Indian Council of World Affairs

Abstract: The paper examines the increasing proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and illicit drugs in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). It assesses their supply routes and the factors behind their combined proliferation. It also discusses the implications for maritime security in the region and possible solutions to combat the growing proliferation. India’s call for a global zero-tolerance approach to drugs at the United Nations (UN) and its recent hosting of the UN Fellowship Training Programme on SALW control in 2026, for the first time in the Asia–Pacific, reflect the urgency of these challenges and emphasise the need to counter them to ensure the holistic security of the maritime domain in the IOR. 

Introduction 

The increasing proliferation of SALW and illicit drugs is one of the most pressing challenges to maritime security in the IOR. SALW, while accounting for only one-fifth of the total global arms trade, is responsible for more deaths worldwide than any other type of weapon.[i] Drug trafficking, has also increased sharply between 2024 and 2025.[ii] The maritime domain serves as the primary conduit for illicit drug trafficking accounting for roughly 70 per cent of all global illicit drug movements, while also facilitating large – scale SALW shipments.[iii]

The trafficking of both SALW and illicit drugs is mostly carried out together. Criminal networks and syndicates often use the same smuggling routes to smuggle these cargoes. The skills and capacities required to procure and transport them, such as gaining access to illegal boats and avoiding authorities, are similar in both cases. The complementary effect of arms and drug trafficking produce is what makes each one indispensable to the other. Drug traffickers need these weapons to protect their operations, fight authorities, and battle other gangs to control larger territories. SALW, being easily transportable and cheap, becomes the preferred option. In identical fashion, small arms traffickers procure illicit drugs to finance their operations. Sometimes small arms are also used as a form of currency for buying drugs. These linkages enable criminal groups to maximize profits while reducing operational risks. The dual trafficking model also enhances operational resilience allowing one network to continue functioning even if the other is detected by authorities. For example, in Sri Lanka, drugs and small arms were labelled as similar commodities and were illegally transported together.[iv]

Small arms and light weapons are concentrated across several regions of the IOR, particularly in Afghanistan and Pakistan in South Asia, Myanmar and Thailand in Southeast Asia and Somalia and Djibouti in the Horn of Africa.[v] Similarly, illicit drug production in the IOR is largely concentrated in two major regions: the Golden Crescent (encompassing Central, South, and West Asia) and the Golden Triangle (located in the remote tri-border area of Southeast Asia where Thailand, Myanmar, and Laos converge).[vi] These areas remain among the world’s largest centres of illicit drug production.[vii] The Indian Ocean connects these production centres with markets across South Asia, the East African coast and Southeast Asia, facilitating the trafficking of both illicit drugs and SALW, thus, posing security challenges across the entire IOR. In response, states have adopted counter-proliferation measures, including national initiatives and multilateral cooperation aimed at securing maritime routes and curbing illicit trafficking. Despite these efforts, trafficking networks remain resilient, continuing to threaten regional security and stability.

Image 1: Depicting the Indian Ocean, the Golden Crescent, and the Golden Triangle

(Source – Google Maps)

An Overview of the Proliferation of SALW and Illicit Drug Trafficking in the IOR

A.  SALW

The origin of SALW in South Asia can be traced to the “Afghan pipeline” of the 1980s, which facilitated large-scale supply of small arms to the Afghan rebel groups.[viii] Following the Soviet–Afghan conflict, significant portions of these weapons were transferred to Pakistan’s Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces through porous border points.[ix] From there, they were exported via the ports of Gwadar and Karachi on Pakistan’s Makran coast and trafficked across the Western Indian Ocean to reach the ports of Somalia and Djibouti in the Horn of Africa and areas around the East African coast.[x][xi] The Mombasa port in Kenya records huge shipments, from where they are transported to countries on the East African coast, including Mozambique, Angola, and South Africa.[xii]

In Southeast Asia, the origin of contemporary SALW trafficking can be linked to the Thai-Cambodian border, where Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a militant group from Sri Lanka, were involved in smuggling arms into South Asia in the 1980s.[xiii] In the past, small arms such as Chinese Type-56s, US M-16s, Light Machine Guns (LMGs), Medium Machine Guns (MMGs) from Myanmar, and 2.5-inch mortars from Singapore were reported to be supplied to the LTTE. [xiv] In the 2010s, they were also smuggled into India with at least 13 smuggling corridors across the north-eastern border areas in Tripura, Assam, Meghalaya and the Chittagong Hill tracts.[xv] Over the last decade, there has been greater proliferation across the region, intensified by civil conflict in Myanmar.[xvi] Collectively, these developments underscore that the IOR has witnessed a surge in the proliferation of such weapons in recent years with serious implications for regional security and stability.

B.  Illicit Drugs

The most common drugs illicitly trafficked in the IOR are cocaine, heroin, marijuana, synthetic drugs, and hallucinogens.[xvii] 

Table containing the names of the drugs and their many aspects of proliferation.

(Source – Online World Drug Report - Drug market patterns and trends, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/wdr-drug-market-patterns-trends.html)

The trafficking patterns of narcotic drugs across IOR vary according to their source and production networks. Cocaine, which is not produced in the region, is trafficked through well-established transnational criminal networks. India is increasingly emerging as a major distribution centre, while several island states serve and several island states serve as storage and transit points due to their vast and under-patrolled Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). [xviii], [xix] Heroin, produced primarily in the Golden Crescent and the Golden Triangle, is transported through maritime routes using traditional vessels with consignments reaching East Africa, Gujarat, the Lakshadweep Sea, and Sri Lanka.[xx] Cannabis is largely produced domestically across many IOR countries. While the production and trafficking of synthetic drugs and hallucinogens have expanded rapidly through clandestine laboratories and transnational criminal networks, making them a growing regional security concern.

The increasing volume and diversity of drug trafficking have led to a significant rise of maritime interdictions across the IOR. Regional navies and law enforcement agencies have conducted numerous successful operations, including major heroin seizures by the Indian Navy under the Combined Task Forces (CTF), a 47-nation multinational naval partnership, and with the Narcotics Control Bureau.[xxi] [xxii]At the same time, traffickers continue to exploit technological advances, proxy supply chains, and the dark web, underscoring the need for enhanced maritime surveillance, intelligence sharing and stronger regional cooperation to counter evolving narcotics trafficking networks. 

Increasing Proliferation of SALW and Illicit Drug Trafficking in the IOR and Its Implications

The proliferation of SALW and illicit drugs has intensified over the last decade in the IOR, largely due to regional conflicts, weak border controls and fragile governance structures. Recent happenings like the withdrawal of US troops and the subsequent change of government in Afghanistan in 2021 and political instability and internal conflict in Myanmar since 2021 have led to an increased flow of SALW and illicit drugs in South and Southeast Asia. Further, with countries witnessing internal conflicts on the East African coast, such as Yemen and Somalia, these weapons and drugs have been found in that region as well.[xxiii] [xxiv][xxv]

Many IOR states lack requisite technical surveillance capabilities to monitor suspicious vessels and track illicit trafficking.[xxvi] Criminal networks exploit these governance and enforcement gaps to traffic drugs and weapons from transhipment hubs to smaller networks and ultimately to consumers. They leverage inefficiencies in port security measures such as non-utilisation of satellite imagery and Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) by dhows (non-mechanised wooden boats). Transhipment hubs and Free Trade Zones (FTZs), which have limited customs oversight, have contributed largely towards creating a vacuum in goods regulation. Major transhipment hubs in the Eastern Indian Ocean include Colombo, Hambantota, Vizhinjam, Kochi, Singapore, and Klang, and in the Western Indian Ocean they include Jebel Ali, Port of Salah, Khor Fakkan, King Abdullah, Port Louis, and Djibouti. In addition, Singapore, Jebel Ali, and Colombo, are transhipment hubs and free trade zones. At transhipment hubs, large vessels station themselves outside the port limits, act as floating warehouses and freely slip past coastal radars. Smaller, local fishing dhows and speedboats pick up its illegal cargo and either disable their AIS or reflag themselves to avoid authorities.[xxvii]

Further, the gaps in existing maritime laws and disputed jurisdictions allow traffickers to use differing national laws and avoid prosecution.[xxviii] Maritime drug law enforcement is a multi-stakeholder activity that involves state, central and transnational agencies, demanding strong inter-agency linkages and coordination. While Information Fusion Centre’s (IFCs) have been created, they are largely information-sharing nodes rather than command centres.[xxix]Weak linkages between IFCs and agencies of individual nations, who are responsible for physically responding to these inputs, create delayed interdictions. Further, most small-scale vessels, registered as stateless and operating unflagged, fall under jurisdictional voids. Existing maritime laws also don’t grant authority to board a foreign-flagged vessel without flag consent beyond the territorial authority of that state.[xxx][xxxi]

The surge in proliferation of SALW and illicit drugs in the IOR carries implications for the IOR and is challenging its maritime safety and security. While sea lanes are already congested by the massive volume of regional fishing and transport traffic, the convergence of many criminal activities with trafficking of SALW and illicit drugs, such as animal trafficking, piracy, and illegal fishing, makes its detection difficult for regional coast guards and navies. Criminal networks and gangs drive a “shadow blue economy” i.e., where illicit, unregulated and criminal activities take place within the maritime sector, affecting coastal communities in the IOR.[xxxii] Small coastal towns in the region have evolved from being mere transit points to housing docks for refuelment purposes or as cargo centres.[xxxiii] These docks have become meeting points for traffickers and facilitators. The youth population in these communities are lured by criminal networks, who offer them a chance to move away from their low-paying and high-taxing jobs in the fishing industry. Not only does this increase the cheap narcotics supply in the entire town area, but also creates an immediate surge in addiction among the youth and increases the rate of HIV/AIDS infections and other diseases.[xxxiv] This shift decreases the overall economic output of fishing industries and impacts littoral states whose economies depend largely on fishing.[xxxv] In the IOR, there is also a notable surge in illegal fishing practices by fishermen, who conceal smuggled cargoes of illicit drugs and SALW at docks for criminal networks. In return, they are paid with explosives, which help them increase their catch. However, this practice has destructive effects on coral reefs.[xxxvi] The intersection of these illegal activities poses a severe threat to maritime security and marine biodiversity.

Initiatives in the IOR for Combating the Surge of SALW and Illicit Drugs

The proliferation of illicit drugs and SALW has become a major challenge in the region. In recent years, various global and regional efforts have been launched to combat the growing proliferation of SALW and illicit drugs.

At the regional level, the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) is the largest multilateral framework, responsible for curbing drug proliferation. The CTF 150, one of the other five individual task forces of CMF, is responsible for deterring and disrupting the ability of non-state actors to move weapons and drugs.[xxxvii] Previously, Indian warships, such as INS Tarkash, have been mission-deployed to support CTF 150, responsible for counter-narcotics and maritime interdiction efforts, seizing over 2,500 kgs of illicit drugs, including 2,386 kgs of hashish and 121 kgs of heroin.[xxxviii] India has recently assumed command of Combined Task Force 154 (CTF 154), which focuses on multinational maritime security training to enhance regional interoperability.[xxxix] Other significant regional initiatives include the Indian Ocean Forum on Maritime Crime (IOFMC), launched by the Global Maritime Crime Programme of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).[xl] This platform coordinates with regional states and international organisations in combating transnational organised crime at sea.[xli] This is supported by the Information Fusion Centre’s (IFC) in Singapore and India, the Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre (RMIFC) in Madagascar and the Regional Coordination Operations Centre (RCOC) in Seychelles.[xlii] In addition, the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) are two of the premier regional groupings in the Indian Ocean Region. India has assumed chair of these bodies for the next two years and should utilise the platform to highlight these growing issues.

India, on its part, has always advocated for a no-drug policy at the UN.[xliii] The UN plays a significant role in combating the growing spread of both SALW and illicit drugs. One of their significant efforts includes the SALW Fellowship programme, launched in 2022, to strengthen technical knowledge and expertise of officials in developing countries for regulating and controlling the proliferation of SALW. It was in this regard that in 2026, India hosted the first edition of the UN Fellowship Training Programme on SALW control in Asia, which saw discussions on preventing illicit manufacturing and strengthening law enforcement mechanisms.[xliv] [xlv]

At the national level, the Narcotics Control Bureau coordinates in efforts to combat drug trafficking and has concluded agreements with several IOR countries, including Sri Lanka and Indonesia. [xlvi] The NCB also coordinates with regional organizations including BRICS, the Colombo Plan, the ASEAN Senior Officials on Drug Matters (ASOD), Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Co-Operation (BIMSTEC), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to facilitate intelligence sharing and coordinate against transnational drug trafficking.[xlvii] [xlviii] The Indian Coast Guard also has several MoUs with other countries in the IOR on combating transnational crime and illegal activities at sea with the coast guards of other Indian Ocean countries.[xlix]

The Indian Navy has expanded its regional engagement through capacity building, coordinated patrols, maritime exercises and the provision of patrol vehicles, to partner countries. Exercises with Australia, Japan, the United States, the Maldives, Thailand, Bangladesh and Indonesia have strengthened maritime domain awareness and enhanced regional interoperability against trafficking networks. [l] [li] The navy has also signed Reciprocal Logistics Support Agreements (LSAs) with a few countries in the IOR, such as Oman, Singapore, Malaysia, France, and Australia, allowing India to extend its operational reach beyond their territorial waters.[lii] In 2023, the Indian Navy separately conducted anti-smuggling missions between the Strait of Hormuz and Malacca under Operation Sankalp.[liii]

Image 2: Depicting NCB’s and Indian Coast Guard Agreements within the Indian Ocean

(Source - Made by the author).

Conclusion

The increasing proliferation of SALW and illicit drugs poses a pertinent challenge to the maritime security and safety of the IOR. Since these crimes are transnational in nature, enhancing greater international cooperation is crucial for tracking and disrupting their flow. Strengthening maritime surveillance, expanding intelligence sharing, enhancing port inspections and improving regional legal cooperation should remain the principal priorities. Equally important is building the capacity of smaller coastal nations and island states through technology transfer, joint patrols and specialized training. Community based awareness programmes can complement these efforts by reducing the local support networks on which traffickers depend.  It is time sensitive, and, thus, essential to collectively address the various threats posed by these crimes to strengthen maritime security in the IOR.

*****

*Zeeshan Ali, Research Intern, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.

References

[i] Illicit small arms and light weapons, International and EU action, Carmen-Cristina Cîrlig EPRS, European Parliamentary Research Service, July 2015, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/565869/EPRS_IDA(2015)565869_EN.pdf.

[ii] UNODC, “Organized criminal networks linked with drug trafficking in the Indian Ocean region”, 2024, https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/AOTP/Organised_Crime_Networks_Linked_with_Drug_Trafficking_in_the_Eastern_Indian_Ocean_Region_single_pages.pdf.

[iii] Jurisdiction in relation to illicit arms trafficking and the law of the Sea, ISSUE PAPER, GLOBAL MARITIME CRIME PROGRAMME, UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2023, https://www.unodc.org/documents/Maritime_crime/UNODC_GMCP-Jurisdiction_In_Relation_To_Illicit_Arms_Trafficking_And_The_Law_Of_The_Sea.pdf.

[iv] UNODC, “Organized criminal networks linked with drug trafficking in the Indian Ocean region”, 2024, https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/AOTP/Organised_Crime_Networks_Linked_with_Drug_Trafficking_in_the_Eastern_Indian_Ocean_Region_single_pages.pdf.

[v] The Use of Small Arms and Light Weapons by Terrorist Organisations as a Source of Finance, R Bergmema, T Mehra, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, Sept 2020, https://icct.nl/sites/default/files/2022-12/SALW-Synthesis-Report.pdf.

[vi] Exponential rise in synthetic drug production and trafficking in the Golden Triangle, UN News, May 28, 2025, https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/05/1163741.

[vii] Ibid

[viii] Light Arms Trading in SE Asia, P Chalk, RAND, March 01, 2001, https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2001/03/light-arms-trading-in-se-asia.html.

[ix] Taliban smuggling weapons to Pakistan for use in cross-border skirmishes against India, New Indian Express, April 14, 2022, https://www.newindianexpress.com/world/2022/Apr/14/taliban-smuggling-weapons-topakistan-for-use-in-cross-border-skirmishes-against-india-report-2441936.html.

[x] Regions and Powers The Structure of International Security, B Buzan, Cambridge University Press, 2003, https://ir101.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Buzan-Waever-2003-Regions-and-Powers-The-Structure-of-International-Security.pdf.

[xi] Is Balochistan the Region’s New Drug Cultivation and Trafficking Hub?, M Suleman Anees, The Diplomat, Feb 27, 2026, https://thediplomat.com/2026/02/is-balochistan-the-regions-new-drug-cultivation-and-trafficking-hub/.

[xii] Kenya intercepts flagless vessel carrying one tonne of crystal methamphetamine, Interpol, October 28, 2025, https://www.interpol.int/News-and-Events/News/2025/Kenya-intercepts-flagless-vessel-carrying-one-tonne-of-crystal-methamphetamine.

[xiii] Small Arms Proliferation in South Asia: A Major Challenge for National Security, G Kanwal and M Chansoria, CLAWS, May 18, 2010, https://archive.claws.co.in/images/publication_pdf/1274853671IB-18.pdf

[xiv] Ibid.

[xv] Ibid.

[xvi] CASHING IN ON CONFLICT ILLICIT ECONOMIES AND THE MYANMAR CIVIL WAR, A Macbeath, March 2025, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Alastair-MacBeath-Cashing-in-on-conflict-Illicit-economies-and-the-Myanmar-civil-war-GI-TOC-March-2025.pdf.

[xvii] India - South Asia Regional Profile Sep 15, 2005, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, https://www.unodc.org/pdf/india/publications/south_Asia_Regional_Profile_Sept_2005/10_india.pdf.

[xviii] How India became a methamphetamine, cocaine hub, M Krishnan, June 01, 2025, Deutsche Welle, https://www.dw.com/en/how-india-became-a-methamphetamine-and-cocaine-hub/a-71210919.

[xix] UNODC inputs to the SG report on Oceans and the law of the sea, pursuant to

A/RES/77/248, United Nations, https://www.un.org/Depts/los/general_assembly/contributions78/35UNODC.pdf.

[xx] UNODC, “Organized criminal networks linked with drug trafficking in the Indian Ocean region”, 2024, https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/AOTP/Organised_Crime_Networks_Linked_with_Drug_Trafficking_in_the_Eastern_Indian_Ocean_Region_single_pages.pdf.

[xxi] These include a 121 kg seizure of Heroin by an Indian Navy frigate, INS Tarkash, operating under the multinational Combined Task Force (CTF), 150 and many other operations by the Indian Navy.

[xxii] Other interceptions include 2 tonnes of methamphetamine (ICE) worth $130 million- and 16-tonnes worth $142 million were also seized from multiple vessels in the Arabian Sea from September 2025 to January 2026.[xxii] The Indian authorities also intercepted Hallucinogens by busting a pan – India drug network, “team kalki’, seizing 2,338 LSD blotters, 160 MDMA (Ecstasy) pills weighing 77.517 grams, and 3.6 kg of liquid MDMA in 2026[xxii] Amongst the largest of interceptions include 150 kg of cocaine in May 2026, at Mundra port in India from a ship recorded visiting 40 ports across the Americas.[xxii]

[xxiii] CASHING IN ON CONFLICT ILLICIT ECONOMIES AND THE MYANMAR CIVIL WAR, A Macbeath, March 2025, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Alastair-MacBeath-Cashing-in-on-conflict-Illicit-economies-and-the-Myanmar-civil-war-GI-TOC-March-2025.pdf.

[xxiv] ILLICIT ECONOMIES IN AFGHANISTAN UNDER THE TALIBAN, M Khoruk, March 2024, http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Maria-Khoruk-Illicit-economies-in-Afghanistan-under-the-Taliban-GI-TOC-March-2024.v3.pdf.

[xxv] ARMS TRAFFICKING AND ORGANIZED CRIME, Global trade, local impacts, G Mercado, August 2022, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime., https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/GI-TOC-policy-brief_Arms-trafficking-web-1.pdf.

[xxvi] Ibid.

[xxvii] Fita, Gia Ayu & Khaldun, Riady & Fatra, Deri, 2022. Patterns of Transnational Crime in The Border of Sulawesi Sea - Sulu Sea and Threats to Indonesia’s Maritime. Resolusi: Jurnal Sosial Politik. 5. 133-142. 10.32699/resolusi.v5i2.3189.

[xxviii] Maritime Crime: A Manual for Criminal Justice Practitioners, Global Maritime Crime Programme, UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2019, https://www.unodc.org/documents/Maritime_crime/19-02087_Maritime_Crime_Manual_Second_Edition_ebook.pdf.

[xxix] Navy’s IFC-IOR played key role in the backend in tackling vessel hijacking episode, D Peri, The Hindu,  December 23, 2023, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/navys-ifc-ior-played-key-role-in-the-backend-in-tackling-vessel-hijacking-episode/article67666875.ece.

[xxx] Christian Bueger, Timothy Edmunds, Blue crime: Conceptualising transnational organised crime at sea, Marine Policy, Volume 119, 2020, 104067, ISSN 0308-597X, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2020.104067..

[xxxi] Combined Maritime Forces, https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/.

[xxxii] The Impact of Organized Crime in Fisheries Extends Far Beyond the Ocean, E Witboi, August 17, 2020, World Resources Institute, https://www.wri.org/insights/impact-organized-crime-fisheries-extends-far-beyond-ocean.

[xxxiii] Panneerselvam, P. (2021). Maritime narcotics trafficking in the Western Indian Ocean: Threat to regional maritime security. Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India, 17(1), 110–115. https://doi.org/10.1080/09733159.2021.1963044.

[xxxiv] From Poppy Fields to Black Markets: Understanding the Drug Trade Across India and Myanmar, Sreeparna Banerjee, Observer Researcher Foundation, October 03, 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/research/from-poppy-fields-to-black-markets-understanding-the-drug-trade-across-india-and-myanmar.

[xxxv] Witbooi, E., K.-D. Ali, M.A. Santosa et al. 2020. Organised Crime in the Fisheries Sector. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute. https://oceanpanel.org/blue-papers/organised-crime-associated-fisheries.

[xxxvi] Carneiro, M., Martins, R. (2022). Destructive Fishing Practices and Their Impact on the Marine Ecosystem. In: Leal Filho, W., Azul, A.M., Brandli, L., Lange Salvia, A., Wall, T. (eds) Life Below Water. Encyclopedia of the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98536-7_10.

[xxxvii] Combined Maritime Forces, https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/

[xxxviii] 2500 KG NARCOTICS SEIZED BY INDIAN NAVY'S MISSION DEPLOYED WARSHIP INS TARKASH, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, April 02, 2025, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2117629®=3&lang=2.

[xxxix] Ibid.

[xl] UNODC input on activities, including adoption of measures and development of programmes undertaken in the implementation of specific provisions of General Assembly Resolution 69/245 entitled "Oceans and the law of the sea”, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, https://www.un.org/depts/los/general_assembly/contributions_2015_2/UNODC_Contribution.pdf.

[xli] Ibid.

[xlii] MARITIME SECURITY: MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU) BETWEEN THE INFORMATION FUSION CENTRE - INDIAN OCEAN REGION (IFC-IOR) AND REGIONAL COORDINATION OPERATIONS CENTRE (RCOC), Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, February 22, 2023, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1901371®=3&lang=2.

[xliii] UNGASS Statement , India, March 09, 2025, https://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND/CND_Sessions/CND_58/UNGASS_Statements/UNGASS_Statements_9March_PM/29_India_Update.docx.

[xliv] Regional Voices, Shared Solutions: Inside the SALW Fellowship Experience, UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, April 20, 2026, https://www.unrcpd.org/apsalwfellowship2026.

[xlv] The UN Fellowship Programme was held from 16 February–6 March 2026 and was delivered in close collaboration with the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific (UNRCPD), and the Government of India.

[xlvi] India signed 27 bilateral pacts, 16 MoUs with different countries to prevent drug trafficking: Govt in Rajya Sabha, ANI News, August 02, 2023, https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/india-signed-27-bilateral-pacts-16-mous-with-different-countries-to-prevent-drug-trafficking-govt-in-rajya-sabha20230802183411/.

[xlvii] Combating Drug Trafficking, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, December 16, 2025, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2204631®=3&lang=1.

[xlviii] Ibid.

[xlix] Drug Trafficking in India: Maritime Dimensions, Himadri Das, National Maritime Foundation (NMF),  December 31, 2021, https://maritimeindia.org/drug-trafficking-in-india-maritime-dimensions/.

[l] India steps up defence and security engagement with its island neighbours, Viraj Solanki, IISS, April 23, 2025, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2025/04/india-steps-up-defence-and-security-engagement-with-its-island-neighbours/.

[li] MAIDEN INDIAN NAVY – ROYAL THAI NAVY BILATERAL EXERCISE AND 36TH EDITION OF INDO-THAI COORDINATED PATROL, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 15 Jan 2024, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1996344®=3&lang=2.

[lii] Military Logistics Agreements: Wind in the Sails for Indian Navy, R Thomas, MP – IDSA, November 26, 2019, https://idsa.in/publisher/comments/military-logistics-agreements-wind-in-the-sails-for-indian-navy.

[liii] Ibid.