Indian Council of World Affairs

Abstract: Costa Rica known for its exceptionalism within Central America faces an arduous choice between continuing with its pacifist model and adopting Mano Dura tactics in fighting surging crime. While pacifism may aid in targeting socio-economic realities behind crime, it ignores the larger regional and transnational dimensions. In contrast Mano Dura may be a calculated risk given Costa Rica’s exceptionalism. 

For years transnational and local criminal networks have plagued Central America, engaging in narco-trafficking and turf wars posing serious threats to regional stability. Costa Rica, in contrast maintained its relative peace amidst the chaos in its neighbourhood due to its exceptionalism[i]. Its exceptionalism is characterised by pacifism, absence of a formal military, greater thrust on education, democratic stability, sustainable tourism and economic growth. This exceptionalism since decades served well, making Costa Rica a cynosure in an otherwise murky environment. 

In recent years, this exceptionalism is under stress due to a noticeable surge in transnational criminal networks. Criminal activities are assuming alarming proportions threatening the very foundation of the Central American country. President Rodrigo Chaves who assumed office in 2022 instituted countermeasures such as the Costa Rica Segura, a comprehensive policy to tackle these issues. Additionally, inspired by the Salvadoran ‘Mano Dura’ model, Costa Rica plans to construct a mega-prison to serve as a correctional facility and adopt stronger measures.

In the current scenario, the debate between continuing with exceptionalism and adopting hardline Mano Dura tactics has widened, necessitating a relook and a possible major shift in its security policy. Hence, at the moment Costa Rica is at crossroads.

This paper examines three main pivots, the surge in criminal activity in Costa Rica, measures adopted by the government, and challenges.

Surge in Criminal Activities in Costa Rica

Surge in crime has assumed alarming proportions in Costa Rica which was once hailed for its security in Central America. There are multiple reasons such as slow economic recovery post-pandemic, growing presence of transnational and local criminal networks and persistent unemployment[ii]. Recent trends show that mostly young people engage in criminal networks for sustenance. Its strategic locations make it lucrative for transnational criminal networks which often partner with homegrown gangs.

According to the OIJ[iii] while homicide rates were 9.9 per 100,000 people in 2014 it surged to 17.2 in 2023-24[iv] with provinces like Limón[v], Puntarenas, and San José being the most affected areas[vi]. Also, tourist hotspots are also being targeted by local gangs, endangering Costa Rica’s sustainable tourism. Homicide rates have increased by 66% between 2013 and 2024[vii], with more than 70% of them being related to narco trafficking.

Costa Rica has become prominent in narco and arms trafficking as transnational groups such as Nueva Generation, Clan de Golfo and Sinaloa, primarily from Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela amplify their operations. Such organised criminal activities have multiple stakeholders with booming revenues, territorial contests and aggravated violence. Previously transnational traffickers paid couriers in cash, recently switching to drugs. This resulted in huge quantities of contraband within Costa Rica leading to increase in number of buyers and peddlers. Local gangs started grooming, marking territories unleashed violence over territorial control, a pattern similar in Central America.

Costa Rica has seen a rise in the number of criminal organizations, from 35 to 340[viii] in the past decade leading to intense turf-wars and conflicts have spilled over from peripheral places like Limón and Puntarenas into metropolitan areas such as the capital San José and the industrial centre of Alajuela. Hence, the increase in intensity, structure and nature of crime and networks is worrisome. In this context, a survey conducted by the Centre for Research and Political Studies (CIEP)[ix], University of Costa Rica in 2025 state that 43[x] percent of the population considers increasing crime to be a primary concern as it affects tourism[xi], local industries, real estate and investor confidence in financial sectors, challenging the very foundation of Costa Rican exceptionalism.

Counter- Measures Instituted by the Government

In response, the government launched the Costa Rica Segura 2023-2030^[xii], an improvement over the earlier POLSEPAZ in 2010. The goal being, to ensure security and reducing crime by incorporating strengthening of institutions, modernising the security apparatuses within the framework of a human security model. The multipronged approach encompasses economic upliftment, enforced legislation and maintaining Costa Rica’s pacifist outlook[xiii].

The plan is based on four main axes which are (a) Prevention, (b) Citizen Security, (c) Checking Organised Crime and, (d) National Protection. Explaining these axes:

1. Prevention- It targets the root causes for crime, ensuring reduction in multicausal elements leading to crime. The programme contains policies at primary, secondary and tertiary levels such as community programmes[xiv], education and sports and promoting local self-help groups. It offers support to victims and counselling for minor offences. Certain legal mechanisms have been implemented such as tougher armaments and juvenile law, extradition of repeated offenders and laws for improved surveillance.
2. Citizen Security- This section deals with ensuring a stronger and proactive police force, increasing security presence and digitalization of security services. To implement, the government has sanctioned an increase in police personnel by 2000[xv], an investment of US$1.2 million for equipment[xvi], extensive training in patrolling and counter-narco trafficking operations.
3. Checking Organised Crime- The objective of this section is to enhance security in areas which are prone to organised crime and fall within routes used for trafficking. It seeks to reform the Drug Control Police (PCD) model, integrate the various security apparatuses such as the Coast Guard and the Border Patrol, reinforcing security in infrastructure such as ports, and enhanced intelligence gathering.
4. National Protection- The absence of a formal military has often been showcased as an obstacle to achieving security goals. Hence, the objective is to strengthen territorial defence with inputs such as Programme for integration of Borders, extend maritime control, digitalisation, checking cyber-crime and inclusion of high-end technology. Focus is also levied on tourist hotspots and main economic centres of the country.

The viability of the Costa Rica Segura depends on multiple elements such as funding, integration of police departments, coordination among provinces and political will. At a regional level, implementation will also depend upon cooperation among the countries in Central America.

Challenges

There are multiple challenges to enhancing security and tackling transnational criminal activity in Costa Rica. Primarily, the absence of a formal military overburdens the already understaffed and strained police. Budgetary constraints, the lack of sophisticated equipment and armaments add to the impediments. Besides, there is an urgent need to improve on-field tactics employed by the security forces considering the ruthless nature of such criminal networks.

Although homegrown gangs are still in a nascent stage in comparison to the rest of Central America, over the years their ranks have swelled, complicating the security dimension. Collaboration with transnational criminal organisations if not checked early on may worsen the situation. The vast network of transnational criminal organisations is a threat to national and regional security. Often difference in laws, jurisdiction and procedures complicate regional cross-border operations, allowing such groups to increase their grip. Financial conditions and community isolation are main reasons for increasing number of criminal organisations and, in this regard, it is challenging for the government to inculcate social and rehabilitation programmes to prevent this.

There's a debate within the Costa Rican civil and political circles to opt for mano dura, or focus on societal development as a deterrence. It would be difficult to emulate the mano dura of El Salvador considering Costa Rica’s exceptionalism and the commitment to zero militarization. Paucity of funding complicates upgradation of the police, and if done hastily may strain other sectors of the economy. Tendency for such criminal organisations to retaliate ferociously must also be considered. However, arguments such as the requirement to combat criminal syndicates head-on as they are not deterred by economic policies and can only be subdued by force, is rapidly catching on.

While the current Costa Rican government has shown interest in the Mano Dura policies employed by El Salvador which has been successful in some ways there, its implementation in Cost Rica is challenging. Compared to Costa Rica, El Salvador has more experience in dealing with criminal organisations and in terms of security forces, equipment and training it stands in a better position. El Salvador’s success must be seen in the light of the popularity of President Bukele, his own personality and centralization of powers which enabled him to proceed on such a hard approach.

To replicate it is unlikely in Costa Rica which has an entrenched culture of pacifism. Its political culture gives little space to such tactics. It has strong   autonomous institutions, separation of powers, check and balances and the executive is significantly weaker necessitating compromise with the other two arms of the government. Hence, for President Chaves with only 9 members in the 57-member strong Legislature[xvii], implementing strong-arm policies will be difficult.

Conclusion

Costa Rican exceptionalism, faces stress due to increasing crime and the presence of transnational criminal networks. Particularly, youngsters joining criminal networks is a dangerous trend, which reflects the fault lines in social and economic policies. In the larger context of security in Central America, this shift is worrying. If unchecked, it could impact multiple vectors such as tourism, economy and the society. Theoretically, even if criminal networks are checked temporarily there are chances of them regrouping. Organised crime is a reflection of prevailing malaise in societies. Hence punitive action and social policies must go hand in hand. A mix of hard and soft approaches too is possible, where the hard approach is adopted towards the more hardened criminals, and soft approach is adopted towards wavering youngsters, and government action is suitably showcased for social messaging. The importance of regional and international cooperation to fight cross-border international crime is also to be kept in mind.

While steps have been taken, insufficient budget, shortage of security personnel and equipment are technical impediments. Due to its exceptionalism, its political culture has been devoid of militarisation and concentration of power, and therefore a major shift in security policies will require a corresponding and strenuous political restructuring. Hence, Cost Rica stands at crossroads between bolstering its pacifist model with social and economic programmes, or adopting a more hardline mano dura approach to at least halt the sudden surge in crime. Any dent in its pacifist model for which it is seen as a poster boy in international relations would however be unfortunate.

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*Dr. Arnab Chakrabarty, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.

Endnotes 

[i] The phrase Pura Vida literally translated as Pure Life is used as a traditional greeting, highlighting an idyllic life. Thus, Costa Rica traditionally enjoyed high economic growth, low crime and stability modelled on its exceptionalism.

[ii] Tico Times (4^th May 2025). Cost Rica’s rising violence challenges Chaves’ security claims. Accessed 7^th July 2025. https://ticotimes.net/2025/05/04/costa-ricas-rising-violence-challenges-chaves-security-claims.

[iii] Organismo de Investigación Judicial or Judicial Investigation Agency which is Costa Rica’s primary criminal investigation agency.

[iv] Alvaro Murillo (23^rd October 2024). Death threats and drug trafficking suspicions” Political tensions rise in Costa Rica. El Pais. Accessed 5^th July 2025. https://english.elpais.com/international/2024-10-23/death-threats-and-drug-trafficking-suspicions-political-tension-rises-in-costa-rica.html

[v] In 2023, Limón's homicide rate was more than 33 per 100,000.

[vi] The OIJ reported 449 murders, with Puntarenas and Cartago provinces up 16% and 20%, respectively, over the same period in 2023.

[vii] Alvaro Murillo (26^th February 2024). Drug violence threatens Costa Rica. El Pais. Accessed 5^th July 2025. https://english.elpais.com/international/2024-02-26/drug-violence-threatens-costa-rica.html.

[viii] El Salvador in English (2025). Costa Rica plans to build prison modelled after El Salvador’s CECOT, President Chaves confirms. Accessed 4^th July 2025. https://elsalvadorinenglish.com/2025/05/02/costa-rica-plans-to-build-prison-modeled-after-el-salvadors-cecot-president-chaves-confirms/.

[ix] Universidad de Costa Rica, CIEP (3rd April 2025). President Chaves’ government’s ratings are declining, while concerns about insecurity and crime are rife in Costa Rica, Accessed 10^th July 2025. https://www.ucr.ac.cr/noticias/2025/4/03/la-valoracion-del-gobierno-del-presidente-chaves-disminuye-mientras-que-la-preocupacion-por-la-inseguridad-y-la-delincuencia-reina-en-costa-rica.html#:~:text=Para%20la%20poblaci%C3%B3n%20de%20Costa,la%20soluci%C3%B3n%20de%20estos%20problemas.&text=Aunado%20a%20estos%20resultados%2C%20la,Foto%20Anel%20Kenjekeeva..

[x] Howler Media (2025). Crime and public safety in Costa Rica: A nation at a crossroads. Accessed 7^th July 2025. https://howlermag.com/costa-rica-crime-crisis/.

[xi] About 163,000 individuals, or 7.1% of the labour force, were directly employed by the tourism sector in 2023, according to data from the Costa Rica Tourism Institute. The number rises to almost 490,000 people, or 21.3% of the labour force, when direct and indirect employment are taken into account. Thus, rising violence poses a serious danger to Costa Rica's US$2 billion tourist sector, which accounts for 8% of the country's GDP. The coastal villages of Jacó de Garavito (279), Cahuita de Talamanca (194), Quepos de Quepos (151), and Bahia Ballena de Osa (120) had the greatest rates of crime against foreigners in 2023, according to the OIJ.

[xii] A national strategy to tackle criminality.

[xiii] Cronkite News (2025). As Costa Rica welcomes record-breaking number of tourists, the country is battling rising crime. Accessed 5^th July 2025. https://cronkitenews.azpbs.org/2024/10/18/costa-rica-face-record-breaking-levels-crime-tourists/#:~:text=Meanwhile%2C%20the%20fight%20against%20crime,year%20in%20the%20country's%20history..

[xiv] It has multidimensional programmes such as Pasándola Bien, Centros Civicos and Ligas Atléticas.

[xv] This also includes 9500 reserve police personnel.

[xvi] Control Risks (2024). Costa Rica’s rising violence: effects on business and governance. Accessed 7^th July 2025. https://www.controlrisks.com/our-thinking/insights/costa-ricas-rising-violence-effects-on-business-and-governance?utm_referrer=https://www.google.com.

[xvii] Divergentes (2025). Little drug traffickers and hitmen: crime and drug trafficking infiltrate Costa Rican schools. Accessed 7^th July 2025. https://www.divergentes.com/crime-and-drug-trafficking-infiltrate-costa-rican-schools/.