Indian Council of World Affairs

Introduction 

The death of Iran's President, Ebrahim Raisi, as a result of a helicopter accident in the highlands of East Azerbaijan on May 19, led Iran to hold early elections. Ebrahim Raisi's unwavering loyalty to Supreme Leader Khamenei in 2021 garnered him the backing of the Supreme Leader and ultimately resulted in his victory in the 2021 elections. The majority of individuals in the fields of administration and press were seeing Raisi as the prospective successor to the supreme leadership of Iran. Essentially, the election scheduled on June 28, 2024, is significant not only for the Presidential seat but has implications for the role of the Supreme Leader.[i] Also, it must be noted that Iran will be facing elections in the backdrop of widespread discontent, high inflation, western sanctions, and Israel - Hamas war. 

The majority of the chosen Presidential candidates are individuals who have conservative views and are hardliners. Among the candidates, four women submitted their candidature for the position of President, but all of them were ultimately rejected by the Guardian Council. Prior to the selection of candidates for Presidential seats, the reformist faction of Iranian Parliament demanded to include at least one candidate who supported reforms. If this condition was not met, they threatened to boycott the elections. In a similar way, the legitimacy of Raisi was called into doubt in 2021 because of a decrease in voting participation.[ii] Thus, Masoud Pezeshkian, a legislator representing Tabriz in the Iranian parliament, was chosen to take part in the elections by the Guardian Council. 

Profile of Candidates for Iran's Presidential Elections 

Iran is now at a critical juncture when an election has the potential to significantly impact its destiny. The Iranian leadership places a high importance on maintaining stability and ensuring continuity. Accordingly, The Guardian Council has chosen 6 candidates out of a pool of 80. Out of the six individuals, one is a reformer, while the other individuals are hardliners and conservatives.  Each candidate during recent debates expressed support for the removal of economic sanctions and expressed a desire to combat corruption and inflation. However, none of them provided details. This lack of clarity raises concerns about the future of Iran and casts doubt on the potential for meaningful reform.  Ghalibaf, a prominent contender in the election (as shown by surveys), expressed his willingness to engage in nuclear deal negotiations at a campaign event in Tehran. He emphasized the imperative that any negotiations should not pose any disadvantage to Iran.[iii]

Further analysis of the election of these 6 candidates reveals that there is no indication of significant change in Iran's political system, and there are chances that the status quo will prevail. Hence, the choice of candidates provides significant insight into the regime's desire for stability and continuity in Iran. Notably, Amir-Hossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi a Presidential candidate, has withdrawn from the presidential race a day before the elections.[iv]

Masoud Pezeshkian was chosen as the only reformist candidate because the reformist voters demanded that at least one reformer be on the Presidential list. Despite lagging in support and popularity, he was chosen over more popular prospective reformist candidates. Pezeshkian, born in 1954, had a distinctive personal background and notable professional accomplishments. These include his role as a conscription officer under the era of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, as well as his subsequent appointment as president of Tabriz University of Medical Sciences. He has received endorsements from reformist figures, such as former President Mohammad Khatami, and Mohammad Javad Zarif, the former foreign minister, is actively engaging in his election campaign. The candidate's capacity to attract support among ethnic minorities, namely Azeris, may play a pivotal role in his campaign. 

Alireza Zakani, the Mayor of Tehran has a position in the Parliament and identifies as a fringe conservative. Furthermore, he does not have a significant support base and maintains a low public presence. Alireza Zakani serves as the Mayor of Tehran and has previously held a high-ranking position as a politician. He withdrew during the final rounds in support of Ebrahim Raisi, who ultimately emerged as the winner. Zakani is a faculty member at Tehran University of Medical Sciences and has experience working at both the Nuclear Medicine Centre of Imam Khomeini Hospital Complex and the Research Centre for Nuclear Medicine at Dr. Shariati Hospital. In addition, he has a position on the board of directors for the Scientific Association of Nuclear Medicine of Iran.[v]

Mostafa Pourmohammadi, who stands out as the only cleric in this particular domain, has served as the Minister of Interior Affairs from 2005 to 2008 and as the Justice Minister from 2013 to 2017 in two different administrations.  He was born in December 1959 in Qom, a city situated in the central region of Iran. He studied Islamic law (Fiqh), foundations of jurisprudence, and philosophy at the seminary in Qom. Afterwards, he achieved a level four degree in jurisprudence and Islamic law, which is often regarded as equivalent to a PhD. Pourmohammadi has authored several books and articles on legal rights and the theoretical foundations of political ideology within the context of Islam.[vi]

Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf is a prominent conservative figure who has previously served as a commander in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), as well as the mayor of Tehran. He presently holds the position of Speaker of Parliament. Shortly after assuming the position of Speaker of the Parliament, he made many comments on the nuclear negotiations and the JCPOA indicating that his administration would not implement significant alterations in Iran's nuclear agenda. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei recently gave a speech where he made indirect references to the personality of Ghalibaf, perhaps indicating his endorsement of the Speaker. Nevertheless, Ghalibaf, a former Revolutionary Guard officer who participated in a brutal attack on Iranian university students in 1999, is popular among the masses though not with the youth and reformers.[vii]

Saeed Jalili is also a known conservative and a very famous nuclear negotiator. Jalili started his diplomatic and political vocation in 1989 when he became a member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He is renowned for his unwavering and scrupulous approach to negotiation, refusing to accept any compromises. The popular base already loves him; this can be stated through the fact that, after the death of Raisi, many high officials and ministers met him, including acting President Mohammad Mokhber.[viii] Jalili now serves as Khamenei's personal envoy to the Supreme National Security Council and seems to have garnered backing from inside the government. He has been held responsible for the imposition of international sanctions on Iran while serving as a nuclear negotiator. This is attributed to his unwavering stance and lack of flexibility during nuclear discussions.[ix] The majority of analysts agree that if he wins, he might continue Raisi's policies with increased involvement in foreign policy.[x]

Iran's Election Polls Surveys signal Low Voter Turnout 

A recent interview-based opinion survey conducted by Iranian Presstv indicated that either Jalili or Ghalibaf had the potential to win the elections.[xi] In some other surveys Pezeshkian has been shown as the winning candidate.[xii] The bulk of the independent polls conducted on internet platforms indicated a voter turnout of about 40 - 50%.[xiii] Based on the majority of independent studies, three candidates, namely Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Saeed Jalili, and Masoud Pezeshkian, are the most favoured candidates by voters. Among the 5 contenders, 4 are hardliners (Amir-Hossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi has withdrawn), indicating the regime's potential inclination to uphold the same policies as Raisi. In the latest discussion, all the contenders pledged an endeavour to ease sanctions and implement reforms to tackle issues like inflation, budget deficits, housing, and corruption. Additionally, they were all committed to revitalising Iran's currency. In the last debate, all the candidates properly structured their speeches to address concerns related to social, economic, and cultural issues.[xiv] The Supreme Leader has praised these televised debates, stating that they provide the public with a comprehensive understanding of the candidates' viewpoints.[xv] If there is a decrease in voter participation, and this results in reformist voters abstaining from voting, it will be very evident that prominent conservatives such as Jalili and Ghalibaf will have a clear advantage and are likely to emerge as winners. [xvi]

Conclusion 

It is important to remember that Iran is ruled by the Supreme Leader, and according to some experts the Presidency does not have the power to bring about significant change.[xvii] Guardian Council is responsible for filtering out all the candidates even before they stand for elections. This Council comprises twelve jurists, with six being appointed by the Supreme Leader and the other six chosen by the Parliament, which is now dominated by hardliners and conservatives. 

Even according to the Constitution of Iran, Supreme Leader is responsible for the delineation and supervision of "the general policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran," which means he sets the tone for Iran’s policies at the end of the day. Also, when it comes to foreign policy and military policy, they are made under the guidance of the rahbar (guide), i.e., Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and people around him, including the members of the Supreme National Security Council and the leaders of the IRGC. 

Therefore, although the immediate impact of this election may be minimal, it has the potential to identify a replacement for the office of the Supreme Leader in the future. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei served as the President of Iran from 1981 to 1989. It is worth mentioning that Khamenei is advancing in age, and Iran may soon have to choose a replacement for him.

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*Kushagra Kushwaha, Research Intern, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

[i] “Khamenei’s Presidential Roulette: Iran’s Future Foreign Policy Wager,” Iran International, n.d., https://www.iranintl.com/en/202406048926.

[ii] Afp, “Iran’s Reformists Condition Participation in Presidential Vote,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, June 8, 2024, https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-election-opposition-reformist-raisi-mansouri/32984482.html.

[iii] PressTV, “Qalibaf: I Will Pursue Sanctions-removal Negotiations if Elected President,” June 22, 2024, https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2024/06/22/727926/Qalibaf--if--elected--as--president--I--will--pursue--negotiations.

[iv] PressTV, “Ghazizadeh Hashemi Quits Iran’s Presidential Race,” June 26, 2024, https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2024/06/26/728223/Iran-candidate-quits-presidential-election-race-Ghazizadeh-Hashemi.

[v] PressTV, “Profile: Alireza Zakani, Tehran Mayor and Former Lawmaker,” June 9, 2024, https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2024/06/09/727153/profile-alireza-zakani-tehran-mayor-former-lawmaker.

[vi] “Explainer: How Does Raisi’s Death Impact Khamenei’s Succession?,” Iran International, n.d., https://www.iranintl.com/en/202405219820.

[vii] “Presidential Elections in Iran: Curb Your Enthusiasm,” Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, June 10, 2024, https://agsiw.org/presidential-elections-in-iran-curb-your-enthusiasm/.

[viii] “Early Iranian Elections Draw Hopefuls From Across Political Spectrum,” Amwaj.media, n.d., https://amwaj.media/media-monitor/early-iranian-elections-draw-hopefuls-from-across-political-spectrum.

[ix] “Presidential Elections in Iran: Curb Your Enthusiasm,” Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, June 10, 2024, https://agsiw.org/presidential-elections-in-iran-curb-your-enthusiasm/.

[x] “Presidential Elections in Iran: Curb Your Enthusiasm,” Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, June 10, 2024, https://agsiw.org/presidential-elections-in-iran-curb-your-enthusiasm/.

[xi] PressTV, “Poll of Polls: Where Do Candidates Stand Ahead of June 28 Presidential Election,” June 21, 2024, https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2024/06/21/727885/Iran-president-election-2024.

[xii] PressTV, “Poll of Polls: Where Do Candidates Stand Ahead of June 28 Presidential Election,” June 21, 2024, https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2024/06/21/727885/Iran-president-election-2024.

[xiii] “Despite Some Polls, Forecasts for Iranian Elections Remain Murky,” Iran International, n.d., https://www.iranintl.com/en/202406180649.

[xiv] PressTV, “Highlights: Fifth Debate in 2024 Iran Presidential Election,” June 25, 2024, https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2024/06/25/728115/Live-updates-Fifth-debate-2024-Iran-presidential-election.

[xv] PressTV, “Leader Hails Election Race as Iran Gears up for Presidential Polls,” June 22, 2024, https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2024/06/22/727919/Leader--Ayat---Khamenie--Meets--with--Judiciary--system--officials.

[xvi] Resul Serdar Atas, “How Much Will a Presidential Election Reveal About Iran’s Future?,” Al Jazeera, June 10, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/6/7/how-much-will-a-presidential-election-reveal-about-irans-future.

[xvii] Staff Reporter, “Elections Won'T Change Much. Iran Still Belongs to Khamenei,” Elections Won’t Change Much. Iran Still Belongs to Khamenei, May 15, 2017, https://www.trtworld.com/mea/change-will-not-come-iran-still-belongs-to-khamenei-356599.