Indian Council of World Affairs

Abstract: Ecuador’s 2025 Presidential elections were held in the backdrop of escalating violence, energy blackouts. President Daniel Noboa, who had assumed office through snap elections in 2023, sought a full term amidst growing criticism over his use of emergency powers and limited democratic oversight. This paper analyses the broader implications of President Noboa’s re-election, focusing on Ecuador’s shifting relations within Latin America, the future of regional integration, and the deepening of U.S.-Ecuador ties under a security-driven, pro-U.S.-aligned administration. 

Introduction 

Ecuador held general elections on 9 February 2025. With no Presidential candidate winning an outright majority, a runoff was conducted on 13 April 2025. Incumbent President Daniel Noboa was re-elected for a full term of four years. He defeated Luisa González, who is the President of the Citizen Revolution Movement, a center-left party founded by the supporters of the former President Rafael Correa. Members of the National Assembly, 21 provincial assemblies, and Ecuador’s representatives to the Andean Parliament, were also elected during the national elections, all of whom will serve full four-year terms. 

Overview of the 2025 Elections

Once considered one of Latin America’s safest countries, Ecuador has seen its homicide rate increase significantly in recent years, becoming a key battleground for transnational drug cartels.^[i] Against this backdrop of escalating violence and instability, President Noboa secured his second term by campaigning on a ‘security-first’ agenda.^[ii] He expanded that the ‘security-first agenda’ prioritizes efforts against drug trafficking illegal weapons, ammunition, and explosives, and exercising greater control at the country’s ports. 

Public security was the central issue in Ecuador’s 2025 elections. The country recorded over 8,000 homicides in 2023, the highest in its history. Major cities such as Guayaquil and Esmeraldas have become flashpoints for drug-related violence, prompting President Noboa to deploy the military and classify drug gangs as terrorist organisations.^[iii] President Noboa’s government has been firmly rooted in a “mano dura” (iron fist) policy, declaring an internal armed conflict against twenty-two criminal gangs in January 2024 and classifying them as terrorist organisations.^[iv] His security approach, which has included the suspension of civil liberties and the increased militarisation of policing, has been criticised. Several human rights organisations raised concerns, voters have supported these measures, placing public safety above democratic norms. 

In addition to the security crisis, Ecuador has been facing critical energy shortage. Prolonged droughts have disrupted hydroelectric power generation, leading to daily blackouts in major cities like Quito, Cuenca, and other coastal areas. These outages have impacted small businesses leading to widespread discontent with the government.^[v] President Noboa blamed the disruption on his political opponents, claiming they were working with criminal groups to weaken his government. He reiterated that his administration would take measures to curb this under his ‘security-first’ agenda. During the campaign, he reinforced his tough-on-crime message and offered financial compensation to citizens affected by a major oil spill and to small businesses hurt by flooding. 

The economy remained a key source of anxiety. Ecuador’s dollarized economy contracted by 1.5 per cent in 2024 due to a sharp 1.5 % drop in exports and a sharp decline in household consumption.^[vi] In early 2025, President Noboa administration secured a stabilisation agreement with the International Monetary Fund, providing financial relief in exchange for structural reforms, which also added to voters’ confidence in President Noboa as a stable leader.^[vii] While critics warned of potential austerity, many middle-class voters saw him as a more reliable option than a return to the instability experienced under the former President Rafael Correa. 

Another major reason for President Noboa’s win was the opposition’s failure to present a united front. Luisa González, a protégé of former leftist President Rafael Correa, struggled to overcome his polarizing legacy. Correa’s regime was marked by political instability and allegations of authoritarianism and corruption. González also failed to connect with younger and urban voters. Indigenous activist Leonidas Iza, leader of the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), the largest indigenous organization in Ecaudaor, reflected growing discontent among Indigenous and left-leaning groups. However, his support base was too limited to influence the runoff. Although González alleged electoral fraud, international observers from the Organisation of American States (OAS) and European Union (EU) confirmed the elections were free and fair.^[viii]

Regional Responses to President Noboa’s Victory

Several Latin American governments, largely from the center to the right of center, have extended their congratulations to President Noboa. President Lula da Silva of Brazil praised President Noboa and highlighted shared commitments to Amazon conservation and multilateralism.^[ix] Chilean President Gabriel Boric congratulated President Noboa and praised the democratic process. ^[x]Argentine, Paraguayan, Costa Rican, Peruvian, Guatemalan, Dominican, Panamanian, and Uruguayan governments echoed the same voice. Uruguay's new president, Yamandú Orsi, congratulated after making a point of ascertaining that no credible evidence of electoral fraud had arisen. ^[xi]

Nonethless, some governments, mostly from the ideological left of center views have questioned the results. Colombia's President Gustavo Petro has refused to recognise on the grounds of the reported repression in opposition fiefdoms. However, Colombia’s Foreign Minister Laura Sarabia granted formal diplomatic recognition.^[xii]  Mexico's President, Claudia Sheinbaum, reiterated that her administration had decided against the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Ecuador under President Noboa.^[xiii] Venezuela's President Nicolás Maduro condemned the elections as a "horrible fraud."^[xiv] Nicaragua's President Daniel Ortega also rejected Prsident Noboa's win as illegitimate.^[xv]

These responses reflect more than simple policy disagreements. Instead, they indicate the region’s increasingly ideological divide. This divide weakens regional unity by making it harder for institutions like the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and the Organization of American States (OAS) to agree to a united front, and it signals a shift away from multilateralism toward bilateral relationships, prioritising the U.S. At the recent 2025 summit of the CELAC, President Lula da Silva called for a united regional stance against President Trump’s economic measures.^[xvi] However, the deepening internal divisions within Latin America continue to undermine efforts toward greater unity.

President Noboa’s aggressive domestic measures have also damaged Ecuador's bilateral relations in Latin America, particularly with Mexico. In 2024, heavily armed Ecuadorian police invaded the Mexican embassy in Quito to arrest Jorge Glas, Ecuador's former leftist vice president, who was wanted on corruption charges.[xvii] Ecuador claimed that Mexico's granting of asylum to Glas was unlawful under international law, which forbids granting asylum to those wanted for criminal prosecution. In response, Mexico suspended diplomatic relations with Ecuador, leading to a significant deterioration in bilateral ties.

Ecuador’s bilateral relationships within Latin America have also been significantly affected by President Noboa’s ‘security-first agenda’, which includes a militarised offensive against drug cartels, tighter port controls, and increased coordination with international partners. While countries like Colombia and Peru share Ecuador’s concerns over transnational organised crime, they remain cautious about the potential spillover effects of Noboa’s internal crackdown.[xviii] There is growing unease over the possibility of displaced criminal groups escalating violence along their borders.

President Noboa’s increasing reliance on external actors, particularly the United States and private security consultants, has further complicated Ecuador’s position among Latin America’s more progressive or sovereignty-sensitive governments. Countries such as Mexico, Brazil, and Chile have expressed scepticism toward what they view as foreign-influenced security strategies.[xix] This divergence in approach has weakened ideological cohesion in the region and made sustained dialogue on shared security issues more difficult.

Nonetheless, President Noboa’s aggressive stance against drug trafficking has also opened the door to some pragmatic cooperation across political divides. His administration has sought security partnerships not only with ideologically aligned governments, but also with countries traditionally more distant, including Argentina and Uruguay.[xx] These developments suggest that shared threats like narco-trafficking can, under the right conditions, transcend political differences and can lead to issue-based collaboration. As Ecuador strengthens its ties with the U.S. on matters of security and trade, the region risks further fragmentation, with national governments increasingly prioritising strategic self-interest over coordinated responses to shared challenges such as migration, organised crime, and economic instability.

Implications for U.S.-Ecuador Relations

During his previous term, President Noboa maintained close ties with President Trump. In March 2025, Ecuadorian officials expressed interest in hosting a U.S. military base, signalling a deeper strategic alignment with Washington.^[xxi] Shortly thereafter, President Noboa announced a "strategic alliance" with Erik Prince, founder of the controversial private military company Blackwater and a prominent supporter of President Trump, to combat crime and narcoterrorism in Ecuador. These moves further anchored President Noboa’s image as a pro-U.S. leader with a hardline security agenda.^[xxii]

In contrast, his rival Luisa González had indicated a pivot away from U.S. and U.S.-aligned countries. She notably stated she would not recognise Edmundo González’s electoral victory in Venezuela over President Nicolás Maduro and backed her party’s support for removing the U.S. dollar as Ecuador’s official currency.

As President Noboa enters his second term, his willingness to align Ecuador’s security framework with Washington’s priorities is evident. His “iron fist” approach to crime closely mirrors U.S. concerns about border security and transnational drug trafficking. At the same time, President Noboa’s re-election has been positively received by international markets. Despite Ecuador’s country risk reaching a 15-month high of 1,900 points in the lead-up to the election, sovereign bond prices surged after his victory, reflecting renewed investor confidence. ^[xxiii]The outcome suggests that President Noboa was able to consolidate support from a broad voter base in the runoff, even though his party holds just 66 seats in the National Assembly, one fewer than the opposition Citizen Revolution party. This opens a potential path for bipartisan cooperation on key legislation, especially related to security and economic reform. For the U.S., this represents an opportunity to expand strategic cooperation with Ecuador across political, economic, and military dimensions.

Conclusion

The 2025 Ecuadorian election represents a turning point in the country’s political trajectory. President Noboa’s victory illustrates how security concerns can dominate democratic decision-making, often at the expense of civil liberties and institutional checks. While his leadership offers the promise of stability and international cooperation, particularly with the U.S., it also illustrates the fragile state of regional unity and the growing trend toward bilateralism over multilateral engagement. As Ecuador navigates a complex landscape of security threats, economic vulnerabilities, and political polarisation, the long-term consequences of President Noboa’s presidency will depend not only on the effectiveness of his domestic policies but also on his ability to balance strategic partnerships and regional solidarity.

***** 

*Aditi Mishra, Research Intern, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal. 

Endnotes

^[i] UNICEF USA. “Ecuador: Homicide Rate Among Children and Adolescents Soars 640 Percent in Four Years.” Press release, January 12, 2024. UNICEF USA. Accessed July 10, 2025. https://www.unicefusa.org/press/ecuador‑homicide‑rate‑among‑children‑and‑adolescents‑soars‑640‑percent‑four‑years‑unicef

^[ii]Dubé, Ryan. “Ecuador Re‑Elects Leader Fighting War on Gangs Smuggling Cocaine to U.S.” The Wall Street Journal, April 14, 2025. Accessed July 10, 2025 https://www.wsj.com/world/americas/ecuador-re-elects-leader-fighting-war-on-gangs-smuggling-cocaine-to-u-s-21e7dc0a&utm

^[iii] Al Jazeera. “Ecuador’s Narco-Gang Violence: A Timeline of the Recent Crisis.” Al Jazeera, January 10, 2024. Accessed July 10, 2025. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/10/ecuadors-narco-gang-violence-a-timeline-of-the-recent-crisis

^[iv] Hernandez, Michael. “Trump Congratulates Ecuador’s Right‑Wing President Noboa on Re‑Election.” Anadolu Agency, April 14, 2025. Accessed July 10, 2025. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/trump-congratulates-ecuadors-right-wing-president-noboa-on-re-election/3538075

^[v] Valencia, Alexandra. “Ecuador Cuts Power in Half of Its Provinces Amid Historic Drought.” Reuters, September 22, 2024. Accessed July 10, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/ecuador-cuts-power-half-its-provinces-amid-historic-drought-2024-09-22/

^[vi] Central Bank of Ecuador. “The Ecuadorian Economy Reported a 1.5 Percent Contraction in the Third Quarter of 2024.” Press release, October 2024. Accessed July 10, 2025. https://www.bce.fin.ec/en/the-ecuadorian-economy-reported-a-1-5-contraction-in-the-third-quarter-of-2024/

^[vii] International Monetary Fund. “IMF Reaches Staff‑Level Agreement on the Second Review under Ecuador’s Extended Fund Facility Arrangement.” Press release, June 11, 2025. Accessed July 10, 2025. https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/11/pr-25194-ecuador-imf-reaches-agree-2nd-review-ext-fund-facil-arrange

^[viii] CuencaHighLife. “EU and OAS Observers Report No Signs of Election Fraud in Sunday’s Presidential Runoff.” CuencaHighLife, April 16, 2025. Accessed July 10, 2025. https://cuencahighlife.com/eu-and-oas-observers-report-no-signs-of-election-fraud-in-sundays-presidential-runoff/

^[ix] Agência Brasil. “Lula Congratulates Ecuador’s Re‑Elected President.” Agência Brasil, April 2025. Accessed July 10, 2025. https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/en/politica/noticia/2025-04/lula-congratulates-ecuadors-re-elected-president

^[x] “Presidente Boric felicita a Daniel Noboa por su triunfo en elecciones presidenciales de Ecuador.” La Tercera, April 14, 2025. Accessed July 10, 2025. https://www.latercera.com/politica/noticia/presidente-boric-felicita-a-daniel-noboa-por-su-triunfo-en-elecciones-presidenciales-de-ecuador/ (translated with Google Translate)

^[xi] MercoPress. “Orsi Reviews Fraud Allegations and Congratulates Noboa on His Win.” MercoPress, April 15, 2025. Accessed July 10, 2025. https://en.mercopress.com/2025/04/15/orsi-reviews-fraud-allegations-and-congratulates-noboa-on-his-win (translated with Google Translate)

^[xii] "Ecuador: Petro says Colombian election observers have been detained and offers asylum to alleged 'blacklist of opponents'." ContentEngine Noticias Financieras [English], April 16, 2025. Gale OneFile: Informe Académico (accessed July 10, 2025). https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A836495879/IFME?u=anon~d07e53e4&sid=sitemap&xid=9b4bc817.

^[xiii] Valencia, Alexandra. “Mexico’s Sheinbaum Says Country Will Not Renew Diplomatic Relations with Ecuador.” Reuters, April 16, 2025. Accessed July 10, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/mexicos-sheinbaum-says-country-will-not-renew-diplomatic-relations-with-ecuador-2025-04-16/

^[xiv] MercoPress. “Maduro Says Ecuadorean Elections ‘a Horrendous Fraud.’” MercoPress, April 15, 2025. Accessed July 10, 2025. https://en.mercopress.com/2025/04/15/maduro-says-ecuadorean-elections-a-horrendous-fraud

^[xv] EFE. “Daniel Ortega y Rosario Murillo acusan a Daniel Noboa de dirigir una ‘dictadura servil.’” El Universo, April 17, 2025. Accessed July 10, 2025. https://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/internacional/daniel-ortega-y-rosario-murillo-acusan-a-daniel-noboa-de-dirigir-una-dictadura-servil-nota/ (translated with Google Translate)

^[xvi] “Lula: ‘Latin America and the Caribbean Must Redefine Their Place in the New Global Order.’” Lula: “Latin America and the Caribbean must redefine their place in the new global order.” - Planalto. Accessed June 1, 2025. https://www.gov.br/planalto%29%3A/en/latest-

news/2025/04/lula-latin-america-and-the-caribbean-must-redefine-their-place-in-the-new Global-order.

[xvii] Reuters. "Why Did Ecuador Raid Mexico’s Quito Embassy?" Reuters, April 6, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/why-did-ecuador-raid-mexicos-quito-embassy-2024-04-06/.

[xviii] VOA News. "Andean Ministers to Discuss Cross-Border Crime as Ecuador Reels." Voice of America, January 24, 2024.
https://www.voanews.com/a/andean-ministers-to-discuss-cross-border-crime-as-ecuador-reels/7441638.html

[xix] Financial Times. "Trump Allies, Security Firms at Center of Noboa’s Ecuador Strategy." Financial Times, March 15, 2025. https://www.ft.com/content/42e2138f-ab1d-4d0e-bfe1-39f7af006a90

[xx] Reuters. "Ecuador’s Noboa Strengthens Security Ties with Argentina and Uruguay Amid Regional Concerns." Reuters, May 3, 2024.
https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/ecuadors-noboa-strengthens-security-ties-argentina-uruguay-2024-05-03/

^[xxi] Valencia, Alexandra. “Ecuador Pitches U.S. Military Base and Free Trade Deal to Trump Allies, Sources Say.” Reuters, March 15, 2025. Accessed July 10, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/ecuador-pitches-us-military-base-free-trade-deal-trump-allies-sources-say-2025-03-15/

^[xxii] Valencia, Alexandra. “Blackwater Founder to Help Ecuador ‘Do What It Takes’ on Gangs, Minister Says.” Reuters, March 14, 2025. Accessed July 10, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/blackwater-founder-help-ecuador-do-what-it-takes-gangs-minister-says-2025-03-14/

^[xxiii] Ibid