Indian Council of World Affairs

Abstract: Since taking over the Presidency of Ukraine in 2019, Zelenskyy has been accused of consolidating his power at the cost of Ukraine’s reform trajectory. His recent but failed move to control two anti-corruption bodies has only confirmed to these allegations.

While the fierce determination of Ukraine against the continued Russian onslaught on the battlefield has been widely praised in the West, the domestic political calculus driven by Zelenskyy’s power consolidation attempts have made his Western counterparts uncomfortable. Many in Ukraine and outside believe that with each step directed towards his power grab, Zelenskyy is threatening the hard-earned reforms that made Ukraine qualify for the EU candidate status in June 2022.

The latest trigger for this has come from Zelenskyy’s decision to curtail the independence of two anti-corruption bodies — the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO). While the NABU is tasked with investigating corruption cases inside the government, the SAPO oversees the NABU-led criminal investigation against the accused persons.[i] On 22 July, President Zelenskyy signed a law effectively ending the independence of the two bodies by putting them under the control of the office of the prosecutor general, Zelenskyy’s appointee.[ii]

Dubbed Law No. 12414, the law granted the prosecutor general’s office the power to issue orders to the two anti-corruption agencies and reassign anti-corruption cases to its own office, a move Zelenskyy said was targeted towards eliminating the Russian influence in the bodies.[iii] Before the law came into existence, the Ukrainian security officials raided and conducted more than 70 searches, arresting two NABU officials for collaborating with Russia, an allegation the NABU denied.[iv]

Zelenskyy’s Russian rhetoric, however, was not sufficient to justify his move, as thousands of Ukrainians gathered in key cities like Lviv, Dnipro and Odessa, including Kyiv, defying martial law and demanding a rollback of the new law. This was the first anti-government protest after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and, thus, attracted the world’s attention to the domestic political situation in the country, which had often been neglected due to the ongoing war in Ukraine. Many European officials, including Ursula von der Leyen, expressed concerns about the law and had cautioned Zelenskyy against pursuing the law. The EU, in a statement, called the law “a serious step back,”[v] while Germany proclaimed the law as hampering Ukraine’s way towards the EU.[vi]

Although Zelenskyy caved in[vii] to the domestic and EU pressure and restored the independent status of the two bodies through a new parliamentary legislation, it was not the first time that he had come under criticism for his authoritarian tendencies. The case of the two anti-corruption bodies was special because they were established in 2015, after the successful EuroMaidan protests, at the behest of Ukraine’s western allies as a precondition for their financial support to the new government in Kyiv. These two institutions were to act as the guardians against the prevailing corruption in the Ukrainian governmental institutions and were, thus, crucial to the broader reform agenda, which was deemed essential for Ukraine’s future accession to the EU.

The EU membership agenda has been a significant issue in domestic politics, like in many other post-Soviet states, and it was the driving force behind the 2014 Euromaidan protests. The trigger point for the Euromaidan protests, also sometimes referred to as the Revolution of Dignity, was the direct result of President Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to not sign the long-awaited Association Agreement with the European Union.[viii] As the protests intensified and took a broader dimension, the Kremlin-supported President fled the country, and with the collapse of his regime began a new era in Ukrainian history where Kyiv took a definitive pro-EU and pro-West political and economic orientation, leading to EU-supported reforms.[ix]

Post 2014, Ukraine, per the European Union, made progress on reforming its overall judicial system, weakening oligarchy, tackling money laundering, and protecting the rights of the national minorities while aligning itself with the EU’s broader set of common rights and obligations.[x] These reforms were the result of popular support from the Ukrainian population, which has consistently risen since 2013, and by 2023 the support for joining the EU had almost reached 100 per cent, as shown in the graph[xi] below.

The election of Zelenskyy to the Presidential office only fast-tracked Ukraine’s prospects to join the EU, as his campaign was based on carrying out reforms and especially tackling the deep-rooted corruption in the country. As a matter of fact, “victory over corruption” as promised by Zelenskyy was meant to be the most significant issue for the people after ending the war in the east.[xii]

Thus, when Zelenskyy decided to take control of the abovementioned anti-corruption bodies, it was seen as a direct attack on the country’s EU path, as Ukraine’s anti-corruption arrangement was designed in a way to suit the EU and IMF conditions.[xiii] The timing of the legislation further contradicted Zelenskyy’s justification. The hasty implementation of the law, including its passage in the parliament and signature of the President, came at a time when the NABU and SAPO were investigating cases against close associates, including the Deputy PM of Zelenskyy.[xiv]

Although the protests forced Zelenskyy to backtrack on the controversial legislation, this was not an isolated event. Under the garb of the extraordinary situations arising out of the war, Zelenskyy has made many decisions, which have not gone well. His decision to ban 11 political parties, including Platform for Life, the largest opposition party, within a month of the Russian invasion raised eyebrows. These parties were banned for their alleged link with Russia. However, experts believe that a pro-Russia tag remains ill-defined, and post-2022 sentiments have often overstretched the term even to classify parties who want, for example, a neutral Ukraine as pro-Russian.[xv] The decision to ban these parties was a continuation of the efforts to silence the broader opposition leaders and media without any convincing evidence against them.

The fate of the opposition parties was also shared by the TV platforms in Ukraine when Zelenskyy signed legislation to extend executive control of the news media in December 2022.[xvi] The legislation was already in the making since 2019, when Zelenskyy came to power, and was the culmination of his efforts to build pressure against the media houses critical of him. Zelenskyy began by censoring pro-Kremlin media outlets, such as NewsOne, Channel 112 and ZIK, which aired views of Viktor Medvedchuk, who was the opposition leader and was considered closer to Putin.

Eventually, the pressure began to be felt on the media outlets considered free, such as the Kyiv Post. The outlet had shared articles criticising Iryna Venediktova, the Prosecutor General appointed by Zelenskyy.[xvii] This was not a single incident of expanding censorship, as many media outlets and journalists, including publication owners, reported threats of criminal prosecution. In a more recent report by Reporters Without Borders (RSF), cases of surveillance attempts, threats, political interference and obstacles against many outlets have also been highlighted.[xviii]

The protests and the criticism against the decision to curtail the independence of the two anti-corruption bodies were thus not spontaneous. The EU’s decision to withhold the 1.5 billion euros from an overall fund of 4.5 billion euros hints at the damage Zelenskyy’s decision has done to the EU-Ukraine relations.[xix] . Ukraine is in dire need of foreign assistance, given it cannot survive on its own, especially when Russia’s attacks have intensified unprecedentedly in recent months. With Trump’s erratic foreign policy approach, the EU is the only major power with the intention, as well as the capability, to keep Ukraine’s hope alive.

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*Aman Kumar, Research Associate, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal. 

Endnotes

[i] Zoya Sheftalovich. “Zelenskyy’s Anti-Corruption Credentials in Doubt as He Sides with Prosecutors.” Politico Europe. July 23, 2025 https://www.politico.eu/article/zelenskyy-ukraine-anti-corruption-kyiv-war-russia-nabu-sap/ (Accessed July 28, 2025).

[ii] Ian Lovett and Nikita Nikolaienko. Protests breakout as Ukraine defangs anti-corruption agency”, Wall Street Journal, July 22, 2025. https://archive.is/20250723095547/https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/ukraine-moves-to-defang-u-s-backed-anticorruption-agency-fbe7efe4 (Accessed July 23, 2025).

[iii] Jamie Dettmer. “Ukraine’s insidious enemy: its own leadership.” Politico Europe. July 24, 2025 https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-corruption-protests-war-volodymyr-zelenskyy/ (Accessed July 28, 2025).

[iv] Serge Duchene. “Ukraine’s Security Service Arrests Anti-Corruption Agents over Alleged Kremlin Ties.” Euronews, July 22, 2025. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/07/22/ukraines-security-service-arrests-anti-corruption-agents-over-alleged-kremlin-ties (Accessed July 24, 2024).

[v]RFL. “Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies say Zelenskyy’s new draft bill restores their independence” RadioFreeeEurope, July 24, 2025 https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-corruption-nabu-european-union-protests/33483051.html (Accessed July 28, 2025).

[vi] Ibid.

[vii] Yurii Statiuk. “Zelenskyy U-turn on anti-corruption agencies power grab after public outcry”, Politico Europe, July 24, 2025, https://www.politico.eu/article/volodymyr-zelenskyy-backtrack-anti-corruption-agency-bill-power-grab-public-outcry/ (Accessed July 28, 2025).

[viii]Alisa Sobolieva. “Ukraine’s EuroMaidan Revolution: What Changed?” The Kyiv Independent. August 24, 2022. https://kyivindependent.com/euro-maidan-revolution/ (Accessed July 28, 2025.

[ix] Marek Dabrowski. “Six years after Ukraine’s Euromaidan;reforms and challenges ahead”, Bruegel, June 2020, https://www.bruegel.org/system/files/wp_attachments/PC-14-2020-final.pdf (Accessed July 25, 2025)

[x]European Commission. “Ukraine’s Path Towards EU Accession.” https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-solidarity-ukraine/ukraines-path-towards-eu-accession_en (Accessed July 28, 2025).

[xi] Cited from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Ukrainians’ Unwavering Path toward the EU.” https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/06/ukrainians-unwavering-path-toward-the-eu?lang=en.

[xii]Christopher Miller. “Zelenskiy’s First Year: He Promised Sweeping Changes. How’s He Doing?” RFE/RL, April 25, 2020) https://www.rferl.org/a/zelenskiys-first-year-he-promised-sweeping-changes-how-s-he-doing-/30576329.html (Accessed July 28, 2025).

[xiii] Stuart Dowell. “Ukraine’s EU path falters after Zelenskyy neuters anti-corruption institution” TVP World, July 24, 2025, https://tvpworld.com/87997034/ukraines-eu-dream-stalls-as-zelenskyy-curbs-anti-graft-bodies-and-fuels-unrest-at-home (Accessed July 28, 2025).

[xiv] Oleg Sukhov. “Zelesnkyy dismantles Ukraine’s anti-corruption infrastructure, brings law enforcement agenscies under his thumb”,Kyiv Independent, July 23, 2025, https://kyivindependent.com/potential-elimination-of-ukraines-anti-graft-infrastructure-signals-slide-into-authoritarianism-may-block-eu-integration/ (Accessed July 28, 2025).

[xv]Volodymyr Ischenko, “Why Did Ukraine Suspend 11 Pro-Russia Parties?” Al Jazeera, March 21, 2022. https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/3/21/why-did-ukraine-suspend-11-pro-russia-parties (Accessed July 28, 2025).

[xvi]Anushka Patil. “Critics say a new media law signed by Zelensky could restrict press freedom in Ukraine”, The New York Times, December 30, 2022 Zelensky Signs Controversial News Media Regulation - The New York Times (nytimes.com) (Accessed July 28, 2025).

[xvii]Igor Kossov. “How Zelensky’s administration moves to dismantle press freedom in Ukraine”, The Kiev Independent,January 12, 2022, https://kyivindependent.com/how-zelensky-administration-moves-to-dismantle-press-freedom-in-ukraine/ (Accessed July 28, 2025).

[xviii] Reporters Without Borders. “Shrinking Press Freedom in Ukraine: Urgent Need to Implement Roadmap for Right to Information.” RSF, https://rsf.org/en/shrinking-press-freedom-ukraine-urgent-need-implement-roadmap-right-information (Accessed July 28, 2025).

[xix] Andrew E. Kramer. “EU cuts aid to Ukraine over corruption concerns” New York Times, July 26, 2025, https://archive.is/20250726201410/https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/26/world/europe/eu-ukraine-corruption-aid.html (Accessed July 28, 2025).