://armenianweekly.com/2023/11/01/pashinyan-presents-crossroads-of-peace-pursuing-regional-connectivity/#:~:text=YEREVAN%E2%80%94Armenian%20Prime%20Minister%20Nikol,Caspian%20Sea%20to%20the%20Mediterranean.
[iv] US Department of State, "United States Publishes Documents from Historic Armenia and Azerbaijan Meeting", Media Note, August 29, 2025, Accessed February 29, 2026. https://www.state.gov/releases/2025/08/united-states-publishes-documents-from-historic-armenia-and-azerbaijan-meeting.
[v] The Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, "Joint Declaration by the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia and the President of the United States of America on the outcomes of their meeting in Washington D.C., United States of America" August 9, 2025, Accessed March 02, 2026 https://www.primeminister.am/en/press-release/item/2025/08/09/Nikol-Pashinyan-visit-US-declaration/.
[vi] The White House, "President Trump Brokers another Historic Peace Deal" August 8, 2025, Accessed March 04, 2026, https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2025/08/president-trump-brokers-another-historic-peace-deal/.
[vii] New Eurasia Strategies Centre, "The South Caucasus after the Washington meeting: What has really changed, and how Russia is responding", February 19, 2026, Accessed February 28, 2026 https://nestcentre.org/the-south-caucasus-after-the-washington-meeting/?print=print
[viii] Armen Press "Armenia, US generate content of TRIPP project", October 16, 2025, Accessed March 02, 2026, https://armenpress.am/en/article/1232316
[ix] The US Department of State, "The TRIPP Implementation Framework (TIF)", Accessed 7 March 2026, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/TRIPP-Implementation-Framework.pdf
[x] Eurasian Star "TRIPP project and the transit potential of South Caucasus", October 14, 2025, Accessed March 08, 2026, https://www.eurasianstar.com/tripp-project-and-the-transit-potential-of-south-caucasus/#:~:text=U.S.%20President%20Donald%20Trump's%20meeting,across%20the%20country%20in%202024.
[xi] Punit Gaur (2023), "Significance of the Middle Corridor in Changing Geopolitical Landscape", November 14, 2023, Accessed March 09, 2026, /show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=10186&lid=6497.
[xii] Linderman L. et al., "Armenia’s Strategic Dilemma: Geography versus History", SILK ROAD PAPER October 2025, Accessed March 10, 2026, https://www.silkroadstudies.org/resources/SR_Armenia_Strategic_Dilemma_LLP.pdf.
[xiii] The Ministry of foreign affairs of the Russian Federation, “Comment by Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova on the talks between Azerbaijanian and Armenian leaders in Washington (United States)”, August 09, 2025, Accessed March 10, 2026, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/international_safety/regprla/2040852/#:~:text=The%20most%20suitable%20option%20to,mediation%20in%20the%20Middle%20East.
[xiv] Caliber, “Armenia builds railway outside Russian oversight: Pashinyan ally details TRIPP project”, December 18, 2025, Accessed March 02, 2026, https://caliber.az/en/post/armenia-builds-railway-outside-russian-oversight-pashinyan-ally-details-tripp-project
[xv] Azernews, “Armenia takes control of its borders as old dependencies from Russia unravel”, January 14, 2026, Accessed March 05, 2026, https://www.azernews.az/analysis/252965.html.
[xvi] Onnik James Krikorian (2024), "Armenia Ends Russian Oversight at Yerevan Airport as Security Concerns Persist", Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 21 Issue 124, Accessed March 07, 2026, https://jamestown.org/armenia-ends-russian-oversight-at-yerevan-airport-as-security-concerns-persist/
[xvii] Iran International, “Iran presses Armenia to address concerns over foreign forces near shared border”, August 19, 2025, Accessed March 05, 2026, https://www.iranintl.com/en/202508193238.
[xviii] Iran International, “Iran rebukes Russia over its policy shift on Zangezur corridor", September 2, 2024, Accessed March 16, 2026, https://www.iranintl.com/en/202409022022
[xix] Emil Avdaliani (2025), "New ‘Trump’ Corridor Leaves Iran Scrambling to Preserve Influence in the South Caucasus", Stimson, September 10, 2025, Accessed March 8, 2026, https://www.stimson.org/2025/new-trump-corridor-leaves-iran-scrambling-to-preserve-influence-in-the-south-caucasus/#:~:text=New%20'Trump'%20Corridor%20Leaves%20Iran,of%20Baku's%20ties%20to%20Israel
[xx] Eka Tkeshelashvili (2026), “Central Asia finds strength in integration”, GIS, March 4, 2026, Accessed March 10, 2026, https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/central-asia-integration/
[xxi] Akbar Novruz (2026), “Türkiye intensifies work to reopen Alican–Margara border checkpoint with Armenia”, Azernews, February 9, 2026, Accessed March 1, 2026, https://www.azernews.az/region/254145.html#:~:text=The%20report%20notes%20that%20infrastructure,finalized%20and%20political%20conditions%20allow.
[xxii] The Armeina Report (2024), "Armenia Spends $2.5 Million Renovating Margara Checkpoint on Turkey Border", November 4, 2024, Accessed March 4, 2026, https://www.thearmenianreport.com/post/armenia-spends-2-5-million-renovating-margara-checkpoint-on-turkey-border
[xxiii] RailFreight, "Türkiye starts building Kars-Dilucu railway, a key part of the Zangezur Corridor", August 22, 2025, Accessed March 6, 2026, https://www.railfreight.com/beltandroad/2025/08/22/turkiye-starts-building-kars-dilucu-railway-a-key-part-of-the-zangezur-corridor/?gdpr=deny