Indian Council of World Affairs

Subodh Bharti:  Before we start the program, I request you to kindly put your mobile phones on silent mode. Thank you. Excellencies, distinguished guests, ladies, and gentlemen, on behalf of the Indian Council of World Affairs, it is my pleasure to welcome you all for this discussion on the theme “Strategic Shifts and Silent Balancing: Emerging Perspectives on Bhutan's Foreign Policy”. We shall begin the program with the Acting Deputy Director General, ICWA, Ambassador N.J. Gangte delivering his welcome remarks. The discussion will be chaired by Ambassador V.P. Haran, former Indian Ambassador to Bhutan. Our distinguished panelists for today are Professor S.D. Muni, Professor Emeritus, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi; Dr. Smruti S. Pattanaik, Research Fellow, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MPIDSA), New Delhi. We have Mr. Tenzing Lamsang, Editor-in-Chief, The Bhutanese newspaper. He has joined online from Thimphu. And Mr. Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy, Associate Fellow, Neighborhood Studies, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. The discussion will be followed by a brief question and answer session, which will be moderated by the Chair. May I now request Ambassador N.J. Gangte, ADDG-ICWA, to kindly deliver his opening remarks, sir.

N.J. Gangte:  Ambassador V.P. Haran, Professor S.D. Muni, members of the panel, distinguished experts from India and Bhutan, members of diplomatic corps, students and friends. It is a pleasure for me to welcome you all to today's panel discussion on Strategic Shifts and Silent Balancing: Emerging Perspectives on Bhutan's Foreign Policy. Bhutan's political evolution and foreign policy trajectory presented itself as the most compelling insights into the changing dynamics of South Asia and the wider Himalayan region.

This panel discussion is both timely and relevant as Bhutan embarks on a new political journey under the visionary leadership of His Majesty the King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuk, wherein initiatives such as the Gelephu Mindfulness City Project and efforts to expand external engagements have attracted considerable regional and global attention. Over the past two decades, Bhutan has undergone a remarkable transformation. Its transition to democracy stands out as a unique example of political reform from within under the visionary leadership of His Majesty the Fourth Druk Gyalpo. The peaceful and exemplary political transition has enabled Bhutan to strengthen democratic institutions while preserving political stability, social harmony, and cultural continuity. Since then, Bhutan has achieved several important milestones, including its graduation from the least developed country category in December 2023. As a constitutional monarchy, the country has successfully balanced democratic consolidation with political stability, sustainable development, and the enduring philosophy of gross national happiness. This distinctive development continues to place the well-being of its people at the centre of national policymaking while pursuing economic progress and modernization. An equally important dimension of Bhutan's transformation has been the emergence of a younger and globally connected generation. Educated both at home and abroad, many young Bhutanese are contributing actively to the country's political institutions, economic and social development, while shaping its engagement with an increasingly interconnected world. Bhutan's external relations simultaneously reflect both continuity and adaptation. India has long played a foundational role in Bhutan's security and development, exemplifying a partnership anchored in trust, mutual respect, and enduring goodwill. At the same time, the relationship continues to evolve in response to new opportunities and challenges. In recent years, Bhutan has expanded its international outreach while navigating a complex geopolitical environment. Situated at a strategically significant location between India and the Tibet Autonomous Region of China, Bhutan's foreign policy reflects careful balancing of national interest, sovereignty, development priorities, and long-term stability. Against this backdrop, today's discussion provides an opportunity to reflect on how Bhutan's domestic transformations are influencing its foreign policy choices, how it is responding to an uncertain global order, and what these changes mean for regional stability and development. We are fortunate to have a distinguished panel of experts from India and Bhutan, and I'm confident that today's discussion will generate thoughtful reflections and contribute meaningfully to the ongoing discourse on emerging shifts in Bhutan's foreign policy. I'd like to thank all of you once again for joining us today, and I look forward to an engaging and insightful discussion with our distinguished panelists. Thank you.

Subodh Bharti:  Thank you, sir. May I now request Ambassador V.P. Haran to kindly share his remarks and conduct the proceedings? Over to you, sir.

V.P. Haran: Thank you very much, good afternoon to everyone. It's my pleasure to chair this session, which is an important one. The panel discussion is on Strategic Shifts and Silent Balancing: Emerging Perspectives On Bhutan's Foreign Policy. We have a panel of four distinguished speakers to deal with the subject, so what I'll do is I'll first bring you up to date on foreign policy, I mean how Bhutanese foreign policy evolved over the last about 100, 150 years, and then leave it to the panel to discuss about the current developments and how Bhutan is coping up with that. I would like to go back to the 19th century, the Treaty of Sinchula, following which-- this followed frequent clashes between the Cooch Behar State and Bhutan, and at some stage the Brits said, that's enough and we can't take it anymore, so they imposed a treaty on them, and under the Sinchula Treaty, Bhutan lost quite a bit of territory, that is the entire Duars area, including from Kalimpong to the east, they lost in fact, and that is merged with British India, in fact, it is now part of India. The next stage was 1910, of course in 1907 I think Bhutan became a hereditary monarchy and in 1910 Punakha Treaty was signed between British India and Bhutan. The importance of the treaty is that Bhutan rightfully took it to mean that the Brits had recognized Bhutan's sovereignty. That is a very important development for them and apart from that it also had some provisions like Britain not interfering in the internal affairs of Bhutan. On its part Bhutan agreed to be guided by the advice of the British Indian regime on external relations.

Next step was our independence in 1947 following which we had to sort of sign a new treaty with Bhutan but the new treaty was almost exactly the same as the earlier one, particularly this provision regarding Bhutan being guided by India and its foreign relations. That remained. And the next stage is early 2000s. There were two significant developments in the first decade of the century. First was the treaty of 1949 which I referred to earlier was updated. We don't call it revision, we call it updation. It was updated and the important provision that was changed was the clause 2 which said that Bhutan will be guided by India's advice on foreign policy. That was changed to say that the two countries will cooperate closely with each other on issues of their national interests. So this is a qualitatively different formulation than the earlier one in which Bhutan had undertaken to be guided by the advice of India. The second important development was 2008 and the enactment of the Bhutanese constitution. The constitution has a couple of provisions about King's involvement in foreign policy. In the section on dealing with the King or Druk Gyalpo, I think Article 217, it clearly says that the Druk Gyalpo may improve relations with other countries through receiving state level guests from abroad and also by undertaking state visits. Obviously when you have state visits, important issues will be discussed. And the second provision is I think Article 24, 20 subsection 4, it says that the Prime Minister shall from time to time keep the Druk Gyalpo informed of developments in affairs of state including on international relations. This has been specifically provided in that section and it also says that, of course, if Druk Gyalpo wants some additional information or files, etc., it has to be submitted to him. The intention being that if he has any views on what is being done, he can share the same with the government so that they take that into account. So even though Bhutan became a democratic constitutional monarchy in 2008 when the constitution was passed, the king retained the power to give some suggestions to the elected government on foreign policy issues and, of course, apart from that, the king also continues to deal with security-related issues. Now it is in this context that the Bhutanese monarchy, which had traditionally been close to India, which had looked to India whenever it required India's assistance or cooperation, this sort of thing continued even after the elected government was in position. Now like in other countries, the social media has had a devastating effect on, I don't know, the youngsters are there and maybe I shouldn't say devastating, but it has had its effect on Bhutan also. Now the expectation, the people who are very happy with what they had, now their expectation levels have gone up tremendously, particularly among the younger generation. Now Bhutan has a very good education system, it's mostly free, and a lot of people, I mean the number of people graduating as a percentage of total student population is much higher than what it is in India or other countries. And these people, when they come out of university and don't have any job, etc., they obviously have difficulty in accepting the situation. They started looking for greener pastures outside. With the result that in the last 10 years, a whole lot of people have moved out of Bhutan. Of course, I'm seeing various figures, so I don't want to quote any single figure. And this is a cause for worry for Bhutan. If the youngsters start leaving, and unfortunately it was not limited to youngsters, because even senior government servants started leaving, and a whole lot of them are in Australia. So this is a thing which is a serious problem for them, which they need to address. And the king has been playing a very positive role all through. He has his pulse on the nation, on the people, he has his fingers on the pulse of the nation and the people. So he knows what the people are thinking, what he should, rather how he should address. Now I'm sure the panelists will take on some of these issues in their remarks. So I'll hand over now to the panelists. First would be Smruti Pattanaik. I would request them to limit their remarks to about 12 minutes or so. Thank you.

Smruti Pattanaik: Thank you sir. I would like to thank ICWA for this invitation. As in your opening remark, you were saying that how Bhutan has moved its foreign policy for the last more than a century. I think two, three things that comes to one's mind. One is that the isolationist policy which Bhutan followed for a very long time, especially, in the early 50s, I would say, basically focusing on its sovereignty, territorial integrity and its cultural identity, which was defined much later, around 1987-88, through various law which Bhutan passed at that point of time, like, for example, the Tsa-Wa-Sum, the Citizenship Law, the Driglam Namzha, which provided Bhutan with a kind of unique identity. So Bhutan has been looking not just to protect its sovereignty, territorial integrity, which is actually not something which is different, and all the countries look towards this. But I think this unique cultural identity emerged as a new factor which actually led to the conflict which Bhutan saw in the early 90s, which actually led to the flow of refugees, and that is one of the reasons why you find many of the Bhutanese refugees living in United States and other Western countries. We were repatriated to these countries following a kind of arrangement between the Western countries and these camps, which are situated in Nepal. In the 1970s, Bhutan moved out from the parameter of this kind of isolation policy to establish relationship with other countries in the world, especially starting with the Indian Embassy in Thimphu, if I'm not mistaken, probably in 1968, followed by the 1970s, after the 1971 war, the Bangladesh Embassy came up, and so also the Kuwait Embassy. And 1971 also marked, in terms of Bhutan's engagement with multilateral organizations, starting with the United Nations, followed by the international, I think, starting with the International Postal Union, followed by the membership of the United Nations. But we also have seen that Bhutan started questioning the treaty of 1949 in 1979, when the king spoke of the treaty, and especially Article 2, which you were mentioning, which Bhutan found is restricting itself, as far as Bhutan's exercise of sovereignty is concerned, in terms of how the treaty appeared at that point of time. But that also does not mean that there is any restriction on the part of India to in fact try to formulate Bhutan's foreign policy. Initially, of course, in the border talks, India was representing Bhutan after being, I think, authorized by the Bhutan government initially. But in 1981, the direct border talks with China started because China had a lot of objection to India representing Bhutan in the border talks. But we also know that most of the talks which takes place between Bhutan and India, of course, India is conveyed whatever discussion takes place. But I think another significant event of 1970s, which actually shaped Bhutan's outlook towards the world is the 75 integration of Sikkim, which many in Bhutan kept on speaking about this particular integration and the kind of implication it will have for Bhutan itself. So I think the 79 statement which the king gave, if I'm not mistaken, in the Mumbai airport, it is very clear that he didn't want it, he wanted to make it very clear that the 49 Treaty needs a kind of revision. But we also have seen currently Bhutan has around a relationship around with 60 countries. Some of them, some of the countries, I think, are represented through their representative in Delhi. But in Bhutan's relationship, the political and economic dimension has become very, very significant. In terms of its external relationship, the economy in economic dimension, Bhutan has not just engaged India, but also at the same time, it is part of the BIMSTEC, BBIN, though it has not ratified the BBIN Treaty, but it was a signatory of the BBIN Treaty. But also at the same time, Bhutan is also multilateralizing its investment in the hydropower project. And I think one of the project, Bangladesh has committed to invest, but that project has not really taken off after the change of the government. I think one billion US dollar was the commitment of Bhutan. And through this the regional grid, Bhutan is also exporting electricity beyond India. There are these plans. Only Nepal has been able to export electricity to Bangladesh. But as far as Bhutan is concerned, that has not been operationalized. But there are plans that Bhutan is going to do electricity trade with other countries, especially in the eastern part of South Asia. And also at the same time, it has access, it is no more confined to, as far as external trade is concerned, it is no more confined only to India. It is, in fact, accessing the Mongla port and the Chittagong port. And India has agreed to provide that kind of facility but for different reasons, some of this has not been operationalized. But we also have seen in the past few years there are high-level visit that has taken place between Bangladesh and Bhutan. We also saw the visit of Nepal King. I don't know what implications that has as far as the bilateral relations are concerned. I think last year or something like that. In question, though we know that the border talk is going to be very significant, it will have impact on India-China border talk. But if you look at the challenges in terms of what Bhutan has been proposing, the younger generation are not very, very happy because I think the GDP-to-debt ratio which they owe to India, I think it is overwhelming the debt which they owe to India. So there are some talks about diversifying. So probably that is where Bangladesh has come into play. And also India is also now – I think the pattern of investment has now changed from 70 to 30, earlier it was 40, 60, so that is also something which is worrying Bhutan. And also the rate of electricity, which Bhutan has always said that the rate at which Bhutan purchase electricity from India is a little expensive. Their expectation was that it should be around three rupees, but I think they're paying four rupees, especially in the winter season when Bhutan imports electricity from India. Second is that – so this is one point of dissatisfaction. Another point of dissatisfaction within Bhutan is the border talks. And some of the younger generation, they feel that because Bhutan is being tied down to the China-India border, they're not able to resolve the border with China. And China has been enticing Bhutan to resolve the border through a kind of swap deal with the middle sector in Bhutan, exchange it with near to the Doklam Plateau. So that is one thing that actually makes them – they feel that if India factor had not been there, probably Bhutan would have resolved its boundary problem with China, and that has not happened. So the younger generation are much more vocal in speaking of the Indocentricism in Bhutan's foreign policy compared to the older elite. But as you were mentioning, the king indeed plays a very significant role in the foreign policy. And Bhutan continues to have the constitutional monarchy, and that is where Bhutan is going to play – the king is going to play a significant role as far as the strategic kind of balancing that goes on. Bhutan, of course, will not speak about the balancing game that is happening in Bhutan, but it is very, very clear that they want to multilateralize their foreign policy, engage with as many countries as possible, so that their foreign policy is not limited to only to India, but within the region, BIMSTEC, SAARC are two regional forum which Bhutan is very eagerly it has engaged itself. And through this organization, it is reaching out to the world. So it is no more the kind of Bhutan which used to be seen a kind of mystic country which nobody knows. I think Bhutan has opened up much more because of its own compulsion of both, its economic reasoning, why it wants to reach out to the world, and also from the foreign policy perspective, as I was mentioning, it doesn't want to be, remain confined only to India, but rather to reach out as many countries as possible. But also at the same time, Bhutan is extremely cautious in its foreign policy approach. It's not that moving out means that it is very eagerly welcoming everyone or eagerly wanting to get engaged with other countries of the world, but it is extremely cautious in its approach. So I think because of the democracy in Bhutan, that is definitely going to have impact on Bhutan's foreign policy. As you said, it has the employment problem, want to reach out to Australia and other Western countries. So those will be a very significant factor in shaping Bhutan's foreign policy in the future. I'll end here. Thank you so much.

V.P. Haran: Thank you very much. Just a few comments. I agree with most of what you said. You know, Bhutan, she referred to isolationist policy, that's right. The reason for that was their only experience in dealing with outside countries was first with Tibet, not with China, but Tibet, and British India, both of whom they had problems. Like for example, in the case of Tibet, the Shabdurung, the person who unified Bhutan, he came from Tibet. Because of that, I mean, the people in Tibet wanted to get rid of him, so they kept on invading Bhutan. In fact, there have been several invasions from the northern side, that is, Tibetan side, but they're successfully repelled by Bhutan. And in the case of British India, I mentioned to you earlier that they sort of took away quite a bit of their territory because of the frequent clashes, etc. So their experience was not good in dealing with either of them. Because of it, they chose to remain isolationist. This was broken only in 1968, as you mentioned, when India was allowed to open a mission there. This was just before Mrs. Gandhi's visit there. But let me also add that that did not prevent them from interacting with India right from 1949. In fact, in 1954, the third king, the third Druk Gyalpo, was the chief guest at the Republic Day celebrations, even though we didn't have diplomatic relations. Similarly, Pandit Nehru went to Bhutan in 1958, again, when we didn't have diplomatic relations, and we started helping Bhutan in its five-year plans. We also set up the Indian military training team in Ha. All this happened before formal diplomatic relations were established. Then there was a reference to people in Bhutan fearing a similar thing as happened in Sikkim could happen to Bhutan. What they overlook is there is a clear distinction between the status of Sikkim and of Bhutan. Sikkim was a protectorate. It was not a sovereign, independent country like Bhutan was even at that time. Of course, being a small country, they were afraid that like it happened in Sikkim, it could happen there. But fortunately, nothing of that sort happened. I don't think at any time in the past India thought on those lines. A couple of other points. One is the Bangladesh hydel project is about 1,000 megawatts plus in the central region of Bhutan. Bangladesh has backed out from that. Now it has been taken over by Tatas and preliminary work has already been completed, and tenders have been floated. Debt-equity ratio being high, it's very valid. But the point is much of the debt is hydropower debt. Hydropower debt doesn't need to be repaid. It's on soft terms, and it doesn't need to be repaid till the project starts generating revenue. So till then, they don't have to pay. So it's not a big burden on their exchequer.

Last point about electricity rate. Yes, you are right. Initially, the rates were low, but the latest one, the Punatsangchhu-II project which was commissioned about a year or a year and a half back, there the rate is much higher than perhaps what we are getting for all the other projects is four plus. But the point she made was valid, that is, when they had to buy power during winter months when there is no flow in the river, they used to buy it from West Bengal, and West Bengal used to charge them much higher than what we were paying Bhutan for electricity. Second speaker is Tenzing, is he there? Yeah, but they'll get him on the line. Yeah. No, he's there. Welcome, Tenzing. Now the floor is yours. You can speak for about 12 minutes or so.

Tenzing Lamsang:  Yeah. So good to see you, Ambassador, after a long time. I have known His Excellency when he was in Thimphu for a few years. Can everybody hear me clearly? Yeah? Okay, good. So I'll start. The topic of today's panel discussion is Strategic Shifts And Silent Balancing: Emerging Perspectives Of Bhutan's Foreign Policy. And in the email sent to me from ICWA, I was asked to give my insights on the implication of Bhutan's foreign policy shifts at both bilateral and multilateral levels, especially concerning the country's internal political landscape and its engagement with external stakeholders and developmental partners. As a close follower of foreign policy movements, both in Bhutan and the wider region, I must say that the more things change around the world and in the region, the more things stay the same in Bhutan. When there are elections in Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Maldives, etc, the MEA and the foreign policy watchers in Delhi and around the region like yourselves must be watching with interest about which party or combination would come to power and what that would mean in terms of foreign policy towards India or even other countries. In the case of Bhutan, we have had four general elections since the advent of democracy in 2008 with four governments, but our foreign policy continues to remain consistent no matter which government or ruling party comes to power. Conversely, even no matter which party or government comes to power in India from the left to the center to the right, the Indian foreign policy towards Bhutan remains largely the same. As far as Bhutan is concerned, foreign policy is too important for us to experiment around or let it be the playing ground for domestic politics or even emotions. The Bhutanese are a practical people and don't believe in fixing things that works well and our foreign policy has been serving Bhutanese national interests well in several key areas. The first and most important aim of Bhutanese foreign policy has been in strengthening our sovereign status as a small country and that purpose has been served and continues to be enhanced. Here Bhutan's foreign policy has ensured its security in a neighborhood with two competing giants. The second aim of our foreign policy is to secure socio-economic development and here again it has been successful in terms of long-term economic cooperation from the early 1960s especially with India and later other bilateral and multilateral partners. It is something that continues to this day with the partnership especially with India transforming itself more into joint investments and business ventures. The third aim of Bhutanese foreign policy is to use it as a tool to enhance Bhutan's soft power and image in the international arena by sharing our story and achievements and we have succeeded to a fair bit in terms of gross national happiness being recognized as a carbon neutral country and on the must-visit destination on most tourism bucket lists. Bhutanese foreign policy while being low-key is also deeply practical and recognizes the reality of its location and geography. Bhutan also deeply values stability and consistency in its foreign policy and that is why you will not see any dramatic changes, no matter which government is in power, be it in Bhutan or India.

India continues to be an important cornerstone of Bhutan's foreign policy as its largest developmental and trading partner, and the importance of India as a road, air and sea access to the world. Bhutan, on its part, takes great care to ensure that Indian security and core foreign policy interests are given important priority in the relationship. There is also a lot of genuine goodwill and deep foreign policy capital to spend in both countries. This also applies to the younger generation in Bhutan, who may ask more questions definitely, especially with social media, as the ambassador said, but trust – but they trust our kings and the government to take the right calls on the foreign policy front. Bhutan is a high-trust society where the people trust the government to take the right call, and this is primarily due to the trust and faith in the monarchy. Bhutan is one neighbour India can count on and vice versa. So in short, there are no major shifts, and there will be no major shift in the times to come. If there has been any change in recent years, it is only that Bhutan has moved even closer to India in a sign of deep trust between the two countries. Bhutan is in the process of building the Gelephu Mindfulness City project, which will be a special administrative region, a new city along Assam's border, and two to three times the size of Singapore. GMC was officially announced on National Day on 17 December 2023 by His Majesty the King with the official Royal Charter issued on 10 February 2024, and in December 2026-2024, the GMC laws were brought in, and in March 2026, the construction of the international airport kicked off, which is the first major infrastructure project. This project, which starts in 2025, will have its first phase till 2030, second and third phases will be 2030-2045, and the third phase will be from 2045 onwards. The GMC project is a demonstration of the trust Bhutan has on India, as the very viability and success of the GMC depends on Indian cooperation, and so far, there has been a lot of positive support at both the central and state government level. The Indian government has been focusing on regional connectivity in eastern India, and also has its long-standing at-east policy that aims to connect India with Southeast Asia. Bhutan's GMC project is a major contribution to this, linking South and Southeast Asia and aiming to attract investments to the South Asian region, and particularly to Bhutan and India. Bhutan has also invited major Indian companies to invest in the GMC, and there is interest. In terms of hydropower, the traditional bilateral model of projects between the two governments with aid and loan components is now being replaced with increasingly more commercial investments and partnerships with major Indian private players. A few examples are the Tatas being involved in the 600-megawatt Kholongchhu project in eastern Bhutan, the one that Ambassador mentioned, the 1,125-megawatt Dorjilung project with the Tatas, the 600-megawatt Wangchhu project with the Adani group, the Chamkharchhu project which is being discussed with GMR group, the Punatsangchhu-II project, which will be a 900-megawatt project which has been discussed with Jindals, and there are others in the pipeline. In addition to this, and inclusive of some of the above, we have signed a 5,000-megawatt power project agreement with Tata and Adani, each of them, which includes hydropower and some solar components. And in these projects, the companies get – the Indian companies get between 49 percent to 40 percent ownership, while Bhutan retains the majority ownership of these projects, with a timeline of 30 years, after which the project is handed back. After the difficult times of the pandemic, tourism is now on the upswing for Bhutan, and the most important component of this recovery is Indian tourists, who make up the largest numbers of tourists to Bhutan. Bhutan does have a major trade deficit with India, as an earlier speaker mentioned, but it is hoped that once we build more power projects and export power and associated industrial goods to India, it will improve in the future. Right now, the biggest challenge that Bhutan faces is migration of its youth, as another speaker mentioned earlier. These youths are migrating in large numbers to foreign destinations from Australia to the Middle East. The prime minister of Bhutan, in a recent speech to the country, to the nation, said that this is the biggest challenge facing Bhutan, and we've seen around 71,000 Bhutanese working abroad. This has happened because while Bhutan has been successful in investing and building human capital with free healthcare and education, we have not been successful in developing a scaled-up economy that can provide quality jobs to the youth. In fact, this is the main reason why we have come up with the GMC project, and it is hoped that the project in the future will create the quality jobs that the youth want. We however are not banking just on GMC, but there are other economic initiatives to attract investment and initiatives, for example, like Bhutan's 21st century economic roadmap, 10X National Economic Vision by 2050, which is to make the GDP grow by 10X its current size. In summary, there has been no shift in Bhutanese foreign policy towards India, and in fact, Bhutan's ties with India has been strengthened over the years. If anything, this is a critical period of economic transformation in Bhutan, and Bhutan will be counting on Indian cooperation and support in GMC, hydropower projects, and other initiatives. Thank you.

V.P. Haran: Thank you, Tenzing. Just one clarification I need. You mentioned about the involvement of Jindal Group in a 900-megawatt project. Which project is it? I thought you said Punat-II, but Punat-II is already over. Yeah. I may be misheard.

Tenzing Lamsang:  I was talking about Punat-III. Punat-I and II is with the GOI.

V.P. Haran:  Okay, right. Thank you. I think he has clearly outlined the aims of the foreign policy of Bhutan. I think, one has to agree with that. There's no doubt at all about it. And he has also referred to consistency of Bhutan's foreign policy. I have been watching Bhutan right from the day I joined service, that was in 1980. I can vouch for that. And I think their – I mean, aims are very clear. And because of the – because the foreign policy is driven by the king, it has remained consistent. And our relations have only prospered over a period of – over the period of time. Going back a little, I just wanted to mention for completing the picture, Bhutan still does not have diplomatic relations with P5 countries, that is, the permanent members of the UN Security Council, though one of them does have an honorary consul general there. Anyway, this is something peculiar. The last two countries with which they established diplomatic relations were Germany and Israel. And when I had inquired in Bhutan why you are not having any diplomatic relations with the P5, I got the response that we do not want Bhutan to become a playground for big power politics. I think that is a very valid point because, you know, small country cannot handle such situations. That is why perhaps they decided not to go in for it. Now I will hand over the floor to Mr. Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy for his remarks.

Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy: Thank you, sir. Very good afternoon, everyone. I will just briefly build upon what the speakers have been saying and what Ambassador Haran has also been speaking about. It is about youth, aspirations of Bhutan's youth in shaping the country's foreign policy. Why has youth become so important to understand in Bhutan? I think a couple of factors. One, social media, as Ambassador Haran mentioned. The way that social media has penetrated through Bhutanese ecosystem, Bhutanese society, especially amongst the youth, is something worth noting. And that also means the number of engagements and the topics that were often considered taboo or something that was not usually spoken about, like foreign policy, is now being discussed openly on social media, challenging the traditional narratives that have always existed. Second, Bhutanese have become more international with the exposure of social media. Not only that they are migrating to other countries, but also even staying within Bhutan, their understanding that the world operates in a different way. Their perception of the world is not restricted to just India, like the previous generations were. Their perception of the world has pretty much grown, as the social media exposure has also grown in Bhutan. Then what was briefly mentioned is about the social welfare system in Bhutan that has efficiently worked, which is education and health, which means that there are a lot of youngsters who are educated today than they were in the past. That also means that the economy has not been able to absorb, because the economy is primarily dependent on agriculture for employment, and then tourism and hydropower sector for revenue generation. For young Bhutanese who have their degrees, who have educated, who don't want to see themselves in these spaces or in these sectors, it has been a difficult space for them to find and navigate jobs because the economy seems to be very little diversified. So youth unemployment is a bigger problem. There is a significant mismatch between the job sector, between the job markets and what the youth are studying and being graduated with. There's been a significant decrease, a slight decrease in youth unemployment which has now come back to 20%, back from 24 or 26%, that was just one and a half year ago. Migration has been a bigger challenge, as Mr. Lamsang mentioned, almost 71,000 Bhutanese, which is approximately 9% of Bhutan's population, is now working elsewhere. Now that has definitely brought in revenues in the way of remittances, but that has also meant that a lot of youth who were contributing to the economy, a lot of labor force that was contributing to the economy is now migrating elsewhere. And that has posed a problem in itself. And that also shows that the young Bhutanese today are more career-oriented, have more educational goals, have seen a better lifestyle for them, sitting right at their home through social media. A brief survey that we had conducted a while ago gives some interesting perspectives about how these young Bhutanese think about India, China, and the rest of the world. As far as India is concerned, still young Bhutanese see it as a significant economic and foreign policy partner. There is robust people-to-people engagement. Almost all of the respondents we had spoken to had visited India at some point in time, know one or the other Indian language that they can communicate with. Indian soft power remains unparalleled. Bollywood movies, Indian cuisine remain very popular in Bhutan. Then we speak about culture that's also quite prevalent in Bhutan, Indian culture and soft power as well. And Indian media channels are very well consumed within Bhutan. But then that also brings us to certain challenges where we also see that education is no longer important. India is no longer considered as a preferred destination for education. A lot of these people would want to migrate to US, UK, Australia mostly and pursue their education there. There is very little interest in finding job or working in India amongst the young Bhutanese. There's also something interesting that came out through the survey is that there has been a bigger foreign policy challenge is being affiliated to their over-dependence on India or something they call as India's overbearing presence in Bhutan which Dr. Smruti Pattanaik was referring to. So there are certain wins and there are certain challenges that comes with India but that said a lot of young Bhutanese still believe that India's role and India's partnership remains unparalleled and they remain deeply grateful to India. But on the other hand when it comes to China, the rise of China is not being seen as a challenge. In fact, there has been increasing tourism, especially on culture. A lot of young Bhutanese and a lot of Bhutanese today, even of the older generation, want to visit Tibet. There's been increasing tourism on that front. But there's very little appeal towards China as an economic alternative or as an economic partner. There is very little appeal to studying there, settling there. But what makes China more attractive for them is the prospects of getting jobs, is the prospect of trading, is the prospect of economic opportunities that Bhutan can get by increasing engagement with China. Chinese social media remains quite popular amongst the youth, especially TikTok. And Tibet is something that is seen as a matter of past. In fact, a lot of people seem to be interested in understanding the deeper people-to-people engagements between Tibet and Bhutan. And as I said, there is some sort of appeal towards Bhutanese going to Tibet as part of tourists. And China is basically seen as an opportunity that Bhutan has to tap upon. That said, Bhutanese are also quite deeply divided on whether a Chinese mission should be established in Bhutan or not. That is something that was an interesting outcome that came out of the survey we had. But all in all, what we see from the Bhutanese perspective of China is that, one, that Bhutan has to close the border dispute with China because the increasing Chinese assertiveness has been a bit of a concern to Bhutan. Then Bhutan sees economic opportunities in China. It wants to increase trade. And the common question that keeps on coming is, why don't we have direct trade with China? And why do we have to import it through India? That's a common narrative that we see across from the youth these days. Then there is also a security threat that comes from China. And that is also one of the reasons why there is more appeal in closing the border dispute and engaging with China. China, overall, has emerged as a second trading partner, second largest trading partner with Bhutan. This has increased, especially with the Bitcoin machinery that Bhutan has imported in the recent years. And there are also a lot of Chinese EVs that are now being imported in Bhutan, either directly or indirectly as well. So that is something that is an interesting space to watch. On its part, China basically sees Bhutan with a security challenge. It sees Bhutan sometimes acting on India's behalf. So that is also one of the reasons why it wants to engage. Bhutan have its economic leverages, have diplomatic relations, and not be challenged in the region where it considers itself as a regional power. Broadly, youth perceptions about China still lurk around economic opportunities and there is more – there is a need of more economic engagement with China as and when the young aspirations grow. How is it contributing to foreign policy? I think a couple of factors. One, with the youth migration, as Mr. Lamsang mentioned, there is an increasing relationship with the Middle East countries. There is an increasing relationship with Australia, for Bhutan. To boost economic growth and further deter future generations of Bhutanese from migrating, there has been a significant push for connectivity that is coming from Southeast Asian countries, that is coming with Bangladesh. And there is also the push for the Gelephu Mindfulness City Project, which was being spoken about, where investments are being drawn in. There is more push for diversification of foreign policy, diversification of economic interactions with other countries. India still remains a traditional partner and a narrative that continues to exist is as Bhutan's aspirations and ambitions grow, India has to continue supplementing Bhutan's aspirations. That said, again, there is a growing appetite to engage with China economically and a narrative that often goes with it is we are ready to engage with China, we are willing to engage with China, but at the end of the day, India should always know that we will always respect Indian concerns and sensitivities. So that is something that we often come across today while we are talking about youth. I'll leave my comments there.

V.P. Haran:  Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Shivamurthy. A couple of points. One is, as you mentioned, about the views of the younger generation on relations with China. I agree with you. In fact, that's what I felt even when I was there. But the migrants issue, it acts both ways. Like you mentioned about remittance, you know how crucial remittance from the migrants was during the COVID years? I mean, the Bhutanese got foreign exchange only through that because there were no tourists coming there. Tourists, I think, were not there for two years or two and a half years or something like that. Even after that, it's only a trickle. So those days, the main source of foreign exchange was remittance from particularly Australia. And that's what helped them tide over the crisis. A point to be noted is quite apart from the issue of migration of youngsters, the fertility rate in Bhutan has come down quite drastically and steeply. It used to be maybe 30, 40 years back, it was 4.6, 20 years before that, it was 6.2 or something. But today, it is 1.6 or 1.7, which means it's well below the replacement rate. So that is something which is of concern to them if even the limited population starts going out, then it's going to pose a problem for them, not in the distant future. And about education, yes, you are right. Some of them who can afford go to Thailand or UK, USA, etc., but most of them still come to India. I come from, I live in Greater Noida now and I see a whole lot of Bhutanese studying in various institutions there. Now, we are running out of time. I think I shouldn't be talking too much. I'll now hand over the floor to Mr. S. D. Muni, Professor S. D. Muni for his remarks. Mr. Muni, incidentally, was one of those who taught the basics of India-Bhutan India-Nepal relations when we as probationers went to JNU for training in 1982. Thank you.

S.D. Muni:  Thank you very much. To begin with, the ICWA for this great opportunity, Bhutan is a subject which is comparatively less discussed in India and I think this is a good opportunity. But more than that, I want to congratulate the ICWA for choosing a very bold subject. Why do I say bold? Because you're talking about strategic shift and silent balancing. I would have used it soft balancing. Soft balancing on the part of Bhutan and strategic shift in terms of India-Bhutan relations. Both Thimphu and New Delhi would reiterate that our relations are normal as good as it is. The reality is what you have written. They would not speak so, so I must congratulate you. Now, before I start my comment, I know, Honorable Chair, we are running quite late.

V.P. Haran: It's okay, 12 minutes for you also.

S.D. Muni:  No, the JNU teachers have two bad habits. One, they notoriously violate the time limit and then they are politically very unwise in terms of saying things which should not be said. And somehow I am constrained by both these factors.

V.P. Haran:  But you're also a diplomat in Bhutan.

S.D. Muni:  To begin with, no diplomacy is by default. I mean, two years' diplomacy can't wash out my JNU upbringing. Anyway, to begin with, 1949 treaty which talks about Bhutan's foreign policy being guided by India was an imperialist treaty. Nehru was absolutely clear in his mind that Bhutan is not foreign to us. And I have seen those documents in Nehru memorial. What I am saying is nothing confidential, in which Nehru said it is not foreign to us and we must control their foreign policy very strictly. Absolutely clear in his mind. He gets his first jolt in 1960 when the Prime Minister of Bhutan made a statement asking for revising the 1949 treaty. And it did so because the Chinese were encroaching on the Bhutanese territory. And Chinese had started encroaching on Indian territory. India was also very unhappy about it. And Prime Minister made this statement on which there was a question on Indian Parliament. In Indian Parliament the speaker has the discretion to allow a question or not to allow a question. The question was, Prime Minister has made this statement, what is the meaning of it? The question was not allowed. In 1979 the king himself made a statement after coming from Havana Non-Aligned Summit. Because S. N. Mishra who was then our foreign minister who had gone there and made certain statements which were not acceptable to the Bhutanese. So the question of shift we have also, India has quite clearly contributed to the shift. After 1960s that question, Nehru realized it. Nehru said we must control the foreign office. But then Nehru encouraged Bhutan to interact globally. The postal union issue came up then in Nehru's time. And he allowed them to interact because international contacts, international connections could be a provision of security for a country. And that is how later on the United Nations participation came and things grew apart. So this shift in changing the foreign policy clause in the treaty goes as back as 1960. It has taken place in 2007 for different reasons and I don't want to go into the details of that. Second point which I wish to make is that the balancing is very soft and Bhutan started doing it very, very softly. I think they, and even now as the chair has said very rightly, they are engaging with international world without appointing diplomatic relations. So that there are no offenses and they are very, very, absolutely intelligently it is being done. They have, I tell you a small anecdote. In 1977 I was in Thimphu. I had a first chance to meet the king, the previous king. And we had a long conversation. And in conversation he said I had done a book on Nepal's foreign policy. And there is a chapter on regional non-alignment. The Honorable Majesty asked me to do a book on Bhutan on that line. How regional balancing can regional non-alignment. I said, Majesty, you want to shift the foreign policy? No, no, no, we don't want to shift the foreign policy but you know we have compulsions, we have regional compulsions. It was being realized before he made the public statement in 1979. This is a personal conversation, one to one and I don't think I was asked to keep it confidential. Therefore, I am sharing it with you. Anyway, therefore, they have started balancing very softly and I think one very soft outlet for the balance is getting into the regional organizations. And the two, three regional organizations are very important from Bhutan's point of view, SAARC, BIMSTEC and BBIN and they show this soft balancing. SAARC, they were very active on issues which were of concern to them, environment, poverty elevation, education. These are the questions which were very, very relevant in terms of Bhutan's own national interest and they pursued it vigorously. On other issues, controversial issues, they would be very quiet, they would follow whatever India's lead is. But at one stage, they even violated the SAARC norms of not to bring in bilateral issues in SAARC forum when they raise the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement of Peace Agreement which was there. Bilateral issues were not to be brought. Pakistan was very against it because this was a question of India and Sri Lanka making up. Bhutan brought it on the table by saying that this is a positive development in terms of regional development where we can cooperate with each other and it is not a controversial issue, bilateral issue, therefore, it should be kept out of it. And the whole of SAARC adopted it in that declaration that this was a good thing. So Bhutan has this very supple, very subtle technique or strategy to bring about this kind of a balancing. They have now very actively been participating in BIMSTEC because SAARC is in ICU. We don't know if it would be revived. But their commitment is there to SAARC even today. They would very much like it to be revived. Now in BIMSTEC, they find a new outlet to not only Southeast Asia but also to the Indian Ocean and therefore, they are very active again on environmental issues. They have taken up and I'll come to it in a short while. And they are finding it extremely useful to which again shows a balancing in terms of widening, diversifying their external relations. BBIN has given us a little setback. They have not encouraged BBIN and the argument which they have made is that this will pollute our environment because so many trucks would come. Factly, I have talked to leaders in all the three other countries, Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan. There another concern which Bhutan has not expressed is that this kind of an arrangement would be highly unequal because India has most of the vehicles which would be moving freely into the neighbouring countries. Comparatively, these countries have a small number of vehicles whether they are transport vehicles or public, private transport or whatever it is. Therefore, it would be an unequal movement, more of the Indian vehicles coming up and you know for all the neighbours, I use a phrase, how close to India is not too close. Everyone wants to be cooperating with India. Everybody wants to be with India because they know there are geographical, civilizational, cultural, economic compulsions and what not but they still want to retain their identity and as I think it has already been mentioned, the identity is a very critical issue and this takes me to… so in BBIN, they have drawn their hands. They are there as an observer. We don't object whatever you want to do but we have our own reservations and this takes, I think, BIMSTEC takes them and this is what I wish to address to my Bhutanese colleague, takes them to Gelephu Mindfulness City. Now, Gelephu Mindfulness City has one, two, three aspects which indicate to the soft balancing and one is the international airport where big bodies, planes could come and they obviously would come from outside and they know that. They have noted it. I mean, they have noted changes taking place in Nepal, monarchy going away, democracy. That's a domestic question. If you have questions, we will go into that but an international airport will link them directly with the world and India has serious reservations so far as the international outlet of Pokhara Airport is concerned. We have not allowed our flights which can go to the Pokhara International Airport in Nepal for various reasons, security, otherwise, whatever else it is. Now, Gelephu Mindfulness Project and they have again, very intelligently taken the models of Singapore and Dubai, not any of the western countries, not any of the big powers so that it doesn't cause any kind of but the effort is to diversify the economy which is hardly constrained by hydropower and tourism and both for hydropower and tourism, they have to depend heavily on India. So if you diversify your economy, make it more manufacturing of the, they call it green technologies or whatever else it is, I mean more finite like Switzerland is doing, if that is the kind of a thing they start, then they can fly off directly to the whole world and connect with them and reduce their dependence upon the two economy factors which are hydropower and tourism. Therefore, they have projected this mindfulness city project as spiritual, as being Bhutan's necessity because of migration, stopping young people there, connected with the gross national happiness, and this is all correct, I am not questioning it, but also with it is correct that it will give them a tremendous boost in terms of diversifying their economy away from India and diversifying their international contacts away from India. Thank you very much.

V.P. Haran:  Thank you, Professor Muni. A couple of points, you mentioned about the BBIN agreement, it is the motor vehicles agreement you are referring to and at some stage we even gave them assurances that our vehicles will not come in, there is no question of Nepalese vehicles going there or even Bangladeshi vehicles going there. We told them we will have some informal arrangement under which we will take care of your concerns. Even that did not satisfy, basically the local people, local drivers, local fleet owners were opposed to it. Second, but I mean you should give credit to Bhutan that despite that they said, I mean they wrote formally saying that you can go ahead with implementing the agreement, we will come and join as soon when possible. Okay, so they gave a green light to the rest of the three to go ahead, but even that has not unfortunately worked out. About, yes, I agree with Professor Muni that there have been frictions in relations with Bhutan, it is not as it is very smooth as it appears on the surface, but what is important to note is we do not talk about it in public, we settle it quietly. I mean whenever there is an issue, we sit down together, sit down across the table and sort it out and both have been accommodative in this respect, that is why it has not blown up, no issue has blown up. Okay, now we will have about 10 minutes or so for questions, so welcome questions from the audience, from the people who are present here, but could you also please mention the name of the panelist to whom you are addressing the question? Thank you, please. Is there a mic somewhere?

Ashok Mehta:  Thank you very much. My name is Ashok Mehta, I am a retired officer of the Indian Army. And if the chair permits, I'll just take two minutes to not ask a question, but highlight an issue which has not come out in this, either due to the constraints of the title of the seminar. The issue relates to border security. And you referred very briefly just now to problems between India and Bhutan. Well, that problem relates directly to the linkage in the border dispute. There is an agreement between India and Bhutan, or there was an agreement, that the border dispute of Bhutan will be resolved once the Indian border dispute is resolved. I'm putting it clumsily, because I'm not a diplomat. But that is a fact. And this little commotion that took place two years ago, when the king came to India four times in a year, was related to the fact that a prime minister of Bhutan was moving at a pace much faster than was necessary in the resolution of the border dispute. And so that is one point that is germane to India-Bhutan relations. And this irks them. And the second point is about the king. I think although it's a constitutional monarchy, it is the king and the king alone, if I might say so, that makes supreme policy decisions, whether it's the border or in foreign policy. You did mention that the king guides the foreign policy. I think the government, the people of Bhutan, have entrusted their faith in the king. And that is what is most important. And therefore, India respects that fact. And India has not allowed this issue of the border dispute to blow up in a way that would cause consternation internationally. Thank you.

V.P. Haran:  Thank you. First, please.

P.M. Narayanan:  Hello. My name is P.M. Narayanan, and I work for German public broadcaster. The question is that, among Indian neighbours, most of our neighbours are very loud and clear where the strategic shift is, their strategic shift is. But here Bhutan is, as you said, is kind of silently balancing the shift. Why they are silent? Is it because of India? To whom are they fearing? The question is to the one of the panelists.

S.D. Muni:  Can I respond to what you said arising out of General Mehta's comments on the border? The Bhutanese today would like to settle their border with China, let's be very clear. And they have repeatedly been coming and saying that let us settle the border more respectfully. The problem is of the Doklam area. The Chinese offered them swapping of the territories. In the central zone there are almost 459 or some square kilometers, while this Doklam zone is about 200 and odd kilometers. The Chinese are willing to give them more territory for this kind of a territory. And this is a strategic area which is very critical to India's own security. That's why India's reservations, I think, are legitimate. And Bhutan is very carefully understanding that. Therefore, this is going slowly. But the whole idea of border defence came up during Doklam issue in a very, as you said rightly, very, it's not two, it's 2017, that the issue came and we had to face it. Secondly, we think, we do things quietly, but sometimes we have problems on that. And one problem was of managing the Northeast insurgents settled in Bhutan. We wanted them to clear since 1997. And the Bhutanese allowed the cooperation in 2003. For seven years they were not willing to have this any kind of a collaboration because they did not want Indian forces to go inside Bhutan. Call it Sri Lanka experience, call it Nepal experience, whatever else it is. But this is where I say they're very intelligently, but very softly, they insisted that. And then later on in 2003, when we were allowed to go and clear them, the condition was that we will flush them out. Once they come out, you manage them. The Indian troops were still not, despite IMTRAT and all other trainings which had gone up earlier, were not welcome so far as the Bhutanese boundaries are concerned. Let us be very clear about that aspect also. Secondly, on China, even without diplomatic relations, it may be a wrong figure, but I have come across it and many Bhutanese have confirmed it, almost 30% of the consumer goods are from China and they come through third country trades and therefore a lot of businessmen who are bringing international goods into China have stakes in projects like diversification and Gelephu Mindfulness City.

No, no, this is not out of fear, this is out of judicious judgement because they know, as the chair said very rightly, they have problem with China and Tibet. They don't feel very confident about China and Tibet. Under compulsions, Vietnam does not feel very confident about China but they settled their border. So settling border is not necessarily playing the Nepal kind of politics. That's not true. So it's not out of fear. It is out of a judicious decision that geography dictates them to have very close relations with India, not to offend India. And that's precisely what I said, it is a soft balancing. That without offending India, they still want to diversify. Therefore there is a shift, a strategic shift that we shall no longer depend for our foreign relations on India, number one. Internal problems, youth which has already been mentioned, business interests which have already been mentioned, exposure to the world which is already there in Bhutan, there are so many factors for that. But we shall diversify without offending India. So I don't think it is a fear. It is a kind of a judicious decision and therefore these are what you may call it self-imposed constraints in not going all out.

V.P. Haran:  But it's not true that they are keeping quiet. I mean they do bring up the issue with us but in a sort of subtle way and directly, not through media. Okay, I think this lady here, you wanted it, no?

Unidentified Speaker:  My question was regarding the lens of soft and silent, you have already answered that. So I would like to ask, can Bhutan sustain strategic autonomy amid intensifying India-China competition? I mean what do you foresee in the next decade? That's what I would like to know.

V.P. Haran:  They have been successfully maintaining it for the last 70, 80 years since we became independent. I don't see any problem in doing that. The youth certainly have a different view on China. They want economic cooperation with them because they see benefits from strengthening economic cooperation with China. The example was in 2013 or so when I went, there was hardly any Chinese tourists. But by 2016, they were the number one tourist-sending country to this one and that benefited the tourism industry a lot. There were 13,000 tourists or so from China, which is a huge number for Bhutan and that benefited the hotel industry, that benefited the car industry, so that is what they had seen. They still think that if they can strengthen relations, economic relations with China, it will be to their benefit. But as far as the political issues are concerned, they left it to the king and they trust the king and they know that he will make a decision, the right decision at the appropriate moment.

Unidentified Speaker:  Thank you. Thank you so much.

V.P. Haran:  Oh my God. Yeah, please, after that.

Ishaan:  Thank you so much. My name is Ishaan.

V.P. Haran:  Please let the question be short, please.

Ishaan:  Yeah. My question is to Mr. Lamsang. So you mentioned that whatever happens in Nepal, Bangladesh, the elections, it doesn't contribute to any instability for Bhutan. So what factors have contributed for that political stability? Thank you.

V.P. Haran:  Tenzing, are you there? Yeah, he is there.

S.D. Muni:  I have a question for him also if I can.

V.P. Haran:  Okay, yeah. Tenzing, one minute. Professor Muni also has a question for you, so please take them together.

S.D. Muni:  In the Gelephu Mindfulness Project, if the Chinese want to come and invest, what would be the Bhutanese response?

V.P. Haran:  We can't hear you. Unmute, please.

Tenzing Lamsang:  Yeah, I'm unmuted. Can you hear me now?

V.P. Haran:  Yes, we can.

Tenzing Lamsang:  Okay. So I'll take both the questions and a couple of my comments. In terms of the earlier question on the stability in Bhutan is because we, like I mentioned in my paper or presentation, foreign policy is too important for us to change with every new government. So whenever a new government of any political party, different parties come in, they will follow the traditional foreign policy of Bhutan because it suits Bhutan the best and it is in line with the geographical realities and also the friendships and relationships we've built over a long period of time. It will be an extraordinary kind of tectonic shift for that to change and I don't foresee it changing for the near future.

In terms of Professor Muni's question, the Gelephu Mindfulness City project is a project which is not in terms of inviting countries to come in. So it will primarily, it's looking at Indian investment and Indian companies and I think His Majesty and the Prime Minister, they've travelled to Mumbai, they've met with Mukesh Ambani, the Tata Group, Adani, Mahindra Group and various Indian, because the shift I see happening is Bhutan is kind of, and I think it's only natural that there's only so much projects we can do with the government of India because the mega projects in Bhutan have mostly been with the government of India in terms of hydro power and all of that. So now I think we are looking at upscaling that and bringing in the Indian private sector. So I think in GMC the most important critical partner would be India and Indian companies but at the same time we are opening up to international companies. So it would not be like Bhutan opening up to China or Russia or America but it's GMC will be an investment avenue where international companies… legitimate companies would come in and there would be very strong KYC norms, know your customer norms, so we will not welcome companies who are there for example money laundering or doing suspicious shady things. So it would be one of the best KYC kind of barriers in the world, only legitimate companies say like Apple or a Microsoft or a Reliance or a Tata group or a TCS would be welcome. A couple of quick comments in terms of the clause 2 of the 1949 treaty Bhutan, I asked some foreign ministry people here a long time ago that what was Bhutan's position on this because when this was being changed in 2007 so I think Bhutan always regarded it as an advisory more than a black and white condition and I think that spirit was upheld in the 2007 renegotiation of the treaty so it was regarded more as an advisory than something to be followed otherwise if you were to follow that strictly then you'd be constrained to a relationship only with India and not have diplomatic ties or even enter the United Nations. So I think it was always regarded as advisory and India has always been a big neighbour but generous in spirit and in understanding of Bhutan situation. So I think that is there and then the quick final comment on… earlier speaker mentioned Chinese social media is very popular in terms of TikTok. So I think just to clarify that I think when you mentioned Chinese social media he I think is referring to TikTok which is used which is right now probably the most popular social media app in the world so it's been banned in India because of the conflict back then but then I think in Bhutan it is used primarily by Bhutanese users so we don't get much content on TikTok from China but I think more so from creators from America and some from India as well who use perhaps VPN bypass and I would I think in that sense, yeah that's the thing there.

V.P. Haran:  This lady and then after that and that ends it, please, no more, sorry.

Shikha Salaria:  Hello my name is Shikha Salaria, I work with India Abroad, I'm a senior journalist. My first question emerges from your comments Ambassador Haran, you mentioned that Bhutan had been very hesitant to engage directly engage with the P5 powers. So my question would be was that emerging from the Nepal experience, because they've seen that Nepal has, at times, been in sort of a dilemma of choosing between India and China. And whenever we see a new head of the nation take over, he has to make the first visit and decide where to go first. So was it because of the Nepal experience, one? My second question is to Mr. Tenzing. How do the youth of Bhutan look at the developments in Nepal and Bangladesh? Would you say that they are also disillusioned to what has happened in the neighbourhood, and which is why they would prefer stability, and which is why they would possibly, even if they have certain differences with the current policy, they would like that the relationship with India should be given priority than any other relationship. Thank you.

V.P. Haran:  Tenzing, will you come again, please?

Tenzing Lamsang: Yeah. Yeah, can you hear me?

V.P. Haran:  Yes.

Tenzing Lamsang:  Can you all hear me?

V.P. Haran:  Yes.

Tenzing Lamsang:  Okay. So in terms of the Nepal and the recent Gen Z revolution in Nepal and the other kind of revolution in Bangladesh, I think the Bhutanese youth have seen it on social media and have discussed it. For example, it's been discussed on Reddit, which is an increasingly popular social media app where, I think, more intelligent discussions are had over there. The uncles and aunties are mostly on Facebook and TikTok, but it's the more smarter youth who go on Reddit. And they kind of brought up the issue of Nepo babies, I think, which was a big thing in Nepal as well. So as soon as that came up, a lot of the so-called Nepo babies started deleting their Instagram accounts and their nice holiday pictures abroad. So I think it had a little bit of an impact, but I think Bhutan is primarily a very stable country. It can't be compared to Nepal and Bangladesh. We are a high-trust society. The government has delivered, so the people trust the government. In terms of, if I can quickly come on the P5 question, you see, if we have relations with a P5 country, let's say America, I think the next question will be from China. I mean, you can have it with America, or you can have it with UK. Why can't you have it with us? So I think our traditional position has been that if there is to be any relationship between Bhutan and China, the boundary issue has to be resolved first. And I think that has been the official line as well. So yeah, I would say that.

V.P. Haran:  Thank you, Tenzing. Just to add a bit, the Bhutanese approach on this issue predates Nepal's own problems between India and this one, China. In fact, it comes down from Third King, Second King also, to some extent. That person, please, at the back. Yes.

Sripathi Narayanan:  I'm Sripathi. So I'm Sripathi. I'm a research fellow with the Council here. My question is that, how long do you think Bhutan can maintain its domestic political stability, given the fact that this political stability since 2008 is structurally forced by the constitution. Even though it is a parliamentary system, the election process is a presidential style and from every election, you have pretty much a new set of political players, new set of political parties and the musical jazz. So how long will that sustain? And the question of that being a presidential style, you can have multiple parties contesting in the first round. But in the runoff round, you only have the top two parties. Therefore, the political stability or a majority government is forced, which means that the government may not actually have mass sympathy or mass support, which is quite visible in the case of Maldives, which also became a democratic country in 2008 like Bhutan. Thank you.

V.P. Haran:  Thank you. I don't think you're right in your assessment about the political situation in this one, particularly as regards elections. Let me make it clear to you. When I was there, I posed the same question. Aren't you sort of limiting the participation in the political process? They also have a rule that anybody who wants to contest elections has to be a graduate. For that counter question from the king to me was, don't you have prescribed qualification for recruiting a peon in the government? These are people who are going to decide your policy. I haven't tried to have something like this for a member of parliament. And about the other question about only two parties being present in parliament after the first round, I mean contesting in the second round, again, they've drawn lessons from Indian experience, like what happened in Bihar, what happened in Haryana. This is precisely what I was told. They don't want a similar situation, but they say that we are a small country. We can't afford such instability. So the best way of handling it is this way. That's why they opened it to everybody. Now, so far, the first one was Jigme Thinley, the prime minister. Second one was Tshering Tobgay. Third was Lotay Tshering. Now, again, Tshering Tobgay has come back. So, I mean, yes, you are right in one sense, because a completely new set of people without experience enter the parliament and then form the ministry. That poses difficulty, but that's only for a short time. They learn the tricks quite fast. And you wanted to say something, sorry. Okay. Okay, I think we'll call it off now. And I would like to thank ICWA for organizing this on a very interesting topic. I'd like to thank the panelists for the contribution, and also the audience for their lively participation in the Q&A session. Thank you.

Subodh Bharti:  Thank you, sir. On behalf of ICWA, I take this opportunity to thank our distinguished chair and esteemed panelists. We have benefitted immensely from today's discussion. My special thanks to the audience for their valuable participation. I extend my sincere thanks to ADDG ICWA, JS Research, JS admin, director, Director of Research, Dr. Nivedita Ray ma’am, and the seminar IT and publication team, research faculty, and the entire ICWA staff for their support. To know more about ICWA's research work, visit our website and follow us on our social media handles on X, LinkedIn, Facebook, and Instagram. May I now invite you to please join us for high tea in the foyer. Thank you once again.

*****