Introduction
Amidst new deterioration in the relationship between Russia and Armenia, Yerevan has asked Kremlin to withdraw its troops from the Armenian territory. The decision was conveyed to Kremlin in a recent meeting of Nikol Pashinyan, the Prime Minister of Armenia, with President Putin who has just secured his another six-year tenure.[i]
As per the agreement at the leadership level, the Russian peacekeepers and the boarder guards will stand down from their positions from five border regions of Armenia- Tavush, Syunik, Vayots Dzor, Gegharkunik and Ararat.[ii] The same had been confirmed by Hayk Konjoryan, a Parliamentarian from the ruling party, in his Facebook post. However, Russian border guards, on the request of Yerevan, will continue to guard Armenia’s border with Iran and Turkey, the two regional powers.[iii] Besides the new arrangement will also not impact Russia’s military base in the Armenian city of Gyumri.[iv]
Source: https://www.worldatlas.com/maps/armenia
The Armenian decision to remove Moscow’s soldiers has significant historical and geo-political reasons behind it and has to be analysed in the broader context of its dwindling relationship with Moscow on the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh, an erstwhile mountainous region recognised officially as part of Azerbaijan but functioned as a breakaway Republic having close political, economic and cultural connection with Armenia.
As of now the Nagorno-Karabakh, which the ethnic Armenians referred to as the Republic of Artsakh, has ceased to exist. After an Azeri offensive in Sep 2023, on the pretext of anti-terrorist operation, Samvel Shahramanyan, President of the breakaway Republic, signed a decree that dissolved all state institutions and announced that the Nagorno-Karabakh, as an independent entity inside the Azerbaijani territory, will cease to exist by 01 January 2024.[v]
A brief historical overview of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute and the players involved in it is needed here to put the conflict in right perspective and analyse the ongoing fissure between Kremlin and Yerevan. Besides, it is also imperative for understanding Armenia’s future foreign policy trajectory, its domestic politics, and the broader geopolitics of the region.
The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: A Historical Overview
Conflict and struggles for influence are not new in the South Caucuses region. It has seen struggles for influence since the medieval period when the imperial Russia, Ottoman Empire and the Persian empire grappled for influence. These three players, Russia, Turkey and Iran, still remain influential players in the region and have been making attempts to further enhance their engagements with the countries in the South Caucuses.
However, the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, between modern day Armenia and Azerbaijan, has a history going back to the Soviet days. It was hundred years back to 1923 that the origin of the conflict can be traced. The Soviet Union established the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, with ethnic Armenians constituting 95 % of the population, within the territory of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic.[vi] By 1921 Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan had been taken over by the Bolsheviks who to garner public support promised Karabakh to Armenia.[vii] However, because of the absence of the internal border and the region being in the effective control of the Soviet Union, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, like many conflicts in the Soviet space remained frozen.
As the Soviet Union began to crumble in the late 1980s and the Soviet Republics began to chart their independent future, tensions began over the political status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Despite being geographically located within Azerbaijan the regional legislature passed a resolution in 1988 and declared its intent to join Armenia.[viii] Although the Soviet Union opposed this move it had become too weak to make any difference.
In absence of a strong overarching authority, ethnic tensions multiplied and the First Nagorno-Karabakh War broke out in 1988. In 1991, as the Soviet Union finally crumbled, leaders from Armenia and Azerbaijan declared independence.[ix] On the same lines, the ethnic Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh also declared independence as new state separate from Azerbaijan.[x] The same was reinforced in a referendum[xi],not recognised internationally, where 99.98 % voted in favour of an independent republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. With this, the war intensified and a Russian brokered ceasefire, called the Bishkek Protocol, was facilitated in 1994.[xii] Besides, a Minsk Group, under the umbrella of the OSCE was also established the same year to find a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.[xiii] Co-chaired by Russia, France and the United States, the grouping has failed to bring a permanent settlement of the issue and has only facilitated occasional ceasefires whenever skirmishes and clashes broke out between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
The ceasefire of 1994, with occasional violations, continued till September 2020 when Azerbaijan launched a military offensive, which was described as “the most serious fighting that took place between the two sides since 1994”.[xiv] It resulted in a 44-day long Second Karabakh War, which Baku considers as Patriotic War[xv], leading to more than 6000 deaths and territorial gains for Azerbaijan in and around Nagorno-Karabakh.[xvi]. A fresh ceasefire agreement, again brokered by Russia, was signed which established the Lachin Corrdor, the lone highway to connect Armenia with the breakaway region along with the stationing of 1,960 strong Russian peacekeeping force.[xvii]
The final Azeri offensive on Nagorno-Karabakh came on 19th and 20th September 2023 which completely changed its status quo. Baku achieved in one day what it could not for three decades. On the pretext of conducting anti-terrorist operation Azerbaijan launched a military assault on the breakaway region which led to the capitulation of the Karabakh Armenian defence forces and a resounding victory for Baku.[xviii] The military assault marked the end of three decades of de-facto self-governance for the Nagorno-Karabkah Republic triggering a mass exodus of ethnic Armenians for the fear of persecution.[xix] More than 100,000 ethnic Armenians crossed border and entered into Armenia in what was described by Yerevan as “a direct act of an ethnic cleansing and depriving people of their motherland”[xx]. As of now Nagorno-Karabakh remains a dissolved republic and the territory remains under the complete control of Azerbaijan.
Changing Dynamics in the Region
The Second Karabakh War considerably changed the dynamics in the region as outside powers like Turkey provided active political and military support to Azerbaijan. Turkey emerged as a significant player in the region and was largely instrumental in Baku’s victory as it supplied sophisticated weapons such as the Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and MAM-L type laser-guided bombs causing heavy loss to the Armenian side. The direct involvement of Turkey in the conflict not only ensured an astounding victory for Azerbaijan but also showcased the rising military-industrial complex of Turkey, which has made it one of the leading drone powers of the world.
Russia has remained a dominant player in the Caucasus since the time of its medieval imperial history. Under the Czar Ivan IV Russia began fortifying its position on the Caspian Sea and gradually extended its control over the surrounding area.[xxi] Since then Russia has looked at the region as its backyard and has desired a position of influence in the region.[xxii]. As far as the modern-day Russia is concerned it emerged as a principal player in the Caucuses and played important role in negotiating peace and ceasefire in the long-standing interethnic conflicts, in the post-Soviet space, that followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.
However, rapid geopolitical transformations, forced resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Russia’s war in Ukraine has changed the dynamics of the South Caucuses where Russia is gradually but steadily losing its influence. As a result of the Second Karabakh War and its aftermath the geopolitical landscape of the region has changed as the Azeri victory has resulted in new borders, shift in regional balance of power and the emergence of new external actors.[xxiii] While Azerbaijan has gained political and military dominance, Armenia has significantly lost its power and influence.[xxiv]
As new dynamics emerge, all the three South Caucasus states-Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, are looking for new friendships while trying to reduce dependence on Moscow as the sole security provider in the region. While, Georgia has been cultivating relations with the EU, China and the United States, Azerbaijan is deepening its relations with Turkey, Israel, Central Asia and some other European countries.[xxv] However, recent protests in Georgia against an Act passed by the Parliament which seeks to control the foreign funding of media and NGOs has disturbed its relationship with the West.[xxvi]
However, it is Armenia which has drastically changed its foreign policy as it looks for expending its relationship with outside powers. The change in Armenia’s approach came after the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh and Russia’s failure to protect its interest. Today, Yerevan has signed military deals with countries like India and France.
The South Caucuses remains a highly congested and contested geopolitical space where many major powers including Turkey and Iran are competing for influence.[xxvii] As the three Caucasian states have become more confident of their stature on the world stage, they are all looking forward to diversifying their foreign policy options. This has given opportunities to the European Union, middle-east, China, Iran, Turkey and India to raise their engagements with the region.
With the other powers deepening ties between with South Caucuses, visible in growing trade, investments, energy and transport infrastructure, the region looks at the end of an exclusive Russian influence.[xxviii]
Russia-Armenia Relations: What has Changed?
As a majority of Russian soldiers have been asked to leave Armenia, with only a minimal presence allowed, it indicates a new dip in the relationship. The current deterioration is largely caused by Russia’s failure to stop Baku’s aggression in Nagorno-Karabakh compelling the Armenian leadership into thinking that their country’s dependence on Russia for its security needs was a “strategic mistake”.[xxix]
In 2018, pro-democracy protests led by Nikol Pashiniyan overthrew a Russia-friendly government in Armenia with the subsequent election of Pashiniyan, a journalist by profession, as the new PM of the country. The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, which remained frozen with minor exceptions, turned hot during his tenure in 2020 when Baku routed Armenian forces, thanks to the sophisticated weapons and drones supplied by Turkey. [xxx]
Armenians looked at their Russian partners for help, urging Moscow to activate CSTO alliance, of which Armenia is a member, to defend its interests. This expectation was based on the assumption that Russia favoured status quo[xxxi] in the South Caucuses and what Azerbaijan was doing was a clear disregard of the ceasefire agreement of 1994. Thus, when Russia decided to not activate the CSTO in the Second Karabakh War it came as a surprise and convinced the Armenians into believing that Russia did not help its ally because it greatly valued its relationship with Azerbaijan.[xxxii].
Russia defended its decision not to activate the alliance by saying that Moscow’s commitment to Armenia’s security through CSTO does not extend to the Nagorno-Karabakh, as the region was disputed and officially not recognised as a part of Armenia.[xxxiii] However, many analysts felt that that Russia abandoned Armenia for, altogether, different reasons.
Armenia, though an important ally and a trusted partner, went through a colour revolution in 2018 which deposed a Russia-backed government in the country. Since then, relationship between the two capitals have soured on issues such as critical publications about Russia and increased influence of western NGOs in Armenia along with the trial of ex-President Robert Kocharyan.[xxxiv] PM Pashinyan’s efforts at greater democratisation and a tilt towards the west was not received positively in Kremlin. So, the fraught in the relationship was already visible when the Second Karabakh conflict occurred in 2020. Yet, Russia negotiated another peace deal and brokered a new ceasefire agreement between the two neighbours which ceased the hostility for the time being and allowed Russian boots on the ground as peacekeepers. Later PM Nikol Pashinyan questioned the role of the Russian peacekeepers as they failed to end a blockade of the Lachin Corridor in December 2022.
With the final Azeri military assault on 19-20 September 2023 bringing the entire Nagorno-Karabakh enclave under its control, the relationship between Armenia and Russia reached its lowest level. The long ques of vehicles carrying ethnic Armenians fleeing Nagorno-Karabkah prompted the Armenian Prime Minister to blame Russia for failing to ensure Armenian security. Besides he also questioned the need of the Armenian-Russian strategic partnership if it could not ensure the external security of his country.[xxxv] Russia had acted as a guarantor of peace when a peace deal was negotiated between the warring parties and yet Kremlin failed to deter the Azeri assault to disturb the status quo.
The dip in the relationship is also visible in the way Armenia has reacted to the Ukraine War. On the sidelines of his Munich visit in February this year, Prime Minister Pashinyan while addressing the representatives of the Armenian community emphasised the significance of the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration and the Belovezha Accord and the need for respecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the post-Soviet Republics.[xxxvi] Armenia also ratified the International Criminal Court founding treaty in October 2023 as a result of which the country has become a party to the international arrest warrant against President Putin.[xxxvii] Armenia is now obliged to arrest President Putin if he sets foot on Armenian territory. Moscow has described this step as wrong and unfriendly.
Armenia Explores New Options
Disappointed with Kremlin’s response to the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis, Armenia is exploring new options for its long-term security needs. As a result, it has changed the very fundamentals of its foreign policy as it increases its arena of engagements with the West. As Yerevan is forging closer ties with the West and discusses new opportunities, the option of joining the European Union is also being explored. In an interview with Turkey’s TRT Ararat Mirzoyan, the Foreign Minister of Armenia, said that “as new opportunities are largely being discussed in Armenia and that will not be a secret if I say that includes membership in the European Union”.[xxxviii] Yerevan’s ambitions for the EU, which coincides with the bloc’s renewed push for greater influence in the region[xxxix], has not gone well in Kremlin, as Armenia, a post-Soviet Republic, remains part of Russia’s perceived “sphere of influence” where no western interference is allowed.
Armenia’s fresh approach with Russia is also been reflected in its engagement with the Moscow led CSTO. Its disappointment with the CSTO, which failed to deter Azerbaijan from making unilateral attempts to forcefully change the status-quo in Nagorno-Karabakh, has forced the country to freeze its membership with the organisation besides halting the required financial contribution to it.[xl]
As Armenia disengages with CSTO and its traditional security partner, Russia, it is seeking to diversify its defence imports as it plans to significantly reduce its heavy dependence on Russia for its security needs. As part of its multi-vector approach, which has become more prominent post 2023, Armenia is now pursuing its foreign policy goals and establishing and strengthening existing relationship to serve its strategic and diplomatic needs. As a result, Yerevan have been keen on building new partnerships with countries like the United States, France and India to help it boost its national defence capabilities.[xli]
On an interesting note, there has been a sign of normalcy between Azerbaijan and Armenia as the two sides have signalled their intentions of normalising ties.[xlii] Armenian government decision to cede some border villages, under its control since 1990s but claimed by the Azeris, to Azerbaijan is not less than a historic decision.[xliii] Though the decision to cede territory generated protests in Armenia leading to the calls of the resignation of the PM Pashinyan, it is nonetheless a very significant development which can bring real peace to the region.
Conclusion
The Caucuses is going through a phase of transformation that will decide the future of the region for a long time. While Armenia and Azerbaijan are striving to normalise relations and bring peace, as evident in the recent events, Georgia is charting its own path. Protestors in Tbilisi are on roads over a law that allegedly threatens freedom of expression and with Georgia’s path to EU integration. Amidst all the churning going on in the region, Moscow is keeping close observation as the Caucuses, a post-Soviet space, remains a perceived zone of privileged interest and an area of great strategic significance for Kremlin. Russia’s influence in the region gets challenged as new players arrive. Armenia which once remained closely integrated with Russia is making decisions which have not gone well in Kremlin. As new dynamics emerge in the region and new players struggle to gain influence Russia must navigate its relationship with all the three Caucasian states carefully as the region remains critical to its national security.
*****
*Aman Kumar, Research Associate, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.
Endnotes
[i] Gabriel Gavin. “Russia to withdraw troops from Armenia’s border”. Politico. May 09,2024 Russia to withdraw troops from Armenia’s border – POLITICO (Accessed May 13,2024)
[ii] Ibid
[iii] Reuters. “Putin agrees to withdraw Russian forces from various Armenian regions, says Ifax”, Reuters, May 09,2024 https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-agrees-withdraw-russian-forces-various-armenian-regions-says-ifax-2024-05-09/#:~:text=MOSCOW%2C%20May%209%20(Reuters),by%20Russia's%20Interfax%20news%20agency. (Accessed May 13,2024)
[iv] The Moscow Times. “Russia agrees to remove some troops, border guards from Armenia”, The Moscow Times, May 09,2024 https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/05/09/russia-agrees-to-remove-some-troops-border-guards-from-armenia-a85084 (Accessed May 13,2024)
[v]Pjotr Sauer. “Nagorno-Karabakh’s breakaway government says it will dissolve itself”, The Guardian, September 28, 2023 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/28/nagorno-karabakh-separatist-government-says-dissolve-azerbaijan-armenia (Accessed May 13,2024)
[vi] Global Conflict Tracker. “Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict”, Centre for Preventive Action, March 20,2024 https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/nagorno-karabakh-conflict (Accessed May 13,2024)
[vii]Rudolf Perina. “Stalin’s Legacy: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict”, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, December 2006 https://adst.org/2013/08/stalins-legacy-the-nagorno-karabakh-conflict/ (Accesses May 13,2024)
[viii] Michael N. Schmitt and Kevin S. Cobel. “The evolving Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict-An International Law Perspective-Part I”, Liber Institute, September 27,2023 https://lieber.westpoint.edu/evolving-nagorno-karabakh-conflict-international-law-perspective-part-i/ (Accessed May 13, 2024)
[ix] Ibid
[x] Walter Landgraf and Nareg Seferian. “A “frozen conflict” boils over: Nagorno-Karabakh I 2023 and Future implications”, Foreign Policy Research Institute https://www.fpri.org/article/2024/01/a-frozen-conflict-boils-over-nagorno-karabakh-in-2023-and-future-implications/ (Accessed May 13,2024)
[xi] DSEDD. “Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan), December 10,1991”, Database and Search Engine for Direct Democracy, December 10,1991 Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan), December 10, 1991: Independence (www-sudd-ch.translate.goog) (Accessed May 13,2024)
[xii] Global Conflict Tracker. “Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict”, Centre for Preventive Action, March 20,2024 https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/nagorno-karabakh-conflict (Accessed May 13,2024)
[xiii] Minsk Group. “Who we are “, Minsk Group, https://www.osce.org/minsk-group/108306 (Accessed May 13,2024)
[xiv] Michael Kofman. “Armenia-Azerbaijan War: Military Dimensions of the Conflict”, Russia Matters, October 02,2020 https://web.archive.org/web/20201005003822/https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/armenia-azerbaijan-war-military-dimensions-conflict (Accessed May 13,2024)
[xv] Prosecutor General Office. “The 44 day Patriotic War (II Karabakh War)”, Prosecutor General Office of the Republic of Azerbaijan” https://genprosecutor.gov.az/en/page/azerbaycan/i-ve-ii-qarabag-muharibesi/44-gun-suren-veten-muharibesi-ii-qarabag-muharibesi (Accessed May 13,2024)
[xvi] Mathieu Droin, Tina Dolbaia and Abigail Edwards. “A renewed Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Reading Between the Front Lines”, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, September 22,2023 https://www.csis.org/analysis/renewed-nagorno-karabakh-conflict-reading-between-front-lines (Accessed May 13,2024)
[xvii] Ibid
[xviii] Alexander Atasuntsev. “Long standing ties between Armenia and Russia are fraying past”, Carnegie Endowment October 13,2023 https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/nagorno-karabakh-conflict/responding-humanitarian-catastrophe-nagorno (Accessed May 13,2024)
[xix] Ibid
[xx] Aljazeera. “Armenia says more than 100,000 people fled Nagorno-Karabakh”, Aljazeera, September 30,2023 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/30/more-than-80-percent-of-nagorno-karabakhs-people-have-fled-armenia-govt (Accessed May 13,2024)
[xxi] R.Craig Nation. “Russia and the Caucasus”, Connections, Vol.14, No 2 (2015), pp 1-12 (Accessed May 13 2024)
[xxii] V.V. Rogushchiva and Zh.A. Gordon, eds., The Caucasus and Russia (Kavkaz i Rossiya) (2006).
[xxiii] Siri Neset et al., “Changing geopolitics of the South Caucasus after the Second Karabakh War. Prospect for Regional Cooperation and/or Rivalry”, Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2023, https://www.cmi.no/publications/8911-changing-geopolitics-of-the-south-caucasus-after-the-second-karabakh-war (Accessed May 13, 2024)
[xxiv] Ibid
[xxv] Emil Avdaliani. “South Caucasus turns away from Russia towards Middle-East”, Carnegie Endowment, February 08,2024 https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2024/04/south-caucasus-turns-away-from-russia-toward-middle-east?lang=en (Accessed May 13,2024)
[xxvi] Aman Kumar. “Protests in Georgia and its larger implications on regional geopolitics” , Indian Council of World Affairs, May 10, 2024 /show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=10854&lid=6899 (Accessed May 13,2024)
[xxvii] Emil Avdaliani. “South Caucasus turns away from Russia towards Middle-East”, Carnegie Endowment, February 08,2024 https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2024/04/south-caucasus-turns-away-from-russia-toward-middle-east?lang=en (Accessed May 13,2024)
[xxviii] Ibid
[xxix] RTVI. “Pashinyan called Armenia’s “strategic mistake” in relations with Russia” RTVI September 03,2023 https://rtvi.com/news/pashinyan-nazval-strategicheskuyu-oshibku-armenii-v-otnosheniyah-s-rossiej/ (Accessed May 13,2024)
[xxx] Patrick Keddie. “What’s Turkey’s role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?”, Aljazeera, October 30,2020 https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/10/30/whats-turkeys-role-in-the-nagorno-karabakh-conflict (Accessed May 13,2024)
[xxxi]Alexander Atasuntsev. “Long standing ties between Armenia and Russia are fraying past”, Carnegie Endowment October 13,2023 https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/nagorno-karabakh-conflict/responding-humanitarian-catastrophe-nagorno (Accessed May 13,2024)
[xxxii] Alexander Baunov. “Why Russia is biding its time on Nagorno-Karabakh?” Carnegie Endowment https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2020/10/why-russia-is-biding-its-time-on-nagorno-karabakh?lang=en (Accessed May 13,2024)
[xxxiii] The Moscow Times. “Russia’s security guarantees for Armenia don’t extend to Karabakh, Putin says”, The Moscow Times, October 07,2020 https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/10/07/russias-security-guarantees-for-armenia-dont-extend-to-karabakh-putin-says-a71687 (Accessed May 13,2024)
[xxxiv] Alexander Baunov. “Why Russia is biding its time on Nagorno-Karabakh?” Carnegie Endowment https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2020/10/why-russia-is-biding-its-time-on-nagorno-karabakh?lang=en (Accessed May 13,2024)
[xxxv] Reuters. “Armenian PM blames Russia for failing to ensure security”, Reuters, September 24,2023 https://www.reuters.com/world/armenian-pm-says-likelihood-rising-that-ethnic-armenians-will-leave-karabakh-2023-09-24/ (Accessed May 13,2024)
[xxxvi] Caucasus Watch. “Clarifying Armenia’s stance: Pashinyan on Ukraine War and Karabakh’ future”, February 20,2024 https://caucasuswatch.de/en/insights/clarifying-armenias-stance-pashinyan-on-ukraine-war-and-karabakhs-future.html (Accessed May 13,2024)
[xxxvii] Avet Demourian. “Armenia’s parliament votes to join the International Criminal Court, straining ties with ally Russia”, Associated Press, October 04,2023 https://apnews.com/article/armenia-icc-russia-3bd422845c2db17bd7636027290cc7ff (Accessed May 13,2024)
https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2024/03/09/Mirzoyan_interview/12542 (Accessed May 13,2024)
[xxxix] Joseph Borrell. “Why we need more EU engagement in the South Caucasus”, The Diplomatic Services of the European Union, August 02,2021, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/why-we-need-more-eu-engagement-south-caucasus_en (Accessed May 13,2024)
[xl] RFE/RL. “Armenia stops financial contribution to Russian-led military alliance”, Radio Free Europe Armenian Service, May 08,2024 Armenia Stops Financial Contributions To Russian-Led Military Alliance (rferl.org) (Accessed May 13,2024)
[xli] EurAsian Times Desk. “Armenia To Withdraw from Russia-Led CSTO; Boosts Ties with India & France Amid Azerbaijan Tensions?” EurAsian Times, February 23,2024, https://www.eurasiantimes.com/armenia-to-withdraw-from-russian-led-csto/ (Accessed May 13,2024)
[xlii] Athar Zafar. “Post-conflict directions of Armenia Azerbaijan Relations-Towards Normalcy?” Indian Council of World Affairs December 11,2023 /show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=10244&lid=6528 (Accessed May 13,2024
[xliii] Aljazeera. “Armenia and Azerbaijan agree on ‘historic’ return of villages”, Aljazeera, April, 19,2024 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/4/19/armenia-and-azerbaijan-agree-on-historic-return-of-villages#:~:text=This%20means%20Armenia%20will%20return,1988%2D1994%2C%20Anadolu%20said (Access May 13,2024)