Indian Council of World Affairs

Abstract: This paper critically examines the US-Qatar-led peace initiatives in mediating the conflict between the DRC and Rwanda, assessing whether these geo-economically driven external mediations represent a genuine shift from past failed mediation or merely reinforce cycles of conflict across the complex regional dynamics of the Great Lakes region. 

A United States-brokered peace deal was signed between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda on 27 June 2025.[i] Subsequently, a Qatar-mediated ‘Declaration of Principles’ was signed between the DRC and the March 23 (M23) rebels on 19 July 2025.[ii] However, the combat in Eastern DRC between the M23 rebels and DRC-backed local groups resumed in early August, with M23 rebels reportedly killing civilians as they advance towards South Kivu.[iii] This escalation derailed the final Qatar-mediated agreement scheduled for 18 August. Citing violations of previous agreements by the Congolese army, M23 postponed sending representatives, insisting that conditions on the ground stabilise first.[iv]

This prompts examining whether the parallel processes, the Washington Accord and the Doha agreement involving external mediation by the US and Qatar, respectively, signify a genuine shift from previous unsuccessful regional and multilateral efforts. Or do they merely obscure the underlying causes of the humanitarian and ethnic crises, echoing past interventions while primarily serving their geo-economic interests?

Note: Areas of Conflict are the DRC’s North Kivu (Goma) & South Kivu (Bukavu), bordering Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi.
Source: Image created by author using Google Earth

Background

The DRC and Rwanda have been locked in a long-standing rivalry since the First Congo War (1996–97), triggered in the aftermath of the Rwandan Genocide. Following the genocide, waves of Hutu refugees, including a subset of génocidaires responsible for the mass slaughter of Tutsis and moderate Hutus, fled into Eastern Congo’s North and South Kivu provinces. This exodus planted the seeds of future conflict, as Rwanda viewed the presence of these militants across its border as an existential threat. In response, Tutsi militias formed and mobilised within the Congolese landscape. What followed was a spillover of identity-based conflict, transforming Congo into a protracted battlefield where old ethnic wounds bled into new territorial and political realities. The subsequent Second Congo War (1998–2002) was a testament to the deterioration of relations not only between the immediate rivals but also among countries in the wider Great Lakes region. It marked the stark visibility of alliances, making regionalisation of the conflict far more explicit. Peace efforts to stabilise relations between the DRC and Rwanda have repeatedly faltered since the end of the Second Congo War. The resurgence of the M23 in late 2021 and again in early 2025 has further escalated tensions. The group now controls key areas of mineral-rich North and South Kivu, including their capitals, Goma and Bukavu, and continues to expand its reach. 

 
Source: Prepared by the author using Napkin AI

Against this backdrop of peace efforts and evolving geopolitics, the latest brokered US-Qatar-led peace deal has become significant. 

Deconstructing the latest ‘Peace Deal’ in the new Geopolitics 

The latest US-Qatar-led peace deal unfolded in a context increasingly shaped by the geo-economic race, with both the West and China seeking to secure access to the DRC’s vast resources.  While China maintains its role as a ‘non-interfering’ partner and Africa’s largest creditor with its infrastructure-for-minerals deals, security cooperation, and diplomatic consistency, Western actors, particularly the US, have re-engaged with Africa more selectively.[v] The US’ inconsistent aid record, including a recent halt to USAID in the DRC, reflects a pivot from development to strategic competition over resources. 

However, to address strategic competition in critical minerals supply chains and counter China’s growing presence in the region, Washington has recently sought to strengthen its presence by promoting a peace deal tied to geo-economic interests, aligning with its national priorities. President Donald Trump initiated the “Minerals for Peace” framework, which offered access to Congolese critical minerals in exchange for promises of security assistance in eastern DRC. This approach, followed by direct mediation between the DRC and Rwanda since early 2025, captures the essence of Trumpian politics: pragmatic, deal-oriented, and overtly transactional while branding himself both as a peacemaker and a defender of US economic interests in the geo-economic race with China. 

Besides the strategic great power competition, the latest peace deal marks a significant departure from the earlier attempts at mediation. The deal consolidates previous regional efforts under the Luanda process last year: respecting the territorial integrity of each country, mitigating hostile activities by non-state actors, and complying with international humanitarian law, particularly regarding the protection of civilians. Combining high-level diplomacy, a dual-track negotiation strategy of the US and Qatar, and economic leverage, this initiative introduces a new model: linking conflict resolution to the US-sponsored Regional Economic Integration Framework (REIF) and a Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM).[vi]

The REIF is a proposed economic bilateral plan to be concocted within 90 days between the DRC and Rwanda, promoting trade in mining, processing and exporting natural resources to eliminate associated illicit activities. In addition, it mentions expanding on a regional level, deriving foreign trade and investment from regional critical mineral supply chains. Given energy and infrastructure development as prerequisites, it aims to promote a rules-based and productive regional economy of mineral value chains that benefits the local communities. The JSCM is another tenet of the Washington Accord, to be established within 30 days to oversee the implementation of the security provisions of the agreement, including the troop withdrawals and neutralisation of armed groups by both countries. The deal binds both the DRC and Rwanda to neutralise the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), the Rwandan rebel group operating in the DRC, and the Disengagement of Forces/Lifting of Defensive Measures by Rwanda (CONOPS), respectively, within 90 days. It also establishes the Disarmament, Demobilisation, Community Reintegration, and Stabilisation Process (P-DDRCS) concerning non-state armed groups in Eastern DRC to help the two countries neutralise them[vii].

Moreover, the accord assigns responsibility to the two countries to facilitate the voluntary return of refugees, the return of ‘internally displaced persons’ to their place of origin, and humanitarian assistance towards civilians in need.[viii] For further supervision, the peace agreement is supported by a Joint Oversight Committee tasked with implementation and dispute resolution, comprising representatives from the US, the DRC, Rwanda, Qatar, and the African Union. The Committee convened for its inaugural meeting on 31 July 2025.[ix]

This shift reinforces a broader trend of shifting power and agency from multilateral institutions (the United Nations and the African Union) and bilateral African players towards mediation by non-African players. External actors, specifically the US and Qatar, possess economic leverage on the conflict states, attempting to influence outcomes to reach regional peace.[x] This geo-economic linkage may serve as a pragmatic reconciliation mechanism, encouraging both the DRC and Rwanda to uphold the provisions. However, the strategic priorities of the two mediators diverge. The United States closely links the accord to its competition with China over critical minerals. Qatar, on the other hand, positions itself as a neutral facilitator, using its mediation role to establish credibility and further its long-term economic interests in the region.

Source: Prepared by the author using Napkin AI

 Qatar’s Quiet Mediation Meets Geo-Economics

Qatar’s rise as a credible peace broker in Africa reflects its broader strategy of soft power. Since 2004, it has mediated in multiple African disputes, including between Morocco and Algeria, Sudan and Chad, Djibouti and Eritrea, Kenya and Somalia, and Ethiopia and Eritrea, despite lacking deep historical, military, or economic roots on the continent.[xi] This track record has enhanced Doha’s credibility as a neutral diplomatic actor in African conflicts.

In March 2025, Qatar became the first country to host direct talks between the Presidents of the DRC and Rwanda since the resurgence of the M23 rebellion in 2022.[xii] It played a central role throughout the US-backed Washington Accord’s negotiation process, actively participating in both its drafting and implementation. In addition, as part of the dual-track strategy of the peace deal, Qatar’s significant mediation between the DRC and the M23 rebel group on 19 July 2025 was applauded by the international and regional community, including the Gulf Cooperation Council and the African Union.[xiii] Its success is an indicator of the shifting contours of a multipolar world order.[xiv] The contemporary world demonstrates both Qatar’s rising diplomatic profile and Africa’s openness to engaging alternative global partners beyond the West-China dichotomy. However, Qatar’s involvement is not driven purely by altruism. While it officially maintains a neutral posture in the DRC–Rwanda conflict and participates in the joint oversight committee, its economic interests in both countries have deepened. Unlike the US, which explicitly tied the peace deal to economic interests, particularly its mineral security, Qatar’s motivations combine discreet diplomacy with long-term geo-economic positioning.

Qatar’s strategic partnerships in Central Africa have deepened significantly in recent years, particularly with Rwanda and the DRC, spanning the economic, defence, and investment sectors. Qatar Airways now owns a 49% stake in Rwanda’s national carrier and holds a 60% share in the construction of a major new airport south of Kigali,[xv] envisioned as a regional cargo hub for Central Africa. Simultaneously, Qatar has signed key economic agreements with the DRC, which include plans to modernise aviation infrastructure, integrate Qatar Airways into a broader Qatar-DRC development initiative, and develop three flagship airports along with key port facilities. These agreements also cover capacity building for sectoral experts and enhanced cooperation in the aeronautical and maritime domains.[xvi] In this context, the regional peace deal, aimed at fostering economic integration between the DRC and Rwanda, stands to benefit Qatar by bolstering its role in regional connectivity and enhancing its long-term stake in mineral security.

While the peace initiative through external mediation may signal a new beginning, it pertinently challenges the African paradigm of ‘African solutions for African problems’, having failed to bring any solution to the table.[xvii] The failed past attempts require an understanding of the regional complexities of the Great Lakes region.

Regional Complexities: Rivalries among Regional actors

A durable peace in the DRC–Rwanda conflict requires grasping the broader interplay of regional actors whose rivalries shape the conflict’s trajectory. The shared ethnic composition and historical entanglements with Uganda and Burundi since the two Congo Wars extend the dispute beyond Kinshasa and Kigali, influencing stability across the Great Lakes. Eastern DRC remains a microcosm of this instability, given its strategic and economic value, with the security landscape defined by overlapping cross-border rebel networks, proxy rivalries, and shifting alliances.

Burundi, sharing Rwanda’s ethnic makeup, has been a consistent rival of Rwanda, except during the Second Congo War, when both opposed the common DRC’s Interahamwe[xviii] threat to Tutsis. Similarly, Uganda and Rwanda, once allies, now engage in proxy competition in eastern Congo, each accusing the other of perpetuating instability. In this context, the role of the two regional actors, Burundi and Uganda, in the current conflict, with their overt support for the DRC alongside rivalry with Rwanda, has made the situation complex.

In the current context, Burundi accuses Rwanda of backing M23, in conjunction with the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) and the SADC Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC) troop deployments to safeguard its interests against non-state actors,[xix] including the re-emergence of the Burundi-based National Liberation Forces (FNL) in South Kivu.[xx] Rwanda, on the other hand, accuses Burundi of fighting alongside DRC-backed Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). As a result, the region witnesses regular fights between the Rwanda-backed M23 and Burundian forces. Although a recent bilateral accord has temporarily de-conflicted Burundian and Rwandan operations in eastern Congo,[xxi] it neither addresses the root causes of instability nor ensures security for local communities.

Uganda’s role in the current context is equally complex and often contradictory. On one hand, Kampala has partnered with Kinshasa in joint military operations against their common threat, Ugandan rebel armed groups, such as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the Cooperative for Development of the Congo (CODECO). The two rebel groups have been implicated in mass atrocities in eastern Congo,[xxii] with massacres continuing as recently as March 2025, failing to provide lasting civilian protection.[xxiii] On the other hand, Uganda stands accused of exploiting its security pacts to cultivate pro-Ugandan proxy networks in the east, enabling large-scale smuggling of Congolese minerals. Internal divisions within Kampala’s leadership, most notably between President Museveni and his son, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, over ties with Rwanda and M23, further complicate its potential role in fostering stability.[xxiv] This is especially significant given that M23 controls mineral-rich territories coveted by multiple actors.

Both Uganda and Burundi,[xxv] despite publicly backing Kinshasa’s security efforts, have been covertly implicated in illicit mineral extraction through proxy groups with competing interests. Similarly, numerous investigations by the UN Group of Experts have further revealed that Rwandan traders allegedly sell Congolese minerals, re-labelled as Rwandan, on the global market.[xxvi] These patterns of proxy warfare, economic exploitation, and competing national agendas underscore the profound connection between the region’s instability and the political economy of conflict in the Great Lakes, rendering any peace settlement vulnerable unless these underlying drivers are addressed.

Regional Efforts and Responses to the Peace Deals

Multilateral and regional interventions, including the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) and regional forces from the EAC and SADC, have produced limited results. MONUSCO peacekeepers have already withdrawn from Bukavu, South Kivu, in June 2024 and are in the process of disengagement in North Kivu as well.[xxvii] The East African Community Regional Force (EACRF) was expelled by the DRC government in 2023, while the SADC Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC), comprising troops primarily from South Africa, Tanzania, Angola, and Malawi, was recently withdrawn after sustaining heavy losses, underscoring the limitations of military-driven interventions.[xxviii]

Regionally, the SADC and the EAC have repeatedly pursued divergent and often biased approaches in the DRC-Rwanda conflict, particularly over the M23 rebellion. As an EAC member, Rwanda has benefited from the bloc’s tendency to downplay its role in the crisis, whereas SADC, to which the DRC belongs, has been more openly supportive of Kinshasa.[xxix] In an attempt to bridge these divisions, the African Union’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) launched a joint EAC–SADC initiative in March 2025, merging the Angola-led Luanda Process and the EAC-led Nairobi Process, both initiated in 2022, under a panel of five facilitators. Yet, the plan quickly unravelled. Angola withdrew from its mediating role after scheduled direct talks between the DRC and Rwanda collapsed in the wake of new EU sanctions against Kigali and M23, which led to the end of the Luanda Process. Meanwhile, the Nairobi Process also failed to secure the DRC–M23 dialogue.[xxx] These setbacks, which have undermined the African Peace and Security Architecture, reflect a growing loss of confidence in regional military solutions for eastern Congo.

Against this backdrop, Qatar’s intervention under both the Doha Agreement and the Washington Accord marked a notable departure from prior efforts[xxxi]. Breaking the deadlock, Doha achieved two milestones pending since 2022: initiating direct talks between the presidents of the DRC and Rwanda immediately after Angola’s withdrawal, and facilitating dialogue between Kinshasa and the M23 leadership in July 2025.      

At the regional level, the new peace accord has garnered backing from African multilateral organisations such as the AU[xxxii] and the regional bodies, including the SADC and EAC. However, the absence of DRC representatives from the joint SADC-EAC summit on 1 August 2025,[xxxiii] which discussed a merger between the blocs for a structured African-led path ahead of the externally mediated peace, highlights a lingering trust deficit toward African institutions. It contrasts with the relative confidence of the DRC shown in external actors.[xxxiv] It remains to be seen whether regional ownership of the deal will prove useful.

International Responses to the External Mediation

The US–Qatar external mediation has been broadly supported by the international community, recognising it as a rare moment of convergence between Western and non-Western actors in conflict mediation. The UN Security Council welcomed the facilitation efforts but, in light of renewed clashes in eastern DRC that left scores of civilians dead, swiftly convened an emergency briefing to address the deteriorating security situation.[xxxv] China, meanwhile, offered its own stance on the mediation. While welcoming the peace resolution, China reminded the world of its role during its 2023 UN Security Council presidency, when it claims to have laid the present-day foundation for subsequent DRC–Rwanda dialogues.[xxxvi]

Members of the International Contact Group for the Great Lakes (ICG),[xxxvii] including Belgium, Denmark, the EU, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK, endorsed the agreements but emphasised the need to revitalise the 2013 Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework as the foundation for durable stability.[xxxviii]  France, with historical colonial ties to the Great Lakes, has appreciated the efforts and has been actively monitoring the Washington Accord through its participation in follow-up meetings.[xxxix] In contrast, Belgium, the former colonial power in the DRC, while welcoming the accord despite strained relations with Rwanda, stressed that African ownership is indispensable, cautioning that external mediation alone cannot resolve the deep-seated drivers of violence in the region.[xl] The Gulf Cooperation Council praised Qatar and the US for the peace deal, also emphasising Qatar’s mediating role as part of the larger involvement of the GCC countries in driving peaceful solutions in various regions worldwide.[xli]

While the US–Qatar initiative has generated unprecedented international support, scepticism remains in terms of the durability of the peace deal, depending less on external mediation and more on whether regional and African actors can turn this fragile momentum into lasting security.

Underlying Issues to Address

The internal divisions within both the DRC and Rwanda, most sharply along ethnic lines, remain the most enduring and destabilising drivers of conflict in the Great Lakes. The humanitarian crisis in eastern Congo, rooted in decades of violence since the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, is compounded by more than 120 armed groups operating with impunity. The M23’s renewed offensives have worsened an already critical situation. UNICEF has designated eastern DRC at Emergency Level 3, its highest alert, with nearly one million people in urgent need of aid and over 7,000 civilians killed since January 2025.[xlii] The conflict, today, transcends ethnic divisions, evolving into a broader struggle between civilians and armed actors— not only non-state actors but state forces, including the Congolese Armed Forces and the Rwandan Defence Forces.[xliii]

Within this volatile setting, the US–Qatar-brokered peace marks a significant diplomatic breakthrough but risks reducing peace to a transactional bargain.[xliv] While it provides for joint oversight, disarmament, and reintegration mechanisms, it leaves humanitarian assistance and transitional reconciliation to weak or politically compromised national systems.[xlv] Both Hutu and Tutsi communities living in the region share a common scepticism toward the recent peace deal, united not by ethnicity but by a desire for enduring peace with a deep distrust of the agreement, perceived as a product of foreign interference and elite collusion aimed at resource extraction rather than genuine reconciliation.[xlvi] Moreover, the Washington Accord’s exclusion of the M23 rebel group, allegedly backed by Rwanda,[xlvii] from its joint security coordination mechanism doesn’t guarantee accountability and prevention of future attacks by the rebel group. This is starkly visible from the ongoing attacks in Eastern DRC. This may widen the trust deficit between DRC and Rwanda,[xlviii] which could hinder President Trump’s larger geo-economic plan in the region. The non-regional, non-African sponsorship of the deal perhaps brings in unanticipated results amidst deeply scarred regional ties.

Bridging Deals and Realities: A Fragile Path Ahead

In early August, follow-up meetings were held to advance both the economic and security integration frameworks under the latest Washington peace accord. The REIF, under the accord, encompasses cooperation in energy, infrastructure, mineral supply chains, national parks, and public health. However, this economic agenda sits uneasily alongside the paradox of the USAID funding pause in the region.[xlix] The US has been the largest humanitarian donor to the DRC, supporting critical services such as healthcare, clean water, sanitation, and food aid for millions of vulnerable people affected by the ongoing conflict. In 2024, over 70% of humanitarian aid in the DRC was funded by the US.[l] However, the abrupt aid pause has left the region to deal with its socio-economic issues, with nearly 25% of the country’s population facing food insecurity, and 4.5 million children are acutely malnourished.[li] 

Critics argue that, while the alignment is positive in theory, the deal’s deeper strategic logic lies in advancing US self-interest, to create a stable and investment-friendly environment for the US private firms.[lii] On 18 July 2025, US-based KoBold Metals signed a memorandum of understanding with Kinshasa to revive the long-stalled Roche Dure Lithium site,[liii] resolve the project’s outstanding disputes, and advance its development under the Lobito Corridor framework.[liv] This, in turn, helps the US to counter China. However, substituting humanitarian aid with extractive partnerships, despite its strategic character, risks exacerbating socio-economic inequalities and resentment on the ground. Nevertheless, the integration framework also creates opportunities for economic interdependence that could help reduce illicit activities and bridge the trust deficit between Kinshasa and Kigali. Talks have already begun on joint ventures, with the Ruzizi III hydropower project and Lake Kivu methane exploitation initiatives, which both countries intend to co-finance, marking a shift from the US’ unilateral emphasis on critical minerals.[lv]

On the security front, the inauguration of the JSCM on 7-8 August 2025, which was signed under the Washington Accord in June, has witnessed parties reaffirm their commitment to a harmonised security plan, adopting terms and conditions to govern future meetings for the successful implementation of the security mechanism.[lvi] Yet, violence has persisted with the continued M23 rebels reportedly killing eight civilians while advancing toward South Kivu.[lvii] As a result, the Qatar-mediated roadmap, as part of the dual-track strategy of the peace accord, towards a permanent peace settlement, stalled. The DRC and M23 missed their scheduled direct talks on 8 August 2025, and again failed to meet the final deadline of August 18 for a full agreement, amid mutual accusations of ceasefire violations and disagreements over prisoner releases. Although Qatar shared the Doha peace agreement with both parties, who responded positively and expressed willingness to resume the talks,[lviii] there seems to be a gap between political agreements and realities on the ground. Should any party perceive the settlement as unfavourable, the return to proxy warfare through armed militias and informal cross-border incursions remains likely.

Source: criticalthreats.org

Ultimately, while the US-Qatar-led peace agreements represent a clear departure from the failures of past mediation efforts, their transactional design, limited ground inclusivity, and strategic selectivity risk undermining their stated commitment to peace. Sustainable stability requires moving beyond elite bargains and mineral-centric arrangements to directly address the ethnic fault lines that drive conflict, enforcing accountability for armed actors, and restoring public trust, none of which can be achieved without long-term commitments from both regional and international stakeholders.

The peace deal nonetheless offers African actors a structured platform to shape a more secure and economically integrated Great Lakes region, but doing so will require credibility and internal cohesion. The fact that it took external mediators to secure an agreement after years of stalled African-led diplomacy reflects both the fragmentation and resource constraints that have plagued the continent’s peace efforts. Whether this framework becomes a genuine foundation for addressing root causes or simply another geopolitical instrument depends on how effectively its provisions, resources, and platforms are leveraged in the times ahead.

Conclusion

The US-Qatar-led peace initiative introduces a notable shift in the mediation of the DRC-Rwanda conflict, positioning economic integration and mineral cooperation as tools for stability. Yet, while this approach may offer a pragmatic blueprint, it risks reducing peace to a transaction, substituting sustained reconciliation with resource interests, thus making it ineffective. The absence of inclusive political processes, weak enforcement mechanisms with limited funding, and the continued influence of armed groups signal that a signed peace deal is not synonymous with peace on the ground. Moreover, the increasing reliance on external actors further marginalises African-led efforts, raising questions about sovereignty and the long-term ownership of peacebuilding processes, which must be rooted in accountability, local legitimacy, and meaningful regional cooperation.

While it is natural for external actors to pursue their self-interests, Africa bears the responsibility of strengthening enforcement mechanisms, ensuring inclusive political settlements, and strategically leveraging external support. Only then can Africa prevent the agreement from becoming another short-lived arrangement. Without such efforts, the deal risks becoming not a true turning point, but another chapter in the Great Lakes’ recurring cycle of peace and relapse— geopolitically significant, yet elusive in delivering real change for the people it is meant to serve.

*****

*Nandini Khandelwal, Research Analyst, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal. 

Endnotes

[i] United States Department of State. “Peace Agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda - United States Department of State,” June 27, 2025. https://www.state.gov/peace-agreement-between-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-republic-of-rwanda.

[ii] UN News. “Doha Agreement Brings DR Congo Government and M23 Rebels a Step Closer to Peace,” July 20, 2025. https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/07/1165441.

[iii] Ford, Yale. “Congo War Security Review, August 11, 2025.” Critical Threats, August 11, 2025. https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/congo-war-security-review/congo-war-security-review-august-11-2025.

[iv] Ozkan , Mevlut . “Qatari Official Says Draft Peace Deal Shared with DR Congo, M23 Rebels: Report.” Aa.com.tr, August 17, 2025. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/qatari-official-says-draft-peace-deal-shared-with-dr-congo-m23-rebels-report/3662032. 

[v] Ilunga, Patrick. “China, US in Battle for Congo Minerals as Bid to End War Gains Momentum.” The EastAfrican. The East African, July 27, 2025. https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business-tech/china-us-in-battle-for-congo-minerals-as-bid-to-end-war-5132760.

[vi] Op.cit.i

[vii] Op.cit.i

[viii] Op.cit.i

[ix] United States Department of State. “Joint Statement on the Inaugural Joint Oversight Committee Meeting for the Peace Agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda - United States Department of State,” July 31, 2025. https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/07/joint-statement-on-the-inaugural-joint-oversight-committee-meeting-for-the-peace-agreement-between-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-republic-of-rwanda.

[x] Custers, Desirée, and Hubert Kinkoh. “Qatar’s Mediation in the DRC-Rwanda Conflict: Reimagining African Agency.” Carpo-bonn.org, May 26, 2025. https://carpo-bonn.org/en/publications/carpo-pulse/qatar-s-mediation-in-the-drc-rwanda-conflict-reimagining-african-agency.

[xi] “Qatari Mediation in International Politics: An Analysis of the Elements of Power and Influence.” DIVAN Centre, June 30, 2025. https://divancentre.org/en/qatari-mediation-in-international-politics-an-analysis-of-the-elements-of-power-and-influence/.

[xii] Karr, Liam, Kathryn Tyson, Yale Ford, and Jean-Philip Banane. “Africa File: Qatari-Mediated Ceasefire in DRC; SAF Closes in on Khartoum; RSF Attacks Spread to South Sudan; al Shabaab Ramadan Offensive; Tigray Simmers as Amhara Escalates; Russia’s Red Sea Efforts; Burkinabe Massacres.” Institute for the Study of War, March 20, 2025. https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/africa-file-march-20-2025-qatari-mediated-ceasefire-drc-saf-closes-khartoum-rsf-attacks.

[xiii] Thepeninsulaqatar.com. “International, Regional Praise for Qatar’s Mediation Efforts between Congolese Government, M23 Movement,” July 20, 2025. https://thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/20/07/2025/international-regional-praise-for-qatars-mediation-efforts-between-congolese-government-m23-movement.

[xiv] Godfred Zina. “Qatar’s Quiet Diplomacy: Reshaping Conflict Mediation in Africa.” Thehabarinetwork.com, June 24, 2025. https://www.thehabarinetwork.com/qatars-quiet-diplomacy-reshaping-conflict-mediation-in-africa.

[xv] Qna.org.qa. “Qatar News Agency,” March 21, 2023. https://qna.org.qa/en/news/news-details?id=0045-qatar.

[xvi] Mavinga, Nathanael. “Agreement between the DRC and Qatar on the Protection of Investments.” Financial Afrik, March 30, 2021. https://www.financialafrik.com/en/2021/03/30/agreement-between-the-drc-and-qatar-on-the-protection-of-investments/.

[xvii] Op.cit.ix

[xviii] Interahamwe is a Hutu paramilitary organisation responsible for the 1994 genocide, whose remnants fled to the Eastern DRC. It is primarily associated with the present-day Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a rebel group operating in eastern DRC, operating in the region and upholding Interahamwe’s legacy.

[xix] Bugala, Andrew. “Burundi Joins SADC Forces as US Tells M23 to Withdraw.” The Citizen, February 19, 2024. https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/africa/burundi-joins-sadc-forces-as-us-tells-m23-to-withdraw-4529900.

[xx] Dembele, Yonas. “Democratic Republic of Congo: Mapping the Conflict Democratic Republic of Congo: Mapping the Conflict.” Open Doors International / World Watch Research, October 2018. https://opendoorsanalytical.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/DRC-Mapping-the-conflict-WWR-2018.pdf.

[xxi] Karr, Liam, Kathryn Tyson, and Yale Ford. “Africa File, March 6, 2025: Burundi and Rwanda Truce in Eastern DRC despite M23 Advance; SAF Targets RSF Supply Lines in Darfur; Sahelian Jihadists Tap Trans-Saharan Networks.” Institute for the Study of War, March 6, 2025. https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/africa-file-march-6-2025-burundi-and-rwanda-truce-eastern-drc-despite-m23-advance-saf.

[xxii] Ford, Yale, and Liam Karr. “Africa File Special Edition: Uganda in the DRC’s M23 Conflict—Friend to All, Enemy to None.” Institute for the Study of War, April 30, 2025. https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/africa-file-special-edition-uganda-drc%E2%80%99s-m23-conflict%E2%80%94friend-all-enemy-none.

[xxiii] Reuters. “Uganda Military Says It Killed 242 Rebels in East Congo This Week.” March 22, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/uganda-military-says-it-killed-242-rebels-east-congo-this-week-2025-03-22/.

[xxiv] Op.cit.xix

[xxv] Prusa, Vaclav. “Burundi: An Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption Efforts.” Transparency International, June 13, 2024. https://www.u4.no/publications/burundi-an-overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-efforts.pdf.

[xxvi] Lezhnev, Sasha, and John Prendergast. “Rwanda’s Stake in Congo Understanding Interests to Achieve Peace,” 2013. https://enoughproject.org/files/Rwanda%E2%80%99s%20Stake%20in%20Congo%20-%20Understanding%20Interests%20to%20Achieve%20Peace.pdf.

[xxvii] UN News. “Despite Renewed Conflict in Eastern DR Congo, Protection for Civilians Is Paramount: Keita,” March 28, 2025. https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/03/1161691.

[xxviii] Handy, Paul-Simon . “African Solutions Have Not Solved the Great Lakes Problems | ISS Africa.” ISS Africa, May 13, 2025. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/african-solutions-have-not-solved-the-great-lakes-problems.

[xxix] Verelst, Bram . “Eastern DRC: Unpacking the Difficult Task of Regional Diplomacy | ISS Africa.” ISS Africa, February 7, 2025. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/eastern-drc-unpacking-the-difficult-task-of-regional-diplomacy.

[xxx] Fabricius, Peter. “Kgalema Motlanthe Added to Eastern DRC Peace Process Facilitators.” Daily Maverick, March 25, 2025. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2025-03-25-former-sa-president-kgalema-motlanthe-joins-eastern-drc-peace-process-facilitators/.

[xxxi] Ibid.  

[xxxii] Au.int. “The Chairperson of the African Union Commission Welcomes the Signing of the Peace Agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda | African Union,” June 28, 2025. https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20250628/auc-chairperson-welcomes-signing-peace-agreement-between-drc-and-rwanda.

[xxxiii] Cheruiyot, Kevin. “East, Southern Africa Blocs to Merge Peace Efforts in Congo.” The EastAfrican, August 1, 2025. https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/regional-blocs-to-merge-peace-efforts-in-congo-5140162.

[xxxiv] Ibid.

[xxxv] Security Council Report. “Democratic Republic of the Congo: Emergency Briefing,” August 21, 2025. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/08/democratic-republic-of-the-congo-emergency-briefing.php.

[xxxvi] KT PRESS. “China Dismisses Accusations of Exploiting DR Congo without Helping End Raging Conflict,” July 15, 2025. https://www.ktpress.rw/2025/07/china-dismisses-accusations-of-exploiting-dr-congo-without-helping-end-raging-conflict/.

[xxxvii] The International Contact Group (ICG) for the Great Lakes, created in the 2000s, is an informal forum of key international partners to address political, security, development, and economic issues in the African Great Lakes region, particularly in and around the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). 

[xxxviii] eeas.europa.eu. “International Contact Group for the Great Lakes (ICG) on the Peace Agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda Signed in Washington on 27 June 2025,” June 29, 2025. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/international-contact-group-great-lakes-icg-peace-agreement-between-democratic-republic-congo-and_en.

[xxxix] France Diplomacy - Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs. “DRC/Rwanda – Signature of a Peace Agreement (28 June 2025),” 2025. https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/rwanda/news/article/drc-rwanda-signature-of-a-peace-agreement-28-june-2025.

[xl] belganewsagency.eu. “As Congo Peace Deadline Slips, Belgium’s Prévot Pushes for African Role on Visit to Region,” August 19, 2025. https://www.belganewsagency.eu/as-congo-peace-deadline-slips-prevot-pushes-for-african-role-on-visit-to-region.

[xli] Arab News. “GCC Praises Qatari, US Efforts in Rwanda, DRC Peace Deal,” June 29, 2025. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2606284/middle-east.

[xlii] “Democratic Republic of Congo Level 3 Emergency Upsurge in Conflict.” Unicef.org. UNICEF, April 9, 2025. https://www.unicef.org/media/169536/file/DR-Congo-Humanitarian-Situation-Report-No.2-(Upsurge-in-conflict),-31-March-2025.pdf.

[xliii] Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. “Democratic Republic of the Congo,” July 15, 2025. https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/.

[xliv] Monaheng, Koaile . “Greenpeace Africa.” Greenpeace Africa, July 16, 2025. https://www.greenpeace.org/africa/en/blog/58338/peace-without-justice-the-u-s-drc-rwanda-deal-and-africas-fight-for-sovereignty/.

[xlv] Newuh, Mimi Mefo, and Josephine Mahachi. “DR Congo-Rwanda Peace Deal Met with Skepticism.” dw.com. Deutsche Welle, July 4, 2025. https://www.dw.com/en/dr-congo-rwanda-peace-deal-met-with-skepticism/a-73147656.

[xlvi] Custers , Desirée , and Hubert Kinkoh. “‘They Have Sold the Country’ Reactions to the U.S. Brokered Peace Deal in the DRC (July 2025) - Democratic Republic of the Congo.” ReliefWeb, July 23, 2025. https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/they-have-sold-country-reactions-us-brokered-peace-deal-drc-july-2025.

[xlvii] Wafula, Ian. “DR Congo Fighting: The Evidence That Shows Rwanda Is Backing M23 Rebels.” BBC, January 29, 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckgyzl1mlkvo.

[xlviii] Musembi, Esther. “Peace for Profit? What the DRC-Rwanda Peace Deal Leaves Unsaid.” OkayAfrica, July 15, 2025. https://www.okayafrica.com/peace-for-profit-drc-rwanda-peace-deal-unsaid/.

[xlix] Krugman, Allison. “DRC in Crisis: The Human Cost of U.S. Aid Cuts amid the M23 Rebellion | Think Global Health.” Think Global Health, March 20, 2025. https://www.thinkglobalhealth.org/article/drc-crisis-human-cost-us-aid-cuts-amid-m23-rebellion.

[l] ReliefWeb. “Abandoned in Crisis: The Impact of U.S. Global Health Funding Cuts in Democratic Republic of the Congo - Democratic Republic of the Congo,” July 24, 2025. https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/abandoned-crisis-impact-us-global-health-funding-cuts-democratic-republic-congo.  

[li] Op.cit. xlv

[lii] Mudge, Lewis . “Minerals for Peace? How to Make the Rwanda-DRC Deal Stick.” Human Rights Watch, July 7, 2025. https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/07/07/minerals-for-peace-how-to-make-the-rwanda-drc-deal-stick.

[liii] Yoka, Ndea. “DRC: Stability on Paper, Mining Rush in Reality? [Business Africa].” Africanews, July 25, 2025. https://www.africanews.com/2025/07/25/drc-stability-on-paper-mining-rush-in-reality-business-africa/.

[liv] Batterymetalsafrica.com. “Rio Tinto Eyes Major Lithium Project in the DRC amid Growing Western Interest -,” March 31, 2025. https://batterymetalsafrica.com/rio-tinto-eyes-major-lithium-project-in-the-drc-amid-growing-western-interest/.

[lv] Al Jazeera. “DRC, Rwanda Agree Economic Framework Outline as Part of Peace Deal,” August 2, 2025. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/2/drc-rwanda-agree-economic-framework-outline-as-part-of-peace-deal.

[lvi] Bentayeb, F. “DRC & Rwanda Hold Inaugural Joint Security Coordination Mechanism Meeting under Washington Peace Accord.” Africanews.dz, August 11, 2025. https://africanews.dz/eng/index.php/2025/08/11/drc-rwanda-hold-inaugural-joint-security-coordination-mechanism-meeting-under-washington-peace-accord/.

[lvii] Op.cit.iii

[lviii] Trt.global. “DR Congo and M23 Rebels Resume Peace Talks - Qatar,” August 26, 2025. https://trt.global/afrika-english/article/1a7bf7beb3dd.