Indian Council of World Affairs

Abstract: The paper aims to discuss the causes facilitating Syria’s negotiation with Israel and where the negotiation’s future is heading. 

Recently, media reports indicated that the Syrian government under President Ahmed al-Shaara had started negotiations with Israel through intermediaries[i] amidst the ongoing Israel Defense Forces (IDF)’s strikes on Syrian territory under the pretext of eliminating Hamas activists and sympathizers and providing protection to the minority Druze community inside the Syrian territory. Following the collapse of President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Israel not only destroyed Syria’s military power, rendering it without a standing army, but it also captured the buffer zone established by the 1974 Separation of Forces Agreement. Though Assad’s regime has collapsed, Israel continued its military strikes on Syrian territory. Tel Aviv sees this new arrangement in a context that once the Syrian forces responsible for handling the boundaries deserted their positions amid the regime’s fall, increasing the risks of terrorists exploiting the security vacuum to mount cross-border attacks.[ii] However, Syria’s new government has so far refrained from countering Israeli measures and indicated that it was not seeking confrontation with Israel. It is also true that Syria at present lacks any profound military power to challenge external actors and is focused on internal threats. Therefore, entering into negotiations is the only option for President Al-Sharaa to secure his rule as also Syria’s stability. The basis of the talks between the two countries has been the security and intelligence matters (counter-terrorism) and Confidence-Building Measures. 

The first stint of negotiation came into public domain when President al-Sharaa confirmed the indirect negotiations with Israel during his visit to France on 7 May, focusing on de-escalation and non-intervention in Syria’s domestic affairs.[iii]Also, Israel’s Channel 12 reported on 17 May that the UAE had mediated a round of talks in the Azeri capital between the representatives of Syrian President Al-Sharaa, a senior Israeli military official and Turkish diplomats.[iv] Israeli Newspaper Haaretz reported a significant development on 27 May, when senior security officials from both countries held direct talks on preventing conflicts and reducing Israeli incursions into Syrian villages.[v] The intention to normalise relations between the two countries became clearer when the Jewish Journal interviewed President al-Sharaa on 28 May 2025, stating that “the reality is that we have common enemies, and we can play a major role in regional security.”[vi]The Syrian government also expressed that it wants to revive the 1974 Separation of Forces Agreement to implement the ceasefire and lay the foundation for mutual restraint and protection of civilians. It is important to note that negotiation between Syria and Israel is not happening in isolation. It is part of the Western and Arab countries’ larger efforts to civilianise President Al-Sharaa’s image and personality and make him acceptable at the global forums. This approach follows the prevalent authoritarian pattern in the region, where a military ‘strongman’ seeks legitimacy from the external actors’ while he finds it difficult to meet the demands of the local constituencies to garner legitimacy. The paper aims to discuss the causes facilitating Syria’s negotiation with Israel and where the negotiation’s future is heading.

Background

Israel-Syria relations remained fraught with conflict and mistrust. The two countries fought wars in 1948, 1967 and 1973. They signed the Separation of Forces Agreement in 1974, which prevented the parties from continuing hostilities. Nevertheless, it did not convert the disengagement into any kind of mutual peaceful agreement due to Israel’s control over the Golan Heights and its denial of Syria’s access to the Sea of Galilee. The hostility continued during President Bashar al-Assad’s rule as he escalated the support to militant actors such as Hizbollah and Hamas. The onset of the 2011 Arab Spring in Syria, which ultimately led to the civil war, undermined not only Assad’s legitimacy but also that of Syria as a state. This was largely due to the emergence of jihadist groups, extremist militias, and mercenaries attempting to capture the Syrian state. The conflict remained fraught as the US recognised the right of Israel on Golan Heights in 2019, which created a hurdle in future negotiations. However, the fall of President Assad in December 2024 and the arrival of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham(HTS), an offshoot of ISIS rule in Syria, amidst the devastation of Syrian defence infrastructures by the Israeli strikes left Al-Sharaa with little choice but to negotiate with Israel to maintain stability and control of HTS in Syria. The current negotiations are part of President Al-Sharaa’s strategy to consolidate his control over the state without posing threats to Israel and its interests in the Levant region. 

Identifying the Causes for the Negotiations 

One of the primary causes behind the negotiation between Syria and Israel is the Trump administration’s initiative to restore diplomatic relations with Syria including the lifting off the economic sanctions for 6 months. This move, authorising certain transactions, including energy sales and incidental transfers imposed on former President Assad’s regime without conditions, could have a profound impact on the region. The administration had also voiced optimism that Syria would eventually join the Abraham Accords. The US has lifted the sanctions that were contingent upon the “enduring defeat of ISIS.” The meeting between Trump and Al-Sharaa, alongside Crown Prince Muhammed Bin Salman, was held in Riyadh on May 13, 2025. The Trump administration indicated that “the Al-Sharaa is open to peace with Israel.” 

On 28 May, the European Council announced the lifting of economic restrictive sanctions on Syria except those based on security grounds and related to the Assad regime, aiming at “supporting the Syrian people in reuniting and rebuilding a new, inclusive, pluralistic and peaceful Syria.”[vii]

The Syrian government welcomed the lifting of the sanctions by the US and EU, as it will benefit the locals in Syria to revive their businesses, boosts investment, and reconstructs the war-torn economy. Besides, it will help Syria to reintegrate with the world economy, allowing economic transactions from outside of the country, including by the millions of Syrian migrants and refugees. Sanctions relief in sectors, such as oil, gas, electricity, and transport remains crucial for Syria, where the World Bank estimates reconstruction of the country could cost more than 250-500 billion dollars.[viii]

Türkiye, a close partner of President Al-Sharaa, has also agreed with Israel to prevent clashes in Syria and established a hotline to avert clashes with Tel Aviv, which has troops in the south of the country, and Ankara’s military stationed in the north of the country.[ix]Türkiye is one of the key backers that had provided military and material support to Al-Sharaa and HTS in its fight against former President Assad’s regime. In the past, Türkiye had restored diplomatic relations with Israel a month before the 7 October terrorist attack on Israel. During Israel’s counter-offensive that led to disproportionate casualties in Gaza, Türkiye was escalating the anti-Israel rhetoric. However, at the same time, it facilitated the transportation of much-needed oil to Israel from Azerbaijan through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. The growing convergence between Türkiye and Israel, including establishing the hotline to prevent the conflict, is indicative of the fact that the countries are prioritising economic and geopolitical interests over norms and values in an increasingly disintegrated international order. 

De-escalation of tensions between Israel and Syria will facilitate Al-Sharaa to strengthen his position amidst the rising challenges from minorities, including Alawites. Al-Sharaa not only has to protect its newly formed government from the internal challenges but also needs to convince Israel to end the ongoing military operations in Syria to focus his interim government’s full attention to the internal challenges.

President Al-Sharaa is also facing challenges from ISIS, as the group though weakened has escalated the attacks on Al-Sharaa militias in recent months. In Aleppo, security forces terminated the ISIS attacks following the interim government's announcement of an operation against the group. The recent operation came after a series of ISIS attacks in past months, including at Sayed Zeinab shrine- the Shia Muslim pilgrimage site (near Damascus), Sweida province and the southern eastern Jaramana city, which is inhabited mostly by the Druze minority.[x] ISIS, in its statement, stated that Al-Sharaa is leading an “apostate regime”[xi]because he failed not only in implementing Sharia law but has sought negotiation and de-escalation with Israel and met with President Trump. There were also clashes in coastal areas-Hama, Homs and Latakia between Alawites and the interim government forces which show that Syrian unity in post-Assad Syria remains a challenge.

Conclusion

The negotiation between Syria and Israel is a pivotal part of the larger geopolitical and geoeconomic regional framework. It carries significant weight as it aims to present the current President and the Syrian government in a more civilized light. This is a crucial effort to counter the jihadist outlook of HTS and Al-Sharaa, which is deeply antagonistic to the centuries old composite culture of Syrian polity and society. The transformation of al-Sharaa from a follower of hardline Islamist ideology to a leader, who is being sought to be mainstreamed, as evidenced by his meeting with President Donald Trump in Riyadh last month, is a momentous event in the rapidly changing regional sub-system. However, this transformation is not without its challenges, including the geopolitical turmoil in the region (Gaza conflict), Israel’s threat perception from pro-Iranian militias, the erosion of Syria’s sovereignty since the civil war started in 2011, and most importantly, the question of the legitimacy of President Al-Sharaa. This legitimacy issue stems from the status of minorities inside the country, as the Syrian interim government has not been able to negotiate a “social contract” with different ethnic and religious groups. Al-Sharaa has to make inclusive and stable government to translate the ongoing political changes into robust Syrian unity. These factors will ultimately determine the outcomes of the negotiation between Israel and Syria.  

*****         

*Dr. Arshad, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

[i]Azerbaijan and the UAE are the prominent mediators. However, the UAE Assistant Foreign Minister denied being the mediator of any such talks. See: https://tinyurl.com/58fn54cu.

[ii]Negotiation Paths between Syria and Israel: Normalization Postponed, Enab Baladi, 16 May, 2025, accessed https://tinyurl.com/4ja72dsk, 31 May, 2025.

[iii]Syria’s al-Sharaa confirms indirect talks with Israel amid soaring tensions, Al-Jazeera, 7 May, 2025, accessed https://tinyurl.com/5b4eyh8s, May 31, 2025.

[iv] Syria, Israel reportedly hold direct talks in Azerbaijan, The New Arab, 17 May, 2025, accessed https://tinyurl.com/35nyb8m4, June 01, 2025.

[v] Syria and Israel in direct talks focused on security, sources say, Haaretz, 27 May 2025, accessed https://tinyurl.com/mr2vh246, June06, 2025.

[vi]A Conversion with Syrian Leader: Journey Beyond the Ruins, Jewish Journal, 28 May 2025, accessed https://tinyurl.com/3wr9abbk, June 01, 2025.

[vii]Syria: EU adopts legal acts to lift economic sanctions on Syria, enacting recent political agreement, European Council, 28 May, 2025, accessed https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/05/28/syria-eu-adopts-legal-acts-to-lift-economic-sanctions-on-syria-enacting-recent-political-agreement/, June 02, 2025

[viii]Three requisites for Syria’s Reconstruction Process, Carnegie, 8 May 2025, accessed https://tinyurl.com/mpv7m59s, June 04, 2025.

[ix]Israel, Turkiye said to agree to prevent clashes in Syria, establish hotline, The Times of Israel, May 21, 2025, accessedhttps://tinyurl.com/yjkt55f6, June 04, 2025.

[x]Atleast three killed as Syrian forces raid ISIL hideouts in Aleppo, May 17, 2025, accessed https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/5/17/at-least-three-killed-as-syrian-forces-raid-isil-hideouts-in-aleppo, 6 June 06, 2025.

[xi]Al-Naba 495: Islamic State’s Propaganda Against al-Sharaa and the Syrian-Israeli Normalisation Tracks, 18 May 2025, Special Eurasia, accessed https://tinyurl.com/2cu434ez, June 09, 2025.