Indian Council of World Affairs

ABSTRACT: The viewpoint analyses how the development of drones, electronic warfare, digital command systems, and the overall transformation of the defence industrial base have reinforced Ukraine’s defence capacity. It argues that modern military power increasingly depends on innovation, industrial resilience and adaptability, rather than on force size alone. 

INTRODUCTION

The defence industry of Ukraine has undergone a dramatic transformation over the past decade. Once burdened by its Soviet legacy, chronic underinvestment and low combat readiness, Ukraine has evolved into a technologically adaptive and increasingly self-reliant defence ecosystem. The Renaissance of Ukraine’s Military Sector is a textbook example of how a prolonged conflict can fundamentally reshape a country’s defence blueprint. The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine acted as a stimulus that prompted the country to initiate a wide array of reforms that equipped the Ukrainian military with advanced technology and strength to face a heavily armed superior adversary.

Ukraine’s defence industry in the early 1990s and 2000s was characterised by stagnant defence production. During the 1990’s, when Ukraine became independent from the Soviet Union, the country’s defence sector inherited the Soviet legacy, including approximately 780,000 troops, extensive defence equipment, and 30% of the Soviet military-industrial complex[i]. However, these defensive postures also served more as a liability than an asset, as ageing equipment, underinvestment, and forced reductions, coupled with its heavy dependence on Russian supply chains and technical standards, significantly undermined its military readiness. By 2014, a meagre 5000 troops were available, highlighting the shortcomings of the defence sector, which prioritised internal security and placed less importance on external threats[ii].

Russia’s annexation of Crimea and conflict in Donbas in 2014 marked a turning point for Ukraine’s defence industry, prompting a comprehensive reassessment. With the events of 2014, Ukraine accorded priority to external security over internal threats by recognising Russia as an important security adversary. As a result, Ukraine sought to strengthen its defence industry by initiating an array of military reforms. It rapidly mobilised 90,000 personnel, developed a professional non-commissioned officer corps, established Special Operations Forces, and strengthened civilian oversight[iii]. The integration of volunteer battalions and the creation of a territorial defence system were monumental in forming the groundwork for its wartime adaptation after 2022.

SURVIVAL THROUGH EXTERNAL SUPPORT

In 2022, hostilities between the two countries escalated into a full-scale invasion when Russia attacked Ukraine from the north, east, and south with the intention of capturing Kyiv. The invasion later turned into a prolonged conflict that ignited a colossal transformation of Ukraine’s defence and industrial capabilities. Ukraine survived the initial years of the war through external assistance received from the US and its Western partners. Following the reforms undertaken in 2014 to adopt NATO standards, the USA, with its training programmes, joint exercises, intelligence sharing, and advanced weapon systems, helped Ukraine build a strong and resilient military force.

Systems such as the Javelin missiles, supplied by the USA from 2018 onwards, were crucial in destroying Russian armoured columns advancing towards Kyiv[iv]. Ukraine was able to carry out precision strikes against Russia with the help of High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), supplied by the USA from June 2022 onwards[v]. The air defence system supplied by the US and allies, such as Stinger missiles and advanced air defence systems, helped the country counter superior air power[vi]. External assistance from the USA, in particular, helped Ukraine to build its own defence production by providing it with adequate resources and time.

DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION

The impact of conflict also sparked a profound transformation of Ukraine’s defence industry and procurement system. The industry, which was largely state-controlled under UkrOboronProm, later opened its doors to private companies, defence tech startups, and innovation due to changing battlefield dynamics[vii]. Driven by the 2022 invasion and the strategic imperative to withstand a militarily superior opponent, Ukraine integrated private companies into defence production. The mobilisation of private firms into the arms industry led to an innovative, flexible and responsive mechanism. By 2024, a considerable number of private enterprises were producing arms, aiding in defence innovation and employment generation. Concurrently, the government initiated an array of procurement reforms to remove longstanding, bureaucratic bottlenecks inherent in Ukraine’s pre-war procurement system. These reforms led to a swift approval procedure, reduced bureaucratic delays and facilitated decentralised procurement that enabled better communication between commanders and manufacturers.

The war also stimulated the rapid growth of defence-technology start-ups specializing in drones, artificial intelligence, robotics, navigation systems and electronic warfare. These industries maintained a close coordination with the frontline units, enabling rapid battlefield feedback and accelerating technological innovation. The cornerstone of this transformation is the Brave 1 initiative, which connects the gap between the government, private companies, investors and the military, thereby enabling the expedited development of defence technologies. Ukraine also made efforts to expand domestic drone production with the increasing demand for low-cost and effective combat weapons. All the above-mentioned reforms have equipped Ukraine with a robust defence-industrial base capable of developing cutting-edge military technologies.

Russia’s actions inadvertently acted as a catalyst for innovation in Ukraine’s defence sector. The continuous missile attack on Ukraine’s critical and military infrastructure, such as Antonov and Motor Sich, from the Russian side, prompted Ukraine to reinforce its defence sector through decentralised production and to increase indigenous arms production by integrating private firms[viii]. Ukraine engineered anti-jamming technology, established secure communication networks, and hardened its overall digital infrastructure to counter Russia’s advanced electronic warfare capabilities[ix]. Sustained drone attacks from Russia spurred Ukraine to develop its domestic drone manufacturing. Russian aggression and the constant wartime pressures led to Ukraine’s defence industrial transformation and forced the country to evolve its military structure to adapt to the changing combat environment.

Battlefield adaptation and technological innovation

In the later years of the conflict, Ukraine pioneered a rapid battlefield adaptation and technological innovation. The 2022 invasion prompted Ukraine to adopt commercial drones, supplementing the absence of adequate conventional weapons. During this time, Ukraine moved away from a strictly state-led defence industry with the inclusion of private firms and technology companies through initiatives like Brave1[x]. Brave1 is a defence innovation platform formulated by the Ukrainian government that binds the military, private companies and investors in one single thread to expedite the development, testing and deployment of new military technology in accordance with the combat requirements. Technological innovation and progress have transcended the traditional roles of drones to include the use of FPV drones, long-range missiles, and maritime drone systems for precision strikes against tanks, logistics hubs and command centres. These advanced drone systems have proved to be cost-effective, with high operational effectiveness, capable of neutralising Russia’s military superiority.

Electronic warfare is at the crux of the Russia-Ukraine war, with Russia deploying highly advanced technological tools and leveraging them to dominate the electromagnetic domain. Russia possesses formidable electronic tools like Krasukha-4, Zhitel, Leer-3 and Moskva-1, which can hamper military communications, jam GPS signals, neutralise drone systems, and intercept Ukrainian troop movements, severely debilitating its operational effectiveness[xi]. Despite the multitude of challenges posed by Russia in this area, Ukraine sought to bolster its electronic defence capabilities with support from NATO and the USA. Ukraine tackled Russian interference by continuously reconfiguring its drone software, implementing alternative navigation methods and employing counter-jamming protocols. For Ukraine, a secure and effective communication system was imperative for synchronising operations between commanders, drone operators and artillery units. The integration of a digital communication system and improved radar protection vastly enhanced their command-and-control system. Ultimately, instead of becoming a limitation and vulnerability, Russia’s next-generation electronic warfare assets acted as a crucible that paved the way for Ukraine to reinforce its battlefield agility and yielded substantive technological imperatives.

The integration of drones, sensors, intelligence and command systems into a unified operational network has become one of  Ukraine’s most significant military innovations.  This digital transformation was spearheaded by DELTA, a combat digital ecosystem that serves as a vital command and control platform that connects all the branches of the Ukrainian military[xii]. The main function of this digital system is to acquire crucial information from multiple sources, such as drones, surveillance and intelligence units, to be combined into a single digital platform and provide real-time battlefield awareness. Moving towards a broader defence modernisation, Ukraine's traditional paper-based military processes were replaced with modern digital infrastructure. This transition facilitated effective communication, rapid decision-making, and accelerated its operational efficiency. The fusion of technology, industry and military operations has created an agile defence system equipped to adapt to the evolving combat environment.

CONCLUSION

Since 2022, Ukraine’s defence industry has evolved from an industrial base, constrained by Soviet legacy, into an adaptive and innovation-driven wartime ecosystem. Ukraine’s experience demonstrates that battlefield strength extends beyond conventional weapons, encompassing technological advancements, defence industrial reforms and strong international partnerships. Consequently, the lessons derived from the Ukraine-Russia conflict can be of great influence for other countries, offering critical insights for future defence planning and military modernisation.

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*Devika Vijay is a Research Intern at the Indian Council of World Affairs.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

[i] Transformation Under Fire – An Analysis of Ukraine’s Security Sector Since 1991.” 2019. IISS. 2019. https://www.iiss.org/research-paper/2025/transformation-under-fire-an-analysis-of-ukraines--security-sector-since-1991/.

[ii] Ibid

[iii] Ibid

[iv] Laird, Robbin. 2025. “How Ukraine Transformed Western Military Aid and Domestic Innovation into a Dynamic Defence Model - Second Line of Defence.” Second Line of Defence. July 24, 2025. https://sldinfo.com/2025/07/how-ukraine-transformed-western-military-aid-and-domestic-innovation-into-a-dynamic-defense-model/.

[v] Ibid

[vi] Ibid

[vii] Bondar, Kateryna. 2025. “How Ukraine Rebuilt Its Military Acquisition System Around Commercial Technology.” Csis.Org. 2025. https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-ukraine-rebuilt-its-military-acquisition-system-around-commercial-technology.

[viii] Kuzmuk, Kateryna , and Lorenzo Scarazzato. 2025. “The Transformation of Ukraine’s Arms Industry amid War with Russia.” Sipri. February 21, 2025. https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2025/transformation-ukraines-arms-industry-amid-war-russia.

[ix] Srivastava, VSM (Retd), Maj Gen AK . 2025. “Technological Advancements in Electronic Warfare and ITS Efficacy in Russia-Ukraine Conflict.” Centre For Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS). SYNERGY. February 2025. https://cenjows.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Maj-Gen-AK-Srivastava_-Article.pdf.

[x] Matlack, Jon-Wyatt, Sebastian Schwartz, and Oliver Gill. n.d. “Ukraine’s Drone Ecosystem and the Defence of Europe: Lessons Lost Can’t Be Learned About the Authors Acknowledgements.” https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/Research-Reports/2025-04-05-DRONES-MatlackSchwartzGill-FINAL-WEB.pdf.

[xi] Srivastava, VSM (Retd), Maj Gen AK . 2025. “Technological Advancements in Electronic Warfare and ITS Efficacy in Russia-Ukraine Conflict.” Centre For Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS). SYNERGY. February 2025. https://cenjows.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Maj-Gen-AK-Srivastava_-Article.pdf.

[xii] Bondar, Kateryna. 2025. “How and Why Ukraine’s Military Is Going Digital.” Csis.Org. 2025. https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-and-why-ukraines-military-going-digital.