Indian Council of World Affairs

Abstract: As China rebrands itself while western support in the Pacific remains inconsistent, Island nations continue to navigate through uncertainty while negotiating existential threats like climate change.

Introduction

At the end of May 2025, when China hosted eleven Foreign Ministers of Pacific Island Countries in Xiamen, it was met with concern in the western strategic community. This was the 3^rd edition of this meeting. The gradually increasing presence of China in the islands of the South Pacific, as well as the systemic anxieties it garners in the west, are not novel phenomena. The ‘China Threat’ dominates popular commentary about the region, a region that has been devoid of great power competition, at least directly, since the end of World War II. Until of course, in the recent past.

U.S. Withdrawal, Aid Cuts in the Face of the Pacific’s Climate Emergency

The joint statement adopted at the end of the meeting had reference to ‘no empty promises’ from the Chinese side.[i] The timing of this statement is notable. The inward looking shift in the US, has led to fears of unreliability amongst its Pacific allies. While the US, New Zealand and Australia, have a high comprehensive presence in the region, there have obviously been concerns caused by latest trends in American foreign policy. Goods like Fiji Water and Kava came under pressure overnight, due the reciprocal tariffs initiated in April 2025 by the US. Slapping duties on goods from one of the most aid dependent regions in the world, was met with disappointment and concern in the islands. The sitting chair of the Pacific Island Forum, Tonga, along with the incumbent troika that supports the chair, wrote a letter to President Trump outlining the concerns caused by the tariffs and aid cuts.[ii] Mr. Trump has also slashed government funding for USAID (United States Agency for International Development), which in the Pacific, was supporting programs around healthcare, economic development and combating climate change.

The most pressing concern for the Pacific, is climate change. The entire world’s existence is threatened by it, but island communities are on track to be the first victims of this human-made calamity, which they had no role in creating. The impactful visuals from Tuvalu’s Foreign Minister’s speech during COP26 in 2021 – which he gave while submerged in water - still remain fresh in the minds of the international community. While there are diverse diplomatic positions taken by the Pacific Island Countries on various issues depending upon their own national interests, nobody departs from the cohort when it comes to climate change. With this in mind, America’s withdrawal from the Paris agreement is extremely concerning. And Mr. Trump’s unscientific public rhetoric on climate change and health, vaccines in particular, do not help their case. It also reverses to an extent the progress made by the Biden administration in repairing years of ignorance. He became the first US President to host the leaders of Pacific Islands Countries at Washington since WWII.[iii] There was reopening of US embassies that had long remained shut, and increase in funding for areas considered national priorities by the island states themselves. The US had also laid out a ‘Pacific Partnership Strategy’.[iv] While the policies under President Biden were not always seamlessly accepted in the Pacific, Washington’s renewed attention, was by and large, received positively. The new American administration has not enunciated a dedicated plan for the region, or committed to the previous administration’s Pacific strategy, the latter seems extremely unlikely. Australia also hasn’t truly placed itself within the Pacific Island imagination when talking about climate change. What irks the Pacific states about Australia is that it doesn’t have a concrete plan to do away with fossil fuels, and lacks acknowledgement of the role of historical emissions.

The Rebranding: A ‘Better Hegemon’

The joint statement, while talking about climate change, called for south-south cooperation amongst the states, reaffirmed commitment to the UNFCCC and its Paris agreement. During the summit the participants adopted ‘China’s Initiative on Deepening Cooperation with Pacific Island Countries on Combating Climate Change’.[v] China always tries to present itself as a ‘better hegemon’ vis-à-vis the United States. At a juncture in world politics where uncertainty runs high amongst American allies and those dependent on its aid, the statement also called for advanced economies to provide leadership on climate change at the international level.

What is also different, about Chinese engagement much recently, is its subtly changing character. There are shifts that are motivated by different factors. Both, in the Pacific and around other parts of the world, China’s efforts at development have been marred with accusations of involvement in corrupt practices, capturing elites, domestic interference, and purposefully financing unsustainable projects – with the ulterior motive of taking them over, for dual use. This creates dependencies that can be difficult to come out of. Owing to high risks in China’s domestic markets, the capacity to lend and provide aid has also gone down.

Thus, there has been a recalibration which is influenced by changing global trends, and attempts at repairing shaky perceptions about Chinese help. From big and loud projects like stadiums and presidential palaces, there has been an increased focus on ‘small and beautiful’ ones. This is a part of Xi Jinping’s next phase of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The average size of the projects in the Pacific has dipped from $40 million to $5 million.[vi] As compared to loans, the share of grants has been higher.[vii] A rapid increase in embassy activity has helped in leading grant based projects.[viii] There has been increased focus on countries in which China has a larger presence compared to others in the Pacific - like Kiribati and Solomon Islands - who have shifted diplomatic ties to China from Taiwan, and increased development and security cooperation, owing to their calculus of risks and rewards. These shifts are motivated by global trends as well, and not just by strategies aimed at mending the unreliable Chinese perception. However, these changes do place China as a rebranded guarantor of development and security. To what extent this rebranding actually pacifies local anxieties, remains to be seen.

“Victims of Global Power Play”: Foreign Policy Concerns

Historically, there have always been foreign powers, both empires and states, which have attempted to include the islands as a part of their sovereign, or have tried to orient the islands culturally, socially, economically, and politically towards themselves, and only themselves. This strategy aims to create dependencies, restrict the choices of the states, and in turn dictate policy.

 In present times, both the US and China, have constructed (through actions and written strategy) the first island chain in East Asia, as a potential battlespace. And in that potential battle, the subsequent imagination of the Islands in the Pacific is that of ‘nodes’ and ‘links’ that provide strategic edge. This is a utilitarian view of sovereign states, that have repeatedly reiterated their aversion to partake in competitions that they did not sign up for. The Pacific Island Countries remain both conscious and concerned about the hegemonic ambitions of the Chinese, as they are about the existing (but contested) presence of the west. Kiribati is a state perceived to be ‘inclined’ towards China. The flows of assistance have increased, and security cooperation has been gradually getting more enmeshed in the recent past. However, in October 2024, when China fired an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) which splashed down inside Kiribati’s exclusive economic zone, it was met with condemnation. What is notable here is that China had informed the US and France about the launch, but none of them felt it was required to inform Kiribati, or any Pacific Island Country in the region. Such actions only reinforce the fear that the South Pacific will turn into a zone of binary competition, where the say of the islands gets lost in the noise. As there are multiple sources of assistance with their own securitizing agendas, the island states navigate foreign policy, based on their assessment of long and short term goals, in order to meet their critical needs. The island states however, are not intrinsically tied to any one state.[ix] They are cosmopolitan spaces with complex relations domestically and regionally. Local communities play an important role in societies where the reach of the state is not as omnipresent, and both remain wary of the strategic conditions which come with foreign assistance, that is crucial for their survival. Largely, the flow of capital between Island states and foreign countries is unidirectional. This is a diplomatic reality. They remain highly dependent on foreign aid. Thus, any developments between big powers and the island nations, have a tendency to be framed as a zero-sum game. As choices often get forced upon these states, and their imagination gets restricted to that of votes at UNGA, The Pacific Islands Forum has endorsed the idea of “Ocean of Peace” proposed by the Fijian PM Sitiveni Rabuka.[x] A draft declaration on ‘Ocean of Peace’ will be up for consideration at the 54^th Pacific Islands Forum Summit in Honiara, Solomon Islands, in September 2025.

In the immediate future, a key foreign policy concern in the pacific will be how to best garner support for critical needs, without conditions, in the face of America’s withdrawal and strategic silence, and China’s rising footprint.

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*Akash Tripathi, Research Intern, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal. 

Endnotes

[i] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. (2025, May 28). Joint Statement of the Third China-Pacific Island Countries Foreign Ministers’ Meeting. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjbzhd/202505/t20250528_11635595.html

[ii] Island Times. (2025, April 22). Troika leaders write to President Trump.https://islandtimes.org/troika-leaders-write-to-president-trump/

[iii] U.S. Department of State. (2022). U.S.–Pacific Islands Country Summit. https://2021-2025.state.gov/u-s-pacific-islands-country-summit/

[iv] The White House. (2022, September). Pacific Partnership Strategy of the United States [PDF]. https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000183-86ba-d824-a1d7-a7bac17e0000

[v] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. (2025, May 28). China’s initiative on deepening cooperation with Pacific Island countries on combating climate change. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjbzhd/202505/t20250528_11635735.html

[vi] Dayant, A., & Duke, R. (2023, November 28). China’s shifting Pacific engagement – loud and brash to “small but beautiful”. Devpolicy Blog.https://devpolicy.org/chinas-shifting-pacific-engagement-loud-and-brash-to-small-but-beautiful-20231128/

[vii] Dayant, A., Duke, R., Ahsan, N., Rajah, R., & Lemahieu, H. (2024). Pacific Aid Map: 2024 key findings report. Lowy Institute. https://pacificaidmap.lowyinstitute.org

[viii] Ibid.

[ix] Davis, S., Munger, L. A., & Legacy, H. J. (2020). Someone else’s chain, someone else’s road: U.S. military strategy, China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and island agency in the Pacific. Island Studies Journal, 15(2), 13–36. https://doi.org/10.24043/isj.104

[x] Office of the Prime Minister of Fiji. (2024, September 5). 53rd Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting, Nuku'alofa & Vava'u, Tonga, 25–30 August 2024. https://www.pmoffice.gov.fj/53rd-pacific-islands-forum-leaders-meeting-nukualofa-vavau-tonga-25-30-august-2024/