Indian Council of World Affairs

Introduction 

The international system is shifting from the ‘unipolar’ and Western-led liberal order to a more ‘hybrid’, decentralised and polycentric system which is being referred to as a ‘multi-polar’ world order. There is a greater diffusion of power and authority in the emerging world order among the states,[i] replacing what the liberal world order had created following the end of World War II. The old order, which is rooted in liberalism, and conceptualised and maintained with the Western hegemony since the onslaught of colonial forces on the Global South, benefitted countries like the US. This order is hailed by thinkers such as Francis Fukuyama as the “common ideological heritage of mankind”.[ii] However, Henry Kissinger argued that “no truly global world order ever existed”,[iii]emphasising that a region or civilisation always promotes a particular ‘order’ to create a just arrangement and distribution of power, which it desires to apply to the entire world. Kissinger’s views draw from the Eurocentric position and Anglo-Saxon tradition, marginalising the voices and experiences of the Global South. Today, this has been challenged by the ‘rise of the rest’, led by major powers, including China, India, and Russia and middle powers, such as Brazil, Saudi Arabia and Turkiye, which have a greater influence on global institutional processes. New institutions, such as BRICS, SCO, AIIB and the New Development Bank, offer an alternative model of global economic and developmental foundations, challenging the dominance and rules of the Liberal World Order. This shift has profound implications to change the global distribution and balance of material, military and ideational power, which is described in Immanuel Wallerstein’s World System Theory that the West, which was the traditional ‘core’, will be replaced by the Global South, which was the traditional ‘periphery’.[iv]Scholars have projected that China and India will become global powers due to their rapid economic growth, military modernisation, growing geopolitical influence and civilizational ethos. 

This new order is being shaped by various factors, including decentralisation and de-concentration of the economic, military, geopolitical and technological power, and the wider distribution of responsibility to tackle regional and global challenges such as climate change, natural disasters and epidemics. Thus, these factors demand to rethink how the emerging world should be structured, sustained and legitimised. However, the shifting world order is more of a mix of competing systems– neoliberal, authoritarian, regional, aggravated by digital prowess– which at present exists together, with different agendas and ideologies. This hybrid world order and its evolution is unprecedented, unpredictable and non-linear, a characteristic that should underscore the urgency of the topic. Therefore, it is important to note that the often sought-after and perceived teleological understanding of progress liberalism desired to implant has become void in the hybrid world order. International relations pundits and experts are scrambling to predict how the new order will be produced and maintained. There is little agreement on its defining features or institutional capacities, as the structure of the emerging world order remains uncertain and fluid. Consequently, it is difficult to determine how well it is equipped to meet the challenges emanating from the new changes in the global political structures, demographies, technology, resources and economic and environmental factors, which emphasise the institutional capacity of the emerging order. 

In this context, this article identifies the contradictions of the liberal world order and what types of drivers are facilitating the emergence of the new multi-polar world order. It essays the feasibility of the transition and tries to create a framework under which a new world order is emerging, characterised by the diffusion of power, principles and institutions in an increasingly fragmented world.  

Liberal World Order and Its Discontents/Contradictions

World order is a contested concept. Broadly, it is defined as a governing arrangement among states, with participation of other prominent non-state actors.[v]Many protagonists associated the LWO with stability and cooperation; however, it has been contested. The intellectual origin of the liberal world order is found in the Renaissance period; however, it was institutionalised after the end of World War II with the constitutionalisation of international organisations, respect for national sovereignty, democracy promotion and the free market.  

The limitations of the LWO became glaring during the Cold War, as it failed to assuage the ideological differences between capitalism and communism and remained confined to the Anglo-Saxon world. Thus, the LWO was a ‘close’ and ‘separate’ order that excluded non-Western civilisations and philosophies in the international system. Though, the order was exclusive, liberal thinkers such as Fukuyama and his ‘End of History” thesis considered the LWO as the last surviving ideology on earth with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. However, he failed to spot the rise of the United States’ as global “hegemon”, a key factor in the LWO’s decline.  

Upon the US’ becoming a global “hegemon”, it advocated hyper-privatisation, deregulation and global capital mobility through the Bretton Woods Institutions– the IMF, World Bank and WTO. Nevertheless, they facilitated the global economic integration. At the same time, LWO undermined the overall capacity of the state to maintain social and economic balance in their countries, worsening the global disparity. The 2007–2008 crisis of the global financial market irrefutably exposed the systemic defects of the alleged “self-regulating market system” that eroded people’s belief in liberal democracy. Disillusioned members of the working class turned to far-right populist leaders and their parties who, while using democratic institutions, promoted an illiberal agenda. These parties[vi], which championed ultra-nationalism, xenophobia, racial superiority and anti-immigrant sentiments, gained power in the United States, Poland, Hungary, Brazil, Italy, Germany and France. Their rise demonstrated how democratic means of elections can be used to undermine the principles of equality and justice, particularly through the erosion of immigrants’ rights and disregard of humanitarian laws. 

Brexit and Trump’s “America First” policies have set the stage for a new era favouring nationalist sovereignty over multilateralism. The United States, once considered the mascot of neoliberal globalisation, prioritised “offshore balance” and “protectionism’ over its commitment to global challenges. The withdrawal of the US from global leadership rendered the norms, principles and organisations of the LWO ineffective, leaving a great degree of power vacuums which is now being taken up by other countries as the world system searches for stability. 

The COVID-19 pandemic exposed the weakness of the LWO, revealing its ultimate decline as it failed to contain the pandemic, secure the supply chains and ensure price stability. Besides, the Western countries alleged that the virus was spread by the ‘Orientals’. They implemented suppressive measures to contain the dissent and human rights of people of colour, exposing the ethnocentric biases of liberalism. As Ikenberry noted, “liberal internationalism prospers where it rests on strong liberal democracy at home”.[vii]Western countries have ignored this amidst the rise of far-right populist regimes. 

The failure of the UNSC and other multilateral institutions to enforce universal norms, human rights and liberal ideals has been brought further to light by the international crises such as the Gaza and Ukraine wars. These crises erode the moral authority of the international system and international society and, unfortunately, facilitate the political leaders around the world to adopt measures including assertive nationalism. This accentuates the crucial need for responsible leadership in the emerging world order to cultivate a consensus-building and unified approach to the global issues and to build an international system based on shared principles and universal values acceptable to all. 

The Global South has witnessed the devastating effects of the LWO, particularly in the context of the IMF and World Bank’s Structural Adjustment Programs, which directed the countries, particularly underdeveloped and developing, to implement austerity measures and cut down subsidies, heightening inequality and poverty. In addition, the West has extended support to authoritarian regimes in different regions through material and military benefits, which became its partners in its alleged “War on Terror”, revealing the “imperialist” intention of LWO. The compounding effect of these factors was the rise of authoritarianism and illiberal democracy due to the people’s disenchantment towards old elites and the growing electoral prospects of the extreme right-wing ideology, which creates a new world order that looks democratic from the outside. However, from the inside, it does not imbibe liberal values. 

Drivers of the Emerging New World Order 

The emerging multipolar world order is significantly influenced by positive drivers such as civilizationalism, decentralization of power and legitimacy, and asserting sovereignty, and capability to shoulder responsibility. These factors are shaping the current global political landscape. In contrast, the negative drivers, including a disintegrated global society, the quest for ethnocentric-driven internal coherence, weak global constitutionalism, differences over justice, cultural diversity, and procedural consensus, present challenges to this emerging order. 

The new world order is fragmented and unpredictable, referred to variously as ‘multipolar’,‘polycentric’,‘post-American’,‘apolar’ and ‘G-zero’.[viii]The world order is a complex system with no dominant ideology, coherent epic or standard normative structure. It is a puzzle that is hard to read and impossible to predict. Regional dynamics have resulted in several ‘proto-epicentres’ with opposing visions. Powerful actors now advocate for distinct orders, each with unique strategic differences– Xi’s Sinitic vision, India’s Indo-Pacific vision, and Putin’s Eurasianism. These differences increase the diversity and complexity of the global order. The robustness of any order is formed by shared beliefs and willingness to join, which are even scarcer today. Just when the liberal order is declining, scholarly nationalist alternatives are striving to influence the emerging world order. Hence, a question arises whether they will collaborate, disagree or be indifferent with each other. 

A civilisational view of the emerging world order is gaining momentum, focusing on concrete and conceptual linkages between countries, communities and their cultures. Historical models– such as China’s Tianxia, Islam’s bridging role and Ashoka’s moral conquest– reflect many traditions of order and administration. This strategy prioritises the flow of ideas over power. Civilisational memory influences the behaviour of today’s rising powers.[ix]The leaders in the Global South are rightly invoking the past to craft their foreign policy and strategic behaviour, which is a key element of contemporary world politics. In times of unprecedented geopolitical shifts, it is only natural to look to the past to find solutions for the future. Lessons of history remain ever important. 

Countries assert their sovereignty through implementing cohesion, a central element of shared identity inside and outside their territories. Ideological and cultural limitations constrained liberalism as it was founded in Christian Europe during the Renaissance, limiting its appeal and acceptance in diverse ethnic and regional identities through dialogue and consensus. On the contrary, the emerging world order is complex, aided and abetted by diverse regional actors and their concerns. While the diversity of views and cultures adds richness to the emerging world order and broadens its acceptance, it also creates complications for the new order to adjust to this diverse global landscape. Nonetheless, multiculturalism and pluralism are values that an emerging world order will have to incorporate in order to be stable on a long-term basis. 

The emergence of numerous centres of power has made the national security context-specific and multi-dimensional in terms of internal stability, cyber resilience and control of the resources. Emerging powers have left the Western security paradigms behind and entered nation-specific ideologies moulded around historical backgrounds and regional dynamics. They now prioritise ‘strategic autonomy’, which distances them from Western-led global security frameworks. How ‘strategic autonomy’ works amidst sharp geopolitical rivalries remain to be seen. Also, strategic autonomy needs to be seen more in terms of widening spectrum of choice available especially to Global South and should not become a pretext for consolidation of authoritarianism or identity politics. 

There is a limit to constitutionalism in the Global South, as there is no set of core institutions in the developing world order that are comparable to the Bretton Woods System, which established standard norms/principles like liberalism, democracy and free market as well as the rule of law. Instead, the international system is a set of sovereign states that reflect their shared values through institutions, focussing on balance of power, diplomacy, international law and conflict.  New entities, like BRICS and ASEAN, are comparatively weak and are not as constitutionalised as old Western institutions. Since they are still evolving, regional institutions are growing to serve national and regional interests, and, as the West recedes, this trend is likely to continue. The shift in the world order also necessitates a review and reform of the institutions of the LWO to better accommodate the voices of the rising rest. 

The financial crisis reaffirmed the West’s declining political legitimacy and technical know-how, highlighting the state’s importance as the ‘order of last resort’, evident in the growing assertive sovereignties in the emerging world order. The shift from the West to other international actors represents this change. However, there is no structure to determine the fair distribution of power which reduces emerging world order’s capacity to conduct global coordination and hence increases volatility. This was not the case with the LWO as it was deeply institutionalised in the Bretton Woods System and reflected the values of liberalism. Hence, the call for advancing reformed multilateralism. 

The legitimacy of the emerging order depends on including the interests of weaker and smaller states. The challenge lies in determining who will be included. Whether they are revisionists posing a threat to the order or those who are weak and excluded? Managing ideological differences presents a considerable challenge, marked by complexity and significance, particularly when considering historical animosities, economic competition, and security dilemmas.  Cooperation must be inclusive, addressing not only clashes of interest but also the concerns of weaker states regarding fairness, justice and status; failing to do so risk exacerbating instability and undermining the required prospects for the cohesion of the emerging world order. 

In the context of procedural consensus, justice and cultural diversity, there is no consensus as of yet among the actors leading the emerging world order. The national sovereignties prefer the moral fairness of the state to cosmopolitan rules, sometimes at the expense of international norms and cosmopolitan justice. This tends to lower the importance of human rights and international law as means of moving towards a unified new global order that is divided between nationalist, authoritarian and liberal ideologies, which needs to be guarded against. 

Critical Appraisal

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the 2008 financial crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, and deadlock on the resolution of the Palestine-Israel conflict have all exacerbated the breakdown of the LWO, opening the door for the new world order. Trump administration’s ethnocentric nationalism and protectionism have increased the pace of the breakdown of the LWO as it turns into a passive viewer of the quickly transforming global order. The West’s monopoly on culture and narratives has been eroded as new non-Western forces have emerged in global politics. The western-led liberal world order adjusted for more than 200 years to survive in the international system, and therefore, it is difficult to predict when the transition from a single order to a multi-order will be completed. The future of the emerging order depends on cultivating a rational structure for global governance and reaching multilateral agreements over complex issues such as climate change and regional conflicts. For its survival, this new order must be fair nationally and internationally, ensuring justice and equality for all. 

Thus, four trends are visible in the emerging multipolar world order. First, the States, particularly in the Global South, are becoming more assertive in seeking to protect and act in accordance with their national interests using their ‘strategic autonomy’. In general, we are witnessing a strengthening of the role of States and their functions. Second, the Private Sector’s role as an alternative entity to the State is on the decline. Instead, the Private Sector is at best to be seen as a partner of the State – supporting the State's responsibilities to the people. Third, the current geopolitical shifts are seeing a review of the functioning of the transnational and global Civil Society Organizations and are seeking to make them partners in governance, though, not necessarily accompanied by a rise in their influence. The case of closure of USAID by President Trump and the recent banning of Amnesty International in Russia may be mentioned here. The Fourth point relates to ‘unlawful’ non-state actors like terror organizations. A noticeable trend is the mainstreaming of ‘terrorists’ (not of ‘terror’ or ‘terrorism’) including the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Daesh in Iraq, the HTS in Syria. These entities – hitherto considered ‘unlawful’ and ‘non-state’ are now being co-opted into the State, its structures including in their running.

*****

*Dr. Arshad, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

[i] MNCs, tech giants, transnational civil society organizations and terrorist groups (Daesh).

[ii]Fukuyama, F. (1989). The end of history? The National Interest, (16), 3–18.

[iii] Kissinger, H. (2014). World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History. United Kingdom: Penguin Books Limited.

[iv] Wallerstein, I. M. (2004). World-systems Analysis: An Introduction. United Kingdom: Duke University Press.

[v] Sørensen, G. (2016). Rethinking the New World Order. United Kingdom: Bloomsbury Publishing. P.7

[vi] National Rally, Alternative for Germany, Brothers of Italy, Confederation Liberty and Independence, Our Homeland Movement, Partido Liberal, and Trump’s Republican Party.

[vii] Ikenberry, G. J. (2011). Liberal leviathan: The origins, crisis, and transformation of the American world order. Princeton University Press. p. 57.

[viii]Acharya, A. (2014). The End of American World Order. Germany: Polity Press., p.1

[ix]Acharya, A. (2023). Before the nation-state: Civilizations, world orders, and the origins of global international relations. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 16(3), [Autumn Issue], p.267