Indian Council of World Affairs

Abstract

Brasilia Consensus reinforces President Lula’s efforts to resume integration in Latin America, signalling that “Brazil is back”, marking a clear departure from the isolation that characterised Brazilian foreign policy under the previous administration. 

Introduction 

On 30 May 2023, at the invitation of Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the leaders of the 12[1] South American countries met in Brasília and reaffirmed their commitment to re-establish a regular dialogue to foster regional integration. This meeting led to the adoption of the Brasilia Consensus, aimed at strengthening ties amongst South American nations, promoting cooperation and projecting a unified South American voice on the global stage. For President Lula, the platform reinforces his efforts to “resume integration” in Latin America, signalling that “Brazil is back” and marking a clear departure from the isolation that characterised Brazilian foreign policy under the previous Bolsonaro administration. This study aims to highlight the trajectory of Brazil’s regional integration efforts, its preference for South American integration and the challenges the country must navigate in forging a unified regional voice among South American nations. 

Brief History of Brazil’s Regional Integration Ambition

1)  Brazil’s role in Latin America's regional integration 

Brazil’s proactive role in Latin American regional integration during the 1990s was driven by its urgent need to control domestic inflation, enhance economic stability and protect itself from global market volatility and unfair trade practices. The proposed US-led Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) in 1994 further intensified Brazil’s concerns, particularly the fear that its developing industries, especially in manufacturing and agriculture, would be unable to compete with highly industrialised US goods. Additionally, there was apprehension that a US-dominated FTAA would marginalise Latin American countries’ influence in shaping regional economic governance. 

In response to these challenges, the then Brazilian President, Fernando Henrique Cardoso — elected with a mandate to combat inflation and modernise the economy — embraced regional integration as a strategic economic and political tool[2]. He gave full support to Mercado Común del Sur/Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), founded in 1991, seeing it as both an opportunity to expand trade and a defensive shield against external pressures. 

With Mexico aligning more closely with the United States through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Brazil seized the moment to assert its leadership in the region. By being part of Mercosur, Brazil gained preferential access to the markets of Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. The removal of trade barriers within Mercosur helped Brazilian companies expand production and investment for products like cars, machinery and electronics.

2)  Brazil’s Preference for “South American Integration”

After persistent internal tensions within MERCOSUR, particularly between Brazil and Argentina[3]^,[4] and growing fear over the bloc’s openness to US neoliberal economic policies,[5] Brazil saw the need to build a broader South American bloc. Such a framework would allow Brazil to shape more favourable outcomes and, importantly, support its aspirations to emerge as a regional leader. 

As a result, in September 2000, President Cardoso hosted the first Summit of South American heads of state in Brasilia, and it resulted in the creation of the Initiative for the “Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America” (IIRSA). The aim was to improve physical integration (transport, energy and communications infrastructure) across South America to facilitate regional trade, connectivity and integration. The second South American Summit advanced the development of physical infrastructure for continental integration. 

After Carlos, the incoming President, Lula, did not dismantle Brazil’s regional ambitions. However, along with the economic integration, Lula was more interested in political integration[6], creating a unified voice for Latin America over regional issues. As a result, Lula gave full-fledged support to “the third Summit” of South American presidents held in Cusco in December 2004, which, with Lula emerging as mastermind, led to the formation of the South American Community of Nations (CSN). In April 2007, the name of the community was changed from CSN to Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) as a result of the “Constitutive Treaty”, thereby formalising the institution with a proper structure.[7]

Under Lula, Brazil also became interested in the security and defence of South American nations and hence formally proposed the creation of a South American Defence Council (CDS/SADC) to promote defence cooperation and coordination amongst the countries of the region.

Soon, Brazil under Lula, with its proactive role in UNASUR, found itself involved in its neighbours’ issues. Lula advocated for South American countries to address issues free from external interference. For instance, Brazil, along with other members, actively opposed US plans to use Colombian military bases for regional operations.[8] Further, the bloc stood against US sanctions on Cuba and responded firmly to regional crises by condemning the 2008 violence in Bolivia[9], rejecting the 2009 coup in Honduras and refusing to recognise the post-coup Honduras election result supported by the US.[10] The UNASUR platform also helped diffuse tensions between member countries Venezuela and Colombia,[11] and has also supported Argentina’s sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas)[12]. Thus, the platform helped Brazil in the 2000s to increase its regional influence and impact.

3)  Whither Brazil’s “South American Regional Integration” Ambitions

Brazil’s ambitions for South American regional integration have since faced significant setbacks due to the deaths of influential leaders like Hugo Chávez and Néstor Kirchner, who were key proponents of UNASUR, thereby creating a leadership vacuum and decline of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR).

The UNASUR has also struggled to maintain cohesion amongst the members due to the prevailing tensions between the member countries. Disputes between Colombia and Venezuela over accusations that FARC and ELN operated from Venezuelan territory and the 2008 crisis involving Colombia's military incursion into Ecuador to kill FARC leader Raúl Reyes[13], underscored persistent interstate mistrust. UNASUR’s attempt to mediate the deepening Venezuelan crisis following Chávez’s death in 2013 highlighted a broader dilemma. The bloc struggled to reconcile its commitment to democracy and human rights with political neutrality, which ultimately limited its effectiveness.[14]

Moreover, the rise of other regional organisations complicated Brazil’s vision of UNASUR as the central platform for integration. The Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), characterised by their anti-US posture, clashed with Brazil’s more moderate approach, while the Pacific Alliance — comprising Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru — pursued free trade and closer ties with the US and Asia-Pacific, in contrast to Brazil’s protectionist stance. These differing models of integration weakened regional unity and Brazil’s leadership role[15].

Domestically, Brazil’s internal politics further constrained its regional ambitions. President Lula’s overt support for leftist allies via the UNASUR platform attracted criticism from opposition forces.[16] Moreover, Lula’s successor, Dilma Rousseff, who assumed the presidency in 2011, lacked his charisma and was consumed by economic difficulties, corruption scandals and political unrest, including impeachment proceedings that led to her removal from office in 2016. As a result, her efforts to deepen Brazil's relations with its neighbours were limited. Later, under President Bolsonaro, Brazil adopted a more isolationist stance, aligning closely with the US and officially withdrawing from the UNASUR treaty in 2019 through a presidential decree in a complete break from the past.

The ideological shift toward right-wing governments in several countries created diplomatic fissures, further undermining UNASUR. Mauricio Macri in Argentina, Sebastián Piñera in Chile and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil distanced themselves from the organisation and created momentum for an alternative organisation called Progress and Integration of South America (PROSUR). PROSUR aligned more closely with the US and free-market principles, reflecting a shift in regional foreign policy orientation away from anti-US sentiment.[17] PROSUR also excluded Venezuela[18], citing concerns about the country’s democratic institutions. 

Finally, UNASUR’s prolonged inactivity contributed to its unravelling. Between 2018 and 2020, seven of the bloc’s 12 members formally withdrew[19], effectively rendering the organisation defunct and symbolising the collapse of Brazil’s vision for South American regional unity. On the other hand, UNASUR is arguably the only major regional organisation where member countries collectively acknowledged its dysfunction, leading to mass withdrawals.

Lula’s Return Fuels Brazil’s Regional Integration Ambition

Lula’s return to power after defeating Jair Bolsonaro in October 2022 revived Brazil’s ambition for South American regional integration with a message that “Brazil is back”. And with a majority leftist government in the region, Lula’s plan gained momentum.

On 30 May 2023, he hosted a Summit in Brasília attended by the presidents of 12 South American countries, with the exception of Peruvian President Dina Boluarte, who was unable to participate due to constitutional impediments.[20] This meeting led to the adoption of the Brasilia Consensus, a consensus-building initiative aimed at strengthening ties among South American nations, promoting cooperation and projecting a unified South American voice on the global stage. The consensus emphasised a shared vision of South America as a region of peace and cooperation, with a focus on democracy, human rights, sustainable development and social justice. It also included pledges to increase trade and investment, improve infrastructure and work towards a South American Free Trade Area.^[21] The meeting also produced a roadmap for South American integration, particularly in areas like ecological and energy transition, strengthening health capacities, disaster risk management, health cooperation, combating transnational organised crime, increasing trade and investment and improving infrastructure and logistics. The consensus also aims to evaluate the experiences of the different regional cooperation mechanisms. By doing so, it aims not to duplicate efforts already underway in other international or regional mechanisms in which the South American states participate.

President Lula, in his inaugural address, emphasised that this meeting marked “the first step towards the resumption of dialogue between our nations.[22]” He outlined a vision for deeper regional cooperation, including reducing dependence on extra-regional currencies for trade, creating a regional energy market and pursuing coordinated actions to address the climate crisis.[23] On financial integration, Lula supports the creation of a common currency called Sur (Spanish for “South”), aimed at aligning monetary policies across the region and reducing reliance on extra-regional currencies in trade.[24] On energy integration, a tangible example of this vision is the Bolivia-Brazil gas pipeline, which connects Bolivia’s natural gas reserves with Brazil’s industrial hubs through over 3,000 kilometres of cross-border infrastructure.[25] And, the Argentinian Pipeline/Vaca Muerta Pipeline to export natural gas from its Vaca Muerta shale formation to Brazil, utilising pipelines through Bolivia.[26] These projects have fostered economic interdependence, stabilised energy supply and showcased the potential for shared regional energy systems. By expanding such initiatives to include additional countries and integrating diverse energy sources, such as hydropower, gas and renewables, Lula envisions a more unified and resilient regional energy framework. On climate, Lula urged development banks to collaborate to finance regional development and suggested coordinated actions by the countries to tackle climate change.[27]

The Brasilia Consensus has helped create a political bloc that shows growing unity in defending its members’ interests. This consensus has resulted in joint statements, including reaffirming support for Argentina’s sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands (the Falkland Islands), expressing solidarity with Bolivian President Luis Arce Catacora, condemning the attempted coup d’état and addressing the escalating violence in Ecuador by framing the violence not only as a national issue but also as a regional threat that necessitates a collective response and defence of the democratic order.

Further, the consensus has facilitated the creation of platforms for regular meetings amongst the foreign, defence, health and energy ministers of South American countries. For example, on 28 May 2024, the health ministers under the Brasilia Consensus approved the establishment of three working groups: one focused on digital health (led by Argentina), another on healthy ageing (led by Brazil) and a third on intercultural health (led by Peru). Similarly, on 10 May 2024, deputy energy ministers convened in Quito, reaffirming their commitment to strengthening cross-border energy interconnections, promoting sustainable energy supply and leveraging the region’s diverse renewable and non-renewable resources, including low-emission hydrogen. The declaration emphasised the need for regulatory harmonisation, the removal of unilateral measures hindering integration and the creation of stable frameworks to attract investment.

Questions have also come up about whether the Brasilia Consensus is the first step towards the revival of UNASUR. However, at this stage, it should be noted that the name UNASUR does not appear in the final document or the website of the Brasilia Consensus.[28] Indeed, while the Brasilia Consensus shares several features with UNASUR — regional focus, regular dialogue and political consensus building — it intentionally avoids rigid institutional structures. It represents a pragmatic, flexible alternative, reflecting lessons learnt from UNASUR’s decline. It focuses on dialogue and issue-based cooperation rather than institution-building. Further, by accommodating opposing ideology-related members in the bloc like Uruguay and Ecuador, the Brasilia Consensus expresses a desire to move beyond ideological polarisation and focus on practical solutions to pressing regional challenges like addressing climate, transnational organised crime, energy, migration, trade and digital connectivity, amongst other issues. The Uruguayan President Luis Lacalle Pou, for instance, urged member states to prioritise unity in action, without which the organisation risks collapsing with an ideological shift[29] in the region. Echoing this sentiment, Chilean President Gabriel Boric, while delivering a lecture at the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), a think tank based in India, reflected on the Brasilia Consensus and Latin America’s chronic struggle with integration. He remarked, “It may have to do with the characteristics of magical realism that define our region’s very makeup ... It’s something we must overcome through action.”[30] President Boric’s use of “magical realism” served as a critique of the region’s tendency to romanticise unity while failing to implement the practical steps necessary to achieve it.

Road Ahead for Brazil in Achieving South American Regional Integration

1.  Overcoming Political Shifts and Ideological Divides

A primary challenge lies in ensuring that regional integration efforts transcend domestic political changes, both within Brazil and amongst its neighbours. Historically, platforms like UNASUR, formed in 2008, aimed to foster unity amongst predominantly leftist governments. However, with key leaders’ deaths and when the political tide shifted in several countries towards the right in 2019, the bloc fell into disuse, reflecting how ideological rifts can fracture cooperation. For initiatives like the Brasilia Consensus to succeed, they must be rooted in shared priorities and practical unity rather than ideological alignment, making the regional agenda resilient to political transitions.

2.  Managing Mistrust and Establishing Cohesion in the Bloc

A.  Venezuela's Inclusion in the Brasilia Consensus

Venezuela’s inclusion in the Brasilia Consensus continues to stir division amongst South American leaders. President Lula da Silva’s warm reception of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his criticism of the US sanctions on the country were met with strong opposition from leaders like Uruguay’s Luis Lacalle Pou and Chile’s Gabriel Boric. While Lula framed Venezuela as a victim of an “anti-democracy and authoritarian” narrative, President Boric countered that the human rights violations under Maduro’s regime were “not a narrative construction, but a reality”.[31] On the other hand, while Maduro seeks the Brasilia Consensus to oppose the US sanctions, it will be important to learn from the past and not reduce a new regional effort to an anti-US platform.

B.  Evolving Brazil-Venezuela Tensions

In the months following Venezuela’s 2024 elections, Brazil’s tone has shifted. President Lula, though, acknowledged the Venezuelan electoral dispute as “normal” and also requested that the results be made public[32], signalling growing unease. Diplomatic tensions escalated at the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) Summit in Kazan, Russia, where Brazil vetoed Venezuela’s bid to join the bloc as a partner state. Caracas reacted strongly, calling it a “stab in the back” and accusing Brazil of interfering in its domestic politics. Lula’s foreign policy adviser, Celso Amorim, clarified that the exclusion was due to Venezuela’s weakened regional credibility post-election.[33]

Though Lula’s position highlights pragmatic diplomacy, replacing ideological alignment, varying stances on how to engage with his regime continue to test Brazil’s role as a regional leader.

C.  Brazil-Argentina Dynamics

Relations between Brazil and Argentina have also been tested by ideological divergence. Lula warned of the threat to democracy in Argentina following the rise of “extremist sectors”, a veiled reference to Javier Milei’s success in the August 13 primary election.[34] Tensions deepened when President Milei visited Brazil to attend a right-wing rally hosted by former President Jair Bolsonaro.[35] Milei has also publicly criticised Lula, calling him “corrupt and a communist[36]” and referencing his past imprisonment for corruption.

Despite ideological rifts, shared strategic interests — such as Brazil’s unwavering support for Argentina’s claim over the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands — offer a potential path for constructive engagement. Besides, despite Argentine President Javier Milei’s personal dismissal of the recent coup attempt against President Luis Arce Catacora in Bolivia as a “self-coup”, Argentina endorsed a unified position through the Brasilia Consensus, condemning the coup. Thus, if both countries prioritise regional cooperation over political discord, there remains scope for rebuilding bilateral trust, including in the regional format of the Brasilia Consensus.

D.  Border Disputes

Border disputes between member countries also pose a serious challenge to the Brasília Consensus, as it undermines the bloc's stated goals of regional integration. For example, the recent tensions surrounding the territorial dispute between member countries Venezuela and Guyana over the resource-rich Essequibo region.

3.  Tangible Outcomes Must Take Precedence Over Ideology

While Brazil has traditionally positioned itself as a stabilising force in South America, most recently seen in its efforts to mediate the Venezuela–Guyana border crisis,[37] its regional diplomacy is sometimes perceived as hegemonic or ideologically biased, which can lead to mistrust. For instance, tensions flared when Argentine President Javier Milei accused Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of interfering in Argentina’s 2023 elections, citing Lula’s open endorsement of Milei’s opponent, Sergio Massa.[38] Previously, Lula has also faced criticism from opposition leaders who claim he has used platforms like UNASUR to promote left-leaning candidates and governments across the region. For the Brasília Consensus to succeed, tangible outcomes must take precedence over ideological ambitions. Also, direct involvement in full public view in the politics of another country in the region, such as through endorsement of candidates during elections, participation in rallies, etc, needs deep reconsideration.

4.  Prioritise Shared Regional Goals Over Opposition to External Influence

In the past, regional platforms such as UNASUR demonstrated a degree of unity against perceived US military and political influence — for instance, by opposing the establishment of US military bases and criticising the role of US-backed candidates in domestic elections. However, sustaining such unity today is far more challenging. For example, while Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has criticised US tariffs on Brazilian goods, Argentine President Javier Milei offered to change legislation to meet the requirements of US President Donald Trump's new tariffs, even raising the possibility of a bilateral free trade agreement.[39] Similarly, regional consensus on issues related to China is elusive. Despite growing concerns over Chinese involvement in illegal mining, unregulated fishing,[40] and digital surveillance in parts of the region, most South American governments maintain close economic ties with Beijing and are unlikely to take a unified stance against it. And though Brazil withdrew from the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), there are now 22 Latin American countries part of it, with five countries from the Brasilia Consensus. These divisions make it increasingly difficult for Brazil to forge a cohesive regional response to the growing geopolitical competition in Latin America.

Instead, Brazil should focus on shared challenges and priorities, such as climate, energy security, transnational organised crime, digital integration and infrastructure development, which will help establish it as a credible leader.

5.  Addressing Organised Crime

Latin America today accounts for a third of all global murders annually, with organised crime and gender-based violence contributing significantly[41]. At least 121,695 people were murdered in Latin America and the Caribbean during 2024[42]. This endemic violence has given rise to citizen insecurity, instability, forced internal displacement, migration, loss of life, significant economic costs, and a diminished quality of life for residents, posing substantial barriers to development in the region and a climate of silent fear. 

Brasília Consensus recognised the importance of confronting transnational organised crime and pledged enhanced regional coordination through intelligence sharing, joint operations, institutional strengthening, and capacity-building for law enforcement personnel. Chilean President Gabriel Boric, in his lecture delivered at ICWA, underscored the significance of regional coordination mechanisms by noting that “the Brasília Consensus has helped us strengthen police coordination against one of the main threats we face in Latin America — transnational organised crime.”[43] Needless to add, a lot of collective efforts need to be done in this direction.

For instance, recently, Chilean authorities have accused the Venezuelan government of orchestrating the kidnapping and murder of former Venezuelan army lieutenant and dissident Ronald Ojeda, who was living in exile in Santiago. Chilean investigations indicate that the Tren de Aragua, allegedly a Venezuelan-based criminal organisation, carried out the operation under orders from Venezuelan officials.[44] For its part, Venezuela denies any involvement or responsibility for Ojeda’s murder.[45] The real challenge, therefore, in addressing organised crime thus lies in implementation, especially given mutual mistrust, resource gaps, and—at times—accusations of state collusion with criminal groups, as seen in the Chilean-Venezuelan case involving Tren de Aragua. 

Brazil can effectively navigate these regional tensions by leading regular dialogues through the Brasília Consensus platform and promoting concrete joint exercises and initiatives.

6.  Strengthening the Social Sector

Although the Brasília Consensus includes “social development” as a core pillar, its effectiveness in addressing South America’s fundamental socioeconomic challenges is limited by the lack of targeted focus on critical areas such as poverty alleviation, agricultural and rural development, gender equality, housing and sanitation, employment and livelihoods, and national integration. These areas are not only essential for achieving sustainable development but also critical for strengthening social cohesion and mitigating the underlying drivers of transnational threats such as organised crime and mass migration. Without a people-centred regional agenda prioritising dignity, opportunity, and equity, social cohesion will remain fragile, and the long-term legitimacy of regional integration efforts may be at risk. As we move forward, it would be desirable for the Brasilia Consensus to work in this direction too.

Conclusion

The Brasília Consensus represents a break from the ideologically divided past and is an important platform for Brazil under President Lula in advancing South American integration. However, for a unified regional voice to emerge, Brazil must navigate political shifts, bridge ideological divides and tackle deeply rooted political, economic and security challenges. Achieving cohesion within the bloc requires prioritising shared goals and delivering tangible results. By focusing on stated objectives, which include addressing critical issues like migration, climate, infrastructure, integration projects and transnational crime, Brazil can reaffirm its role as a credible and effective regional leader.

*****

*Girisanker SB, Research Associate, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal. 

Endnotes

[1] Note- The twelve countries are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

[2] Inter-American Dialogue. “The State of Brazil’s South American Project”, 2015. https://www.thedialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Spektor_IAD_Brazilregionalpolicy.pdf.

[3] Note- Argentina accused Brazil of not reciprocating market access, devaluing its currency, and failing to address trade imbalances. Meanwhile, Brazil was sceptical of Argentina's alignment with U.S. neoliberal policies during Menem's presidency, which contributed to tension and suspicion within MERCOSUR.

[4][4] Note- The internal tension happened as a result of the exchange rate crisis of 1999, and about the common external tariff.

[5] See Endnote 2.

[6] See Endnote 2.

[7] Pothuraju, Babjee. “UNASUR and Security in South America”. IDSA. October 30, 2012. https://www.idsa.in/system/files/Backgrounder_UNASURandSecurityinSouthAmerica_Babjee.pdf.

[8] LADB Staff. "UNASUR Condemns U.S. Use of Colombian Bases; Little Else Accomplished." (2009). https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/notisur/13811.

[9] Martínez, E. D. M., & Lyra, M. P. O. (2018). The role of UNASUR in the South American democratic crises (2008–2015). Carta Internacional, 13(1), 98–126. doi: 10.21530/ci.v13n1.2018.729.  

[10] “General Assembly President Expresses Outrage at Coup d’État in Honduras, Says Crucial for World Community to ‘Stand as One’ in Condemnation | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases.” Accessed May 13, 2025. https://press.un.org/en/2009/ga10840.doc.htm.

[11] BBC News. “UNASUR Addresses Venezuela’s Rift with Colombia.” July 29, 2010, sec. Latin America & Caribbean. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-10799546.

[12] MercoPress. “Unasur Summit Rejects Falklands’ Referendum and Wants to Limit ‘Vulture Funds.’” Accessed May 13, 2025. https://en.mercopress.com/2012/12/01/unasur-summit-rejects-falklands-referendum-and-wants-to-limit-vulture-funds.

[13] See Endnote 8.

[14] May 3, Sean Burges | and 2018. “UNASUR’s Dangerous Decline: The Risks of a Growing Left-Right Split in South America.” Americas Quarterly (blog). Accessed May 13, 2025. https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/unasurs-dangerous-decline-the-risks-of-a-growing-left-right-split-in-south-america/.

[15] See Endnote 2.

[16] See Endnote 2.

[17] Wilson, Gwen. “PROSUR: The New Tool for U.S. Imperialism in Latin America.” Left Voice (blog), April 17, 2019. https://www.leftvoice.org/prosur-the-new-tool-for-u-s-imperialism-in-latin-america/.

[18] Foggin, Sophie. “Piñera Proposes Venezuela-Less PROSUR as Alternative to UNASUR ‘Failure.’” Latin America Reports (blog), February 21, 2019. https://latinamericareports.com/pinera-proposes-venezuela-less-prosur-as-alternative-to-unasur-failure/1192/.

[19] Long, Guilaume. Towards a New UNASUR: Pathways for the Reactivation of South American Integration”. October 18, 2022. https://cepr.net/publications/toward-a-new-unasur-pathways-for-the-reactivation-of-south-american-integration/.

[20] Progressive International. “Lula and South American leaders launched the Brasilia Consensus: peace, integration, and progress”, September 6, 2023. https://progressive.international/wire/2023-09-01-lula-and-south-american-leaders-launched-the-brasilia-consensus-peace-integration-and-progress/en.

[21] Refer Endnote 21.

[22] Planalto. “Lula: ‘We Have Recovered Our Right to Making Foreign Policy in a Serious Way.” Accessed May 13, 2025. https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2023/05/lula-201cwe-have-recovered-our-right-to-making-foreign-policy-in-a-serious-way201d.

[23] Shurrab, Hatem. “Lula Urges Greater South American Integration at Brasilia Summit.” Brasilia summit. Accessed May 13, 2025. https://www.trtworld.com/latin-america/lula-urges-greater-south-american-integration-at-brasilia-summit-13433667.

[24] “Brazil Is Back from the Dead,” June 26, 2023. https://www.ips-journal.eu/topics/foreign-and-security-policy/brazil-is-back-from-the-dead-6796/.

[25] World Bank. “International Gas Trade— The Bolivia-Brazil Gas Pipeline”. 1998. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/964191468768033131/pdf/multi0page.pdf.

[26] robertsailo. “Argentina Commences Vaca Muerta Gas Exports to Brazil through Bolivian Pipelines.” Offshore Technology (blog), April 2, 2025. https://www.offshore-technology.com/news/vaca-muerta-gas-export-brazil-bolivian-pipelines/.

[27] Reuters. “Brazil’s Lula Pushes for Greater South American Integration at Summit.” ThePrint, May 30, 2023. https://theprint.in/world/brazils-lula-pushes-for-greater-south-american-integration-at-summit/1603121/.

[28] “Brazil Is Back from the Dead,” June 26, 2023. https://www.ips-journal.eu/topics/foreign-and-security-policy/brazil-is-back-from-the-dead-6796/.

[29] Agência Brasil. “South American Presidents Sign Brasília Consensus,” May 31, 2023. https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/en/politica/noticia/2023-05/south-american-presidents-sign-brasilia-consensus.

[30]“Read Transcript of 53rd Sapru House Lecture by H.E. Mr. Gabriel Boric Font, President of the Republic of Chile on ‘Chile and India: Side by Side on the Global South’, Vivek Auditorium, Sapru House, 2 April 2025 - Indian Council of World Affairs (Government of India).” Accessed May 13, 2025. /show_content.php?lang=1&level=2&ls_id=12713&lid=7780

[31] Paraguassu, Lisandra, Anthony Boadle, and Anthony Boadle. “Lula’s Call for South American Unity Faces Opposing Views on Venezuela.” Reuters, May 30, 2023, sec. Americas. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/south-american-presidents-led-by-lula-seek-new-shared-agenda-2023-05-30/.

[32] Brasil de Fato. “Lula Opposes Alarmism about Venezuela and Says He Is Waiting for the Voting Records to Be Released,” August 1, 2024. https://www.brasildefato.com.br/2024/08/01/lula-opposes-alarmism-about-venezuela-and-says-he-is-waiting-for-the-voting-records-to-be-released/.

[33] Brasil de Fato. “Tension between Venezuela and Brazil Rises after Veto at BRICS,” October 31, 2024. https://www.brasildefato.com.br/2024/10/31/tension-between-venezuela-and-brazil-rises-after-veto-at-brics/.

[34] Buenos Aires Times. “Lula Declares That Argentine Democracy Is ‘in Danger’ with Milei,” September 21, 2023. https://www.batimes.com.ar/news/latin-america/lula-says-to-biden-argentine-democracy-in-danger-with-milei.phtml.

[35] Mint. “Milei Picks Pro-Bolsonaro Rally Over Lula for First Brazil Trip,” July 1, 2024. https://www.livemint.com/companies/news/milei-picks-pro-bolsonaro-rally-over-lula-for-first-brazil-trip-11719858213404.html.

[36] Anderson, Jon Lee. “Javier Milei Wages War on Argentina’s Government.” The New Yorker, December 2, 2024. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2024/12/09/javier-milei-wages-war-on-argentinas-government.

[37] “The Venezuela–Guyana Dispute and Brazil’s Foreign Policy Ambitions.” Accessed May 13, 2025. https://www.rusi.orghttps://www.rusi.org.

[38] Reuters. “Argentina’s Milei Doubles down on Lula Criticism as War of Words Heats.” July 2, 2024, sec. Americas. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/argentinas-milei-talks-about-idiot-dinosaur-new-prod-brazils-lula-2024-07-02/.

[39] Buenos Aires Times. “Milei Says He Will Change Argentina’s Laws to Mitigate Trump’s Tariffs,” April 4, 2025. https://www.batimes.com.ar/news/argentina/milei-says-he-will-change-argentinas-laws-to-mitigate-trumps-tariffs.phtml.

[40] “Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing in Latin AmericanWaters by China’s Distant Water Fleet- Concerns - Indian Council of World Affairs (Government of India).” Accessed May 13, 2025. /show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=12229&lid=7461.

[41] “Latin America Wrestles with a New Crime Wave. International Crisis Group”. May 12, 2023. https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/latin-america-wrestles-new-crime-wave

[42] Newton, Marina Cavalari, Juliana Manjarrés, Christopher. “InSight Crime’s 2024 Homicide Round-Up.” InSight Crime, February 26, 2025. http://insightcrime.org/news/insight-crime-2024-homicide-round-up/.

[43] See Endnote 30.

[44] Lapadula, Isabella. “Chile Accuses Top Venezuelan Official of Orchestrating Murder of Dissident.” Latin America Reports (blog), January 31, 2025. https://www.latinamericareports.com/chile-accuses-top-venezuelan-official-of-orchestrating-murder-of-dissident/10528/.

[45] AP News. “Chile Says a Venezuelan Fugitive Has Been Arrested in the Killing of an Anti-Maduro Dissident,” July 12, 2024. https://apnews.com/article/chile-venezuela-fugitive-maduro-socialist-tensions-dissent-army-23b8e27f77e98e7e1c12f3335e0de5da.