Indian Council of World Affairs

ABSTRACT: In March 2026, the Supreme People’s Assembly of North Korea amended its constitution and dropped all references pertaining to unification with South Korea, marking a significant shift in inter-Korean relations. By officially defining South Korea as a separate and unfriendly country rather than a future partner, Pyongyang has raised fresh questions regarding the prospects for peaceful Korean unification. This article examines the implications of the amendment by analyzing South Korea’s institutional reforms, public attitudes and government policies aimed at  sustaining unification support amid declining public enthusiasm. The paper argues that despite declining public enthusiasm and North Korea’s constitutional shift, the present South Korean government pursues unification as a central objective in accordance with Article 4. 

INTRODUCTION

In March 2026, the Supreme People’s Assembly of North Korea removed all the clauses pertaining to unification from its Constitution. The amended constitution removed terms such as ‘Reunification of the fatherland’, ‘Peaceful Reunification’,¹ and references to the so-called ‘Three Principles of National Reunification’, which included independence, peaceful reunification and national unity, first proposed in the July 1972 Joint Statement.²

This amendment is the culmination of developments that began in 2024 when supreme leader Kim Jong Un of North Korea declared South Korea a primary enemy and dismantled all inter-Korean cooperation agencies.³ Since the division of the Korean peninsula in 1945, unification had remained a shared national objective enshrined in the constitutions of both states,⁴ making the 2026 amendment a turning point in inter-Korean relations. Moreover, Pyongyang dismantled the Arch of Reunification monument, which had been built under the leadership of his grandfather Kim Il Sung.⁵

Such developments indicate that Pyongyang has formally and symbolically severed its commitment to reunification with Seoul. For South Korea, whose constitution commits the state to peaceful unification under Article 4,⁶ this poses a direct challenge to one of South Korea’s fundamental national objectives, which Seoul defines as a gradual, phased and consensual process of integration, explicitly rejecting unification by absorption or force.⁷

The two states share a heavily fortified border along the 38^th parallel, divided by an approximately 250 km Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in Northeast Asia,⁸ making unification not just a constitutional aspiration but an enduring geographical reality for millions of Koreans living on both sides of the divide.

While Pyongyang has institutionalized a “two hostile states” framework,⁹ South Korea continues to treat unification as a fundamental national aspiration, as it is expected to  bring economic, demographic and social benefits to the Korean peninsula.¹⁰  What was once a goal shared by both Koreas, after Pyongyang’s constitutional amendment, has become a burden that Seoul alone must now carry. Retaining genuine public support through institutional reforms and meaningful policies is therefore critical to keeping this objective alive.

SOUTH KOREA’S INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE TO NORTH KOREA’S CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

Prior to North Korea’s constitutional amendment, South Korea had already begun reorganizing its Ministry of Unification in October 2025 under the administration of President Lee Jae Myung. The reforms reversed the previous administration’s confrontational approach by prioritizing dialogue, humanitarian engagement and economic cooperation.¹¹ This shift is reflected in efforts to restore communication channels, address the separated families issue and explore future cooperation in areas such as tourism, railway connectivity, public health and environmental cooperation including the prospect of reviving the Kaesong Industrial Complex, closed since 2016. These priorities were incorporated into South Korea’s 2026 Work Plan,¹² and the 5^th Master Plan on Development of Inter-Korean Relations (2026-2030), both emphasizing peaceful coexistence and shared growth while pursuing unification as a long-term objective.¹³

In direct response, the Ministry of Unification released its first White Paper under President Lee on May 18,2026, formally referring to North and South Korea as ‘two states’ for the first time in official government language. The paper commits to pursuing a policy of peaceful coexistence rather than one of hostility while respecting North Korea’s government and rejecting unification by absorption.¹⁴

The amendment has compelled Seoul to rethink its approach towards unification. Seoul has therefore adopted a more gradual and pragmatic strategy, treating coexistence as a prerequisite for any future unification while managing immediate tensions without abandoning its constitutional obligations, even as public attitudes continue to evolve.

SOUTH KOREAN PUBLIC OPINION ON UNIFICATION

Public attitudes towards unification in South Korea have changed significantly over the past decade. Support for unification declined from 69.3 per cent in 2014 to 49 per cent in 2025, while 63.2 per cent of South Koreans expressed preference for peaceful coexistence without unification and public indifference towards North Korea rose to 68.1 per cent. ¹⁵

Several factors help explain this trend, one of which is the perceived economic burden, a primary concern among South Koreans due to the anticipated costs of integration and development. Public confidence in unification was further eroded by North Korea's 2024 hostile state declaration and dismantling of cooperation agencies,¹⁶ raising doubts about the viability of unification. Younger generations, in particular, tend to prioritise everyday concerns such as employment, housing and economic stability over national unification. Support for peaceful coexistence without unification has also been reinforced by the nuclear threat posed by North Korea. Additionally, the rising indifference reflects a younger generation that has grown up with a global identity rather than an ethnic one, making unification feel less like a national duty and more like a foreign concern.¹⁷

However, public attitudes are not fixed and can shift with changes in inter-Korean relations. Any meaningful revival of support would depend on sustained de-escalation and a durable change in Pyongyang’s posture rather than an imminent political transformation in North Korea. Unification Minister Chung Dong-young clarified that public support for peaceful relations should not be mistaken for an abandonment of unification.¹⁸ Public support remains critical because Seoul’s constitutional mandate requires unification to remain a goal rooted in genuine societal belief. Without that public backing, government policies alone cannot fulfil what the constitution ultimately demands.

SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT POLICIES ON UNIFICATION IN THE POST AMENDMENT ENVIRONMENT

Following North Korea's March 2026 constitutional changes, several existing South Korean policies acquired renewed significance in preserving long-term public support for unification.

The 2026 revision of the Unification Education Support Act established "peaceful unification" as an official objective of unification education,¹⁹ ensuring that every South Korean student continues to learn about shared Korean history and identity irrespective of their family background or political views through classroom education before indifference sets in because without this, unification could simply disappear in the younger generation.

Beyond education, the Korea Hana Foundation, a non-profit public organization established by the Ministry of Unification in 2010,²⁰ is advancing measures that support North Korean defectors through employment, education and social adaptation, which creates an opportunity for South Koreans to interact with defectors as colleagues, neighbours and community members rather than strangers helping to normalise the idea that unification is socially possible.²¹

The separated families DNA database programme initiated in 2014 focusing on first-generation of the surviving separated families, is now expanded to the children and grandchildren of separated families, including separated family members residing overseas.²²  The  expansion was primarily driven by demographic realities and humanitarian concerns.

Together, these policies reflect Seoul's determination to sustain the idea of unification as a national goal through its institutional and public engagement initiatives.

CONCLUSION

North Korea’s March 2026 constitutional amendment has profoundly altered the terms of Korean unification, transforming it from a shared aspiration into an unavoidable unilateral objective. South Korea has chosen adaptation over abandonment as reflected in the institutional reforms, shifting public views and people centered policies.

In the current scenario, under Lee Jae Myung's administration, these developments reflect Seoul's efforts to pursue unification through a coexistence-first approach, thereby translating the constitutional commitment enshrined in Article 4 into a practical policy framework. Yet, despite these efforts, the future of unification remains uncertain, as changes in political leadership continued to shape Seoul’s approach.

This leaves South Korea committed  to a goal that is no longer shared by its neighbouring country, as the North Korean leadership has now fundamentally shifted its policy direction towards the South by viewing inter-Korean relations as a system of “two hostile states”.

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*Deepti Anand, Research Intern, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal. 

Endnotes 

[1] Jung Min-kyung, “North Korea’s Revised Constitution Reflects ‘Two Hostile States’ Doctrine,” The Korea Herald, October 2, 2025, https://www.koreaherald.com/article/10732176. Accessed June 9, 2026.

[2] Don Huh, “North Korea's New Constitution Deepens Split with Seoul,” Deutsche Welle, July 10, 2025, https://www.dw.com/en/north-koreas-new-constitution-deepens-split-with-seoul/a-77195733. Accessed June 9, 2026.

[3] Brad Lendon and Gawon Bae, “North Korea’s Kim Vows to Dismantle Father’s Unification Arch as He Declares South Korea ‘Principal Enemy’,” CNN, January 16, 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/16/asia/north-korea-kim-unification-arch-intl-hnk. Accessed June 9, 2026.

[4] Salma Putri Manora, “Explaining North Korea’s Abandonment of Korean Unification: External Pressures and Domestic Political Dynamics,” WILAYAH: The International Journal of East Asian Studies 15, no. 1 (2026):1-15, https://doi.org/10.22452/IJEAS.vol15no1.1. Accessed June 9, 2026.

[5] Robert King, “North Korea’s New Constitution Buries the Reunification Project,” Korea Economic Institute of America, May 21, 2026, https://keia.org/analysis/north-koreas-new-constitution-buries-the-reunification-project/. Accessed June 9, 2026.

[6] “Constitution of the Republic of Korea,” Korea Legislation Research Institute, n.d., https://www.law.go.kr/LSW/eng/engLsInfoR.do?lsiSeq=61603. Accessed June 9, 2026.

[7] Associated Press, “South Korea's President Vows to Restore 2018 Inter-Korean Military Agreement to Ease Tensions,” NBC News, July 25, 2025, https://www.nbcnews.com/world/south-korea/south-koreas-president-vows-restore-2018-inter-korean-military-agreeme-rcna225165. Accessed June 9, 2026.

[8] “Korea to Shorten Civilian Control Line-DMZ Distance to as Little as 5 km: Defense Chief,” Yonhap News Agency,The Korea Times, September 16, 2025, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/southkorea/defense/20250916/korea-to-shorten-civilian-control-line-dmz-distance-to-as-little-as-5-km-defense-chief. Accessed June 9, 2026.

[9] Jung Min-kyung, “North Korea’s Revised Constitution Reflects ‘Two Hostile States’ Doctrine,” Korea Herald, October 2, 2025, https://www.koreaherald.com/article/10732176. Accessed June 9, 2026.

[10] 외교부 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea), The Significance of a Unified Korea and Its Advantages and Implications, 외교부, https://share.google/NUZ0ozaVSRdaRAFh3. Accessed June 9, 2026.

[11] Ji Da-gyum, “South Korean Unification Ministry Reshuffle Aims at Reviving Dialogue, Economic Cooperation with North Korea,” Asia News Network, September 30, 2025, https://asianews.network/south-korean-unification-ministry-reshuffle-aims-at-reviving-dialogue-economic-cooperation-with-north-korea/. Accessed June 10, 2026.

[12] Ministry of Unification, “Toward 2026 as the Inaugural Year of Peaceful Coexistence on the Korean Peninsula,” Ministry of Unification, December 23, 2025, https://www.unikorea.go.kr/web/eng_unikorea/bbs/bbs_0000000000000034/54767?cp=1&sortOrder=BA_REGDATE&sortDirection=DESC&bcId=bbs_0000000000000034&baNotice=false&baCommSelec=false&baOpenDay=false&baUse=true. Accessed June 10, 2026.

[13] Ministry of Unification, “1st Inter-Korean Relations Development Committee of 2026 Convenes, Reviews 5th Master Plan on Development of Inter-Korean Relations,” Ministry of Unification, March 14, 2026, https://www.unikorea.go.kr/web/eng_unikorea/bbs/bbs_0000000000000034/54824?cp=1&sortOrder=BA_REGDATE&sortDirection=DESC&bcId=bbs_0000000000000034&baNotice=false&baCommSelec=false&baOpenDay=false&baUse=true. Accessed June 10, 2026.

[14] Robert King, “North Korea’s New Constitution Buries the Reunification Project,” Korea Economic Institute of America (KEIA), January 30, 2025, https://keia.org/analysis/north-koreas-new-constitution-buries-the-reunification-project/. Accessed June 10, 2026.

[15] Sang sin Lee et al., KINU Unification Survey 2025: Executive Summary, Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), 2025,https://www.kinu.or.kr/eng/module/report/view.do?nav_code=eng1691113830&category=76&idx=128339.  Accessed June 10, 2026.

[16] Ji Da-gyum, “Public Support in South Korea for Unification Dips Below 50% for 1st Time: Poll,” Asia News Network, October 21, 2025, https://asianews.network/public-support-in-south-korea-for-unification-dips-below-50-for-1st-time-poll/. Accessed June 10, 2026.

[17] Alex Wilson and Yoojin Lee, “South Korean Support for Reunification, US Alliance Drops in Annual Government Survey,” Stars and Stripes, October 22, 2025, https://www.stripes.com/theaters/asia_pacific/2025-10-22/south-north-korea-unification-alliance-19504040.html. Accessed June 10, 2026.

[18] “Gallup: 64.6% of S. Koreans View N. Korea As Separate State,” KBS World, July 4, 2025, https://world.kbs.co.kr/service/news_view.htm?lang=e&Seq_Code=198054. Accessed June 10, 2026.

[19] Jung Min-kyung, “Unification Education Law Revised to Reflect Current Policy,” The Korea Herald, April 1, 2026, https://www.koreaherald.com/article/10707798. Accessed June 11, 2026.

[20] “Who We Are,” Korea Hana Foundation, n.d., https://www.koreahana.or.kr/home/eng/contents.do?menuPos=2. Accessed June 11, 2026.

[21] Ministry of Unification, “South-North Korea Exchanges and Cooperation Support Association and Korea Hana Foundation to Present 2026 Work Plan,” Ministry of Unification, December 26, 2025,https://www.unikorea.go.kr/web/eng_unikorea/bbs/bbs_0000000000000034/54775?cp=1&sortOrder=BA_REGDATE&sortDirection=DESC&bcId=bbs_0000000000000034&baNotice=false&baCommSelec=false&baOpenDay=false&baUse=true. Accessed June 11, 2026.

[22] “S. Korea Funds Inter-Korean Projects, Separated-Family DNA Tests,” United Press International, January 22, 2026, https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/01/22/funding-for-inter-korean-exchange-cooperation-projects/8131769137537/. Accessed June 11, 2026.