Indian Council of World Affairs

 

Aman Kumar: Good afternoon, excellencies, ladies and gentlemen. My name is Aman. I'm a researcher with the Council. On behalf of the Indian Council of World Affairs, I welcome you all to this panel discussion titled Geopolitical Awakening in Europe: EU as a Security Actor. Before we proceed, may I kindly request you all to put your phone on silent mode. Thank you. The discussion will be chaired  by Ambassador Saurabh Kumar, former Indian Ambassador to EU, Belgium and Luxembourg. Our speakers for today are Professor Gulshan Sachdeva, Professor Centre for European Studies, JNU, New Delhi, Ms. Shairee Malhotra, Deputy Director Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, and Dr Gesine Weber, Senior Researcher at the Centre for Security Studies, Zurich. The welcome remarks will be delivered by Ambassador N.J. Gangte, Acting Deputy Director General of ICWA.

 

May I now request Ambassador N.J. Gangte to deliver his opening remarks.

 

1. J. Gangte: Good afternoon, everyone. Ambassador Saurabh Kumar, distinguished panelists and experts from India and Europe, members of the Diplomatic Corps, academia, students and friends. It is a delight for me to welcome you all to today's panel discussion on a Geopolitical Awakening in Europe: EU as a Security Actor. For much of its existence, the European Union has been viewed as a unique experiment that championed regional integration, multilateralism and the promotion of democratic norms and human rights values, making it a normative actor at the international stage. However, on matters of security and defence of Europe, the EU traditionally played a secondary role, with the member states and NATO primarily driving the European security and defence narratives and policies.

 

With the geopolitical landscape drastically transformed at both the global and regional level in the last two decades, many long-held assumptions are also being challenged. Russia's assertive foreign policy, growing great power rivalry, and the perceived dwindling American commitments to European security have fundamentally changed the continent's security environment, leading to what has been described as geopolitical awakening. With the return of geopolitics as articulated by Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, there is greater reflection in Brazil about the EU's role and duties in a turbulent world.

 

Accordingly, we are seeing greater securitization of the EU policies, where strategic perspectives are now guiding EU's engagements with third parties. Much of this transformation is visible in the EU's response to the Ukraine war, triggered by Russia's invasion in 2022, which now has been considered a turning point in where Europeans have relooked at their security comprehensively, now includes significant military support to Ukraine along with the member states. To reduce Europe's dependence on the U.S. and further strengthen the European pillar of the NATO, EU is taking lead with rearmament strategies such as Readiness 2030 and Security Action for Europe plan to boost European defence and readiness. EU is equally focusing on tech and digital sovereignty, with priorities such as securing digital infrastructure, with a shift in approach from value-based digital diplomacy towards a more security and competitive-driven approach.

 

Security, however, is not just limited to military preparedness. Equal emphasis is now being put on energy security, securing critical supply chains, protection of the digital infrastructure along with building economic resilience. Yet critical questions such as dependency on the U.S. security umbrella, internal narratives, the rise of far-right parties across Europe, China's industrial overcapacity remain in place and needs to be addressed. With this brief outline, it is anticipated that today's deliberations and presentations will address these issues and put before us a comprehensive picture of the ongoing transformation in the EU.

 

With these words, I'd like to thank all of you once again for joining us today, and I look forward to an engaging and insightful discussion. Thank you.

 

Aman Kumar: Thank you, sir. I may now request Ambassador Kumar to please take over the proceedings. Thank you.

 

Saurabh Kumar: Let me welcome all of you to this session, and it's really my privilege to chair this session, which is on a very important topic, Geopolitical Awakening in Europe: EU as a Security Actor. As the title perhaps implies, it has inherent in it the question whether we are witnessing a transformational change in EU's identity from primarily a regulatory and economic superpower to a consequential geopolitical and security actor. And I do hope that the discussion we have today would shed more light on this.

 

As we know, the European project rested on a remarkable historical achievement, that of Europe breaking away from the tradition of waging wars to choosing integration and interdependence as a means of peace. EU's influence thus primarily rested on normative power, its ability to shape rules, standards and institutions. The so-called Brussels effect became as influential globally as military might of many of the other countries. The strategic environment, however, has changed fundamentally, and not least by the efforts to expand the European and the transatlantic projects eastward.

 

Four developments are noteworthy. First, Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2020, as has been mentioned, which brought about a fundamental change in Europe's strategic thinking. Territorial threat, however, not only comes from the East, but also the West, in the nature of American desire for Greenland. Second, is equally, if not more important, it is the structural erosion of confidence in the U.S. commitment to Article 5 and NATO more generally. Third, is the spread of grey zone and hybrid threats, such as marine cable cutting, cyber attacks on infrastructure, disinformation, etc. And finally, there are aspects related to technology and economy, space security, technological competition, energy insecurity, weaponization of economic interdependence, both by China and the U.S., which demonstrates that economics and technology are more closely linked to security than perhaps ever before.

 

The response of EU and European countries to these developments, in my view, have been impressive. They took a number of steps, remarkable not only by their own standards, but general standards. I would mention a few of them. One, imposition of incrementally tightening sanctions on Russia and financial and other assistance to Ukraine. Two, increase in defence spending. Three, a number of measures were taken on the defence side and they brought out a white paper on European defence and rearm Europe plan with a Readiness 2030 horizon aiming to mobilise EUR 800 billion in additional defence investments.

 

Next is entering into new strategic and defence partnerships with important and major partners, India being one of them. And lastly, launching of flagship projects like European Drone Defence Initiative, Eastern Defence Watch and the proposed European Air Shield, all reflective of an approach, which would have been unthinkable some years ago. So the question is no longer whether Europe recognises the changed geopolitical environment, or for that matter whether there is geopolitical awakening in Europe. The more pertinent issue is whether the EU will be able to develop the necessary political cohesion, institutional capacity and strategic culture to become a genuine geopolitical actor in the long run.

 

Can 27 democracies with different histories, nuanced differences in threat perceptions and different domestic priorities work towards a common strategic outlook, particularly when defence remains a national competence? We'll be happy to have the views of this panel on this issue. It would also be worth deliberating issues such as ability of member states to sustain high levels of defence financing, particularly debt financing. The other issue worth discussing would be NATO and the confidence which the European countries have in it and its future. Europe increasingly speaks of strategic autonomy and European pillar within NATO, how we see NATO going ahead. NATO summit is taking place in Turkey and I think we would have one of our panellists joining us from there.

 

The other important point, of course, is political cohesion within the 27 countries, which remains hugely important. Also, the impact of diminishing American footprint and rearming of Germany would warrant a discussion. Would the demons of the past come to haunt Europe again or would EU and Europe raise their game to match the challenges which the continent faces? And lastly, but not the least, relations with China, China's actions on the global stage and EU's global pacific strategy. Lastly, it would also be worthwhile for the panel to delve into what all of this means for India as we diversify our defence relations and seek defence technology.

 

The summit which took place in January, during that security and defence partnership between EU and India was signed. It was also announced that the FTA negotiations have been completed and that EU and India would be launching negotiations on EU's major innovation initiative that is Horizon Europe. So from India-EU perspective, all the three major areas of engagement, I think one has been concluded and the second negotiations have been concluded and the signing of the FTA is likely to take place later this year or early next year and the negotiations have been launched on the third.

 

So where does it take us, what comes out of it is something again, which would be of interest. So to help us unpack all this, we have a very distinguished panel with us, both from academia as well as the people from the think tank. I do look forward to their addresses after which I think we would have half an hour for exchange of views. So I would conclude with this short address of mine and give the floor to, I think, Professor Sachdeva.

 

Gulshan Sachdeva: Thank you, Ambassador Saurabh Kumar. And first, let me take this opportunity to formally thank ICWN, particularly Ambassador Gangte and Joint Secretary Abhijit Chakravorty and the whole team looking after Europe for this invitation. And I also can recognize Ambassador Bhatia and many others who are really following these things very, very closely. And of course, my co-panellist, you know, Shairee Malhotra. Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, in fact, I had prepared slightly longer, but now I see that it's only 10 minutes. And so I don't want to really take up time, come to just a couple of points. This is a very broad actually topic, geopolitical awakening in Europe. And then the EU as a security actor.

 

So it means, as I think Ambassador Kumar has mentioned I mean one has really covered a lot of areas, really to understand this. Let me try to see and he also said, he also want something on the India-EU, and what is really going on maybe I'll just spend two minutes on that as well at the end. Now, when we are talking about geopolitical awakening. Now geopolitics is not new to Europeans. It's not something that suddenly they have discovered. They built global empires. And even geopolitics as a concept originated in Europe. But of course the situation changed after the Second World War. Europe was totally devastated. They had to face mighty Soviet Union next to them which had already expanded into Eastern Europe. And then of course they were also economically and militarily dependent on the United States.

 

And in that kind of situation, relatively small countries in Europe in the global sense they could have become irrelevant or they would have just lost their cloud in the process. But what we have today is they have really built this whole European integration project, which not only suppress the nationalist sentiments, which was quite strong in many of the countries which actually led to wars in Europe. And also to kind of tackle the Germany question within Europe. And what you have is one of the largest economies of the world. If one is talking about United States and China was two major economies, exactly the same way you can also look at the EU.

 

So, despite all the challenges which of course they have so many of them, which I don't want to not get into this which Europe faces today. It's one of the largest economies something about $20 trillion and per capita income in Europe is something about average more than $50,000. And they just represent only about 5.5% of the global population, and in the smaller geographical, I would say area, but still economy is almost equivalent to China or even the U.S. bigger than Chinese economy. And there is a high degree of economic integration, stronger human development, and of course relatively low level of economic inequality. And still they play a very important role in the core institutions of global governance and also global economic governance.

 

And if one is following the whole climate negotiations, Europe of course has played very important role and they do have ambitions to play a leading role there as well. And in the global development architecture, more than 50% global development finance actually come from Europe, I mean the member states and also from the European Union. So as a result of this whole European integration projects and the transatlantic partnership, European citizens have also experienced unprecedented peace and also prosperity. And as a result, you can see despite all these challenges, still many countries in the European area, they want to be member of the European Union because that will perhaps provide assured ticket to prosperity, stability, etc.

 

Now, the major challenges what they are really facing, and I'll come to this geopolitical and security point in a minute, which was of course also highlighted by the Draghi report in '24. One is that the cheap Russian energy which really supported growth, now that is not going to be available. That's a geopolitical decision which Europe has taken. Not that Russia doesn't want to supply to them, but the way, as you all know, things have developed in the last few years. Second, what the kind of market China provided for many years, because China is also very deeply engaged with the Europe and Europe is also very deeply engaged with the Chinese economy. There are issues and those things also may not be available in the years to come.

 

And then of course, security guarantees under transatlantic partnership, that is also questionable. And the couple of things which even the Draghi report pointed out, if you look at all the future technologies, you look at artificial intelligence, you look at digital platforms, you look at advanced manufacturing, you look at ability to scale firms. I think Europe, they thought that actually they'll be doing very well in all these things. But I think there are challenges now coming both from the United States and also from China. So there are three major transformation as Draghi report pointed out taking place in Europe now.

 

First, in fact, what they have to do is accelerate innovation and identifying new growth engines. Second, reducing high energy costs while continue progress toward net zero. And third, of course, ensuring their own security in this kind of fragmented geopolitical world. But of course, Europe also has very solid strengths, particularly its education system, its health system, and also robust welfare state so far what we have in Europe. So there is a very solid possibility that if things are put together, Europe can really continue to be a very important player in the global economy and also coming back to the geopolitical and security actor as well.

 

Now, if one is really looking into coming to that security actor and the geopolitical thing, if one goes to all those documents, which have been released by the European Commission in the last 10-15 years. Now, I do not have no time to go into any one of them. But starting from the European security strategy in 2003 to 2016, the global strategy, then the European compass of 2022, the neighborhood policy reviews, and Indo-Pacific strategy, you have the global gateway strategy, you have the European Green Deal, common foreign security policy, etc. And the China outlook in 2019, India strategy 2018-2025, the declaration of Versailles in 2022, the PESCO, Permanent Structural Cooperation, European Defence Fund, strategic compass, space and security strategies, cyber defence policy, Defence Industrial Strategy '24, and of course the white paper on defence.

 

So all these are available, you can download and go through all of them. But what is really comes as a result of all these things and what we have just discussed so far, if one is looking at the defence part, I think the major transformation is going to take place or already taking place in Europe. These changes are structural. And they are not just temporary. And they are driven mainly by the war in Ukraine. Uncertainty about the future the U.S. commitments and also the rise of new domains like cyber, space and drones, etc.

 

So one is that Europe is also coming back to return to hard power. From soft power, they're trying to build their hard power and conventional deterrence. So it's not post-modern Europe as we used to know. So they're also coming back to the classical geopolitics and military deterrence. That's going to happen in the next many years. There is also a massive increase in the defence spending. Under Trump pressure now there are going to be 5% commitment by 2035 and out of that 3.5% has to be really on actual real defence rather than the peripheral things. So it means the model of low defence spending is changing but obviously if resources are going to be more on defence then you have to cut it somewhere else. So the kind of welfare state, yes, I'll just finish there, and then of course the push for the European strategic autonomy, etc. And then going for the industrialization of defence and then the new security partnerships etc.

 

So the paradigm shift which is really taking place in Europe, the first time you also see that the European Union itself is now going for weapon financing, which they have done in Ukraine. You also have the commissioner for defence and space and then the whole defence industrial base, which is going to be changed dramatically. So from a normative active you are going to look for more realist actor, from naive globalization you're looking for more economic security and other kind of policies coming. And then for defence outsourcing you're looking more for strategic autonomy and building defence capabilities within Europe. But, of course, there are limits of this kind of geopolitical turn which Europe is doing because there has to be unanimity on all these things, the way the European project is. And it's not very easy within 27 countries to get into this unanimity.

 

The last one minute if I can take on this India-EU thing. Now we have been following this, details are known, but two things what we did in the last summit, the finalization of the trade negotiation and the defence and security partnership. Geopolitics obviously has played a very important role. If the way the geopolitics is today, the way the Trump tariffs wouldn't have been there, the way the transatlantic tensions wouldn't have been there, maybe would have been actually still negotiating this trade deal for some more time. We can come back to this later in detail if there are certain questions, and on defence and security partnership.

 

Now, we also have signed this with the European Union. And you can also look at when Prime Minister has gone to many of the other countries to the Netherlands to Italy to other places. And earlier with Germany and also with France. We also have no bilateral kind of defence partnership and all the roadmaps, etc., with all of them. But I think the last point which I would like to make here on this, which I've written earlier that buying few defence items, high ticket items from Europe, like you buy Rafael from France or you buy a submarine from Germany or anything else. That's okay that has been going on for quite some time, it's good for them, and we have resources we can buy it. But now the ambition from both sides is also linking defence industries of India and Europe, becoming part of value chain because we have our own ambition of make in India, and then exports have gone up in the last few years. Now one has to understand that so far, the Indian defence ecosystem is largely based on Russian defence industry because many of our exports from BrahMos and many others are also Russians. I mean, produced with Russian collaboration.

 

Now at the moment, there is a serious strategic challenge, Europe has with Russia, and that's likely to continue at least for some time. So long as that continues, we may say that it's easy to kind of work with both of them. But in defence matters as I said, buying certain things are relatively easy, but actually linking defence industries are going to have much more I would say geopolitical convergence between India and Europe on many of those issues. And those perhaps will take time, but I think still we are working on those, which we can come back to some of those things. Thank you.

 

Saurabh Kumar: Thank you very much, Professor Sachdeva, particularly giving us a bird's eye view of a relationship, which is very wide, and the developments which are taking place, but also pointing out the challenges, which would be there as we engage our defence cooperation with the Europeans. We are running a bit behind schedule. So, Ms. Shairee Malhotra may I request you to take the floor.

 

Shairee Malhotra: Sure. Thank you, Ambassador. I want to first of course thank ICWA the organizers for doing this event for inviting me here to speak. I also want to congratulate you because I think it's wonderful timing for the event because we do have the NATO summit currently taking place. So in my remarks, I'll quickly discuss some of the drivers or factors behind the EU's emergence as a security or strategic actor. And then I'll also delve into some of the challenges that the EU faces in its path to becoming a more strategic actor. And finally, some implications for EU-India relations.

 

So, of course, we are all aware that the EU has predominantly been an economic power and it was envisioned as such. But lately, it is at a strategic crossroads due to several external pressures. And when President von der Leyen came to power, she did announce that she would create a geopolitical commission. And I think to some extent, the EU has succeeded in its ambition, even though there are several challenges along the way. I think, of course, one of the biggest catalysts in the EU's emergence as a strategic actor has been Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Contrary to what a lot of people believe, it's actually the EU that has been the largest supporter, the largest financial and military backer of Ukraine.

 

I think until about mid-2025, EU and member states had spent $138 billion, I think it's dollars on military aid to Ukraine, whereas the US had spent $122 billion. So the EU is actually higher, has spent more than the US in that context. And so the EU has acted as a credible security provider and financial assistance provider for Ukraine. Member states have also been more or less united when it comes to their assistance to Kiev. The EU has adopted 20 packages of sanctions against Russia, which are really of an unprecedented scale. And I think it's due to adopt the 21st package soon as well.

 

And then, of course, the second issue that has enabled the EU to become a strategic actor is the transatlantic turbulence that we've witnessed during President Trump's second term, which has really redefined perceptions of the US from the EU's most trusted ally to becoming an unpredictable and unreliable partner, and sometimes even a rather coercive partner. And the U.S. has finally pushed Europe to stop freeriding on U.S. security guarantees and take responsibility and share of its own security. And therefore, member states during the last summit in last June, the Hague Summit, did pledge to spend 5% of their GDPs on defence. And of course, the EU has also come up with several new defence initiatives. The Rearm Europe plan, for instance, that targets EUR 800 billion in joint and national defence spending, the safe instrument of EUR 150 billion towards loans for defence modernization.

 

The EU also recently created a new position for EU Commissioner of Defence and Space. Then you have the white paper on the future for European defence readiness, etc., etc. I mean, if you want to discuss the EU's documents, we can, of course, as Professor Gulshan Sachdeva said, we can go on and on. But yes, I think it is important that the EU will be releasing a new European security strategy this year. That is the plan. And this strategy will come only four years after the strategic compass was released in 2022. And I think this gap of only four years, I think it reflects how much has changed within Europe and how quickly the EU is trying to adapt to all this change.

 

Then you have the SDPs, the Security and Defence Partnerships that the EU is signing with several countries. And these SDPs are core pillars of the EU's foreign and security policy. There are 12 SDPs so far, five are in Europe, and these include Norway, the UK, and the three enlargement countries. In addition, the EU has signed SDPs with Canada, Japan, South Korea, and only this year, the EU did sign an SDP with India, with Australia, and with Ghana. And these SDPs are really frameworks of cooperation aimed at strengthening the EU's relations with non-EU like-minded countries.

 

Then there is the question of EU enlargement, which has now taken on a very strategic outlook. It's now viewed as a major security imperative to prevent countries from falling into antagonistic spheres of influence. And it's likely that there will be a new wave of enlargement soon, the first wave after 2013. And then, of course, the EU does have a massive China problem, and the EU has a growing trade deficit with China. Last year, it was about EUR 360 billion. And one would have thought that with the divergences with the U.S., that the EU would have tried to normalize its relations with China, but no, that's not really happened. The EU is instead using the tools in its toolbox, FDI screening instruments, anti-dumping tariffs, etc., to deal with the China challenge. So it is, again, looking at China from a very strategic lens.

 

And, of course, another thing that's very important, and I think Ambassador mentioned it, what's happening domestically within member states. And most important is Germany, of course, because it is the largest economy of the EU, and the Zeitgen-Wende that is happening within Germany, which is finally shedding some of its reluctance when it comes to affairs of military and security. So there is indeed a massive shift underway in Brussels at the moment. The strategic autonomy debate is rampant in Europe at this time. And these are some of the factors, as I mentioned that are influencing the EU's ability to transition from an economic bloc to a more geopolitical force.

 

But of course, not all is rosy. There are a lot of challenges on the path of the EU's emergence as a geopolitical actor. And of course, you have all the structural and institutional constraints that are really embedded in the EU's decision-making architecture. These limit the EU's ability to act in a timely manner, because unanimity is needed, consensus is needed amongst 27 member states when it comes to key foreign policy issues. And I'm sure you're all familiar with the previous Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who was considered a serial blocker in the EU. He was always blocking important decisions when it comes to sanctions packages against Russia, etc.

 

So even though I believe the EU's support to Ukraine has really been commendable. And the problem is that it hasn't been timely enough, which is why the EU, in a sense, has set up Ukraine to not lose this war, but it's not necessarily set it up to win the war. Because again, all of these processes and all of these procedures, when you have all of that, and important decisions have to be taken, and when they are delayed, that obviously causes an issue. In the Iran war, for instance, you've also seen the EU being conspicuously absent due to disagreements between member states.

 

And that brings me to the other massive challenge, which is divergent foreign policy priorities, different national interests, threat perceptions among member states. You have countries on the eastern flank, for instance, that are very much threatened by Russia, so they want to spend more and more on security and defence. You have countries on the southern periphery of Europe, such as Spain, that are not particularly threatened by Russia, so who haven't signed up to the NATO pledge of spending 5%. And then unlike on matters of trade, the European Commission does not have exclusive competence when it comes to things like security and defence, which is mostly under the purview of EU member states, under the purview of national capitals.

 

So I think there is a limited role in that sense that the EU can play in these matters as a security actor. The European defence industry, on the other hand, is also extremely fragmented. You have overlapping national priorities, you have competition between member states. And the most recent example of this is the FCAS collapse, the Future Combat Air System that France, Germany, and Spain were building together, and which eventually collapsed after almost 10 years, because France and Germany could not reconcile on so many of their differences. So the Commission is trying to create the basis for more cooperation, but I think concrete results are yet to be seen.

 

And finally, you have this massive challenge of the issue of domestic politics and elections within member states. We all know that the far right is gaining ground, it's becoming more and more popular in Europe. Next year, several member states such as France will be going to elections. And again, the national rally is very popular in France, Jordan Bardella is leading the opinion polls at the moment. And again, if you have far-right candidates coming to power in Europe, they naturally come with a dose of Euroscepticism, they want to prioritize national interests over European concerns. And this does directly undercut the EU's influence, right? Again, you could have a problem of serial blockers, such as in the case of Viktor Orban, etc.

 

And so I think domestic politics will, to a quite a large extent shape, and the direction of the EU's emergence as a strategic actor. And I think finally, even if the EU is willing to spend more and more on security and defence, it will have to communicate the trade-offs that will be eventually there to its population to its citizens. I have a section on EU-India relations, but I can see Ambassador looking at me. So I will conclude my remarks, but perhaps come back to it in the question and answer session. Thank you.

 

Saurabh Kumar: Thank you, Ms. Malhotra. I think you pointed out the tremendous progress which EU has made, but also the practical difficulties, which are there. We now move on to our third and last speaker who would be joining us virtually, Dr. Weber. She's joining us from the NATO Summit venue. So we look forward to hearing you, Dr. Weber, including your throwing us some insights as to what is happening where you are. The floor is yours.

 

Gesine Weber: Yes, thank you so much. I hope that the audio is still very good and that you can all hear me at least that was the case when we did the test. So thank you very much for having me and also big thank you to the Indian Council of World Affairs for pulling together this tremendous panel. There was already so much rich information on all things EU and EU instruments that I will indeed benefit from the opportunity to embed everything a bit in the current context and in the context of the Ankara summit, as I'm currently sitting here and let's say it doesn't really look like a harmonious rosy summit at the moment.

 

But before I do that, I want to come back to the bit more general point of where the EU is currently standing in terms of geopolitical thinking, how that has evolved over the last 10 years, and also where we might expect this to go in the next years. I think it's interesting when we look back, for example, to the EU's Global Strategy in 2016, to the remarks of the former High Representative Joseph Borrell, that we are kind of the first attempts of the EU to actually think about its role in world politics beyond Europe. And in general, as a truly geopolitical actor. Because when that actually happened, there was a lot of criticism about that. And when, for example, Ursula von der Leyen, for the first time in 2019, called for the idea of her commission also being a geopolitical commission, people did not like that.

 

There was a lot of pushback in Brussels, there was a lot of pushback in national capitals, against the idea that the EU could play a more forward-leaning role, because member states have generally been very reluctant to transfer any kind of competence in foreign and security policy, but even more so on security and defence policy to Brussels. Everything is unanimity, everything has always been cautious, often too little too late. So there was certainly a lot of room for improvement. But we also clearly see that it needed these structural geopolitical shocks for all the quantum leaps in European security to occur.

 

I think a first important rethinking already happened in 2020, with the COVID-19 pandemic. And this idea that having one-sided dependencies is probably problematic, that you have to think about economics, not only about happy free trade and globalisation, but also about risks of weaponisation and choke points. So that was the first, I would say, point where the EU actually had to think what it can do on its own to respond to external shocks. And then obviously, we felt that the catalysts of Russia's war against Ukraine, and now the second Trump administration, also not making Europe's life easier.

 

So basically, the three key pillars on which Europe's role in the world has relied in the last decades, are crumbling now. We have this idea of free trade and economic globalisation, that is increasingly challenged. We see the idea of the end of history and no wars in Europe, that is crumbling, although people from the Balkans would certainly challenge the no wars in Europe hypothesis. But let's say no war of Europe against external aggressors. And then the last point, obviously, the transatlantic relationship that has always underpinned everything Europe believed in the world, is now also crumbling.

 

So there are three strategic assumptions that Europe has relied on, and now they're all gone. So, basically, Europe has to rethink that. And we see that this is happening, of course, in the member states. We see that in new national security strategies and in how states approach Brussels. But I also find it noteworthy how and to what extent this rethinking is happening in Brussels and how we really also see new actors. We've already heard that, for example, the EU now also has a defence commissioner. But what is particularly interesting about this defence commissioner is not only that he's there, it is that he's very, very active and pushing initiatives.

 

And we see the same, for example, also with the high representative who really pushes a lot of initiatives over the finish line, comes up with proposal after proposal and is also very often very outspoken on foreign affairs questions. Although not all member states always like what she's saying. And then we have, of course, the commission lead with Commission President von der Leyen, who really makes all things Europe in the world, global Europe, geopolitical Europe, a commission priority, which we have not seen in that way before.

 

So it's really, on the one hand, a profound reckoning with the strategic paradigms that Europe has relied on. But it is also, on the other hand, I would say a lot of new energy inside the commission and really inside the bureaucratic structures of Brussels that make things move and that make things move especially faster than they have moved before. I'm not going to go into detail with the initiatives that we've heard about, but I'm happy to do that in the Q&A. But I think what's interesting is that we see a lot of creativity in Brussels and especially in the EU institutions, how to address these challenges.

 

Example, as per EU treaties, there is no way to fund EU defence from the budget. So, in other words, the EU cannot buy arms. But the EU has a lot of competency in industrial policy, which previously it hasn't really leveraged because there was no idea, especially also no appetite from countries like Germany and also the Nordics, Netherlands, for example, to have a bit more of a forward leaning industrial policy that it was always seen a bit as a weird French claim, but not as something that they actually wanted to do.

 

But now the commission is tapping into it. And it's not only tapping into this in, let's say, classical industrial domains like steel manufacturing and all that, but it is tapping into that to promote defence cooperation. And that, I think, is quite noteworthy when you see that this commission is what the EU is basically coming from, an almost zero industrial policy now moving into leveraging all this for defence. And we also see that there is a lot of willingness to think about how existing instruments can be used. An example is the European Peace Facility, which was originally created in 2019-2020 to support partner countries in the Global South. And honestly, the idea behind it is that it's kind of an Africa instrument.

 

So very simplistically, the EU supports partner countries in Africa with weapons, with arms, and potentially also with financial support. So like these EU missions there can be reduced. When Russia invaded Ukraine, policymakers in Brussels found out that this instrument actually conceptualized for the South would also very well do the job on providing lethal weapons to Ukraine. And I think this again shows that there is a good understanding right now of what the EU can do and how it can mobilize its instruments.

 

This being said, I now want to spin it back to the Ankara dimension of the discussion. Right now, as Europeans are coming under increasing pressure from the United States to do more on security and defence, the entire discussion on EU-NATO cooperation is gaining traction on another level. Previously, the division of labor between NATO and EU seemed relatively clear. The idea was NATO does all things, deterrence, territorial defence, quote-unquote, the hard stuff. And the EU would support through crisis management, perhaps hybrid threats.

 

Now, the EU becomes increasingly critical for funding European defence efforts. And what I find interesting is also that it becomes increasingly an additional layer of security when it comes to what was already mentioned in the very beginning of this discussion here, a hostile U.S. Because we've just seen that here at the summit again, there was a bit of a surprise that Greenland was brought up during the summit. Nobody believed that it would actually be over, but people were quite surprised that it actually dominates the agenda again here. And now member states actually also realize that there is a place to discuss questions of collective defence in the EU, because there is this mutual security clause, Article 42.7, which is perhaps even stronger than NATO's Article 5, because it doesn't need unanimity of member states to be activated.

 

So in a nutshell, we see that Brussels is doing more out of the change of strategic paradigms, because it is doing more in terms of activism in the Commission, and that there is also more demand of member states to actually think about a stronger role of the EU, simply because the dynamics in NATO and the transatlantic relationship are so significantly shifting.

 

And with that, I stick to my nine minutes and hand it back to the panel.

 

Saurabh Kumar: Thank you very much, Dr. Weber, including for giving us an update as to what is transpiring there, including the developments around Greenland. So I think we started a bit late, I think five to eight minutes late. We are to conclude by 4:45. I think we'll give ourselves five more minutes. So if it is fine, we can conclude by 4:50. So I think that would take up a little bit of time. So let me just set the ball rolling by asking a question. And I would ask Professor Sachdeva this question. And the question is frank and open. And I do hope you would give a reply in similar vein, based on your knowledge. You see, it was the American security umbrella, which was one of the factors apart from other important things, which brought about peace in Europe, the competition between the major actors in Europe, in a sense, was no longer there, because the American security umbrella was there.

 

Now, we heard Dr. Weber, I think, this Greenland issue came up again, it had come up during the G20 also when Mike Scott, what President Trump was telling the President of the Commission, Council rather. So considering the fact that if we take for granted that American security umbrella, its commitment to Article 5, if they are to diminish, and Europe is moving on a trajectory of greater funding, rearmament, how do you see the prospects which some of the commentators highlight that the rivalries within the European players coming back? Or do you think that the world today is different and there is more responsibility and that is a thing of the past and would not play back again?

 

Gulshan Sachdeva: No, I think the many things which are really happening in Europe, one of course is that today what Europe is, it's not the Europe of the 1950s. They have also seen all these developments, the way things have really, the economies have integrated, which is a fact. All kind of mobility within Europe, that's a fact. But most importantly, which again is not fully appreciated, I think, in many parts of the world, even in defence and security policy and even in foreign policy, despite all the problems what you see in Europe and all the differences and many other issues, I think the way they have responded to the Ukraine crisis, it means they can come together and despite all the differences, I think they have been working.

 

Still, they have not really come to the point that they can push Ukraine to win in a sense, but at least, I mean, that's a criticism that they are just fuelling the war for many more years, that's a separate question. But I think that there is a lot of coordination is taking place at the foreign policy level and I think one can see the similar kind of things are also going to take place in the defence sector as well. And the old rivalries, to some extent, many have disappeared, but as you can see, many of the right-wing political parties have come back and the way things may happen in France and some other countries in Germany, that of course will have implications.

 

And as I earlier said, if you're going more on defence, then you also have to cut back your budgets on all your welfare and everything, what Europe has. So those are serious issues which Europe has to grapple. But I don't really see that, at least in any foreseeable future, number one, NATO is disappearing and the commitment to Article 5 is kind of not there. Of course, I think the U.S. is pushing very hard that Europe will spend more and more, which they have committed. At the same time, Europe should also take care of their own security rather than actually depending more on the U.S.

 

So those things will continue, those tensions and tussles will continue, but at least in the next foreseeable future, at least five to 10 years, I don't think any major fundamental change in that kind of relationship. And also not that you will see the Europeans start fighting with each other. I don't really see that kind of scenario.

 

Saurabh Kumar: Thank you very much.

 

Shairee Malhotra: Just wanted to quickly comment on that. I think that's a fear that the French have, that with the German military buildup, they will no longer be the only primary military power in Europe. So that's very much a fear that I see in French circles generally. But yeah, I agree with Professor Sachdeva. I don't really see that becoming, see the situation of the First World War, the Second World War, etc., coming to play. But I think it will also very much largely depend on what happens within member states in their domestic politics. So again, if you have right wing parties coming to power, if you have right-wing politicians gathering more and more traction, that there is a risk then that the EU will weaken. And this is the reason that the EU was created in the first place to stop these sort of rivalries from playing out.

 

Saurabh Kumar: Thank you very much. I'll open the floor for questions. I'll take three questions at a time. Just introduce yourself also, please.

 

James Rosenberger: Thank you. Good afternoon. My name's James Rosenberger, Head of International Security Policy at the British High Commission. I want to ask about Ankara and NATO 3.0. Does the panel see a more self-reliant EU defence and security architecture as a net positive for India? Or is there some concern about potential European distraction away from the Indo-Pacific? Thank you.

 

Anirudh: Good evening. Myself, Anirudh. So my question is open to the panel. So while growing geopolitical uncertainties, so how do we envision the future of India and European Union future trajectory? So like for the strategic partnership, so how do we envision it in the future? Thank you.

 

Saurabh Kumar: I think the lady out there behind him.

 

Stuti: Good evening, sir. My name is Stuti. I wanted to ask a question on Iran since European countries were involved in negotiations with Iran on the nuclear issue. How do they look at the current instability in the region and whether the EU is equipped to play any meaningful role in bringing stability in West Asia?

 

Gulshan Sachdeva: Yeah, I think the first question on whether a self-reliance on defence is how India looks at, particularly Europe. I think the way India's relationship has developed in the last at least seven, eight years with Europe. Europe means I'm saying EU, UK, and also with EFTA countries, with all kinds of agreements what we have. I think within India's vision of a democratic multipolar world, strong Europe is not a bad thing for India. In fact, interestingly, when India's relations were developing very closely with the United States, and then, of course, the transatlantic partnership was there, that also brought India and Europe together.

 

Now, when you have certain tensions, both with India and United States, and also between Europe and the U.S., that has also brought India and Europe together. But only thing is that I would say it's not just only self-reliant Europe, but I would say there's some kind of stable security architecture in Europe, which would be much more useful for India, in the sense where, now, at the moment, there is a turbulence in Europe, because of the Russia-Ukraine war. But I mean, that may not be forever. So I hope things would become much more stable. That would be the desirable kind of thing for India, where you have a stable security architecture in Europe. Europe is also quite self-reliant, as far as defence and other things are concerned. And then you have a reasonably working thing with Europe. And that's the kind of, I think, scenario in which India would like to be.

 

And on the other one is, what are the second one, I think, EU-India, you said? The last one, I understood. EU-India, you asked something?

 

Saurabh Kumar: Future trajectory.

 

Gulshan Sachdeva: Oh, future trajectory. No, future trajectory is vague. I mean, just in 30 seconds. Now, India has clearly identified Europe and the EU as very close partners in trade, investment, technology, and energy transition. So that trajectory is, I think, quite clear. And we'll be working, perhaps, broadly in that direction.

 

Now, on Iran, the European leadership made it very clear during this war that we were not consulted, and this is not Europe's war. But of course, this has affected everyone. So any kind of stability is desirable to India, as well as also to Europe, because they are also very much dependent on energy from outside. But so far, European role has been very limited. But maybe later on, to stabilize the State of Hormuz, etc., many things are happening, and the UK is also taking lead in that. I mean, maybe some role they would play. And the same is also true for India, as well, because so far, our role has also been relatively limited. So let's see how things develop. But obviously, both have been affected negatively and would like to play a larger role than what they have played so far.

 

Shairee Malhotra: Yeah, just your question on the Indo-Pacific. And I think that's an interesting one, because I feel that Europe's maritime role, for instance, has always been more developed than its other defence instruments. And we've seen that operations like Atlanta, Aspidus, etc. And that cooperation grew largely from a shared vision of the Indo-Pacific with India as a theater of great power contestation where multipolarity must be upheld. But I think since the EU and member states released their Indo-Pacific strategies, and it's been several years now before Russia's invasion of Ukraine, I think the EU has always played a rather limited role in the Indo-Pacific. It's mostly been through some symbolic maritime operations, as well as a frigate going by here and there, the German frigate, and there was a lot of noise made about that. But I don't know how substantial that actually is.

 

Now, of course, Europe is more preoccupied with its own theater, and that's natural. But I think the question is valid because a lot of the promise of EU-India cooperation was based on the premise that they would work together to ensure stability and security in the Indo-Pacific. And now the EU's bandwidth is elsewhere. But I think this is also something that EU and member states should perhaps clarify to global partners as to what really is going to be the Indo-Pacific strategy going forward. Are they even thinking about it? But I think one thing is clear, that the two theaters are interconnected. That is not a thought process that has gone away. And we've seen even the North Korean troops that fought in Russia against Ukraine. So the two theaters are certainly connected.

 

I also think what will matter going forward is how the EU's China policy will evolve. Because for the time being, it's very much focused on trade and economics. And my suspicion has always been that the EU sometimes does talk about the security problem and China implicitly helping Russia out, etc. But I think if China were to really pacify some of the EU's grievances on things like over capacities, all of those give European companies a level playing field, I think that security concern would actually go away. So their concern is really primarily economic.

 

And again, when we talk about the Indo-Pacific, the valiance really stems from China's assertive behavior, etc. So if the EU's China policy is unclear, I'm not sure if their Indo-Pacific policy might be clear.

 

Saurabh Kumar: Can we take another set of three questions? I think I saw a lady's hand right behind.

 

Shweta: Oh, good evening, panellists. I'm Shweta from Symbiosis International University. My question is for all the panellists. So as the European Union strengthened its role as a security actor, so how can higher education institution contribute to EU-India strategic cooperation? And do you see greater scope for academic exchanges, joint research programs, and policy dialogue in areas such as security, technology, and geopolitical studies? Thank you.

 

Saurabh Kumar: Okay. Can we have this side?

 

Yashodhan: Good evening, sir. I'm Yashodhan. I'm an intern at the council. Apart from Article V considerations, we are seeing a shift and a divergence in the US-EU relationship, especially when we are seeing discontent over the F-35 deal and the AWACS deal going to Saab instead of Boeing. Is this shift in the defence cooperation more a result of the Trump administration, or is the EU shifting away and becoming more self-reliant? And if this is the case, how do we look at the EU's and also NATO's presence in the Indo-Pacific and in the Indian Ocean region? Because much of their naval deployments are also reliant on the U.S. 5th and 7th Fleet and their associated facilities.

 

Saurabh Kumar: I think there's a lady there right at the back.

 

Anubha Gupta: Good evening, everyone. I'm Anubha. I work here at the council. My question is to Dr. Weber. Europe's security environment now extend beyond the conventional warfare to include new threats like cyber, AI, critical infrastructure and climate change. Is EU institutionally prepared for this broader conception of security? Thank you.

 

Saurabh Kumar: So can we start with Dr. Weber? She can address the non-conventional threats question as well as the one before that regarding Article 5 and US-EU. Is she there?

 

Gesine Weber: Yes, I am. Thank you. So maybe I'll start indeed with the broader conception of security. I would say actually the EU is more prepared for the broader conception of security than for the very narrow conventional understanding of security. Very simply because, for example, tools like hybrid threats, cyber a bit less, but especially hyper-threats, disinformation and so on, that have been things that the EU has been trying to address already for a longer while, whereas this idea of there is a conventional, traditional threat is very new for the EU, especially because all this was previously outsourced to NATO.

 

And in general, there is a lot of things that can be done institutionally, again, for example, for cyber or other hyper-threats, because they can potentially bring in other policy areas, especially those, and what previously was the area of internal security and justice, freedom, security, and justice, where the EU has a bit more competences, because then you also quickly come in the terrain of internal security, and there the EU is not that poorly equipped. So I would say in general, yes, better understanding of what can be done there, whereas in the conventional realm, it is still a very long way.

 

And then on the broader EU-U.S. question, and I would also bring in this idea of NATO 3.0 there again, I think the EU is now very much clear that it will have to do much more in terms of transatlantic burden sharing, and that doing things in the EU and doing things in EU security and defence is not just like a nice add-on, but more a fundamental building block of the future of a European security order. And when we talk, for example, about Article 5, there are indeed concerns among European states to what extent and in which scenarios the U.S. will come to Europe's help.

 

Like imagine, for example, a very small-scale conventional attack by a malign actor on an EU-NATO member state. No casualties, limited material damage. Think about scenarios like, for example, the infiltration of Russian soldiers, only soldiers on NATO territory, without necessarily harming people, harming infrastructure. It's not just, but soldiers entering a country which they are not supposed to enter. Will the U.S. necessarily see that as an attack against all? I'm not absolutely sure it would. And I think this concern also exists among Europeans.

 

So the key question is basically how you can also get to a logic of burden shifting where Article 42.7 can be used and is actively used before you actually get to Article 5, because that allows you also to bring the U.S. a bit more in. And to really have a firm commitment to Article 5. If Europeans also do the homework.

 

Saurabh Kumar: Thank you. Thank you very much. Would you like to take Would you like to take on the first one, higher education?

 

Gulshan Sachdeva: The other one, I mean, particularly on you EU and the U.S. the question which was asked, which is very crucial. I think whether it was only because of Trump or something fundamental is really changing. I think I mean, many European leaders from Charles de Gaulle on words they have been talking about strategic autonomy and present macro has been the European sovereignty etc., for the last many years. But the kind of damage which has been done both during Trump one and particularly during Trump two administration is quite significant, which will have impact on relationship, particularly the security relationship in the years to come. So that's a permanent in between President Biden try to repair a little bit but I think now the weird trajectory is very, very different. This relationship. And now of course the bring the Greenland again and again.

 

And on the issue of academic exchanges and other things particularly the security and defence matters a lot of things are already happening between India and the European Union, to Erasmus, and all kind of exchanges are taking place. The largest number of students are from India under Erasmus. Since the security and defence also has become an important area of cooperation or going to become important area. So I'm sure many of those mobilities, activities, joint research, etc., would also happen more and more in this area.

 

Saurabh Kumar: I think we have reached  the conclusion of our time. So thank you very much  for being an involved participants for this event  and I do hope you have benefited. Let me just conclude by saying that India and EU had a very positive summit earlier this year. I think the documents of that summit and the articulations which happened during the summit I think speak for themselves. So I spent two years in Brussels looking after the relationship. So if you have any doubts about India-EU bit, I think just revisit the statements of the leaders. There was a lot of warmth, there was a lot of understanding, and there was a lot of vision in those statements. I think India-Europe and India-EU relationship is one of the very important relationship  which is being given emphasis from both the sides. Thank you.

 

Aman Kumar: Well, this was indeed a very insightful discussion. On behalf of the council, I thank the respected chair and the esteemed speakers for participating in the discussion. My thanks to the research and administrative officers and the staff of the council. Without your support, this event would not have been possible. I also thank the audience for engaging with the speakers and making the discussion more interactive and thought-provoking. With this, the panel discussion comes to an end. And you may please follow our social media handles across different platforms from X, Insta and other platforms for our upcoming activities and also to know more about our research work. And may now request all of you to please join us for a high tea at the foyer. Thank you.

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