Abstract: The USAID freeze under President Trump reflects his administration’s preference for transactional diplomacy, prioritising short-term American gains over the strategic advantages of soft power. The article examines the impact of USAID’s funding cuts on Latin America and its implications for US national security.
Introduction
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was established in 1961 by President John F. Kennedy through an executive order, following the enactment of the Foreign Assistance Act. Its creation consolidated various US foreign aid programs under a single agency with a mandate to promote long-term economic and social development. The agency primarily distributes funding through grants and partnerships with NGOs, aid groups and multilateral organisations like the United Nations.
In its early years, USAID played a key role in the US Cold War strategy, countering Soviet communist influence in developing and postcolonial nations. The agency focused on providing emergency food aid, building infrastructure, supporting market economies and expanding trade opportunities for US goods. Throughout the 1970s, USAID shifted its focus towards addressing basic human needs, including food security, healthcare and education. Over time, USAID expanded its activities to include democracy promotion, climate change initiatives and crisis response, adapting to global demands. The idea behind US foreign assistance was to reinforce the belief that American security was linked to the economic progress and stability of other nations[i].
While the agency plays a significant role in global development, it faces ongoing scrutiny. The Trump 2.0 administration, along with key allies, such as Elon Musk, considers USAID a "radical leftist" institution and accuses it of financial mismanagement[ii]. This criticism aligns with the "America First" policy, which advocates for reducing foreign aid expenditures. The US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, also the acting USAID director, asserted that taxpayer money must serve US national interests rather than function as a global charity[iii]. Consequently, after President Trump’s executive order, USAID has faced layoffs and a funding freeze for 90 days. Within this timeframe, decisions will be made regarding the continuation, modification, or termination of each programme based on the review findings of existing programmes. The administration intends to realign certain USAID functions to the US Department of State by July 1, 2025, and dismiss the agency.
This study examines USAID’s role in Latin America and the potential consequences of funding freezes on the region and its implications for US national security.
Key Focus Areas of USAID and Consequences of Fund Withdrawals in Latin America
The US faces major national security challenges from drug trafficking, organised crime and irregular migration along its southern border. While USAID primarily focuses on humanitarian and economic aid, its efforts are crucial in addressing the root causes of crime and migration. By supporting development initiatives, USAID not only promotes regional stability but also helps mitigate security threats that impact the US, contributing to its national security.
1) Preventing Violent Crime and Drug Trafficking
Between one-third and half of homicides in Latin America and the Caribbean are linked to organised crime, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)[iv]. The rise in violence across the region is closely tied to shifts in the international drug trade, particularly the control of key trafficking routes as traffickers move drugs from South America to the US market[v]. While Mexico and Colombia continue to battle powerful cartels, Central American nations — especially Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador — face security challenges from violent street gangs. These criminal organisations engage in drug trafficking, extortion, human trafficking, and territorial disputes, primarily targeting marginalised youth for recruitment. The escalating violence drives irregular migration to the US and also contributes to the surge in overdose deaths, as illicit drugs — particularly fentanyl and cocaine — are smuggled into the US from the region. The year 2022 alone in the US witnessed 73,838 fentanyl overdose deaths, according to data from the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Further, the escalating violence affects security, governance, economic stability and social development in the region.
The USAID security assistance programs have been helping the region address these challenges. These initiatives include counter-narcotics efforts, law enforcement training and community-based crime prevention strategies, with a focus on both cocaine-source countries, such as Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, and transit zones like Mexico, the Caribbean and Central America, which are heavily impacted by transnational drug trafficking networks and violent street gangs and other organised crime groups[vi].
USAID funds various programs tailored to urban and rural contexts. In urban areas, where violent crime is concentrated, USAID supports community resilience programs, such as youth violence prevention, community policing, and economic development initiatives in crime-prone neighbourhoods. For instance, in El Salvador, the Education for Children and Youth Project expands educational opportunities for vulnerable students in high-crime municipalities, reducing the likelihood of gang recruitment. USAID, also under the Sembrando Oportunidades programme, improves youth employment prospects in the country[vii]. In Mexico, USAID funds Mexico’s Resilient Civil Society Activity to strengthen the capacity of civil society organisations to address human rights, justice, transparency, sustainable development and violence prevention[viii]. In Central America, USAID supports community crime prevention through initiatives under the Central American Regional Security Initiative, which includes crime prevention committees, programs for at-risk youth, public space improvements and community policing[ix].
In rural areas, USAID promotes alternative development programs in illicit crop-cultivating regions, helping small farmers transition to legal agricultural production. These initiatives also provide physical and social infrastructure, agricultural inputs and market access. For instance, in Peru, USAID partners with the National Commission for Development and Life without Drugs to combat poverty and illicit drug production by financing alternative crops such as coffee and cacao[x]. In Colombia, the Rural Financial Initiative promotes market-based rural financial services for micro, small- and medium-sized producers, while the Colombia Land and Rural Development Program supports land tenure resolution, aiding President Gustavo Petro’s vision of Total Peace[xi].
Without adequate financial and technical support, these initiatives risk failure, potentially leading to a resurgence of illicit drug cultivation, increased violent crime and greater youth involvement in organised crime, and eventually challenging US national security. Therefore, sustained investment in both urban and rural programmes remains critical to ensuring stability and security in the region.
2) Addressing Irregular Migration
Migration from Latin America to the US has reached record levels, with over 370,000 people intercepted at the US-Mexico border in December 2023 alone[xii]. USAID plays a vital role in addressing the security, governance and economic factors driving irregular migration. Its key initiatives focus on citizen security, human rights, good governance, youth empowerment, regional economic integration, trade expansion, job creation, clean energy, migration prevention and support for returned migrants. For instance, through its Central America and Mexico (CAM) Regional Program, it collaborates with regional governments, the private sector, and local organisations to promote prosperity, transparency and security[xiii]. Further, in Belize, USAID launched a campaign to raise awareness about migrant integration through videos, audio messages, and graphic materials, fostering social cohesion and informing migrants about available services[xiv]. In 2021, it announced Centroamérica Local, a five-year, $300 million initiative empowering local organisations in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras to tackle migration’s root causes, such as poverty, corruption and violence, while promoting economic growth, governance, and security[xv]. Additionally, USAID has supported host governments in assisting Venezuelan migrants across 16 countries, including Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and various Caribbean nations. It has also provided aid to migrant shelters along the Mexico-US border, addressing essential needs, such as counselling and basic services[xvi].
However, funding cuts now threaten grassroots organisations that provide vital healthcare, guidance, counselling, shelter, vocational training and supplies to migrants. This economic and security instability will likely intensify migration pressures, increasing the number of asylum seekers and undocumented migrants at the US border. Strict enforcement alone cannot resolve irregular migration without addressing its root causes; migratory pressures will persist, underscoring the strategic importance of sustained developmental aid.
The above-mentioned priorities of the U.S. are supported through USAID’s broader development efforts in Latin America. In FY2022, U.S. foreign assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) totalled approximately $2.1 billion. The largest recipients of USAID funding in the region were Colombia ($490.3 million), Haiti ($237.4 million), Guatemala ($137.4 million), Mexico ($127.1 million), Honduras ($117.9 million), and Peru ($107.9 million)[xvii]. The funding in the LAC region supports key areas such as,
A) Strong Governance, Human Rights, Inclusion and Democratic Institutions
High levels of violence, organised crime and impunity in parts of Latin America have eroded public trust in governments and judicial systems. In response, USAID has played a key role in strengthening democratic governance through judicial reforms, anti-corruption initiatives, police training and civil society support.
In Mexico, USAID has helped institutionalise the rule of law by reforming the judicial system through the Promoting Justice Project (PROJUST), which facilitated the transition to an accusatory justice system[xviii]. Following these reforms, USAID trained police officers in crime scene preservation and evidence collection. Additionally, the agency has promoted anti-corruption efforts through initiatives such as the Alliance for Integrity in Mexico, the Mexico Economic Policy Project (MEPP) and the Mexico Transparency Rapid Response Project (RRP)[xix].
To address crime and violence in the Eastern and Southern Caribbean, USAID partnered with the UNDP on CariSECURE, an initiative that established the Police Records Management Information System (PRMIS) across eight Caribbean nations, improving crime data collection and analysis for more effective prevention strategies[xx].
To promote human rights and combat corruption, USAID supports civil society organisations, independent media, and journalists, fostering investigative reporting and enhancing protections for those working in high-risk environments. In Guatemala, USAID collaborated with the Special Prosecutor’s Office Against Impunity (FECI) and supported the now-defunct International Commission Against Impunity (CICIG) to strengthen judicial institutions and combat corruption[xxi]. In Honduras and El Salvador, USAID has funded legal aid clinics that improve access to justice for marginalised communities, including indigenous groups and survivors of gender-based violence[xxii].
USAID also promotes LGBTQ+ rights in Latin America, training them to participate more fully in democratic processes, recognising that discrimination, violence and lack of legal protections force many individuals to flee their home countries. For instance, USAID has invested in programmes that seek to fight gender-based violence against LGBTQ and intersex people in Honduras and Guatemala. USAID also supported the implementation of Colombian peace agreement that specifically include LGBTQ and intersex people through the Youth Resilience Activity Programme[xxiii].
However, funding cuts can weaken institutional reforms in several nations, reducing their ability to combat corruption and improve judicial transparency, ultimately threatening progress in governance and security.
B) Addressing Poverty, Education and Lack of Economic Opportunities
USAID funding has historically been crucial to Latin America’s economic development, addressing the quality of education and supporting poverty alleviation through various initiatives.
Its agricultural development programs aim to reduce rural poverty by expanding income opportunities, improving access to credit, and promoting environmentally sustainable technologies for producing and marketing traditional and high-value agricultural commodities. In several countries, USAID has implemented land titling programs to enhance land security and encourage small farmer investment. In Honduras, for instance, a large-scale land titling initiative has strengthened property rights and stimulated rural economic growth.
In Haiti, USAID contributed to the establishment of social protection platforms, including the adoption of the country’s first National Social Protection and Promotion Policy (PNPPS) in 2020[xxiv]. In Brazil, it played a key role in addressing food insecurity by funding the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa)[xxv]. Additionally, USAID has promoted financial inclusion by helping households build assets, supporting small business growth, and fostering a sense of community. Through education, job training and private-sector partnerships, it has expanded employment and income opportunities for young people. To boost regional economic integration, USAID launched the Regional Trade and Investment Project, facilitating export-led growth between El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras[xxvi].
However, funding cancellations now threaten to suspend projects focused on poverty alleviation, agricultural development and infrastructure improvement. Countries like Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala, which rely heavily on these programs, will face setbacks in entrepreneurship initiatives, microfinance schemes and rural development efforts, undermining progress in economic stability and opportunity.
C) Addressing Climate Issues, Sustainable Development and Environment Protection
USAID has played a crucial role in addressing climate challenges, promoting sustainable development and protecting the environment in Latin America. Its initiatives focus on climate adaptation, biodiversity conservation, clean energy, and disaster resilience. Efforts include reducing deforestation in the Amazon, curbing illegal mining and pollution and supporting renewable energy transitions. Additionally, USAID has strengthened disaster preparedness by funding early warning systems and resilient infrastructure in hurricane-prone areas. Through collaborations with governments, NGOs and local communities, it has promoted sustainable land use, water management and eco-friendly urban planning.
In Brazil, USAID’s Partnership for the Conservation of Amazon Biodiversity has supported conservation and Indigenous communities’ livelihoods[xxvii]. However, the withdrawal of US funding endangers these populations, already struggling with illegal mining and economic hardship. The suspension has also halted the Forest Management and Fire Prevention Program, a collaboration between the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) and the US Forest Service (USFS), which trained professionals to manage wildfires[xxviii].
In Mexico, USAID backed the IE-Tram, a fully electric bus system enhancing urban mobility under the Partnership for Net Zero Cities[xxix].
The Caribbean has also benefitted from USAID’s Caribbean Investment Program (CIP), which fosters sustainable energy solutions and disaster resilience[xxx]. In the Dominican Republic, USAID introduced climate-smart technologies to support farmers in achieving food and energy security[xxxi]. To mitigate climate-induced migration, USAID has also promoted city-led solutions, including investments in climate adaptation, dignified relocation strategies and economic integration through green job creation. Besides, it has addressed environmental health concerns, improving access to clean water, sanitation and hygiene while working to reduce human exposure to pollutants such as lead. Recognising the region’s vulnerability to natural disasters, USAID has provided extensive support through initiatives like the Caribbean Vision for Climate and Disaster Resilience, launched in 2022[xxxii]. Additionally, the USAID Regional Coastal Biodiversity Project plays a crucial role in strengthening climate-smart economic activities and reducing environmental threats while boosting local livelihoods[xxxiii].
The suspension of USAID funding disrupts these critical environmental and climate-resilience programs, leaving communities more vulnerable to natural disasters, biodiversity loss and resource depletion. Without continued support, sustainable development efforts risk being significantly undermined, exacerbating existing economic and humanitarian challenges across the region.
D) Addressing Health Crisis
USAID has played a significant role in strengthening healthcare systems across Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) by combating infectious diseases, enhancing public health infrastructure, and expanding access to essential medical services.
Its efforts include tackling HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, Zika and COVID-19 while supporting maternal and child health programmes, saving millions of lives[xxxiv]. The agency has also improved disease surveillance, preparedness and response capabilities to mitigate future pandemics. In rural areas, USAID has promoted clean water access, sanitation and nutrition initiatives to combat malnutrition and waterborne diseases. Through partnerships with local governments, NGOs and the private sector, it has helped build long-term health resilience in the region.
USAID’s child survival programs in Bolivia, Peru, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Haiti and the Dominican Republic have strengthened disease prevention and treatment efforts for malaria, dengue, diarrhoea and respiratory infections[xxxv]. It has also bolstered laboratory and epidemiological capacities and supported public health education initiatives. The agency has funded the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) vaccination programme and played a key role in introducing the pentavalent vaccine in Bolivia, expanding protection against Haemophilus influenzae (HiB), diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus[xxxvi].
Further, USAID has contributed to rebuilding water and sanitation systems damaged by the 1998 Hurricane Mitch in Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala[xxxvii]. It has also supported hygiene-focused community programs in the Dominican Republic and tuberculosis detection and treatment initiatives in Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador, Bolivia and Peru[xxxviii].
However, the withdrawal of USAID funding now threatens these critical health programs, potentially reversing progress in disease prevention, vaccination coverage and healthcare infrastructure. Without continued support, countries in the region face significant setbacks in public health, further exacerbating economic instability and migration pressures.
Criticisms from Latin American Governments Against USAID Funding
Nonetheless, despite the efforts, USAID has faced persistent criticism in Latin America for allegedly serving as a tool for US political influence, often undermining local governance and national sovereignty. Leaders view USAID’s engagement as transactional—closely tied to U.S. strategic interests rather than purely humanitarian or developmental goals. They argue that its funding of journalism, human rights organisations and civil society groups constitutes interference in internal affairs.
Argentine President Javier Milei has accused USAID of involvement in electoral fraud during Brazil’s 2022 presidential election[xxxix], while Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum has supported shutting down the agency, claiming it funds organisations working against Mexican interests[xl]. Former Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador also labelled USAID as "interventionist[xli]." Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele on the X platform has criticised the agency, arguing that most of its funds support opposition groups, politically motivated NGOs and destabilising movements, with only a small portion benefiting real development projects. Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro has alleged that USAID provided over $700 million to opposition groups linked to Juan Guaidó to weaken his government[xlii].
In the past also, the USAID has been accused of similar interventions across the region. In the 1990s, the agency was linked to a controversial forced sterilisation campaign under Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori, which disproportionately targeted indigenous and rural women[xliii]. In 2008, USAID was accused of financially supporting opposition groups to undermine Bolivian President Evo Morales[xliv]. In 2010, the agency launched ZunZuneo, a social media network allegedly designed to organise “smart mobs” and incite an uprising in Cuba[xlv]. In 2014, Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa expelled USAID due to growing tensions over its influence[xlvi]. In Haiti, the agency has been criticised for directing most of its funds through American companies, charities, and international organisations rather than local groups, with former Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive questioning whether the aid benefits Haitians[xlvii].
Despite the criticism that comes from the top by some Latin American Presidents over concerns regarding external influence and potential threats to national sovereignty—including fears that aid could be used to undermine their leadership—there remains significant support for resuming agency’s initiatives at the local level.
USAID-supported programs play a vital role in advancing economic growth, improving public health, expanding employment opportunities, strengthening food security, providing humanitarian and refugee assistance, and promoting environmental conservation across Latin America. For instance, key components of U.S. foreign assistance in FY 2022 included Development Assistance ($656.5M–$672.5M), the Economic Support Fund ($472.5M–$523.5M), Global Health Programs implemented through USAID and the State Department ($91.5M–$198.8M), International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement ($470.2M–$584.9M), and security-related initiatives such as Non-proliferation and Foreign Military Financing[xlviii]. The agency also plays a significant role in disaster response and humanitarian crisis management. Its crop substitution programs support farmers in transitioning away from coca cultivation, while investments in education enhance learning opportunities for children across the region. Indigenous communities particularly benefit from targeted programs that improve child nutrition and preserve ecosystems, including efforts that protect the Amazon rainforest. Security and development initiatives—such as community-based interventions in high-crime areas—aim to reduce violence, curb migration pressures, counter organized crime, and strengthen local economies.
Now, with the freezing of funds, many of these initiatives have come to a standstill, disrupting the work of local civil society organizations and the communities that benefited from them. For instance, support has been affected in areas such as the integration of Venezuelan migrants[xlix], efforts to address the root causes of Central American migration, the operation of migrant shelters in Mexico[l], the implementation of Colombia’s 2016 peace agreement[li], efforts to stabilize Haiti[lii], strengthen disaster resilience in the Caribbean, and promote environmental and community conservation in the Amazon[liii]—particularly in regions vulnerable to illegal gold mining and illicit drug cultivation etc. Further, the Trump policy has created uncertainty about the future of these development programs, leaving vulnerable populations without essential support, raising concerns about long-term sustainability and pushing many to illicit activities or forced migration. On the other hand, while USAID’s efforts are acknowledged, their overall impact remains difficult to quantify, as long-term outcomes are shaped by multiple local and external factors. Development is a gradual process, and the sustainability of these initiatives depends on continued engagement, local partnerships, and broader socio-political dynamics.
Thus, rather than dismantling the agency or freezing aid, USAID should reflect on the criticisms and restore trust and improve its effectiveness in Latin America by increasing transparency in its funding allocations. Strengthening partnerships with local governments and community-led organisations can help make aid more inclusive and better address the issues at hand. Further, implementing independent oversight mechanisms and fostering open dialogue with Latin American governments can enhance accountability and demonstrate that USAID’s mission aligns with the region’s development priorities and respects national sovereignty. There is a need to look at the utility of the organization beyond its politicization and power dynamics of relations of the countries involved.
Geopolitical Ramifications
The US retreat from aid diplomacy will weaken its soft power in Latin America, creating a power vacuum that China and Russia are eager to exploit. The freezing of economic and governance aid will accelerate Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) expansion, allowing it to secure infrastructure contracts and strengthen economic ties beyond the 22 Latin American countries already participating[liv]. This shift risks ceding long-term influence to US rivals, limiting Washington’s ability to shape regional developments.
Unlike China’s debt-driven model, the US — particularly through USAID — has historically promoted good governance, economic sustainability and human rights. Scaling back these efforts will likely not only damage Washington’s global standing but also weaken strategic alliances, giving China greater leverage.
Beyond geopolitics, the impact will be felt across Latin America. Funding cuts will hinder progress in education, governance, healthcare and infrastructure, while the loss of microcredit and financial services will limit job creation and slow economic growth. Food security, disaster relief and health interventions will also suffer, making it harder for the US to champion democratic values. Further, development aid has been a crucial gateway for American businesses to enter emerging markets. Without it, China will likely dominate trade and investment, sidelining US industries.
Additionally, this shift in foreign policy will affect counter-narcotics and migration policies, eventually challenging US national security. The Trump administration’s focus on militarising the drug war in Latin America[lv] and tightening border controls overlooks root causes like poverty, corruption, and economic instability. Without a balanced approach that includes development aid and institutional support, these challenges will persist, further diminishing US influence in the region.
Conclusion
Questions arise as to whether USAID’s current trajectory reflects a fundamental shift in U.S. values or is merely a bureaucratic restructuring within the establishment. While the policy aims to limit U.S. financial commitments, it risks fostering regional instability, weakening American influence, and undermining democratic values, human rights, and progress on sustainable development, disaster relief, and climate goals. Furthermore, it exacerbates security challenges, health crises, and the expansion of organized crime and illicit drug cultivation, which in turn contribute to increased migration and the flow of drugs into the U.S., posing a direct threat to national security.
At the same time, the potential merger of USAID with the U.S. State Department could further undermine its effectiveness by shifting its focus from long-term development to short-term diplomatic objectives. Such a move risks diluting USAID’s technical expertise and grassroots partnerships, making aid more politically driven and less responsive to local needs. It could also lead to increased bureaucratic inefficiencies, and the erosion of U.S. soft power by making aid appear transactional.
A balanced approach to foreign aid — ensuring transparency, accountability, and strategic engagement — remains crucial for building trust, promoting stability and sustaining US engagement in the region. An approach that abruptly gives up on long-functioning institutions with global presence such as USAID which might be in the need of reform or a new sense of direction to keep up with changing realities can also prove to be counter-productive for US international stature and for global cooperation.
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*Girisanker SB, Research Associate, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.
Endnotes
[i] “Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations - Office of the Historian.” Accessed March 6, 2025. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/pl-480.
[ii] Petrov, Arkady. “Milei Alleges USAID Funded Electoral Fraud in Brazil’s 2022 Elections.” The Rio Times (blog), February 24, 2025. https://www.riotimesonline.com/milei-alleges-usaid-funded-electoral-fraud-in-brazils-2022-elections/.
[iii] United States Department of State. “Secretary of State Marco Rubio at a Tour of Aeroman.” Accessed March 6, 2025. https://www.state.gov/secretary-of-state-marco-rubio-at-a-tour-of-aeroman/.
[iv] UNODC. UNODC Global Study on Homicide 2023, Homicide and Organised Crime in Latin America and Caribbean. Accessed March 6, 2025. https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/gsh/2023/GSH_2023_LAC_web.pdf.
[v] Refer endnote iv.
[vi] “GAO-08-784, Drug Control: Cooperation with Many Major Drug Transit Countries Has Improved, but Better Performance Reporting and Sustainability Plans Are Needed.” Accessed March 6, 2025. https://www.gao.gov/assets/a278217.html.
[vii] USAID. “EL Salvador Factsheet.” Accessed March 6, 2025. https://observatorioeducacion.org/sites/default/files/el_salvador_usaid_ninnez_riesgo.pdf
[viii] Anderson, Jennifer. “USAID/Mexico Civil Society Activity.” Social Impact (blog). Accessed March 6, 2025. https://socialimpact.com/portfolio-items/usaidmexico-civil-society-activity/.
[ix] Cawley, Marguerite. “What USAID Impact Study Says about CentAm Community Crime Prevention.” InSight Crime, March 27, 2017. http://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/usaid-study-centam-community-crime-prevention/.
[x] USAID. “Alternative Development Peru.” Accessed on March 6, 2025. https://2012-2017.usaid.gov/peru/our-work/alternative-development.
[xi] USAID. Accessed on March 6, 2025. https://2017-2020.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1862/RFI_FactSheet_030717.pdf
[xii] Chatham House. “How Latin American Migrants Became a Geopolitical Weapon.” December 9, 2024. https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/the-world-today/2024-12/how-latin-american-migrants-became-geopolitical-weapon.
[xiii] USAID. “Mexico and Central America Regional Program.” Accessed on March 06, 2025. https://2017-2020.usaid.gov/news-information/fact-sheets/mexico-and-central-america-regional-program.
[xiv] United States Agency for International Development. “USAID’s Central America and Mexico Regional Program Newsletter.” Accessed March 6, 2025. https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USAIDHQ/bulletins/3b85888.
[xv] Office, U. S. Government Accountability. “Central America: USAID Should Strengthen Staffing and Fraud Risk Management for Initiative Addressing Migration to the U.S. | U.S. GAO.” Accessed March 6, 2025. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106232.
[xvi] CBS 42. “Migrant Shelters in Tijuana feel pinch with no USAID money.” February 10, 2025. https://www.cbs42.com/border-report-tour/migrant-shelters-in-tijuana-feel-pinch-with-no-usaid-money/.
[xvii] U.S. Congressional Research Service. “U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2024 Appropriations”, August 6, 2024. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47321.
[xviii] MSI. “Helping Mexico on the Path to Reform.” Accessed March 6, 2025. https://www.msiworldwide.com/projects/helping-mexico-on-the-path-to-reform/.
[xix] USAID Mexico. “USAID Mexico Economic Policy.” April 2019. https://www.ictworks.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/MEEP-USAID.pdf.
[xx] USAID Eastern and Caribbean Report. October 31, 2019. https://info.undp.org/docs/pdc/Documents/R46/CariSECURE_Annual_Report_Y3_Oct2018-Sept2019_USAIDapproved.pdf.
[xxi] WOLA. “Assault on Guatemala’s Justice System Intensifies With Expulsion of Anti-Corruption Prosecutor.” Accessed March 6, 2025. https://www.wola.org/analysis/ousting-anti-corruption-prosecutor-guatemala/.
[xxii] USAID. El Salvador. Accessed on March 06, 2025. https://2017-2020.usaid.gov/el-salvador/history.
[xxiii] Lavers, Michael K. “USAID Highlights Work to Promote LGBTQ, Intersex Rights in Latin America, Caribbean,” November 2, 2022. https://www.washingtonblade.com/2022/11/02/usaid-highlights-work-to-promote-lgbtq-intersex-rights-in-latin-america-caribbean/.
[xxiv] “Transforming Lives through Social Protection Programs in Latin America and the Caribbean - Haiti | ReliefWeb,” June 10, 2024. https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/transforming-lives-through-social-protection-programs-latin-america-and-caribbean.
[xxv] The Borgen Project. The History of the US Involvement in Latin America. Accessed March 05, 2025. https://borgenproject.org/the-history-of-the-u-s-involvement-in-latin-america/.
[xxvi] United States Agency for International Development. “USAID’s Central America and Mexico Regional Program Newsletter.” Accessed March 6, 2025. https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USAIDHQ/bulletins/3bf6513.
[xxvii] USAID. “Brazil Environmental Partnership”. Accessed on March 06, 2025. https://2017-2020.usaid.gov/brazil/our-work/environmental-partnerships.
[xxviii] Development Aid. “The Fallout from USAID Cuts: Latin America Faces a Humanitarian and Environmental Crisis.” Accessed March 6, 2025. https://www.developmentaid.org/news-stream/post/191864/usaid-cuts-to-latin-america.
[xxix] “Mexico Partnership | USAID-NREL Partnership | NREL.” Accessed March 6, 2025. https://www.nrel.gov/usaid-partnership/project-mexico.
[xxx] Barbados, U. S. Embassy. “USAID Hosts Caribbean Climate Investment Program – Energy and Climate Financing for Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean.” U.S. Embassy to Barbados, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, September 14, 2023. https://bb.usembassy.gov/usaid-hosts-caribbean-climate-investment-program-energy-and-climate-financing-for-barbados-and-the-eastern-caribbean/.
[xxxi] fundsforNGOs. “USAID: Climate Adaptation Activity (Dominican Republic and Haiti) - fundsforNGOs,” July 24, 2023. https://www2.fundsforngos.org/latest-funds-for-ngos/usaid-climate-adaptation-activity-dominican-republic-and-haiti/.
[xxxii] Report to Congress on Progress to Strengthen Disaster Resilience in the Caribbean Region. Accessed 5th March 2025. https://climateandsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/LAC-1-Disaster-Resiliency-in-the-Caribbean.pdf.
[xxxiii] USAID. “Regional Coastal Biodiversity Project.” Accessed on March 06, 2025. https://2017-2020.usaid.gov/documents/1862/regional-coastal-biodiversity-project
[xxxiv] USAID. “HIV”. Accessed on March 06, 2025. https://2017-2020.usaid.gov/documents/1864/our-hivaids-work#:~:text=Through%20the%20U.S.%20President's%20Emergency,of%20people%20around%20the%20world.
[xxxv] OAS. “Selected Programs in Latin America and the Caribbean in Support of the Bolivia Summit on Sustainable Development.” Accessed March 6, 2025. https://www.oas.org/dsd/PDF_files/usaid.pdf.
[xxxvi] “PAHO-USAID Partnership - PAHO/WHO | Pan American Health Organization,” July 17, 2024. https://www.paho.org/en/paho-usaid-partnership.
[xxxvii] “Fact Sheet on Hurricane Mitch for the President’s Trip to Central America.” Accessed March 6, 2025. https://clintonwhitehouse4.archives.gov/WH/New/centralam/fsheet1.html
[xxxviii] Refer Endnote xxxiv.
[xxxix] Refer Endnote ii.
[xl] Newsweek. “Trump and Musk Find Unexpected Ally in Push to Shut down USAID,” February 4, 2025. https://www.newsweek.com/trump-musk-unexpected-ally-push-shut-down-usaid-2026231.
[xli] Ghanem, Noureldein. “Mexico Slams USAID Funds as ‘Interventionist.’” Mexico slams USAID funds as “interventionist.” Accessed March 6, 2025. https://www.trtworld.com/latin-america/mexico-slams-usaid-funds-as-interventionist-13078685.
[xlii] Pablo Meriguet. Venezuela: USAID Funded Guaido to Weaken Govt, Says Maduro. February 08, 2025. https://www.newsclick.in/venezuela-usaid-funded-guaido-weaken-govt-says-maduro.
[xliii] FEE. “The U.S. Government Led a Program That Forcibly Sterilized Thousands of Peruvian Women”. October 26, 2018. https://fee.org/articles/the-us-government-led-a-program-that-forcibly-sterilized-thousands-of-peruvian-women/.
[xliv] The Times of India. “From Cuba to Brazil: How USAID Became a Political Interference Tool in Various Countries.” February 4, 2025. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/from-cuba-to-brazil-how-usaid-became-a-political-interference-tool-in-various-countries/articleshow/117921098.cms.
[xlv] Press, Associated. “US Secretly Created ‘Cuban Twitter’ to Stir Unrest and Undermine Government.” The Guardian, April 3, 2014, sec. World news. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/03/us-cuban-twitter-zunzuneo-stir-unrest.
[xlvi] NBC News. “After More Than 50 Years, USAID Is Leaving Ecuador,” October 1, 2014. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/after-more-50-years-usaid-leaving-ecuador-n215621.
[xlvii] Carisealand. “Disastrous Aid in Haiti Before and After the Earthquake,” October 14, 2019. https://carisealand.org/disastrous-aid-in-haiti-before-and-after-the-earthquake/.
[xlviii] Refer xvii
[xlix] Ortiz, Jazmine Santillana, Mario Ojeda and Carlos, and Jazmine Santillana. “Venezuelan Migrants in Colombia Affected by USAID Cuts (Includes Video Story).” Caplin News (blog), March 20, 2025. https://caplinnews.fiu.edu/venezuelan-migrants-in-colombia-affected-by-usaid-cuts-includes-video-story/.
[l] “Trump’s USAID Freeze Threatens Mexico’s Refugee Support Network,” February 15, 2025. https://www.intellinews.com/trump-s-usaid-freeze-threatens-mexico-s-refugee-support-network-367057/.
[li] Garrett, Braeden. “Can USAID’s Funding Freeze Put Colombia’s Peace Process at Risk?” JusticeInfo.net, March 14, 2025. https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/142794-usaid-funding-freeze-colombia-peace-process-risk.html.
[lii] Pacheco-Giron, Andres. “USAID Dismantling: What It Could Mean for Haiti.” The Haitian Times, February 7, 2025. http://haitiantimes.com/2025/02/07/usaid-dismantling-haiti-impact/.
[liii] Gabay, Aimee. “Pause to USAID Already Having Impacts on Community Conservation in the Amazon.” Mongabay Environmental News, February 24, 2025. https://news.mongabay.com/2025/02/pause-to-usaid-already-having-impacts-on-community-conservation-in-the-amazon/.
[liv] “Brazil-China Partnership: Redefining the Belt and Road Initiative in Latin America.” Accessed March 6, 2025. https://thediplomat.com/2024/12/brazil-china-partnership-redefining-the-belt-and-road-initiative-in-latin-america/.
[lv] DePetris, Daniel. “What Would Bombing Mexico Accomplish?” Lawfare, February 16, 2025. https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/what-would-bombing-mexico-accomplish.