Indian Council of World Affairs

Introduction

The region of West Asia and North Africa (WANA) continues to remain the focal point of world politics and the global media for not-so-insignificant reasons. While one of the ruthless Israel-Palestine wars in recent decades was still rippling throughout the region, set in motion by the Hamas terrorist attack on 7 October 2024, the focus of the strategic community was subsumed deep into interpreting and deciphering the prospect of sustenance of Israel-Gaza ceasefire; the sudden collapse of the Assad regime in Damascus (Syria) on 8 December 2024 again shifted the whole discourse from Gaza to Syria. This seismic event not only seems to have triggered a new strategic churning but also aimed to reshape Syria’s dynamics and impose new political realities across the region.

Soon after the arrival of rebel forces in Damascus, it appeared quite explicit that Assad’s security forces had neither the urge nor the ability to fight them. The leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Abu Mohamad Al-Jolani, emerged as the uncontested and de facto ruler who appointed an interim government and announced a timeframe for the country’s political transition. 

Those who removed Assad must themselves be surprised over the swiftness of the fall of the regime, which sustained itself for a decade with the support of Russia, Iran and Hezbollah. Over the years, Assad’s fatigued national army too seems to have lost the impulse to protect the political oligarchs without hope for economic or political incentives in the near future.

The nuances of Assad’s fall, the rise of opposition forces, the rising ambitions of the regional and global powers and the complex interplay among these factors deserve a deeper examination to unravel the challenges and possibilities in post-Assad Syria. The sudden exit of Assad from the country’s political horizon has not only exposed the limitations of the foreign powers over the dynamics of Syria’s internal politics but has also added new complexities to the current political realities that have emerged in the wake of the Israel-Gaza war. One is not certain if the recent developments would usher in an undoing of Syria’s chaotic past or a consolidation of Syrian democratic politics. In light of the above, this issue brief will examine the process of the collapse of the regime and why Iran and Russia showed no desire to rescue Assad. The paper will also explain the gainers and losers of the downfall of the Assad regime and what are the challenges left behind by the ousted President for Syria and others.

How It All Happened

It all began on 27 November 2024 in Idlib, a de-escalated zone[i] in the northwest of Syria, when the militias belonging to the HTS and its other affiliates launched a military operation, named Deterrence of Aggression,[ii] amidst the frequent violation of the Russia-Türkiye-mediated de-escalation deal (March 2020) on the part of Syrian armed forces. According to an estimate, the HTS has around 40,000 fighters and around 80,000 as reserves.[iii] The huge contingent of fighters who had set out from Idlib first captured the city of Aleppo (the economic capital of Syria and the second-largest city). The city of Aleppo has always been a symbol of sovereignty for the ousted regime, and it was a source of celebration after it was retaken in 2016 by the forces of Assad from the control of ISIS. In the absence of significant resistance, the militias moved forward towards Homs and Hama and finally reached Damascus, hurling their own flag over the roof of the royal palace in Damascus[iv] on 8 December 2024, which the Assad family had occupied for more than half a century beginning in 1970. The last member of the Assad family (Bashar Assad) fled to Russia, leaving behind a ruined nation in the hands of those whose ideology and political and social outlook are not so explicit.

The line of army communication was hacked, and a large-scale desertion soon followed, and President Assad announced a hike in the salary for military personnel by 50%[v] to stop the exodus. As the situation began to turn bleak, President Assad sought military help from Iraq and financial assistance from the UAE but in vain.[vi] The Russian Foreign Minister reportedly contacted his Iranian and Turkish counterparts but without any progress, and reportedly Türkiye told the Russian and Iranian sides that if they intervened, Türkiye too would act militarily. Initially, Russia’s air forces bombed some areas in Aleppo, like Idlib and Hama, but failed to halt the march of the opposition. President Assad received the Iranian Foreign Minister on 2 December 2024, who stated, “We will continue to fight terrorism in all its lands,” while King Abdullah of Jordan observed, “We stand by our brother in Syria and its territorial integrity and sovereignty.”[vii] Despite the high-level statements, actual support on the ground for Assad was not forthcoming.

When the situation seemed grave after Assad continued losing one city after another, the hotline opened in 2017 between Russia and the US was resumed, and the foreign ministers of Russia, Iran and Türkiye (Astana signatories) met on the margin of the Doha Forum on 7 December 2024, and then President Erdogan stated, “The new phase is being managed in Syria very calmly.”[viii] While the President-elect Donald Trump noted that if Russia is forced out of Syria, this is the best thing that can happen.[ix]

All these happened when President Assad paradoxically seemed to have regained his lost legitimacy and had already visited the UAE and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The country had re-entered into the fold of the Arab League after a decade-old estrangement. Other countries were on the verge of reviving their diplomatic and economic ties with Syria.

The whole anti-Assad operation was spearheaded by HTS, a hardcore Sunni Islamist militant entity, based in Syria, which remained steadfast against Assad until the latter was overthrown. It is also worth recalling here that HTS had many incarnations in the past. Earlier it was part of Al-Qaeda, later emerging as the Nusrat Front in Syria during the heydays of ISIS, and finally designating itself as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. It is currently headed by Abu Mohamad Al-Jolani (Ahmed Al-Shaara), on whose head the US had announced a bounty worth $10 million[x] that has now been withdrawn since the takeover of Syria by anti-Assad forces.[xi]

The HTS maintained its control over Idlib (de-escalated zone) while most parts of the territories were retrieved by Assad with the support of his allies. The HTS had established a sort of autonomous region in Idlib and were managing all affairs under the banner of the Salvation Government, headed by Mohammad Al-Basheer, now caretaker Prime Minister of post-Assad Syria.

The Defense Minister in the caretaker Syrian government, Marhaf Abul Qasra (Abu Hassan), in an interview said, “Earlier we had thought of capturing Aleppo only, but by the time we reached there, we realised that we could capture Damascus as well, given the vulnerability of the Syrian Arab Army.”[xii] Marhaf Abul Qasra also said that the victory became easy because the allies of Assad had neither time nor desire to save Assad. According to him, the real plan for military advancement was conceived soon after Russia and Türkiye had reached an agreement to turn Idlib into a demilitarized zone in 2020. The exercise of de-escalation paved the way for anti-Assad forces to unify and arm themselves. Between 2020 and 2024, the senior members of HTS focused on military training, established a military college and General Administration of Training, and created a new military doctrine[xiii] to prepare disgruntled youth to join the anti-Assad forces.[xiv] They also sought the help of those senior army officials who had deserted Assad’s army in the recent past. The Salvation Government in Idlib had established weapons production units, which manufactured rocket launchers, snipers, drones, missiles, tanks, bulldozers, sweepers, reconnaissance aircraft and mortars and shells. Some of their reconnaissance aircraft could have reached the Russian air base in Hmeimim. They had established an operation room named Fathe-Mubeen and had named different battalions differently, and the most prominent was the “Shaheen” battalion, named after a plane manufactured by a group of scientists sympathetic to HTS. According to Marhaf Abul Qasra, their battle was guided by two main principles: comprehensive preparation and waiting for an opportune moment.

Why Assad’s Allies Let Him Fall

The most surprising element of the whole course of the fall of Assad was the swiftness with which the latter fell. A lot has been written about the role of Russia, Iran and Hezbollah in protecting the Assad regime. First, it was Iran with the help of IRGC and Hezbollah, which weakened the rebel forces, and later it was Russian air power along with its diplomatic shield at the UN that halted an imminent fall of Assad amidst the heydays of ISIS in 2015.[xv] Through its presence in Syria, Russia had re-established Moscow’s dominant share of bilateral influence in Syrian affairs, and for many it was the return of the 21^st-century version of the Cold War. While for Iran, Syria was a catalyst in bolstering its ideological and strategic sway in the region, the end of the Assad regime perhaps would halt the process of Iranianisation of the region. Iran reportedly invested around $30–$50 billion in rescuing Assad[xvi] while Russia spent $1–$2 billion annually for the same.[xvii] But during the current course of military assault, Assad’s trusted allies failed to spot his collapse or create a situation that could have prevented his downfall.

Because of the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022, Russia seemed to have deprioritised Syria from its foreign policy priority, and what distracted Iran and Hezbollah from Syria was the Israel-Gaza war and its expansion towards Lebanon and Iran. Hezbollah could not do much unlike in the past to save Assad because of its exhaustive war with Israel, which had rendered it too weak to act in Syria. As the forces of Hezbollah were getting depleted on the southern border of Lebanon, its battalions deployed to assist the Assad regime were moved to Lebanon after Israel had launched a ground operation in September 2024.

In the early phase of the Israel-Gaza war, Iran had witnessed the unravelling of its command in Syria when top members of the IRGC and diplomatic corps were killed on Syrian soil by Israel in clandestine operations.[xviii] The killing of several IRGC members also led to an impression among top Iranian officials that armed personnels in Assad’s regime were sharing information with Israeli officials about secret location of IRGC members. Syria was also not very happy about the expansion of the ideological and religious imprints of Iran in Syria. To the disdain of Iran, Assad did not allow Iranian militias to enter into the Golan Heights to confront Israel directly.[xix] For Iran, Assad had become an unreliable ally after he began to pursue an independent foreign policy that sometimes was in conflict with Iran’s overall regional objectives, particularly after Assad visited the UAE and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Syria’s return to the Arab League.

Both Iran and Russia had grown increasingly frustrated with Assad’s growing intransigence. For both, Assad was their man until he was not.[xx] Russia seemed to have become incensed by the constant violation of the Idlib de-escalation deal agreed upon with Türkiye. What further distanced Russia from Assad was his stubborn resistance to the resumption of dialogue with Türkiye. Russia wanted Assad to discuss the return of Syrian refugees stranded in Türkiye with Erdogan.[xxi]

Russia was unhappy over Assad’s reluctance to engage with the Astana Peace Process[xxii] launched in 2017 at the behest of Russia, Iran and Türkiye. Assad barely pretended to engage with the Geneva Peace Process too.[xxiii] Similarly, Assad showed no keenness to implement the principal component of the Sochi Dialogue (2018), which called for striking a comprehensive political dialogue with the participation of stakeholders, including the armed opposition forces.[xxiv]

Further, Assad’s old allies (Iran and Russia) lacked both the resources and the will to rescue him again amidst the evolving geopolitical landscape in the wake of the Israel-Gaza war. All efforts to resolve the internal crisis were continuously being ignored. Bashar had mobilised his followers behind the slogan, “Assad or no one and Assad or we burn the country.”[xxv] He ignored the promises made to his allies to begin serious dialogue with opposition forces when his fall looked certain in 2015. Other regional countries that had facilitated Syria’s reentry into the Arab fold saw no change in his attitude as the drug empire continued flourishing under him, affecting the whole of the region.

Besides the growing difference between Assad and allies, there were other key factors that contributed to the demise of the regime. Years of global sanctions, rampant corruption and loss of access to oil-rich areas had already devastated the Syrian economy. The military had lost its cohesion and was both poorly paid and ill-equipped.[xxvi] Sometimes, top officers in the armed forces were required to work under the instruction of Iranian and Hezbollah officials, which they perceived as a humiliation in their own country. [xxvii] Assad’s army was also grieved by the fact that they had invested a lot to protect an individual alone and not a nation.

Who Gained and Who Lost

No doubt, the exit of Assad from the political horizon of Syria would create a new political template in the country, engendering the emergence of a new regional strategic equation. The post-Assad Syria is likely to pave the way for many coveting for long to determine the political trajectory and deepen their political influence in Syria. The old allies of Assad will see a major blow to their strategic and political relevance in the fall of Assad. The biggest losers in the wake of the collapse of the Assad regime would be Iran and Hezbollah, as both were the principal pillars of the Axis of Resistance.

It was the outbreak of the civil war in Syria that anchored the formation of the Axis of Resistance. Iran has already lost much of its maneuvering space for its militias abroad in the wake of the killing of a Hamas leader on its soil, the assassination of several of its IRGC and military personnel, including in Syria, and not to mention Israeli air strikes against Iran itself. In the absence of Assad, Iran’s ability to provide military facilities to Hezbollah has been seemingly impacted, which in turn would weaken Hezbollah further.

Similarly, Hezbollah would overwhelmingly lose much of its political sway across the region. It has already lost much of its political and ideological footing and military capabilities after a year-long war of attrition with Israel, killing 37,00 people and displacing about 1.2 million Lebanese[xxviii] from southern Lebanon. Hezbollah has lost many stalwarts, including the long-time Secretary General, Hassan Nasrullah. The Hezbollah was already under immense pressure because of the Israel-Gaza war, but the fall of Assad would further weaken it, and that has been accepted by the current General Secretary, Naim Qasim, as well.[xxix]

Iran too, after the fall of Assad, can no longer deny that its strategic asset in the form of the Axis of Resistance has substantially weakened, if not collapsed. Tehran always perceived Syria through the prism of its ambition to project itself as a Shiite power in the region.[xxx] However, the debacle in Syria has inadvertently also stalled the growing shiization of the region.[xxxi] Iran had lost a faction or a wing of Iran in the weakening of Hezbollah, but in the loss of Assad, it has lost the entire nation, which was an indissoluble part of the Axis of Resistance.[xxxii] During the heydays of the civil war, it was said that Iran controlled four Arab capitals (Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus and Sana’a) through its militia proxies and through influencing domestic politics  but now it seems to have lost all.

Russia’s influence too would decline in Syria, and it would tarnish its image as a major power and could halt Russia’s future ambition in the region. Those who were imagining carving a new security architecture under Russia in the region would be required to reevaluate their strategic move and assessment. Soon after the removal of Assad, Russia reportedly began to move its warship from Tartus — its only naval base on the Mediterranean.[xxxiii]

Amidst the current political evolution in Syria, Türkiye seems to be the biggest gainer from the fall of Assad. Türkiye has already expanded its role in an unprecedented manner in Syria, particularly after the Astana and Sochi Peace Processes. Many reports have been claiming that Türkiye extended military and logistic support to the rebel forces in Syria such as Syrian National Army, which, along with HTS and other small outfits, played the role of a catalyst in ending the rule of Assad. Much before the takeover of Damascus, President Erdogan had stated publicly that he had hoped for an early advance of rebel forces to Damascus.[xxxiv]

Türkiye’s principal concern in Syria is to contain Kurdish forces active on the Syria-Türkiye border. Since 2016, Türkiye has launched four major military operations on the Türkiye-Syria border to halt the advance of the Syrian Democratic Forces and its armed wings, the People’s Protection Unit (YPG), both of which are said to be extended wings of the Kurdish Worker Party in Türkiye.[xxxv] The new ruler of Syria, Ahmed Al-Shaara, has already warned against any sort of anti-Türkiye activities from Syrian soil. But there are reports of clashes between Turk-backed forces and Kurdish ones in Kurd-dominated northeastern Syria.[xxxvi]

The removal of Assad would provide Türkiye opportunities to craft a comprehensive policy to protect its strategic and economic interests. Now, Türkiye would have more leeway to address the issue of Syrian refugees and contribute to the future of Syria. It was not a coincidence that Türkiye’s spy chief, Ibrahin Kallin, visited the Omayyad Mosque in Damascus, the day after the fall of Assad.[xxxvii] Kallin’s visit was followed by the visit of Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. Türkiye was the first to open its mission in Damascus.[xxxviii] During his visit, Hakan Fidan said that Türkiye was proud to be on the right side of history.[xxxix] It should be recalled here that Türkiye was among the first few nations to call for Assad to step down in the early days of the civil war.[xl] Türkiye would like to expand the orbit of its engagement with post-Assad Syria and invest in sectors, such as real estate, energy and defence.[xli] Turkish entrepreneurs are expecting that Turkish companies will be in the running to win the valuable contracts. There was a sharp rise in the real estate shares on the Istanbul Stock Exchange, and some shares in major construction companies increased between 4% and 10%.[xlii]

After Türkiye, Israel seems to be another beneficiary of what happened in Syria. After the decimation of Hamas, the eradication of Hezbollah, and the weakening of Iran, Syria was the only hostile nation in Israel’s neighborhood, though it remained indifferent throughout the Israel-Hamas and Israel-Hezbollah wars. Soon after the capture of Damascus by anti-Assad forces, Israelis entered the Syrian-controlled Golan Heights for the first time after the signing of the 1974 disengagement treaty. It declared its withdrawal from the 1974 treaty[xliii] and took over the control of buffer zones and key locations. Netanyahu declared that Israeli forces would remain there to ensure national security.[xliv] Within 48 hours of Assad’s departure to Moscow, Israeli forces launched around 480 air raids, destroying 70–80 of Syria’s military capabilities.[xlv] Israel itself claims that the recent operation against Syria was the largest operation in history.[xlvi] Assad’s removal from power has created a favourable situation for Israel to advance its interests in the country and the region as well.

Future Challenges

The abrupt fall of the Assad regime is likely to pose many challenges to Syria in near future and regional politics given the emergence of new political forces, which has rendered series of traditional regional forces such as Iran and Hezbollah weak, particularly following the Israel-Gaza war.

Today Syria has completely entered a new era of politics after almost five decades of the Assad family rule. The question that arises now is whether the HTS would pursue a policy of accommodation and inclusion or would remain stuck in the divisive politics of the past. There are many challenges but the biggest challenge would be to erect a new security architecture to contain the rise of any disruptive forces in the country. Other challenges include reconstruction of the country that has been devastated in the course of a decade-old civil war. Most of the country’s infrastructure have been depleted, and the majority of school buildings and hospitals are beyond recognition. Any reconstruction process would require decades and would cost billions of dollars This is a huge challenge for the new dispensation and the people of Syria.

Besides, some remnants of ISIS are still active in parts of Syria,[xlvii] and how the new government would deal with this menace and other obscure terror outfits needs to be seen. Their capacity will have to be minimized to prevent them from resurrecting and posing new security challenges.

Most Western countries want an end to the role of Russia and Iran, but they would not like to see the replacement of Assad with a hardliner or any militant Islamist force, as is the case in many countries that witnessed the overthrow of the regimes in the past. One needs to see if Iran would remain content with the unfolding polity or the emergence of a new political edifice, devoid of Iran, or again it would make effort to revive its Axis of Resistance-hitherto a pillar of Iran’s regional politics.

The US would be confronted with a new dilemma of dealing with the rise of HTS, and if the US decided to abandon Syria in preference for the Gulf, Israel and Palestine, there is the likelihood that power like Türkiye would fill the power vacuum to the chagrin of the US. In the course of the civil war, the Syrian Arab Army has been completely exhausted, and its arsenal has been destroyed; hence the fortification and reorganization of the national army would be another significant challenge for the future government.

Amidst all this, early trends seem to be quite promising as new leadership in Syria is showing all sign of political maturity and have not spoken of politics of vendetta or shown any sign of politics of exclusion. Many regional leaders including Saudi Foreign Minister visited Syria and Ahmad Al-Shara himself visited both Türkiye and Saudi Arabia.

Conclusion

Now Assad is gone after being in the saddle of power for two and a half decades but an event of this magnitude would have multiple repercussions on domestic, regional and global politics. No doubt his removal was unanticipated and has resulted in political and strategic challenges in the country. The biggest challenge would be to create a lasting resonance between unfolding political realities in the country and evolving global scenarios in the wake of Trump’s reentry into the White House, aggressive military and diplomatic posturing of Israel across the region, the waning influence of Iran and Hezbollah in regional politics, and emerging new security architecture in the Arab world. The transition represents an opportunity to lay a foundation for the establishment of inclusive and democratic politics that Syria has been deprived of for long. However, the movement towards new politics will only be possible if the regional stakeholders do not act, as seen in the past, as spoilers and the caretaker administration in Syria does not pursue the vendetta politics or puritanical, single-ideological, or sectarian politics as is noticed in many parts of the world. A new environment will have to be created to pave the way for trust instead of animosity among different social and political groups. Any future politics in Syria should be anchored in good governance, inclusiveness respect for the citizenry and promoting rights and freedom. While reviving the collapsed national army, the government would not have to be swayed by regional, sectarian and ethnic preferences, and instead, the army should be indoctrinated in the philosophy of nationalism and humanism. Finally, a safe transition from Assad’s Syria to the new Syria requires a complex set of conditions, most notably an open leadership that seeks to involve everyone in achieving a safe political transition.

*****

*Dr. Fazzur Rahman Siddiqui is a Senior Research Fellow with ICWA.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

[i] Idlib was one of the four deescalated zones identified under the Astana Peace Process, not supposed to be entered by Assad’s forces.

[ii]That is How we prepared ourselves the fall of Assad: Syria’s New Défense Minister, Majella, (Arabic Weekly), January 21, 2025, accessed https://shorter.me/6cO2A January 25, 2025.

[iii] Whole Story of How Assad Fled, ( Arabic Weekly), January 18, 2025, accessed https://shorter.me/Bnxk5  January 23, 2025.

[iv] Haleigh Bartos & Others, Assad’s Downfall in Syria: Who Wins and Who Losses? Modern War Institute, December 12, 2024, accessed https://shorter.me/vtyzn January 23, 2025.

[v] Assad Hikes Soldiers’ Salery, The Syrian Observers, December 6, 2024, accessed https://shorter.me/NCfEN January 12, 2025.

[vi]Whole Story of How Assad Fled, (Arabic Weekly), January 18, 2025, accessed https://shorter.me/Bnxk5  January 22, 2025. 

[vii] Whole Story of How Assad Fled, (Arabic Weekly), January 18, 2025, accessed https://shorter.me/Bnxk5  January 22, 2025.    

[viii] Whole Story of How Assad Fled, (Arabic Weekly), January 18, 2025, accessed https://shorter.me/Bnxk5  January 22, 2025.    

[ix] Whole Story of How Assad Fled, (Arabic Weekly), January 18, 2025, accessed https://shorter.me/Bnxk5  January 22, 2025.      

[x] decided to lift US $ 10 million bounty on the head of Al-Jolani, Jerusalem Post, 20 December 2024, accessed  https://shorter.me/XuKn-  5 January, 2025.

[xi] US decided to lift US $ 10 million bounty on the head of Al-Jolani, Jerusalem Post, 20 December 2024, accessed  https://shorter.me/XuKn-  5 January, 2025.

[xii] That is how we prepared ourselves the fall of Assad: Syria’s New Défense Minister, Majella, (Arabic Weekly), January 21, 2025, accessed https://shorter.me/6cO2A January 25, 2025.

[xiii] That is How we prepared ourselves the fall of Assad: Syria’s New Défense Minister, Majella (Arabic Weekly), January 21, 2025, accessed https://shorter.me/6cO2A January 25, 2025.

[xiv] That is How we prepared ourselves the fall of Assad: Syria’s New Défense Minister, Majella, (Arabic Weekly), January 21, 2025, accessed https://shorter.me/6cO2A January 25, 2025.

[xv]Ahmad Mustaf Ghar, Syria after Assad: Mapping Poer and Zones of Influence, Sautul Qahira (Voice of Cairo) [Arabic], December 19, 2024, accessed https://shorter.me/89TzH December 23 25, 2025.     

[xvi] Nichole Grajewski, why Did Iran Allow Basha al-Asad’s Downfall? Carnegie, December 9, 2024, accessed https://shorter.me/jJpLq December 31, 2025.    

[xvii] Ahmad Mustaf Ghar, Syria after Assad: Mapping Poer and Zones of Influence, Sautul Qahira (Voice of Cairo) [ Arabic], December 19, 2024, accessed https://shorter.me/89TzH December 23–25, 2025.    

[xviii] Nichole Grajewski, why Did Iran Allow Basha al-Asad’s Downfall? Malcom H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Centre, December 9, 2024, accessed https://shorter.me/jJpLq December 31, 2025.    

[xix] Nichole Grajewski, why Did Iran Allow Basha al-Asad’s Downfall? Malcom H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Centre, December 9, 2024, accessed https://shorter.me/jJpLq December 31, 2025.    

[xx] Nichole Grajewski, why Did Iran Allow Basha al-Asad’s Downfall? Malcom H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Centre, December 9, 2024, accessed https://shorter.me/jJpLq December 31, 2025.    

[xxi] Nichole Grajewski, why Did Iran Allow Basha al-Asad’s Downfall? Malcom H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Centre, December 9, 2024, accessed https://shorter.me/jJpLq December 31, 2025.    

[xxii] The Astana Peace Process talked of gradual peacebuilding through negotiation with the opposition and the creation of some de-escalated zones.

[xxiii] Zaki Kaf Al-Ghazal, End of House of Assad: How and Why Now, Middle East Monitor, December 9, 2024, accessed https://shorter.me/-4jp4 December 10, 2024.

[xxiv] https://shorter.me/-7bAy.

[xxv] https://shorter.me/-7bAy.

[xxvi]https://shorter.me/jjfDc.    

[xxvii] Zaki Kaf Al-Ghazal, End of House of Assad: How and Why Now, Middle East Monitor, December 9, 2024, accessed https://shorter.me/-4jp4 December 10, 2024.

[xxviii]Jo Adetuji, Assad’s fall in Syria will further weaken Hezbollah and curtail Tehran’s Iranianisation in the region, The Conversation, December 11, 2024, accessed https://shorter.me/nzzpQ December 22, 2024.  

[xxix]

[xxx]Haleigh Bartos & Others, Assad’s Downfall in Syria: Who Wins and Who Losses? Modern War Institute, December 12, 2024, accessed https://shorter.me/vtyzn January 23, 2025. 

[xxxi] Jo Adetuji, Assad’s fall in Syria will further weaken Hezbollah and curtail Tehran’s Iranianisation in the region, The Conversation, December 11, 2024, accessed https://shorter.me/nzzpQ December 22, 2024.        

[xxxii] Why Supreme Leader is Stubborn Despite Losing, Al-Quds Al-Arabi (Arabic Daily), December 30, 2024, accessed https://shorter.me/OUgUb January 12, 2025.

[xxxiii] Haleigh Bartos & Others, Assad’s Downfall in Syria: Who Wins and Who Losses? Modern War Institute, December 12, 2024, accessed https://shorter.me/vtyzn January 23, 2025.  

[xxxiv] https://mwi.westpoint.edu/assads-downfall-in-syria-who-wins-and-who-loses/  

[xxxv] Reasons for Türkiye’s Growing Influence in Post-Assad Syria, Annahar (Arabic), January 19, 2025, accessed https://shorter.me/Xs7-T January 26, 2025.

[xxxvi]Reasons for Türkiye’s Growing Influence in Post-Assad Syria, Annahar (Arabic), January 19, 2025, accessed https://shorter.me/Xs7-T January 26, 2025.

[xxxvii] Reasons for Türkiye’s Growing Influence in Post-Assad Syria, Annahar (Arabic), January 19, 2025, accessed https://shorter.me/Xs7-T January 26, 2025.

[xxxviii]Reasons for Türkiye’s Growing Influence in Post-Assad Syria, Annahar (Arabic), January 19, 2025, accessed https://shorter.me/Xs7-T January 26, 2025.

[xxxix]Reasons for Türkiye’s Growing Influence in Post-Assad Syria, Annahar (Arabic), January 19, 2025, accessed https://shorter.me/Xs7-T January 26, 2025.

[xl]Reasons for Türkiye’s Growing Influence in Post-Assad Syria, Annahar (Arabic), January 19, 2025, accessed https://shorter.me/Xs7-T January 26, 2025.  

[xli]Reasons for Türkiye’s Growing Influence in Post-Assad Syria, Annahar (Arabic), January 19, 2025, accessed https://shorter.me/Xs7-T January 26, 2025.     

[xlii] https://shorter.me/SxpQ._

[xliii] Israeli terminated 1974 Treaty with Syria, Al-Quds-Al-Arabi, 8 December 2024, accessed https://shorter.me/yLHEF  8 January ,2025  

[xliv] Analytical Map: Israeli Penetration into Syrian territories after fall of Assad, Harmon Centre for Contemporary Studies, January 11, 2025, accessed https://shorter.me/xiN7w January 26, 2025.

[xlv] Analytical Map: Israeli Penetration into Syrian territories after fall of Assad, Harmon Centre for Contemporary Studies, January 11, 2025, accessed https://shorter.me/xiN7w January 26, 2025.

[xlvi] Amar Salahi, Syria wakes up from Assadist Nightmare: But What Comes Next, The New Arab, December 16, 2024, accessed https://shorter.me/HwKMg January 2, 2025.

[xlvii] Ahmad Mustaf Ghar, Syria after Assad: Mapping Power and Zones of Influence, Sautul Qahira (Vice of Cairo) [ Arabic], December 19, 2024, accessed https://shorter.me/89TzH December 23–25,2025