Indian Council of World Affairs

Abstract: On July 3, 2025, Russia officially recognized the Taliban regime, becoming the first country to extend formal diplomatic legitimacy to Afghanistan's de facto rulers since their return to power in August 2021. This historic move marks the culmination of a multi‑stage evolution, from outright opposition to pragmatic engagement, fuelled by shifting geopolitical realities, regional security concerns and economic interests. The decision has drawn both global attention and backlash for legitimizing a regime accused of severe human rights violations. 

Introduction 

On July 3, 2025, Russian Ambassador Dmitry Zhirnov met with Taliban Acting Foreign Minister Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi to formally announce Moscow’s recognition of the ‘Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’, according to Afghanistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[i] As part of efforts to strengthen ties, Russia has also accepted the credentials of Taliban-appointed Ambassador Gul Hassan Hassan in Moscow.[ii] Since the Taliban's return to power and the withdrawal of the U.S. and NATO forces in August 2021: an event Russia labelled a “failure”[iii]- Moscow has steadily worked to normalize relations, viewing the group as a potential partner in counterterrorism, anti-narcotics efforts, and regional trade. This milestone reflects Russia’s shift from past hostility to pragmatic engagement, shaped by evolving geopolitical dynamics and strategic interests. 

Russia's Foreign Ministry shared on the Telegram app: “We believe that the act of official recognition of the government of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan will give impetus to the development of productive bilateral cooperation between our countries in various fields.”[iv] The move makes Russia the first country in the world to recognise the country’s Taliban Administration as a legitimate government. Underscoring the significance of this decision, Taliban’s Acting FM Muttaqi called it “a historic step towards strengthening relations between the two countries” and described it as “a new phase of positive relations, mutual respect, and constructive engagement”[v]. He further stated that now the process of recognition of the Taliban government has started, “this brave decision will be an example for others.”[vi] While the Russian Foreign Ministry said it would help Kabul tackle terrorism and drug-trafficking, while also boosting economic cooperation.[vii]

Since the Taliban seized power in Afghanistan on August 15, 2021, several countries have engaged with the Taliban regime, yet formal recognition of the regime has remained elusive. Countries like China, the UAE, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan have appointed ambassadors to Kabul, yet none have officially recognized the Taliban government. In 2023, China became the first country to appoint a new ambassador, Zhao Sheng, to Afghanistan and accepted Taliban-nominated Assadullah Bilal Karimi as Afghanistan’s envoy to Beijing, while emphasizing that this “did not constitute formal recognition of the Taliban as the legitimate governing authority”.[viii]

According to reports, Beijing has expressed support for Russia’s decision, with Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning stating that, “As a traditional friendly neighbor of Afghanistan, China has always believed that Afghanistan should not be excluded from the international community.”[ix] Pakistan responded cautiously, framing the move as a bilateral matter between two sovereign nations.[x] The development is expected to draw close attention from Washington, which has frozen billions in Afghan central bank assets, imposed sanctions on senior Taliban leaders, and recently implemented a travel ban on Afghan nationals. In light of this pivotal shift, the following section examines the historical evolution of Russia-Taliban relations over the past decades.

From Terrorist Label to Diplomatic Validation: Russia’s Evolving Calculus on the Taliban

Russia’s evolving relationship with the Taliban is best understood as a shift from enmity and mistrust to strategic pragmatism, driven by both international realignments and domestic security imperatives. During the Taliban’s first regime (1996–2001), Moscow supported the anti‑Taliban Northern Alliance and condemned Taliban sanctuary for groups like Al‑Qaeda. Initially, Moscow viewed the Taliban with deep hostility and had declared the Taliban as a terrorist organisation in 2003, rooted in past grievances and overlapping concerns with the West. However, over the last two decades, changing geopolitical dynamics, especially Russia’s worsening ties with the West, reshaped Moscow’s calculus, culminating in closer engagement with the Taliban and ultimately formal recognition in 2025.

Historical Estrangement

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, President Vladimir Putin was among the first world leaders to express support for the United States’ ‘Global War on Terror’. This alignment was not purely ideological, it served dual purposes for Moscow. First, it offered a pathway to warmer relations with Washington after years of post-Soviet uncertainty. Second, and perhaps more crucially, it provided Russia with the international legitimacy to pursue its own counterterrorism operations in regions like Chechnya and Dagestan under the broad umbrella of fighting Islamist extremism.

Russia’s antagonism toward the Taliban during their first regime was deeply rooted. Not only had the Taliban recognized Chechnya’s independence, but they also allowed Chechen fighters to operate from Afghan territory and even established a Chechen “embassy” in Kabul.[xi] These actions were seen by Moscow as a direct affront to its territorial integrity and sovereignty, sparking serious concerns. Hence, when the U.S. launched military operations in Afghanistan in 2001, Russia was quick to support the intervention, even offering intelligence and logistical aid.

However, this alignment with the U.S. began to fray by the mid-2000s as Moscow perceived growing Western encroachment in its traditional sphere of influence. A key turning point came with the so-called “Colour Revolutions”: the Rose Revolution in Georgia (2003), the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (2004), and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan (2005). All three saw pro-Kremlin leaders ousted and replaced with governments leaning westward. To Moscow, these revolutions were not spontaneous democratic movements, but U.S.-orchestrated regime changes aimed at weakening Russia’s influence in the post-Soviet space. This perception hardened with NATO’s eastward expansion and the EU’s attempts to integrate former Soviet republics. By 2014, the rupture was complete. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the subsequent fallout with the West marked a definitive break. Increasingly isolated, Moscow deepened its ties with China, pivoted toward non-Western powers, and sought new alliances to balance Western pressure. It is within this reorientation that Moscow’s rapprochement with the Taliban must be situated.

Gradual Rapprochement

By 2015, Moscow grew concerned about developments on its southern flank. The emergence of the Islamic State’s Khorasan Province (ISKP) in Afghanistan, coupled with the declining American military presence, raised alarms in the Kremlin. Russia feared that Afghanistan, once again, could become a source of instability, exporting terrorism and narcotics across Central Asia and into Russia itself. In Moscow’s eyes, the Taliban - though historically adversarial- were now a lesser evil compared to ISKP and could be instrumental in stabilizing Afghanistan and containing jihadist spillover.  Parallel to these concerns, Russia’s global policy increasingly ran counter to Washington’s positions: in Syria, where Moscow backed Bashar al-Assad; in Venezuela, where it supported Nicolás Maduro; and across multiple conflict zones where Moscow and Washington stood on opposite ends. These strategic divergences made it politically easier for Russia to engage the Taliban without concern for American backlash.

Domestically, too, Russia’s confidence was growing. Its military intervention in Syria had bolstered its regional credentials. The Kremlin felt it could project power and shape outcomes, even in traditionally Western-dominated theatres. This assertiveness translated into a policy of “strategic hedging” in Afghanistan. As U.S. withdrawal loomed, Moscow stepped up its outreach to the Taliban. It hosted Taliban delegations in Moscow, brokered Moscow Format Dialogues since 2017 involving regional countries, and quietly developed diplomatic and intelligence channels with the group. Russia also found itself in alignment with Beijing and Tehran—all of whom had their own pragmatic reasons for engaging with the Taliban. These countries viewed the Taliban not just as a pariah force, but as a political reality that could not be ignored and must be co-opted to serve broader regional interests. By 2021, even before the fall of Kabul, Russia had significantly softened its rhetoric. It was among those very few countries whose Embassy remained open after the Taliban takeover and continued formal engagements while withholding official recognition. The Taliban’s ability to take and hold power across Afghanistan without widespread resistance reinforced the perception in Moscow that they were the de facto authority and possibly the only viable one.

Groundwork for Formal Recognition

It became increasingly clear that Russia’s primary objectives were: to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a haven for transnational jihadist groups like ISKP, to limit the spread of Islamist extremism, narcotics trafficking into its borders and Central Asia, and to expand its influence in a post-American Afghanistan. The Taliban, eager for legitimacy and aid, became a willing interlocutor. Russia was the first to sign an international economic deal with the Taliban in 2022, where they agreed to supply oil, gas and wheat to Afghanistan.[xii] A Taliban delegation attended Russia’s flagship economic forum in Saint Petersburg in 2022 and 2024, and the group’s top diplomat met Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Moscow last October.[xiii] In July 2024, Russian President called the Taliban “allies in the fight against terrorism” [xiv]– notably against Islamic State Khorasan Province, ISKP (ISIS-K), a group responsible for the deadly Moscow Concert hall in Moscow in March 2024 and several attacks within Afghanistan.[xv] In April 2025, Russia took a decisive step by removing the Taliban from its “list of banned terrorist organizations”, a formal prerequisite to diplomatic recognition. Eventually, on July 3, 2025, it became the first country to officially recognize the Taliban regime, a move that solidified its new Afghan policy.

Implications: Strategic, Political, and Ethical Ripples

A formal diplomatic relationship enables deeper security cooperation: counter‑terror, drug trafficking, and intelligence sharing - all high on Moscow’s agenda. Legal recognition removes barriers to investment, opening sectors like energy pipelines, infrastructure rebuilding, and regional trade routes toward India and China. In terms of messaging, the move showcases Russia’s independence from Western norms, emphasising a multipolar world where Western-style conditionality takes a back seat to strategic interests. Moreover, following Russia's formal recognition of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, several countries may consider may following suit due to geopolitical, economic, or regional security interests. Nations like China, Iran, Pakistan, and some Central Asian Republics could be among the first, as they prioritize stability on their borders and engagement with whoever holds power in Kabul. At the same time, without clear conditional commitments, Russia may undercut global human rights standards. 

Critics of the decision warn that legitimising a regime guilty of severe rights abuses—sends a dangerous signal. Afghan activists and politicians, in particular, have strongly voiced against the decision, warning that it legitimizes oppression, particularly targeting women and girls. Naseer Ahmad Faiq, Afghanistan’s representative to the United Nations, remarked that recognition by countries that previously supported the Taliban is "unsurprising," but cautioned that it “could have serious and lasting repercussions for ordinary Afghans”.[xvi] Nasir Andisha, Afghanistan’s Envoy to the UN office in Geneva, called the move a “lose-lose” for both Russia and the Taliban, noting that “while it may create new opportunities, these must be approached with caution and purpose”.[xvii] Both Naser Faiq and Nasir Andisha do not represent the present Taliban regime in the UN which the UN has not recognized; they continue to represent the fallen pre-Taliban 2.0 government of Afghanistan. The Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF), an anti-Taliban resistance group formed after the fall of Kabul in 2021, also sharply condemned Russia’s decision, arguing that legitimizing the Taliban’s “self-declared Emirate fosters extremism and terrorism.”[xviii] Fawzia Koofi, a former Afghan MP and advocate for women’s rights, stressed that normalizing relations with the Taliban would not lead to peace but would instead embolden impunity -“Such actions risk not only the safety of Afghans but global security as well,” she warned, “If we ignore the lessons of the past, history will deliver its lessons at a devastating price.”[xix]

Conclusion

Russia’s formal recognition of the Taliban is a milestone rooted in pragmatic interest; addressing security threats, countering narco-trafficking, reinforcing regional influence, and tapping into Afghan markets. It marks a conscious shift from viewing the Taliban as a pariah to a strategic partner. However, the decision remains deeply contentious.  Recognition affords legitimacy even as the Taliban continue policies that reverse decades of social progress—especially for women. Whether Russia can leverage engagement into real change or merely legitimise a repressive regime is yet to be seen; it can however be said that Russia’s recognition would prove to be of consequence to regional stability in the years to come.

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*Dr. Anwesha Ghosh, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

[i] Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Afghanistan, X handle, @MoFA_AFG, 3 July, 2025. Available at: https://x.com/MoFA_Afg/status/1940824370089545839?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Etweet (Accessed on 5.7.2025)

[ii] Ibid

[iii] Russia becomes first country to recognise Afghanistan’s Taliban government.” Al Jazeera, July 3,2025. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/3/russia-becomes-first-country-to-recognise-afghanistans-taliban-government(Accessed on 5.7.2025)

[iv] “Russia becomes first country to recognise Afghanistan’s Taliban government.” Al Jazeera, July 3,2025. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/3/russia-becomes-first-country-to-recognise-afghanistans-taliban-government(Accessed on 5.7.2025)

[v] Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Afghanistan, X handle, @MoFA_AFG, 3 July, 2025. Available at: https://x.com/MoFA_Afg/status/1940824370089545839?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Etweet(Accessed on 5.7.2025)

[vi] Russia becomes first country to recognise Afghanistan’s Taliban government.” Al Jazeera. Op.cit.

[vii] Russia becomes first state to recognise Afghanistan's Taliban government.” BBC, 5 July, 2025. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c78n4wely9do (Accessed on 5.7.2025)

[viii] China becomes the first country to host Taliban Ambassador”. ICWA Viewpoint. Dec 13, 2023. Available at: /show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=10268&lid=6538 (Accessed on 5.7.2025)

[ix] Russia first country to recognize Taliban rule” Duetsche Welle, 4. 7. 2025. Available at: https://www.dw.com/en/russia-first-country-to-recognize-taliban-rule/a-73150385 (Accessed on 6.7.2025)

[x] “Pakistan reacts cautiously to Russia’s Recognition of Taliban.: The Khaama Press, July 5, 2025. Available at: https://www.khaama.com/category/afghanistan/#google_vignette (Accessed on 6.7.2025)

[xi] “THE TALIBAN FORMALLY RECOGNIZES CHECHNYA”. The Jamestown Foundation, 18 Jan, 2000. Available at: https://jamestown.org/program/the-taliban-formally-recognizes-chechnya/(Accessed on 6.7.2025)

[xii] “Russia becomes first state to recognise Afghanistan's Taliban government. “BBC, 5.7.25. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c78n4wely9do (Accessed on 6.7.2025)

[xiii] “Russia becomes first country to recognise Afghanistan’s Taliban government.” Al Jazeera. Op.cit.

[xiv] “Putin says Taliban 'our allies' in fighting terrorism.” The Hindu, 5 July 2024, Available at: https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/putin-says-taliban-our-allies-in-fighting-terrorism/article68369810.ece (Accessed on 6.7.2025).

[xv] “Moscow concert hall attack: Why is ISIL targeting Russia?”Al Qaeda, 24 March 2025. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/23/moscow-concert-hall-attack-why-is-isil-targeting (Accessed on 6.7.2025)

[xvi] “Russia’s Decision to Recognize Taliban Sparks Backlash from Afghan Politicians and Activists”. Kabul Now, 5 July 2025. Available at: https://kabulnow.com/2025/07/russias-decision-to-recognize-taliban-sparks-backlash-from-afghan-politicians-and-activists/ (Accessed on 6.7.2025)

[xvii] Ibid

[xviii] Ibid

[xix] Ibid