Indian Council of World Affairs

Introduction

Yemen is known to be one of the smallest countries on the Arabian Peninsula and is one of the poorest nations in the world. Yemen too, like other countries of the region, witnessed political upheaval and continues to slide further into a deeper crisis in the wake of what is in general parlance known as the Arab uprising that began in 2010–11. 

When most countries tormented by the turmoil seem to have overcome the after effects of the uprising and have achieved some level of political stability, Yemen is still reeling under the burden of a deep ethnic, political, regional, ideological and strategic divides. Amidst unravelling political complexities and the emergence of numerous stakeholders over the decade, the Houthis of Yemen have emerged as a formidable force in the Yemeni polity. 

The Houthis not only continue to pose military and political challenges to the internationally recognised government in Yemen, but they also harbour an ambition to redefine the national political landscape by imposing new religious and political ideology under the deepening influence of Shiite ideology of Iran while the majority of Yemenis follow the Sunni Shafiite school.[i] The Sunni Shafiite is known to be not so unreceptive to the Zaydi branch of Shiite to which the Houthis belong. During the peak of the civil war and fight for control of the capital city of Sanaa, Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had the distinction of serving as the president of both southern Yemen (People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen) and also the united Yemen (Republic of Yemen) after their unification in 1990, was killed by the Houthi rebels in 2017. 

The Houthis also overpowered the Saudi-led military operation launched in 2015 to subdue them in the emerging political spheres of the country and eventually turn the war-torn nation into a proxy of Saudi Arabia. In 2023, the Israel-Gaza war offered a new opportunity for the Houthis to refurbish their image and position themselves as an actor with impact beyond its region. Within weeks after the Israeli retaliatory operation in Gaza, the Houthis, like Hezbollah, joined the war on the side of Hamas by attacking international ships in the Red Sea. The maritime operation of the Houthis added a new twist to the Israel-Gaza war as many European and other countries continue to bear huge economic losses and suffer the disruption in the global supply chain after many shipments were forced to take a longer route of the Cape of Good Hope instead of the Suez Canal and other shorter routes. 

In light of the above, the paper intends to explore the evolution of Houthis over the decades whose core strength was rooted in its cohesive tribal structure but gradually the tribal ethos was taken over by   religious underpinning, morphing into a  religious-ideological entity over the decades under the influence of changing geopolitical spheres of Yemen and beyond and today the Houthis have turned  into a terrorist outfit not only challenging the legitimacy of the state but also aims to offer a polity altogether based on puritinical Islamist theology. 

The paper will also delve into how, over the years, the Houthis have emerged as a major stakeholder because of the changing political dynamics of the region and growing admiration for Iranian political and religious norms among the Houthis. In addition, the paper will examine the role of Houthis in the ongoing Israel-Gaza war as a regional actor and how it disrupted the global supply chain, incurring huge economic losses for giant shipment companies, raising insurance costs and opening a new phase of military operation against the Houthis and their operational bases in northern Yemen. 

Who are the Houthis? 

The movement draws its name from its religious and political ideologues who belong to the Houthi tribe, largely concentrated in northern Yemen, which shares a long border with the southern part of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Because of the nature of their politics, induced by the Zaydi theology, they are also known as Ansar Allah. [ii] The Houthis have remained embedded in the political evolution of the country for centuries, but their revival beginning in the decade of the 1980s, is quite reflected in their growing religious and cultural imprint under the shadow of the Zaydi religiopolitical assertion,[iii] requires some analysis. 

As mentioned earlier, the majority of Yemenis are Shafiite Sunni (65%), who enjoy the historical affinity with the Zaydi Shiites, and because of the centuries-old affinity, Zaydis are known as Sunni amongst Shiites, and Shafiite as Shiite among Sunnis. [iv] Zaydis, who constitute around 35 % of the total Yemeni population[v] and are mostly concentrated in northern Yemen, are ideologically known for their political moderation unlike Twelver Shiites of Iran. 

The core of the political ideology of Zaydi sects lies in the philosophy that the leadership of the global Muslims should belong only to the family of the Prophet who was from the clan of Hashemite in Mecca.[vi]The members of the Prophetic family are also called Ahl Al-Bayt (direct descendants of the family of Prophet). Like Prophetic family, the Zaydis of Yemen also see the entitlement of protection and respect after he migrated to the city of Medina from Mecca. 

The Houthis of Yemen belong to the most puritanical school of Zaydi called “Jaroudi School,”[vii] which believes in the purity of the ruler (Imamate) and that purity, according to them, is fundamentally limited to the Prophetic family. The adherent of Jaroudi Zaydi sees the Imamate as an extension of Prophethood and they in turn possesses the divine right to rule. [viii] The Houthis address their leaders as Alm al-Huda[ix] (Icon of Guidance) to accord religiosity to their politics. For example, the current chief of the Houthis, Abdul Malik Houthi carries the title Alam al-Huda which can be claimed by only those who have prophetic lineage.[x] A document signed by Abdul Malik Houthi in 2012 stipulates that Ahl Al-Bayt have been chosen by the Almighty to interpret the Quran and they have to rule till the day of Judgment as they are the true inheritors of the rule and guide to the Muslim Ummah. [xi]

The first Zaydi state was formed in 938 CE by Al-Hadi Al-Rasi, also known as al-Hadi al-Haque (a True Guide), who had come from Saudi Arabia and established his rule in today’s Saada[xii] governorate — now a hub of Houthi politics. The name, “Saada” (plural of Sayyed), itself derives its name from Sayyed, an epithet for the Prophet’s family name. Al-Hadi Al-Rasi had reached Saada at the invitation of local tribal leaders/Sheikhs to resolve their local disputes, and in exchange, the Sheikhs pledged loyalty to the ruler. Al-Hadi Al-Rasi established Imamates as a political system, and since then it has become integral to Zaydi political tradition. 

The rule of the Zaydi Imamate continued till 1962 when it was overthrown in a revolutionary coup, and the Kingdom of Yemen under the Zaydi Imamate was renamed the Yemen Arab Republic. The anti-imamate revolution was backed by Colonel Nasser of Egypt, while Zaydi Imamate rule enjoyed the support of the Saudi Monarch. It can be recalled here that it was the era of Cold War politics where Colonel Nasser belonged to the Soviet Socialist camp and the Saudi monarchy had thrown its lot with the US capitalist camp. The revolution ushered into Republicanism and introduced political and economic equality while Zaydis considered themselves superior to other tribes and cast the rest of the people as inferiors. 

The revolution was not as much against the Zaydi rule as it was against the privilege accorded to the Zaydi family to rule alone. In today’s evolving Yemeni polity, the Houthis have two principal aims: to reinstate the absolute authority of the Zaydi and recast a social order to establish their religious and lineage superiority. The Houthis captured global attention in the decades of the 1980s and 1990s and the early years of the 21^st millennium when they began to pose big military and political threats to the long rule of Abdullah Saleh. 

The founders and ideologues of the current Houthi movement belong to the reputed religious Sayyed family of northern Yemen.[xiii] Despite the claim of the purity of blood, the Houthi leaders, like Badr al-Din, the founder of the current Houthi movement, and his son and current chief of the Houthis, Abdul Malik Houthi, have married into lower tribes for political gains. Similarly, the field commander of a lower tribe from Saada is married to the daughter of Husayn al-Houthi, the son of Badr al-Din Houthi. 

Politico-Ideological Transformation of Houthis 

The Jaroudi branch of Zaydism to which the Houthis of Yemen belong rejuvenated under the leadership of the founder of the movement, Badr al-Din Houthi (1922–2010), and his son, Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi (1959–2004). The ideological and political spirit behind the rise of the Houthi movement was Badr al-Din al-Houthi, a great scholar of the Zaydi school of Shiism. But on the issue of hereditary Imamate, the movement witnessed a deep ideological divide in the 1990s and subsequently Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi founded a new faction calling for radical transformation of Zaydi ideology, including its militarisation, which was against the spirit of the traditional Zaydi sect. Many of the Zaydi ideologues and philosophers ended their association with the belligerent branch of new Zaydism, and they suffered because of their nonconformist attitude. [xiv]

The outcome of the radicalisation and militarisation of Zaydi ideology at the hand of Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi was more visible when they revolted against the regime of Abdullah Saleh in 2004[xv] and fought six major and minor wars between 2004 and 2010. [xvi] The first Houthi-Regime war took place in June 2004 after the arrest of Hussayn al-Houthi, son of Badr al-Din Houthi, which changed the centre-periphery relationship forever. Houthis successfully capitalised on anti-US sentiments among Yemenis, and the regime of Abdullah Saleh embarked upon to finish its ideological and political adversaries forever. Saleh mobilised support in the name of combating the reinstatement of the Imamate, as advocated by belligerent Zaydis in the country, and depicted the Houthis as the proxies of Iran. During its military operation against the Houthis, the regime reportedly dropped leaflets warning the locals in Houthi-dominated areas against any association with Hussayn Badreddin al-Houthi or his ideology. The first war was followed by five other successive wars, which finally ended in February 2010.[xvii] The main combat zone was the Saada governorate and neighbouring towns. In the early years of the war, the regime’s only target was to arrest Husayn al-Houthi, and finally, he was killed in September 2004[xviii] and replaced by his brother, the current chief, Abdul Malik Al-Houthi. The Saleh regime in its war against the Houthis also sought the help of local tribal leaders, but many changed sides after the regime failed to accommodate them in the power structure despite the promises. Many members of Saleh’s General People Congress from the Saada region resigned over the stalemate and the treatment meted out to the Houthis for their political and religious ideology.  

Unlike the past hostility between the Saleh regime and the Houthis, the new anger of the Houthis was more inspired by the belligerent theology of Zaydi, which was more shaped by Iranian religious polemics. The Houthis began to cast Saleh as a heretic, and his rule was conceived against the philosophy of Imamate. In the first decade of the 21^st century, Zaydis had become a formidable force under the leadership of Sayyid, who enjoyed the respect and authority in the governorate of Saad, a spiritual and political centre of the Houthi in the northern part of Yemen.[xix]

The six-year-long war between the Houthis and the regime was fought in the background of Saleh’s full support for the “US war on Terror,” the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan and Israeli military operations in the West Bank during the second Intifada (2000). Saleh had no option but to support the US War on Terror because he was still haunted by the bitter economic and political consequences of his criticism of the 1990–91 US military action against Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait. Moreover, many of the 9/11 accused were Yemeni-born Saudi nationals which had left Saleh with few options. Further, the bombing of the US fleet USS Cole in 2000, at a Yemeni port, had subjected Saleh to severe US pressure to act against the Islamists. Saleh also wanted support from the US to veil his oppressive politics and ease the Western pressure for democratisation at home.[xx] There was also a tribal angle to the six wars fought against the Houthis. One of the loyalists of Saleh and a top brass of the army was Ali Muhsin Al-Ahmar. He was from a rival tribe of Hashed, a hard-core anti-Zaydi Sunni, trainer of Afghan Mujahedeen, and close to the Baathist regime of Saddam, who was in pursuit of an opportunity to eliminate Zaydi, and these wars served as a blessing for Ahmar to achieve his objectives. 

Houthis between Saudi Salafism and Iranian Shiism 

The revivalism of Zaydi in the 1990s is also intrinsically linked to the growing influence of Salafism in the northern part of Yemen. The years following the unification of Yemen in 1990 were marred by the political and ideological intervention of Saudi Arabia with a Salafist package that was conceived to be a threat to traditional Zaydism. The entrenchment of Wahhabism/Salafism in northern Yemen could be attributed to the growing influence of Yemeni Gulf returnees, the deepening influence of Afghan Mujahedeen who had come back high-headed after defeating the Soviet forces and induced with the Salafist ideology, Saudi funding to its missionaries in Yemen and the rise of the al-Islah party that was a Yemeni version of the MBH of Egypt.[xxi] The Yemenis who travelled to the Kingdom returned as Salafists and began advocating the same ideology among the locals. They preached against the excessive invocation of Ali (fourth caliphate and infallible figure and first Imam for Zaydis) as an anathema to the true spirit of Islam and a sort of derogatory monotheism. The Salafists opened several schools to preach their doctrine and hired teachers from Egypt, Sudan and Saudi Arabia. The regime had its apprehension against the radicalisation of Zaydism and hence, extended support to the anti-Zaydi Salafist mission. 

Moreover, the traditional tribes and Sheikhs were attracted towards the egalitarian religious philosophy of Salafism as they had over the decades become disillusioned with the religious and societal hierarchy practised by the Zaydis. The tribal elders believed that hierarchy and nobility of birth (Sayyed) were obstacles to their social upliftment and economic advancement. [xxii] There was an element of immorality in the hereditary entitlement of Zaydis and often local tribes under the influence of Salafism challenged the religious hierarchy, but Zaydi rebutted the allegation in the guise of the jurisprudential concept of Kafaah (equality in marital relationships).[xxiii]While many Zaydis renounced the institution of Imamate, many were also against the vilification of Sayyids.[xxiv]

Because of the state’s fear vis-à-vis the militarisation of the Houthis and its implicit patronage of Salafism, Zaydis had no means to confront the Salafist indoctrination and its ideological onslaught against them. Amid the overwhelming influence of Salafism in northern Yemen, a young generation of non-Sayyed Zaydis, known as the Zaydi Believing Youth Movement, emerged in the 1980s to counter the imported Salafist puritanical ideology[xxv] through the propagation of Zaydi’s theological doctrine. For this, several schools and seminaries were opened in the Saada region for the purpose of countering the Salafist doctrine. By the early 1990s, around 15,000 youths joined the camps organised across northern Yemen to educate them on Zaydi theology.[xxvi] In the later years, the forum started several indoctrination and training camps[xxvii] and it was under the influence of Believing Youth Movement that many Zaydis moderated their views about the obligation of Prophetic family rule and advocated that the morality and the piety are the source of the authority and institution of the Imamate and were no more mandatory for the rule.[xxviii]

The new doctrine preached by the Believing Youth Movement was resented by the adherent of puritanical Zaydis and hence Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi formed his own faction called, Believing Youth Organisation.[xxix] The division within the Zaydi had its ideological and political bearings on the Houthis, and they too got divided between Imamate and non-Imamate, and Badr Al-Din Al-Houthi and Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi (father-son duo) were ardent supporters of the institute of Imamate. It was also the time when Iranian political and religious ideology were making inroads in Yemen through the process of influencing Zaydism and colouring the Fivers (another name for Zaydis) with the doctrine of Twelvers (the Iranian sect of Shiite). Since its inception, the Zaydi revivalist movement was inspired by Iranian political and religious ideology. In one of the lectures, Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi said that the best method to follow in today’s time is the Iranian revolution if one desires to build a Muslim nation and confront the US and Israel.[xxx] Taking the cue from Iranian polemics, particularly the teaching of Iran’s spiritual leader Khamenei[xxxi], Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi talked of the Jewish-Christian conspiracy against the Muslim world, and he claimed that Muslims can overcome their weaknesses and adversities through following the path of the Quran only.[xxxii] He, in several sermons, spoke of Iran as being the real target of the Western world. He further accused the Salafists of weakening the position of Zaydis in Yemeni politics and exhorted that if the Arab leaders are united, they would be able to strike Israel. The Houthi leader also called Hezbollah the torchbearer of Jihad [xxxiii] and called Iran and Hezbollah the pillars of resistance to Western hegemony. The literature distributed at their camps is highly influenced by Iranian theology. 

The Badr Al-Din Al-Houthi and Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi (father-son duo) are equally inspired by Wilayat Faqeeh, and they also studied in Qum (seminary in Iran) and spent some time in Lebanon as well. Some opponents of the radical Houthis claim that they have modelled themselves on the path of Iranian Twelvers and are on the way to becoming the Yemeni version of Lebanese Hezbollah.[xxxiv]

The Houthi leaders frequently travelled to Iran, and Iranian clergy travelled to Yemen to educate the youth about the theology of Twelver Shiism. Over the years, there has been a noticeable growth in the impact of Iranian Twelvers on Zaydis of Yemen, now they, unlike in the past, commemorate the mourning of Ashura (the killing of the grandson of the Prophet, Hussain) and the celebration of the International Quds day enunciated by Khomeini. The Houthis have also declared Eidul-Ghadeer, a celebration specific to Iran, as a holiday with mandatory marches while it was banned after the 1962 revolution.[xxxv] These occasions are also used to mobilise the Houthi youth to revolt against the regime. 

Arab Uprising and the Ascendency of Houthis 

Amid an all-out war against the Houthis in northern Yemen, the wave of uprisings, like in other countries across the region, also struck Yemen and changed the whole course of Yemeni politics for the decades to come. After a year-long protest, demonstrations and repeated confrontations between Saleh’s forces and the civilians, the longest-serving president in the history of Yemen stepped down in 2012 after gaining assurance of immunity. Saleh’s deputy and an old loyalist, Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, was named interim president under a deal brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).[xxxvi] The emerging political template, following the exit of Saleh, paved the way for the Houthis to rejuvenate in the successive years and to emerge as one of the biggest actors. The Houthis sought more power amidst the battle for power among different stakeholders, and hence, the UN and other regional initiatives failed to meet the timelines. The Houthis successfully capitalised on the political chaos and the economic plight, which deepened further after the removal of the oil subsidy at the behest of the IMF, which the interim government had executed to seek additional economic packages. The Houthis continued to stage nationwide protests against the fuel price hike and the interim president, Hadi, along with the Sunni Islamist Al-Islah party, organised counter-rallies across the country.[xxxvii] Amidst the rising inflation and the political chaos, the Houthis were running a sort of parallel taxation system by imposing additional taxes in the areas under their control. According to a study conducted by a US institute in 2017, Houthis earned around 1.62 billion through means of tax collection and extraction and extortion.[xxxviii]

After the exit of Saleh, many top officers of the army deserted the Yemeni national force and allied with different warlords, rendering the regime vulnerable to its adversaries. In a full-fledged military operation in September 2014, Houthis captured the capital city of Sanaa.[xxxix] After capturing Sanaa in 2014, the Houthi installed many Hashemites in top positions to fulfil their religious obligation and to reclaim their lost position in the political structure of the country. Later, they issued a decree claiming that 20% of the tax on natural resources falling under their rule should directly go to the inhabitants of Saada. The capture of Sanaa was a testimony to the growing military power of the Houthis and the vulnerability of the Saudi-backed regime. Today the most part of the Sanaa is under the control of the Houthis and it has almost become a state within state where the writ of the Houthis runs. After decade of civil war in Yemen, control of the country’s territories stands divided between three major players: Sanaa is controlled by the Houthis, the international recognised government have control in north-west of Yemen and the separatist Southern Transitional Authority control the southern part of Yemen. 

To confront the expansionist march of the Houthis and to restore the government of Hadi, Saudi Arabia launched an all-out war against them. Today, the Houthis are in control of northern Yemen as their writ runs in 10 of 23 governorates in Yemen. Amidst the peak of the war against the Saudi-led coalition, the Houthis launched missiles and rockets targeting the Saudi territories, including oil installations. In 2018, they even fired seven ballistic missiles that traversed the capital city of Riyadh and a military depot in Khamees Mushait. [xl] Again in 2019, they targeted two major oil installations in Aramco, forcing the Kingdom to shut down half of its oil production.[xli] In one of the attacks, the oil terminals in southern Yemen were damaged very severely, rendering them defunct.[xlii] Throughout 2023, the Houthis continued to bolster their presence in northern Yemen by frequent marches in major cities like Sanaa, Marib and Taiz and fought several battles against the UAE-backed Saba Axis of Giant Brigades in Marib, in north-western Yemen.[xliii] Besides the entanglement with the coalition forces of Saudi Arabia, they confronted ISIS because of the latter’s sectarian hostility against the former after many of the Zaydi mosques were attacked the ISIS in Sanaa.[xliv]

This volley of attacks and counterattacks stopped only after a UN-mediated ceasefire deal was signed between the two in April 2022.[xlv] The two-month ceasefire was later extended to six months, and it was also agreed that the Saudi government would pay the outstanding civil servant salaries in the Houthi-run areas. Surprisingly, both sides have been able to preserve the ceasefire, and there are demands to turn the current extendable deal into a permanent ceasefire. For a permanent ceasefire, the Houthis continue to press for more concession, like compensation for the war damage and financing the post-war reconstruction.[xlvi] In December 2023, the office of the UN Special Envoy for Yemen announced plans to establish a UN roadmap for direct talk between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia to be mediated by Oman.[xlvii]But it led nowhere and stalemate continued. 

The longing of Saudi Arabia for a ceasefire could be attributed to declining support for the US to the Saudi-led operation. The US support declined only after some reports emerged that US weapons were passing into the hands of Houthis and some weapons were deliberately passed on to the forces of opposition and other groups to buy their loyalty.[xlviii] President Biden, in February 2021, removed the Houthis from the terrorist organisation list for the sake easing the aid delivery in Yemen. 

If the US and its Western allies supported the Saudis against the Houthis, Iran extended logistic support to the Houthis in their battle against the Saudi-led coalition. Iran is reported to have supplied ballistic missiles and rockets that targeted the Saudi oil installation and other arms depots.[xlix] President Hadi, who was forced by Saudi government in April 2022 to step down and hand over power to a ruling council had earlier accused Hezbollah of aiding Houthis in their military activities within Yemen and beyond. According to a report, hundreds of IRGC members and Hezbollah travelled to Yemen in 2014 to train the Houthis, and hundreds of Houthis were trained in Qum in Iran as well.[l] In the past, Saudi Arabia called Houthis a proxy of Iran rather than an indigenous political or religious entity. There has been a noticeable decline in Iran’s support for the Houthis after the China-mediated and Iran-Saudi rapprochement in March 2023. 

The Ongoing Israel-Gaza Conflict and the Emergence of Houthis on the Global Map 

The October 7 Hamas attack in Israel set in motion a chain of events that turned the Yemeni political scene upside down and ushered the Houthis onto the global map. Within weeks after the Israeli retaliatory operation in Gaza, the Houthis joined the war as a mark of solidarity with the people of Palestine. After Hezbollah, it was the involvement of Houthis in the Gaza War that added a new twist to the ongoing Israel-Gaza conflict. The Houthi chief, Abdellah Malik Al-Houthi, announced his support for Hamas in Gaza and declared that his men, in thousands, are ready to march to Gaza.[li] He also claimed that the Houthi naval operation in the Red Sea would stop only after Israel allows food and medical aid to reach Gaza.[lii]

The first time, on October 19, a missile launched from Yemen was intercepted by the Saudis and US forces, and it was understood to have been directed towards Israel. A week later again, Egypt suffered a drone attack that Israel claimed was directed against Israel. The two Houthi attacks soon galvanised into a full-fledged naval operation in the Red Sea when they began the drone and missile attacks against the Western merchant ships sailing in the Red Sea. The Houthis claimed that they were targeting the ships of countries for their military and diplomatic support of Israel’s “genocide” in Gaza. The progress of the Houthi military operation also concurred with a growing display of the maritime capability of the Houthis. In the last year, they have launched around 130 attacks on the crucial waterway of the Red Sea and have used advanced weapons, including drones, missiles, helicopters, ballistic missiles and war boats, to seize several foreign merchant vessels. Some drones and anti-ship cruise missiles used by them have been to be the particularly deadly. In the latest round of missile attacks from the Houthis (1 December 2024), four Israelis suffered mild injuries[liii] as the rocket hit the central part of Israel. 

Since the Red Sea conflict started, the members of the Houthi militia have captured dozens of crew members as hostages, including 25 crew members from a Japanese merchant vessel, Galaxy Leaders.[liv] Few ships were so badly damaged because of the repetitive drone and missile attacks that they subsequently sunk deep into the Red Sea. One such ship was the UK-owned MV Rubymar that sunk in March this year.[lv] In the early days of the operation, the US, UK and Israel deployed their anti-missile destroyer system to intercept the Houthi rockets and missiles. In the second week of January 2024, the US and British warplanes targeted around 60 of the Houthi sites inside Yemen, including their command centres, ammunition stores and missile and drone launch systems.[lvi] Though the US-led international force (Operation Prosperity Guardian) has been able to thwart many attacks, commercial ships continue to be targeted, raising the likelihood that trade will continue to suffer. 

Soon after the escalation of the conflict in the Red Sea, most of the world’s leading container-shipping companies either stopped their operations or began to avoid the Red Sea route. Today more than 60 per cent of commercial ships are forced to change their routes and go around the Cape of Good Hope. At present, the average daily transit through the Suez Canal stands at 29 compared with about 80 in October 2023 as estimated by Port Watch.[lvii] The changes in the route are likely to entail an additional distance of around 17,000 kilometres, estimated to add 60 per cent extra travel time, pushing the freight rates as much as threefold.[lviii] This is raising the shipping cost, including insurance and additional perks for sailors working in high-risk zones.[lix]

The war is not only disrupting the global supply chain or hurting the global economy, it has also added a new factor to the regional geopolitics. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia reportedly snubbed the pressure of the US when the former was asked by the latter to slow down the ongoing peace negotiation with the Houthis until they halt their operation in the Red Sea.[lx] Saudi Arabia is quite aware of the limitations of the leverage they could avail against the Houthis, given their bitter experience of an eight-year-long war. 

Saudi Arabia is not likely to allow the Red Sea crisis to harm the prospect of Houthi-Saudi peace negotiations and meanwhile, the Kingdom, along with the UAE, decided not to join the ten-nation coalition, Operation Prosperity Guardian[lxi] formed at the behest of the US to stop the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. Saudi was among the first few nations to call for self-restraint to avoid an escalation after the US and the UK launched the operation against the Houthis in January this year.[lxii]

Through these naval raids against the global shipment, the Houthis aim to prove that their calls for Palestinian freedom were not hollow slogans like other Gulf nations but that they are the real enemy of the US-Israel alliance. The Red Sea attacks are also a manifestation of their rising military power and their will to position themselves differently from the rest of the Arab world, which continues to maintain steady silence over the Gaza plight.[lxiii] Their movement in the Red Sea is likely to refurbish their image as a formidable force in the evolving Yemeni polity and regional geopolitics. Through this exercise in the Red Sea, they tend to achieve more bargaining power against their opponents at home in any future political formation. Their military operation in the Red Sea for the sake of Hamas is also helping them to win over their ideological foes, such as the al-Islah party, which was in praise of the Red Sea operation because of its linkage with the Gaza war. It is worth recalling that al-Islah was the close ally of the anti-Houthi forces during the peak of the civil war in Yemen.[lxiv]

Conclusion 

It can be concluded that the Houthis, as a tribal and religious force, have been embedded into the socio-cultural, political and religious evolution of the country for centuries. Their current political and religious revivalism is shaped by the relic of their past religion and the ideology they have practised for centuries. In recent decades, the evolving political landscape inside Yemen and the evolving geopolitical template across Yemen offered a favourable milieu for the Houthis to dictate the political and religious trajectory of the nation. Though the Houthis, as a political and religious force, have been at the helm of the affairs for almost four decades, the years following the Arab uprising (2010) were the time of their robust religious and political consolidation, which was exemplified by their capture of the capital city of Sanaa in 2014 and later turning the Saudi-led war in their own favour and preventing its wealthy neighbour (Saudi Arabia) from establishing a political model in Yemen with complete disregard to their interest, stakes  and strength in the country. 

The post-2014 Yemen seems to belong to the Houthis, and today they are in control of the whole of northern Yemen, and southern Yemen too is not far from their reach. Their march to achieve their political ambitions rooted in their religion seems today to be fully inspired and guided by Iranian religious and political ideology. Today’s Zaydism (Fiver) of Yemen is significantly fused and coloured with Iranian Shiism (Twelver). No doubt there is opposition from amongst the traditional Zaydis for their over-enchantment with the Iranian political and religious model and radicalisation, but their growing political influence has subdued those dissenting voices. The way they have consolidated themselves in the national political sphere over the decade, one should harbour no doubt that there cannot be a political solution without their participation and without a major share in the political structure. 

But one cannot exclude the possibility of other scenarios in the country if the ongoing Israel-Gaza war does not stop soon or Israel’s occasional military strikes against the Houthis turns into another larger involvement of the Houthis in regional conflict. One also needs to see if radicalisation and militarisation of Houthis could turn Yemen into another Afghanistan or Libya where most of the country’s territories falls into their hands.  Iranian retreat from supporting its proxies and reducing stakes of Hezbollah in Lebanon and regional politics would likely have an impact on the trajectory of the Houthis.

*****

*Dr. Fazzur Rahman Siddiqui is a Senior Research Fellow with ICWA.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

[i] Shafiite is one of the four prominent Sunni schools of thought and is known to be quite liberal and close to Zaydi branch of Shiism. Because of the intimacy between the two, the latter is known as Sunni among Shiites.

[ii] Kali Robinson, Yemen’s Tragedy: War Stalemate and Suffering, Council on Foreign Relations, May 1, 2023, accessed https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis November 30, 2024.

[iii] The Zaydi sect of Shiite draws its name from Zayd ibn Ali, grandson of Ali’s martyred son Hussayn, who was killed in 740 AD in revolt against Umayyad Caliphate. In line with Twelvers of Iranian Shiites, Zaydis are known as Fivers[iii] because of their firm belief in the divinity of fifth Imam who is Zayed bin Ali himself. The emergence of Zaydi owes to disagreement over which descendent of Ali should be considered as a true Imam. Zaydi Like Iranian Twelver believe that Imamate is the privilege for the descendants of Ali and Fatima (son-in-law and daughter of Prophet Mohammad respectively) but contrary to the belief of Twelvers, they are not infallible for Zaydis and any one can be chosen Imam on the basis of qualification and religious knowledge. Zaydi also believe that the lineage should not be the only criteria of Imamate(ruling) and instead he should be man of letter and wisdom.

[iv] Joana Cook & Shiraz Maher (ed.) The Rule is for none but Allah: Islamist Approaches to Governance (London: Hurst, 2023) P.n.267.

[v] Joana Cook, P.n.267.

[vi] Nadwa Al-Dawsari, The Ideological Underpinning of Houthi’s Red Sea Attacks, Middle East Institute, January 22 2024, accessed https://shorturl.at/lvYg8 November 22, 2024.

[vii] Joana Cook, P.n.267.

[viii] Nadwa Al-Dawsari, https://shorturl.at/lvYg8.

[ix] Nadwa Al-Dawsari, https://shorturl.at/lvYg8.

[x] Joana Cook, P.n.276.

[xi] Houthis Intellectual and Cultural Document.

[xii] Nadwa Al-Dawsari, https://shorturl.at/lvYg8.

[xiii] Barak A. Salmani, Bryce Loidolt and Madeline Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Houthi, Phenomenon, (Rand Publications, 2010) P.n. 120.

[xiv] Nadwa Al-Dawsari, https://shorturl.at/lvYg8.

[xv] Nadwa Al-Dawsari, https://shorturl.at/lvYg8.

[xvi] Kali Robinson, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis.

[xvii] Barak A. Salmani and Bryce Loidolt and Wells, P.n.133.

[xviii] Nadwa Al-Dawsari, https://shorturl.at/lvYg8.

[xix] Barak A. Salmani and Bryce Loidolt and Wells, P.n. 127.

[xx] Barak A. Salmani and Bryce Loidolt and Wells, P.n. 124.

[xxi] Barak A. Salmani and Bryce Loidolt and Wells, P.n. 189.

[xxii] Shelagh Weir, A Tribal Order: Politics and Law in the Mountain of Yemen, (Texas: University of Texas Press, 2009), P.n. 297.

[xxiii] Shelagh Weir, P.n.297.

[xxiv] Shelagh Weir, P.n.297.

[xxv] Joana Cook, P.n.267.

[xxvi] Joana Cook, P.n.267.

[xxvii] Joana Cook, P.n.267.

[xxviii] Nadwa Al-Dawsari, The Houthis and limits of diplomacy in Yemen, Middle East Institute, May 21, 2021, Accessed https://shorturl.at/bALqN November 22, 2024

[xxix] Joana Cook, P.n.267.

[xxx] Mohammad Al-Maflahi and James Rott, Iranian Islamic Revolution and how does it inspire and does not inspire Houthis in north Yemen (Arabic) Sanaa Centre for Strategic Studies, December 2020.

[xxxi] The Houthis’ Red Sea Campaign and Yemen ‘s Future Politics: A conversation with Stacey Philbricky and Yazid Al-Jeddawy, Brandies university, January 1, 2024, Accessed https://shorturl.at/SYyCx December 4 2024.

[xxxii] Barak A. Salmani and Bryce Loidolt and Wells, P.n. 177.

[xxxiii]Barak A. Salmani and Bryce Loidolt and Wells, P.n. 121.

[xxxiv] Mohammad Al-Maflahi and James Rott, Iran’s Islam Revolution: How it does aspire and not aspire Houthis in Northern Yemen (Arabic), Sana Centre for Strategic Studies, Yemen, December 2020.

[xxxv] Mohammad Al-Maflahi and James Rott.

[xxxvi]Kali Robinson, Yemen’s Tragedy: War Stalemate and Suffering, Council on Foreign Relations, May 1, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis,

[xxxvii] Kali Robinson, Yemen’s Tragedy: War Stalemate and Suffering,

[xxxviii] Mohammad Al-Maflahi and James Rott.

[xxxix] Joana Cook & Shiraz Maher (ed.) The Rule is for none but Allah: Islamist Approaches to Governance (London: Hurst, 2023) P.n. 265,

[xl]Rail Youm, https://shorturl.at/CUM5O.

[xli] Veena Ali Khan, Why Saudi Arabia is Staying on the Sideline in the Red Sea Conflict, Foreign Policy, January 16, 2024, Accessed https://shorturl.at/v8QcW November 27, 2024.

[xlii] Yemen Annual Review 2023.

[xliii] Yemen Annual Review 2023.

[xliv] Kali Robinson, Yemen’s Tragedy: War Stalemate and Suffering.

[xlv] Bruce Reidel, How to Bolster Yemen and Saudi Arabia’s bitter Peace Deal, Brookings, May 10, 2022, Accessed https://shorturl.at/3Oxmc December 2, 2024.

[xlvi] Yemen Annual Review 2023.

[xlvii] Yemen Annual Review 2023.

[xlviii] Nima Elbagir & Others, Sold to an ally, lost to an enemy, CNN, n.d., Accessed https://shorturl.at/LyhJ0 December 1 2024.

[xlix] Kali Robinson, Yemen’s Tragedy: War Stalemate and Suffering.

[l]Yara Bayoumy & Mohammad Ghobari, Iranian support seen crucial for Yemen’s Houthis, Reuters, December 15 2014, Accessed https://shorturl.at/XF6YY December 5, 2024.

[li] Lior Bin Ari, Houthi leader pledges support for Gaza, calas for protest in Yemen, Ynet.com, November 28, 2024, Accessed https://shorturl.at/4KQAA December 2, 2024.

[lii]US and UK carry out attacks against Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen, CNN Politics, January 12 2024, Accessed https://shorturl.at/OKCwi December 24, 2024.

[liii] https://shorturl.at/W632L.

[liv]

[lv] Mike Schuler, Red Sea crisis: A Timeline of Maritime Chaos over the past year, gCapatin, November 25, 2024, Accessed https://shorturl.at/j5zzy November 24, 2024.

[lvi] US and UK carry out attacks against Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen, CNN Politics, January 12, 2024.

[lvii] Houthi Red Sesa attack still torment the global trade, a year after October 7, Aljazeera (English) October 5, 2014, Accessed https://shorturl.at/UWFrO December 5, 2024.

[lviii] Houthi Red Sesa attack still torment the global trade, a year after October 7, Aljazeera (English)

[lix]Houthi Red Sesa attack still torment the global trade, a year after October 7, Aljazeera (English)

[lx] Does the Red Sea attack derail the Yemeni peace Process, Aljazeera (Arabic), December 26 2023, Accessed https://shorturl.at/vZvbU December 4, 2024.

[lxi] The Houthis’ Red Sea Campaign and Yemen’s Future Politics, https://shorturl.at/SYyCx

[lxii] Veena Ali Khan, Why Saudi Arabia is Staying on the Sideline in the Red Sea Conflict, Foreign Policy, January 16, 2024, Accessed https://shorturl.at/v8QcW November 27, 2024.

[lxiii] The Houthis’ Red Sea Campaign and Yemen’s Future Politics, https://shorturl.at/SYyCx.

[lxiv] The Houthis’ Red Sea Campaign and Yemen’s Future Politics, https://shorturl.at/SYyCx.