Indian Council of World Affairs

On 20^th July,2026, the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office issued an arrest warrant for Izmit Mayor Fatma Kaplan Hurriyet and 31 others on charges of creating a criminal organization, bribery and bid rigging. This marked the latest in the series of arrests from the opposition run municipalities since the Republican People’s Party (CHP) made significant place in the 2024 local elections defeating the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).[i] These developments stem directly from expansion of increasing executive presidentialism under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan following the 2010 constitutional reform and the 2018 transition from a parliamentary democracy to a Presidential system. This paper focuses on how President Erdogan has exercised executive influence on the judiciary to control and suppress the opposition leaders. Tracing the trajectory back to the 2010 referendum, the 2016 failed coup attempt and the 2018 transition, this paper argues that Turkey is undergoing a shift from a democratic framework to an authoritarian system, wherein the judiciary serves as a political instrument of the ruling party. 

Transition from a Parliamentary Democracy to an Executive Presidentialism

In the early years of Turkish Republic, the judiciary played an important role in the secularist ideologies of the Turkish Republic but there was no separation of powers between the branches which made the judiciary dependent on the government. The 1961 Constitution drafted after the military coup in 1960, granted more civil liberty and political rights, assuring separation of powers and allocating powers to autonomous institutions. Consequently, the judiciary and the military emerged as two institutions capable of counterbalancing majoritarianism in the country.[ii] Over time, however, the judiciary raised concerns of lack of independence to challenge the military at times of any rulings. This led to restrictions on the individual and political rights of the people. It was after this, in 2002, that the AKP came to power promising good governance and development, which the citizens considered as an opportunity to challenge the judiciary and the military.

The AKP retained power for the second consecutive year but lacked control over the judiciary this prompted a constitutional referendum on 12^th September 2010, which altered the composition and selection procedures for both the constitutional Court and High Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK). This led to an increase in the number of constitutional court members from 11 to 17 and HSYK members to 22 from 7. While the AKP argued that this would enhance the accountability of the judiciary the opposition viewed them as a move to expand the ruling party’s influence over the courts. In first judicial elections, all the seats for the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors were won by candidates who support the ruling government. This was achieved by obtaining support from the Fethullah Gulen group, with Gulenists being given high posts in the government. This was a planned move by Erdogan, the then Prime Minister of Turkey to extend control over the judiciary with nearly 160 new judges being appointed in 2011 in the High Court of Appeals to replace the outgoing members. ii

The AKP began to exercise its majoritarian rule after the 2010 amendment which ultimately led to the Gezi Park protest on March 27th, 2013. The government responded to the protesters with extreme force triggering widespread resentment among the citizens. Along with this, the Judiciary comprising of Gulenists’ Judges ruled against Erdogan’s son and his cabinet ministers in a corruption case. Erdogan responded to this by dismissing the judges and police officers involved in the probe and ordering a sweeping shut down of Gulenists institutions. He turned the case against the Gulenists and won the 2014 and 2015 elections becoming the President of Turkey. Soon after this he had to face a failed coup attempt in 2016 which Erdogan claimed was organized by the Gulenists. This led to the declaration of emergency which extended for two years, and the arrest of record number of journalists, judges and citizens who were related to the Gulenists.[iii] Erdogan utilized this situation to concentrate power within the executive and propagate the narrative that to maintain stability the country should consolidate its power within the office of the president. He introduced a Constitutional referendum on April 16^th, 2017, in the parliament, transitioning Turkey from a Parliamentary democracy to a Presidential Executive. This gave the President powers to appointment, dismiss and promote judges and other officials paving the way for a biased judiciary.[iv]

Key Incidents of Judicialisation of Opposition Politics

The transition to a Presidential system gave Erdogan enormous control over the judiciary which he utilized to control the opposition. This is evident from the series of incidents that have been taking place over the years. The arrest of Kurdish politician Demirtas, former leader of pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) alleging participation and destruction of state unity during the Kobani protest in 2014 is one incident where judiciary was used as a tool by the government. Demirtas was alleged of connections with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and of promoting terrorism. But the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) widely criticized the detention of Demirtas and called for his release three times in 2018, 2020 and 2025. But the government was unwilling to release him, stating that the pretrial detention that he was facing was for a different case and he must face another 42 years in prison for the ongoing case. [v]

Another incident is that of Osman Kavala who was alleged of attempting to overthrow the government through the Gezi park protests and the 2016 coup attempt. He was sentenced to life in prison by an Istanbul Heavy Penal Court no.13, after spending nearly four and half years in prison.[vi] The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) criticized the government for the violation of human rights and called for his immediate release. But Turkey violated the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights and continued their imprisonment strategy to suppress any further protests. [vii]

On March 19th, 2025, Turkish government arrested Istanbul mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, a main rival to President Erdogan in the next presidential election for leading and participating in a criminal organization and other corruption related activities. Just one day prior, on March 18^th, the Istanbul University annulled his degree citing irregularities regarding his transfer from a private university in Northern Cyprus 30 years ago. Thus, the annulment rendered him ineligible for 2028 elections as Turkish Constitution allows only candidates with a degree to participate in elections. This was widely seen as a tactic used by Erdogan to crack down on his rivals.[viii] In a separate ruling, a Turkish court annulled the leadership of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) of its 2023 elections. The court removed Ozgur Ozel, considered as a key figure of CHP, from the position and reinstated Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who lost the 2023 elections to Erdogan. International agencies have called this series of arrests as a method used by the ruling party to weaponize the judicial system against the opposition parties. [ix]

The above incidents examined are not isolated, they follow a clear pattern, and a goal to suppress the opposition using judicial institutions. President Erdogan used his powers post 2016 coup to oust judges and other officials, arrest opposition leaders using the judiciary as a tool and even annulment of elections within a party, all citing potential terrorist connections and corruption. All this clearly depicts that the 2010 reorganisation of the appointment of judges and the 2018 transition to presidential system enabled Erdogan to influence the judiciary without any checks and balances.

Conclusion

Turkey’s transition from a parliamentary democracy to an executive presidential system has not only concentrated power in the hands of President Erdogan but has led to the use of judiciary as a tool for that power. Through a series of referendums and restructuring, the independence of Turkish judiciary has been completely disrupted. Erdogan has used judiciary to shape an opposition to his choice by arresting the leaders who won or spoke against him in the country. This has raised questions regarding the reversibility of the actual power of this institution. As famously stated by Sir Ivor Jennings, “Without opposition in the Parliament, the democratic form of government will surely turn into an autocratic or a monarchy form of government”. The policies adopted by Erdogan shows a visible shift towards authoritarianism with the President governing the country and its strategic institutions. Considering the present conditions were all appointments to the judiciary being decided by the president, the question of who will hold power next is less important compared to the structural changes made to the constitution.  

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*Gouri Deva V S is a Research Intern at the Indian Council of World Affairs.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

[i] CHP mayor, husband detained as crackdown on opposition municipalities expands. (2026, July 20). Turkish Minute. https://www.turkishminute.com/2026/07/20/chp-mayor-husband-detained-as-crackdown-on-opposition-municipalities-expands/

[ii] Esen, B. (2024). Judicial transformation in a competitive authoritarian regime: Evidence from the Turkish case. Law & Policy, 47(1). https://doi.org/10.1111/lapo.12250

[iii] Sullivan, Amelia (2018) "Unconditional Surrender: The Rise of President Erdogan and the end of Kemalist Turkey," History in the Making: Vol. 11, Article 5.

[iv] Bâli, A. (2025, October 21). Turkey’s constitutional coup - MERIP. Middle East Research and Information Project. https://www.merip.org/2018/12/turkeys-constitutional-coup/

[v] Stockholm Centre for Freedom. (2025, November 6). ECtHR upholds ruling requiring Turkey to free prominent Kurdish politician. Stockholm Center for Freedom. https://stockholmcf.org/ecthr-upholds-ruling-requiring-turkey-to-free-prominent-kurdish-politician-selahattin-demirtas/

[vi] Turkey: Baseless charges over landmark 2013 protests. (2024, May 19). Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/03/25/turkey-baseless-charges-over-landmark-2013-protests

[vii] Amnesty International UK. (2026, January 13). Turkey: Aggravated life sentence for Osman Kavala a “devastating blow” for human rights. https://www.amnesty.org.uk/latest/turkey-aggravated-life-sentence-osman-kavala-devastating-blow-human-rights/

[viii] Cevik.S. (2025, March 29). The arrest of Ekrem Imamoglu: a critical turning point in Turkey’s politics. Arab Center Washington DC. https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-arrest-of-ekrem-imamoglu-a-critical-turning-point-in-turkeys-politics/

[ix] Michaelson, R. (2026, May 22). Turkish court ruling removes head of main opposition party. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/may/21/turkey-court-removes-head-chp-party-ozgur-ozel-erdogan