Indian Council of World Affairs

Four years since the Taliban’s return on 15 August 2021, Afghanistan reflects a landscape of both advances and setbacks. The regime has consolidated control across the country, strengthened fiscal management, curtailed opium cultivation, and delivered an improved security environment, while sustaining pragmatic relations with regional neighbours. At the same time, its refusal to embrace inclusivity and persistent curbs on women’s rights have deepened humanitarian distress. Though international engagement has grown, contradictions continue to define governance. This ICWA Special Report highlights that the realities of Taliban rule cannot be captured in binary terms as they unfold in complex shades of grey.

Introduction

“These (Islamic rule) are great divine blessings that our people should not forget… if, against God’s will, we fail to express gratitude for blessings and are ungrateful for them, we will be subjected to the severe punishment of Allah Almighty.”

– Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada, 15 August 2025[i]

The Taliban leader, Haibatullah Akhundzada, made the above statement in a social media post commemorating “Victory Day” on 15 August 2025. The occasion marked four years since the chaotic US and NATO withdrawal, when the Taliban seized Kabul after more than two decades of war. In that statement, he described the Taliban’s return to power on 15 August 2021 as Afghanistan’s “liberation from American occupation and its allies” and claimed the country now enjoys nationwide security and has been freed from “corruption, oppression, land usurpations, narcotics, theft, looting and plunder” under Sharia law.[ii] He also instructed government ministers to drop the term “acting” from their titles, underscoring the consolidation of his administration’s authority in the absence of significant internal opposition.[iii] Akhundzada, the reclusive Taliban leader who communicates only through written and audio statements or decrees from his base in Kandahar, also praised what he called the “sacred Sharia system” established since the end of the war.[iv]

While the Taliban commemorate 15 August as “Victory Day” and many Afghans remember it as a “Dark Day,” these contrasting narratives capture the enduring fault lines within Afghan society and politics. They encapsulate, on the one hand, the regime’s self-proclaimed success in reclaiming power and, on the other, the population’s sense of repression, exclusion, and loss. Yet, the past four years under Taliban rule cannot be understood solely through the lens of loss and regression. Alongside severe restrictions and alienation, there have also been areas where relative stability, improved security situation, or pragmatic policy shifts (especially while dealing with the outside world) have emerged. The experience of Taliban 2.0, therefore, emerges as a complex and uneven reality; defined simultaneously by consolidation of authority and deepening alienation, but also by incremental gains in certain domains. The following sections seeks to examine this complex trajectory, moving beyond a one-dimensional portrayal of Afghanistan’s post-2021 reality.

Reflecting on Four Years of Taliban Rule

On 15 August 2021, Afghan Republic collapsed, and by the end of that month, the final US and NATO troops withdrew from the country. In the aftermath, the Taliban declared the restoration of the “Islamic Emirate”, abrogated the 2004 Constitution, and instituted a governance model anchored in their ideological framework under the authority of Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada. At the time, early assurances of general amnesty, access to girls’ education, and inclusive governance generated cautious expectations of a more pragmatic Taliban 2.0. Four years later, the record reflects a more complex trajectory. While many of these promises remain unfulfilled and the regime continues to draw criticism for its rigid social policies and exclusionary practices, the period has also witnessed the consolidation of central authority, a degree of security and administrative stability, and selective instances of pragmatic adaptation. The subsequent sections analyse changes in domestic, regional, and global contexts during this period and highlight key political developments in a timeline.

Internal Dynamics

The Taliban have solidified control under Hibatullah Akhundzada, with minimal factional disruptions threatening unity. The interim administration, announced in September 2021, excluded women, minorities and non-Taliban figures and was largely dominated by Pashtun men.[v] Ministries were restructured, dissolving the Ministry of Women’s Affairs and reviving the Ministry of Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice as a “morality police”.[vi] Inter-ethnic tensions persist, with minorities like Hazaras facing marginalisation, forced evictions and targeted attacks. At the same time, the consolidation of authority has meant that, for the first time in over four decades of conflict, the entire country is under the control of a single authority. This has brought an end to large-scale civil war, with many Afghans acknowledging the decline in day-to-day violence[vii], targeted killings, and conflict-related deaths. Improved security has enabled people to travel more freely across provinces without facing the checkpoints, extortion, and militia violence that were common during the Republic. Security has improved significantly, as compared to the Republic’s final years, with reduced large-scale fighting. Yet it was also observed in the past four years that, Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP) has expanded operations, conducting attacks on Taliban officials, Shia communities and civilians, including bombings in Kabul and provinces. Anti-Taliban groups like the National Resistance Front and Afghanistan Freedom Front have launched sporadic attacks but pose no territorial threat, per UNAMA's June 2024 assessment[viii], a trend continuing into 2025. Transnational jihadist groups remain concentrated in Afghanistan, raising regional stability concerns, yet the Taliban show reluctance to act decisively against former allies.

Human rights have shown no improvement. Women and girls endure severe curbs: girls' education beyond sixth grade remains banned, and women are barred from most public life, including universities and many jobs. In 2024, the Taliban intensified these measures with a new morality law enforcing strict dress codes and public behaviour, resulting in UN condemnation.[ix]

Over the past four years, the Taliban has grappled with stabilising Afghanistan’s fragile economy, which continues to rely heavily on humanitarian aid, which is contributing in ameliorating food insecurity. Following the collapse of the US-backed government in 2021, international sanctions, the freezing of Afghanistan’s foreign reserves and the suspension of development aid precipitated a severe economic contraction. Nonetheless, some Afghans and international observers note relative improvements in internal fiscal management.[x] The Taliban’s emphasis on tax collection and curbing predatory practices has reduced the perception of corruption compared to the Republic era.[xi] Customs duties, natural resource exports, particularly coal sales to Pakistan and improved taxation have provided a functioning revenue system, reducing to some extent the regime’s reliance on external aid.[xii]  This fiscal discipline, coupled with the absence of competing power centres, has also been associated with more predictable administrative control and a measure of political stability.[xiii]  However, the absence of international recognition, exclusion from global financial systems and restrictions on banking have stifled investment and trade.Additionally, the April 2022 opium ban reduced poppy cultivation by over 85%, which has deepened rural poverty[xiv], with farmers protesting in Badakhshan in July 2025[xv], and being met with lethal force. At the same time, this unprecedented decline in opium production has been acknowledged internationally as one of the most significant drug-control achievements in recent Afghan history, curbing a trade long linked to conflict financing and regional instability.[xvi] Parallelly, synthetic drug trafficking, especially methamphetamine[xvii], surged twelvefold, per UNODC reports.[xviii] Taken together, these developments underscore the paradox of the Taliban’s counter-narcotics policy-delivering notable success in curbing opium while simultaneously generating new economic hardships and fuelling the rise of synthetic alternatives.

Regional Equation

Afghanistan’s neighbours have adopted a pragmatic stance toward the Taliban, treating their rule as a political reality while avoiding formal recognition. Diplomatic and economic ties have gradually expanded, reflecting a desire to secure national interests rather than endorse the Taliban’s legitimacy. Relations with neighbouring Pakistan remain fraught. Persistent disputes over the Durand Line, the Taliban’s reluctance to act decisively against Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) sanctuaries and Islamabad’s forced expulsion of Afghan refugees have all deepened tensions. Pakistan’s airstrikes in 2024 -2025 on Afghan provinces, such as Khost and Paktika, targeting TTP militants and the Taliban’s retaliatory attacks in Pakistan[xix], further strained relations, drawing condemnation from Kabul.[xx] The deportation of over a million Afghans, many of whom had lived in Pakistan for decades, added a humanitarian dimension to the diplomatic rift.[xxi] Efforts at rapprochement, such as the May 2025 trilateral talks with China, have been cautious, as Pakistan remains wary of the Taliban’s growing engagement with India.[xxii]

Iran, which initially welcomed the US withdrawal in 2021 as a strategic gain, has faced mounting challenges in its dealings with the Taliban. Chief among them are large-scale refugee influxes, the intensifying dispute over Helmand River water allocations and the growing threat of ISKP attacks. By July 2025, Iran had deported over 1.36 million Afghans, with expulsions peaking at 29,155 in a single day, often accompanied by reports of mistreatment and abuses.[xxiii] These expulsions not only aggravated bilateral relations but also reflected Iran’s domestic economic pressures and security concerns. Yet, despite recurring flashpoints over water rights and refugee flows, both Tehran and Kabul have shown pragmatism in managing their ties, preventing disputes from escalating into prolonged confrontation. During the Iran-Israel conflict of 2025, the Taliban notably aligned their rhetoric with Tehran’s position, strongly condemning Israeli actions[xxiv] while simultaneously avoiding direct entanglement, a stance that underscored their balancing act between ideological solidarity and pragmatic statecraft. This cautious approach illustrates how both sides, despite deep grievances, have sought to preserve channels of dialogue and maintain a functional relationship.

Central Asian states, meanwhile, have prioritised economic pragmatism, pursuing connectivity projects such as the July 2025 railway agreement linking Pakistan and Uzbekistan through Afghanistan.[xxv] Despite disagreements over the Qosh Tepa Canal project, the Taliban have managed to maintain stable and cooperative relations with Uzbekistan, which has emerged as one of their strongest regional partners. Regular dialogues on trade, electricity, and transit underscore the Taliban’s prioritisation of ties with Tashkent, which remains committed to engaging Kabul pragmatically. Similarly, while Tajikistan has historically taken a harder line, the Taliban have sought channels of engagement, including security assurances and limited economic cooperation, reflecting a cautious but deliberate effort to prevent confrontation. Taken together, relations with Central Asian neighbours have been notably stable compared to the volatility on Afghanistan’s southern and western borders, suggesting that the Taliban have exercised a measure of prudence in managing these partnerships.

China has concentrated its engagement on counterterrorism assurances and economic opportunities, particularly infrastructure and mining.  It has refrained from formal recognition, but has kept its embassy in Kabul fully functional, signalling pragmatic acceptance of Taliban authority. Both sides have also accepted each other’s ambassadors, a step that underscores the political weight Beijing attaches to maintaining stable channels of communication. At the same time, China’s approach remains cautious, with investments tied to security guarantees and concerns over spillover of militancy into Xinjiang.

India has pursued a cautious approach, focusing on humanitarian assistance, educational scholarships, and calls for an inclusive government, while keeping its diplomatic engagement at a limited level. During the 2025 India-Pakistan confrontation, the Taliban regime maintained neutrality, pointedly denying Pakistani claims that India had attacked Afghan territory, signalling its unwillingness to be drawn into bilateral hostilities. In this context, the recent interaction between the Indian External Affairs Minister and the Taliban’s Acting Foreign Minister signalled a tentative but notable step in their evolving engagement.[xxvi]  In contrast, Russia’s recognition of the Taliban in July 2025[xxvii] - making it the first country to grant formal legitimacy - marked a significant development in regional politics. Moscow’s decision may encourage other states, such as China or Kyrgyzstan, to consider similar steps, thereby strengthening the Taliban’s claims to authority.

Overall, while serious concerns remain about the Taliban’s harbouring of groups that threaten regional stability, their broader diplomatic conduct has demonstrated a pragmatic emphasis on cultivating neighbourly relations, reducing the risk of isolation, and embedding Afghanistan within regional connectivity frameworks. However, most of Afghanistan’s neighbours have so far chosen a pragmatic middle path, maintaining embassies and practical cooperation in Kabul without extending official recognition.

The timeline above was assembled by the author based on her research.

International Engagements

Since reclaiming power, the Taliban have prioritised their foreign policy and global engagement, emphasising what they call “economic diplomacy” and asserting that they pursue a “balanced, economy-focused foreign policy”.[xxviii] The international community, on the other hand, has attempted to pressure the Taliban into moderating its policies through reduced aid and stringent sanctions, but these efforts have not altered the group’s perspective. By and large, engagement with the Taliban at the international level remains tentative and fragmented, marked by an emphasis on humanitarian relief and counterterrorism rather than political endorsement. The United States and European powers have deliberately restricted their involvement, focusing on aid delivery and an “over-the-horizon” monitoring strategy that avoids direct entanglement.

Meanwhile, the Taliban regime has forged effective working relationships with many neighbouring countries and beyond. Although a significant gap persists between the level of engagement from regional nations and Western countries, there is a growing, albeit reluctant, acknowledgement of the need to interact with the Taliban in some capacity. According to Aaron Zelin, a researcher at the Washington Institute, who has systematically tracked the Taliban’s international engagements,, who tracked interactions between the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” and other nations from August 2021 to 22 February 2024, the Taliban administration held approximately 1,382 meetings with representatives from about 80 countries, with many of these engagements publicised on their social media platforms.[xxix] Despite this distancing, Kabul hosts more foreign diplomatic missions today than it did during the Taliban’s first regime in the 1990s, with Pakistan, China, Russia, Iran and several Central Asian states either reopening or maintaining embassies.

In parallel, the Taliban have actively pursued diplomatic channels to advocate for Afghanistan’s economic sovereignty. A major point of contention has been the nearly $7 billion of Afghan foreign reserves frozen in the United States. While Washington has not released these funds, both Russia and China have consistently spoken in favour of their return to Kabul, framing it as a humanitarian and sovereignty issue. Interestingly, even as the US held back assets, according to SIGAR Report 2024, throughout 2022–23, Washington facilitated shipments of millions of dollars in cash - under UN oversight- into Afghanistan to stabilise liquidity and keep the banking system afloat.[xxx] This paradox reflects the complexity of Western engagement: financial containment on one hand, and crisis mitigation on the other. The United Nations’ November 2023 independent assessment, led by Feridun Sinirlioğlu, former UN Permanent Representative of Türkiye, criticised the incoherence of international approaches and recommended appointing a Special Envoy to streamline engagement.[xxxi] This proposal, however, was resisted by the Taliban, Russia and China, resulting in a deadlock within the UN Security Council.

The regime’s most significant diplomatic breakthrough came in June - July 2024, when Taliban representatives were invited to participate in the third UN-sponsored Afghanistan conference in Doha.[xxxii] Although the exclusion of Afghan civil society, particularly women, drew criticism, the Taliban’s inclusion marked a clear departure from their complete isolation in the 1990s and provided them with a platform to press their economic demands. Their biggest symbolic victory followed in July 2025, when Russia extended formal recognition, becoming the first state to do so and potentially paving the way for other powers to reconsider their approach.[xxxiii]

Multilateral processes pertaining to Afghanistan have also faltered by mid-2025, no further Doha rounds had been convened, and the principle of non-recognition largely remained intact. Meanwhile, accountability efforts gained significant momentum: in January 2025, the International Criminal Court (ICC) Chief Prosecutor Karim A. A. Khan formally requested arrest warrants for two senior Taliban figures - Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada and Chief Justice Abdul Hakim Haqqani - accusing them of crimes against humanity, specifically the systematic persecution of women, girls, and gender-nonconforming individuals.[xxxiv] Following due process, Pre-Trial Chamber II issued the actual arrest warrants on 8 July 2025.[xxxv] The Taliban dismissed the warrants outright, with their spokesman characterizing them as baseless and hostile to Islamic values.[xxxvi] Nevertheless, the ICC’s move sent a clear message: the international legal community is watching, and the uneasy power dynamics between the Taliban and the West are becoming increasingly fraught. Yet, viewed comparatively, the level of interaction between the Taliban and the international community is far higher today than during their first stint in power. Dozens of countries now engage with Taliban 2.0 through diplomatic channels, development projects, and regional initiatives, suggesting that while recognition remains limited, political and economic engagement has become an established reality.

Conclusion

Four years into Taliban rule, Afghanistan presents a reality that is rather complex in an evolving landscape. On the one hand, the erosion of women’s rights, systematic curbs on freedoms, and continuing humanitarian crises highlight the costs borne by ordinary Afghans. On the other, the end of large-scale war, improved security, relative fiscal discipline, and the establishment of a single governing authority across the country represent notable shifts from the instability of the previous era. In essence, the Taliban in their second avatar have made some positive, though faltering, strides on the political and economic fronts, but remain woefully wanting on the social side, with no credible signs of moderation.

Regionally, the Taliban have pursued pragmatic engagement with neighbours, maintaining stable ties with Central Asian states, carefully managing relations with Iran despite disputes, and navigating fraught dynamics with Pakistan. Their ties with China have deepened, marked by Beijing’s growing investments in Afghan mining and infrastructure and its cautious endorsement of the regime. Their cautious but incremental relationship with India, focused on humanitarian aid and limited diplomatic exchanges, also reflects a more nuanced regional strategy than in their previous tenure. Internationally too, their outreach has yielded some success: participation in the 2024 Doha conference and Russia’s recognition in July 2025 illustrate that while broad legitimacy remains withheld, international isolation is less absolute than during their first period in power.

Taken together, these dynamics underscore that Afghanistan’s trajectory since 2021 cannot be captured in binary terms. The ground reality is deeply grey - marked by simultaneous consolidation and exclusion, incipient stability and fragility, faltering engagement alternating with isolation. For the international community, the challenge lies in responding to this layered reality; sustaining support for the Afghan people, pressing for rights and inclusivity, incentivizing good state behavior, and mitigating regional security risks, all while avoiding policies that either entrench repression or deepen abandonment.

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*Dr. Anwesha Ghosh, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA)
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

[i] “Taliban leader warns God will severely punish Afghans ungrateful for Islamic rule”.NBC News, Aug 15, 2025. Available at: https://www.nbcnews.com/world/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan-god-punishment-islamic-law-us-withdrawal-rcna225176 (Accessed on 16.8.2025).

[ii] “Taliban marks fourth anniversary of return to power with internal threats.” Al Jazeera, Aug 15, 2025. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/15/taliban-marks-fourth-anniversary-of-return-to-power-with-internal-threats (Accessed on 16.8.2025).

[iii] “Taliban Leader Removes ‘Acting’ Designation From All Government Posts.” Afghanistan International, Aug 15, 2025. Available at: fintl.com/en/202508152035 (Accessed on 16.8.2025).

[iv] Ibid.

[v] “One Year Later: Taliban Reprise Repressive Rule, but Struggle to Build a State”, USIP, August 17, 2022. Available at: https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/08/one-year-later-taliban-reprise-repressive-rule-struggle-build-state (Accessed on 16.8.2025).

[vi] Ibid.

[vii] “Taliban celebrates ‘victory day’, as Afghans face economic crisis.”Al Jazeera, Aug 15, 2022. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/15/the-taliban-mark-one-year-since-in-power

[viii] “The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security.” UNAMA, June 13, 2024. Available at: https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/sg_report_june_2024.pdf#:~:text=Participants%20took%20positive%20note%20of%20the%20report%20following%20the%20independent%20assessment&text=As%20at%2030%20April%202024%2C%20vacancy%20rates%20in%20UNAMA%20were%209%20per%20cent. (Accessed on 17.8.2025).

[ix] “Afghanistan: Condemnation for new Taliban ‘virtue and vice’ order targeting women.”United Nations, Aug 27, 2024. Available at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/08/1153631

[x] “Taliban Are Collecting Revenue — But How Are They Spending It?” USIP, Feb 2, 2022. Available at: https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/02/taliban-are-collecting-revenue-how-are-they-spending-it?

[xi] Ibid

[xii]“ World Bank: Afghan Revenue Collection, Exports Remain Strong.” VoA, Jan 26, 2023. Available at: https://www.voanews.com/a/world-bank-afghan-revenue-collection-exports-remain-strong-/6935243.html?utm

[xiii] Taliban Are Collecting Revenue — But How Are They Spending It?” USIP, Feb 2, 2022. Available at: https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/02/taliban-are-collecting-revenue-how-are-they-spending-it?

[xiv] “Smoke and mirrors: Afghanistan’s illicit drug economy after the opium ban.”Global Initiatibe against Transnationals Organized Crime, Feb 17, 2025. Available at: https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/afghanistans-illicit-drug-economy-after-the-opium-ban/.(Accessed on 17.8.2025).

[xv] “The Fourth Year of the Opium Ban: An update from two of Afghanistan’s major poppy-growing areas”.ReliefWeb, June 23, 2025. Available at: https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/fourth-year-opium-ban-update-two-afghanistans-major-poppy-growing-areas. (Accessed on 17.8.2025).

[xvi] “Afghanistan Opium Survey:2023”. UNODC, November 2023. Available at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_opium_survey_2023.pdf

[xvii] Afghanistan’s wild-growing plant ephedra is used as a natural source of ephedrine, a key precursor for methamphetamine. The drug is produced via a two-tiered process: first widely dispersed, low-skilled extraction of ephedrine; then specialized meth “cooks” convert it into crystal meth. (Source: “Afghanistan is the fastest-growing maker of methamphetamine, UN drug agency says”. AP News, Sep 10, 2023. Available at: https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-methamphetamine-production-un-drug-report-65d307ad0c0857fe93b92268106c6adf.) . Reportedly, the Bakwa district (Farah Province) in southwestern Afghanistan has become a production hub, with an estimated 300+ suspected ephedrine labs.(Source: “Afghanistan, home to the heroin trade, moves into meth”, BBC, Nov 2020. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-55048147?utm; Afghan meth has been seized across Iran, Pakistan, East Africa, Southeast Asia, Australia and the traditional heroin trafficking routes and networks are now being used to transport meth, often overlapping with old smuggling systems. (Source: “Is Afghanistan-made methamphetamine about to flood Europe?”Al Jazeera, Aug 24, 2021. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/24/in-europe-fears-of-a-flood-of-afghan-made-methamphetamine-grow?utm_source=chatgpt.com).

[xviii]“Methamphetamine trafficking in and around Afghanistan expanding rapidly as heroin trade slows” UNODC, Sep10, 2023. Available at: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/press/releases/2023/September/unodc_-methamphetamine-trafficking-in-and-around-afghanistan-expanding-rapidly-as-heroin-trade-slows.html. (Accessed on 17.8.2025).

[xix] “Afghan Taliban hit ‘several points’ in Pakistan in retaliation for attacks.”Al Jazeera, Dec 28,2024. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/12/28/afghan-taliban-hit-several-points-in-pakistan-in-retaliation-for-attacks (Accessed on 17.8.2025).

[xx] “Taliban accuse Pakistan of conducting strikes inside Afghanistan”. Voice of America, Dec 24, 2024. Available at: https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistan-resumes-senior-level-contacts-with-afghanistan-s-taliban-to-address-mutual-tensions/7912605.html. (Accessed on 17.8.2025).

[xxi] “Pakistan accelerates deportation of Afghans: UN”. Al Jazeera, April 15, 2025. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/4/15/pakistan-accelerates-deportation-of-afghans-un(Accessed on 17.8.2025).

[xxii] “Pakistan, Afghanistan move towards ‘restoring ties’ in talks with China”. Al Jazeera, May 23, 2025. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/5/23/pakistan-afghanistan-move-towards-restoring-ties-in-talks-with-china(Accessed on 17.8.2025).

[xxiii] “Iran drives out 1.5 million Afghans, with some branded spies for Israel.” Al Jazeera, Aug 1, 2025. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckglp8epg11o. (Accessed on 18.8.2025).

[xxiv] “Taliban Condemns Israeli Strikes on Iran as ‘Violation of International Law’”. Kabul Now,  June 13, 2025. Available at: https://kabulnow.com/2025/06/taliban-condemns-israeli-strikes-on-iran-as-violation-of-international-law/ (Accessed on 28.8.2025).

[xxv] “Uzbekistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan Sign Agreement on Trans-Afghan Railway”. The Asthana Times, 21 July, 2025. Available at: https://astanatimes.com/2025/07/uzbekistan-pakistan-and-afghanistan-sign-agreement-on-trans-afghan-railway/. (Accessed on 18.8.2025).

[xxvi] “In a first, External Affairs Minister Jaishankar talks to Taliban’s acting Foreign Minister Muttaqi”. The Hindu,  May 15, 2025. Available at: https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/in-a-first-external-affairs-minister-jaishankar-talks-to-talibans-acting-foreign-minister-muttaqi/article69580713.ece

[xxvii] Russia becomes first state to recognise Afghanistan's Taliban government”.BBC, July 4, 2025. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c78n4wely9do(Accessed on 18.8.2025).

[xxviii] “How The Emirate Wants to be perceived: A closer Look at the Accountability Programme”. Afghanistan Analysists Network, July 9, 2024. Available at: https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/themed-reports/political-landscape-themed-reports/how-the-emirate-wants-to-be-perceived-a-closer-look-at-the-accountability-programme/ (Accessed on 18.8.2025).

[xxix] Aaron Zelin, “Looking for Legitimacy: The Taliban’s Diplomacy Campaign”. Washington Institute. 2024.Available at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/7651 (Accessed on 18.8.2025).

[xxx] “U.S. Currency Shipments to Afghanistan: UN Shipments Stabilized the Afghan Economy but Benefit the Taliban”. SIGAR Report, Nov 2024. Available at: https://www.sigar.mil/Portals/147/Files/Reports/Audits-and-Inspections/Evaluation/SIGAR-24-32-IP.pdf

[xxxi] “Speakers Weigh Prospects for Engagement with Taliban in Afghanistan amid Ongoing Concern over Harsh Repression of Women’s Rights”.UNSC,Dec 20, 2023. Available at: https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15541.doc.htm (Accessed on 19.8.2025).

[xxxii] “Taliban agree to attend UN-hosted 3rd Doha meeting on Afghanistan .” VoA, June 26, 2024. Available at: https://www.voanews.com/a/taliban-agree-to-attend-un-hosted-3rd-doha-meeting-on-afghanistan-/7657895.html

[xxxiii] Russia becomes first state to recognise Afghanistan's Taliban government”.BBC, July 4, 2025. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c78n4wely9do(Accessed on 18.8.2025).

[xxxiv] “ICC prosecutor seeks arrest warrants for two Taliban leaders in Afghanistan.” Reuters, Jan 23, 2025. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/icc-prosecutor-seeks-arrest-warrants-against-taliban-leaders-2025-01-23/?utm (Accessed on 2.9.25)

[xxxv] “ICC issues arrest warrants for Taliban leaders for persecuting women and girls.”BBC, July 8, 2025. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c98jn0ry8jqo (Accessed on 19.8.2025)

[xxxvi] “Taliban reject court move to arrest top officials for persecuting Afghan women and girls.” AP News, July 9, 2025. Available at: https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-taliban-women-icc-89217b072c019da55dffa558b68cd430