Indian Council of World Affairs

Abstract: The contemporary strategic environment is undergoing a transformative shift in the nature of alliances, cooperation and partnerships. Japan, which has traditionally been heavily dependent on the US since the Cold War, is recalibrating its approach from a bilateral treaty alliance structure led by Washington towards a model of minilateralism which allows Japan to take more responsibility to contribute to regional and global security on its own standing and in partnership with like-minded countries. This article examines the underlying motivations shaping Japan’s turn to minilateralism within today’s fragmented geopolitical landscape. 

Introduction: The Strategic Imperative for Minilateralism 

In the domain of international relations, mechanisms of alliances, cooperation and partnerships are often the wherewithal of sovereign countries in their foreign policy approaches to secure economic, political, social and security assurances or guarantees in alignment with their national interests. However, these partnerships are also susceptible to the complex phases of global and regional security environments. When the number of member countries is greater, the modality and functionality of larger groupings end up being overburdened with interests divergent to the normative objectives of individually sovereign members per their strategic autonomy. 

The term “minilateralism” is academically stated to have been coined by Miles Kahler in 1992.[i] Scholars, like Bhubhinder Singh and Sarah Teo, have defined it as arrangements involving three to nine countries that are exclusive, flexible and functional in nature.[ii] Given the backdrop of the current international system, where the rules-based order is in a state of flux and large group cooperation mechanisms or large-scale multilateralism dominated by the West are becoming ineffective, the world is witnessing a resurgence of alternative smaller groupings termed minilateralism. 

Minilateral groupings are not a recent phenomenon, but scholars like Kei Koga have highlighted how “strategic minilateralism” has re-emerged since the second half of the 2010s, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, driven by factors like the rise of China and the need for more effective regional security mechanisms.[iii] US-led minilaterals in the Indo-Pacific are a case in point. Minilateralism had, in fact, a symbiotic evolution with the advent of the Indo-Pacific regional security architecture. The first edition of the Quad, which originated in response to the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, depicted one of the first instances of transformed diplomacy in broader Asia during the 21^st century.[iv]

With the passage of time, the Indo-Pacific region in particular has witnessed a significant sprouting of minilaterals, or small-group cooperation, generally involving three or four countries structured around specific, practical objectives positioned between bilateralism and broad multilateralism. Some of the more noted ones include Japan-India-Australia and Japan-India-US in 2015; a revived Quad in 2017; AUKUS in 2021; India-Australia-France and India-Australia-Indonesia in 2022; Japan-ROK-US institutionalised in 2023; and SQUAD (US-Japan-Australia-Philippines), Japan-Philippines-US and US-Japan-Australia in 2024. Also, not to forget the Japan-ROK-China trilateral with origins in 2007-2008,[v] which was restarted in May 2024 after a gap of four years since 2019.[vi] Due to their informal nature, making them more agile and adaptable, the current regional dynamics are expected to continue creating and convening more minilateral groupings. However, the longevity of these arrangements is subject to prevailing conditions.

Japan’s Strategic Drivers

Before talking about the current strategic drivers of Japan’s motivations for engaging in minilateralism, it is necessary to trace the historical and structural context of Tokyo’s standpoint in alliance/partnership dyads. The defeat of Japan in the Second World War and the subsequent bombing of Hiroshima (6 August) and Nagasaki (9 August) by the US resulted in Japan receiving Emperor Hirohito’s endorsement on 15 August 1945, ultimately accepting the Potsdam Declaration of the Allied Powers issued earlier in July 1945[vii] for Japan’s unconditional surrender, disarmament, demilitarisation, democratisation and an eventual return to the international community.[viii] Japan’s wartime overreach reflected a recurring pattern in global politics, when a state grows too powerful, it risks collapsing under its own weight, or alternatively, it adopts the appearance of decline to recalibrate its position.

Thereafter, the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP), led by General Douglas MacArthur, took over the occupation of Japan, suspending governmental authority during the occupation and limiting Tokyo’s administrative rights.[ix] Following on, General Douglas MacArthur oversaw the drafting of Japan’s post-war constitution, and central to the draft was Article 9, compelling Japan to not maintain any armed forces or other war potential to prevent a resurgence of Japan’s militarism.

However, the US strategic position shifted with the onset of the Cold War and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. The Allied powers through the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, restored Japan’s sovereignty and encouraged the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence referred to in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This led to the signing of the first US-Japan Security Treaty on 8 September 1951, the same day as the San Francisco Peace Treaty. [x] This treaty was later revised on 19 January 1960 to accommodate Japan’s need for more equal footing and guarantees of US support while the US maintained its bases in Japan amidst Cold War tensions.[xi]

Thus, began Japan’s long post-war security trajectory under the guided framework of the US-Japan Security Treaty of 1960. While the arrangement provided the foundation for Japan’s security, the passage of time revealed limitations inherent in a bilateral alliance heavily dependent on Washington’s strategic priorities. As the Cold War came to an end, and new challenges emerged in the Indo-Pacific with the onset of the 21^st century, the alliance model, which was hierarchical in nature, started to give way to more networked and partnership-oriented models. Against this backdrop, Japan’s embrace of minilateralism in the 21st century can also be seen as a hedging strategy to insure against the unpredictability of the US alliance system.

In the Indo-Pacific domain, minilaterals respond to perceived inadequacies in both alliance structures and cumbersome multilateral institutions, offering flexibility, agility and focused cooperation. Japan’s presence in many such minilateral groupings, as noted before, suggests that perhaps Tokyo is already in the driving seat of the evolving regional arrangements. In table 1 given below, Japan is noted with presence in at least 11 minilateral initiatives in the 21^st century.

Table 1.1: Japan’s Minilaterals initiatives

Apart from the abovementioned minilaterals, there will be various other forms of regional cooperation platforms in which Japan would be directly or indirectly involved. Considering the repeated presence of Japan across the many Indo-Pacific minilaterals, it can be interpreted that Tokyo has carefully calibrated its strategic posture. The list of the known minilateral arrangements described above highlights six core drivers for Japan’s motivation to engage in minilateralism:

1.  Fraying of US alliance: Having been an “economic power” for most part of post war period, Japan is now feeling the compulsion to step forward in the security front based on its own terms. After years of keeping a low profile on the political and security front, Tokyo with easing of defence exports since 2014, introduction of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision in 2016, upgradation of the National Security Strategy in 2022, and adopting the Official Security Assistance (OSA) in 2023 to like-minded countries, is preparing itself for a restructuring of the global order amidst the unpredictability of US commitment. 

The fraying of the US alliance would force Japan to assume greater security responsibilities in line with its economic stature, but this carries risks on two fronts. Regionally, a more proactive Japanese security posture could further complicate relations with China, North Korea, and South Korea, further destabilising the already uneasy status quo. Domestically, sustaining such a posture would require higher defence spending, as well as navigating political and public resistance to revising pacifist norms. While financially Japan may be able to sustain the greater security responsibilities, the overall acceptance of a sudden proactive posture could lead to domestic stress.

2.  Balancing China: The National Security Strategy of Japan 2022 expressed significant concerns regarding China’s activities in the South and East China Seas. The strategy document highlights China’s intensified attempts at unilaterally changing the status quo in the maritime and air domains. Therefore, Japan is seemingly embedding itself in minilateral arrangements, such as the Quad, US-Japan-Australia, Japan-Australia-India, SQUAD, Japan-US-Philippines and GCAP to build counterweights that reinforce deterrence. 

In its attempts to balance China while undertaking a more security-oriented approach, there will be risks of intensified militarisation. Southeast Asian countries that want to hedge against US-China rivalry may opt for security partnerships with Japan in addition to economic ones. While this may provide a foothold to Japan to mediate in favour of Southeast Asian countries, if necessary, a securitized Japan would also mean intensified militarization of the Indo-Pacific. Domestic constituencies for Japan as a mediator in its region will also have to be built up.

3.  Diversifying security partnerships to spread a web of stability: Traditionally, in the post-war era, Japan has relied heavily on the US alliance for its security, which raises concerns about overdependence. To address this issue, Tokyo has been looking at diversifying security partnerships through Australia, India, France, the UK and even the Republic of Korea (ROK). These alternative partnerships have also provided an opportunity for Japan to gain wider military cooperation while underscoring their expertise in advanced technological capabilities. Networks of partnerships through minilaterals by countries of influence like Japan can add to regional and global stability even when focused on areas such as non-traditional challenges to security and related cooperation including in capacity building. 

Diversifying security partnerships also means managing multiple, overlapping partnerships which complicates coordination. There will be differing standards and interoperability gaps which creates space for reduced effectiveness. Additionally, technology-sharing negotiations may hinder progress as partners debate over control and intellectual property rights.

4.  Advancing standards in a multipolar context: Amidst the challenge to the international order and transition towards a more multipolar world order, Japan needs to make sure that its advocacy to promote cooperation does not marginalize regional perspectives. This approach is also much required amidst the accelerating protectionist trends around the world in the wake of the US-China competition and the war in Ukraine. On one hand, Japan is involved in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)G7-driven framework known as the Blue Dot Network. Alternatively, Japan is also involved in the Mangrove Alliance for Climate, which is an intergovernmental alliance launched by UAE and Indonesia at COP27, with India and other countries. Consequently, Japan faces an inherent dilemma of how to realistically avoid western templates while simultaneously promoting regionally inclusive cooperative mechanisms with the Global South. 

While exchange of best practices can prove to be useful, overemphasis on OECD/G7 standards and their propagation risks conflict with local requirements, capacity and norms. A developed country normative agenda based on developed country experiences and growth trajectories may not always suit the needs of developing countries of the Global South. For that there is a need for more inclusive and participatory standard-setting/norm-setting organizations at the global and regional level. Japan can take the lead in this context. For instance, by capacity building of officials from low means developing countries participating in multilateral forums negotiating standards like ISO.   

5.  Issue-based coalition building: One can easily observe Japan’s flexibility in joining different minilaterals depending on the domain, such as security, climate, infrastructure and supply chains. This strategy reflects a like-minded, issue-based network diplomacy through a web of partnerships to amplify influence, hedge against risks, add to regional and global security and stability and reinforce a rules-based Indo-Pacific order. 

The multiplicity of minilaterals could also lead to speculation that Japan intends to construct a Tokyo-centric order in the Indo-Pacific as it hedges against a receding US. There can therefore be inhibition amongst partners about whether these coalitions provide equal status or instead serve as vehicles for Japan to advance its own agenda, especially to maintain its predominance in Northeast Asia and deter China.

6.  Domestic political drivers: Japan has for a significant portion of their post war history maintained a pacifist outlook, due to constitutional constraints limiting independent military projections. In such a situation, minilaterals are also said to provide a legitimacy cover for an incremental proactive security approach while reassuring the domestic audience and regional neighbours about Tokyo’s intention to operate collectively rather than unilaterally.

However, in the longer term, relying on minilaterals as a domestic legitimacy cover could generate opposition amongst the domestic audience in Japan, if they notice that the government is bypassing pacifist constraints without transparency. Amongst regional neighbours, Tokyo’s intentions of collective security could also be misunderstood as a gradual attempt at normalising an assertive and expansive security role. Thus, minilaterals for Japan could pose as a short-term enabler but a long-term risk.

Japan vs US Motivation for Minilateralism

In the post war international order, Japan’s foremost strategic directions were shaped by the US alliance treaty. Towards the 21^st century, the Japanese engagements in addition to the US bilateral alliance began to reveal an evolving strategic trajectory which was distinct in comparison to the US approaches to minilateralism. Against this background, a comparative analysis of the US and Japan’s motivations for pursuing or engaging in minilateralism particularly in the post war period is needed.

China Factor

The US minilateralism has over the years been evolving as one of its classic strategies designed for deterring China through multiple, overlapping frameworks. Observers critical of the US minilateralism allege that Washington builds coalitions across economic, technological and security domains to fundamentally aim at “depleting China’s strategic resources to the limit”, by forcing Beijing to inevitably engage with multiple minilateral arrangements simultaneously.[xii]

Japan, while concerned about China’s assertiveness as stated through its revised National Security Strategy of 2022 maintains flexibility taking a risk-averse approach seeking to deter Chinese coercion without direct confrontations. Tokyo is attempting to maintaining a balance through simultaneous strategy of engagement and hedging. This is exemplified by Japan’s participation in regional institutions alongside China, such as in ASEAN+3, East Asia Summit (EAS), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Japan-China-South Korea trilateral mechanism. Tokyo can be stated to have a dual-track simultaneous approach, while reinforcing military alignments with the US for deterrence, it also adopts economic-diplomatic engagements with China.[xiii]

Japan’s dual-track strategy engagement with China indicates approaches to integrate Beijing into a rules-based regional process, while Tokyo’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) also underpins a region-wide strategy to counter China’s influences, specially the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).[xiv] Japan has additionally intensified its relations with countries that are critical of China, such as the Philippines, as well as those considered more aligned with China, such as Cambodia.[xv]

Regional Responsibility

Japan’s statecraft reflects desires to balance strategic autonomy with alliance dependence. However, Tokyo seeks to establish itself as a proactive regional power capable of shaping the regional order. The FOIP vision which Tokyo introduced in 2016,[xvi] two years before the US, represents an occasion where Japan played the role of an agenda-setter for regional governance and not merely a follower. The Official Security Assistance (OSA) adopted in 2023 is an added dimension to Tokyo’s efforts for increasing its security responsibilities in the region.

On the other hand, the US as an extra-regional power in the Indo-Pacific continues to be embedded institutionally in the region primarily through AUKUS, Quad, and Japan-ROK-US trilateral. However, these alignments of the US also frame Washington’s involvement as selective and transactional. At the moment, the commitment of the US in upholding regional responsibility per the alliance treaties or the minilateral frameworks remains a doubt. The second Trump administration introducing the global tariffs has also fuelled speculations of alliance credibility while Washington exhibits signs of primarily focusing on distributing costs.

Signs of a Receding US

The agenda of “Make America Great Again” under Trump 2.0 reinforces the narrative of a receding US as it suffers resource constraint while its military becomes overstretched, resulting in domestic pressures to embrace an inward-oriented or a protectionist policy approach. In the short term, Washington is assumed to remain a global military power, and it aims to fix the challenges at hand by transitioning from an anchor to a conductor role. This means, Washington is conducting its coalition partners to undertake greater share of the burden of public goods supplied, for the US commitment to persist.

Japan’s trajectory of defence build-up, codifying its expanded security roles demonstrates a generational shift, adapting to changing US priorities and secure itself against Washington’s unpredictability. At the moment, Japan is looking to continue expanding its role regardless of US strategic choices. Tokyo is seemingly preparing itself for either of the two possibilities - a greater engagement by the US in the region or Washington’s strategic withdrawal from the Indo-Pacific. In fact, Japan’s engagement of minilateralism is to gain legitimacy and trust through cooperation, as well as offer foundations for consistent commitment to uphold stability amidst the fundamental restructuring of the global order.

Currently, the receding of US is a baseline expectation, while Japan’s role for security of the region is anticipated to grow. In the long term, if the US continues to undertake an isolationist policy approach or a selective and transactional role, Japan will be anticipated to emerge more actively in several minilaterals in the Indo-Pacific which are issue-driven and independent of Washington’s influences.

Avoiding Norm Export and Western Hegemonic Templates

When working towards the collective interest of the region, it is essential to avoid imposing norms that contradicts the interests of stakeholders. In the era of resurging minilateralism, it is important to consider that these arrangements do not become conduits of Western-centric norms. Japan, which is a member of the G7 and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), needs to be cautious that their critical push for minilaterals in the Indo-Pacific does not disseminate G7-crafted norms but provides for a responsive, regionally attuned governance, perhaps an Asian way of behaviour in the Indo-Pacific that respects the strategic autonomy as well as territorial sovereignty and integrity of member countries.

Minilateralism should guard norm-setting independence through flexible and regionally informed partnerships. It will even bode well for Japan’s diplomacy towards the Global South to pursue minilateralism as a novel organising principle of international cooperation distinct from bureaucratic hurdles and normative domination. While many minilateral groupings have been Western-led or steered by extra-regional countries, Japan, as a regional stakeholder in the Indo-Pacific, to preserve its agency, must target preference for flexible, issue-based cooperation rather than rigid norm propagation. Japan’s subsequent action in promoting inclusive minilateral frameworks will also underscore the important principles of Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) pertaining to respect for diversity, inclusiveness and openness.[xvii]

Minilateralism as an Alternative to Western-Dominated Alliances

Japan stands at a pivotal juncture amidst the complex international global order heading towards a multipolar arrangement. The country is well-positioned to adapt and integrate itself to take advantage of the current international system due to Tokyo’s traditional associations with Western-led blocs while at the same time being duly acknowledged for fostering mutual understanding and cooperation with the Global South. Japan must target the creation of platforms that show minilateral functioning not as replicas of Western alliance structures but as targeted, cooperative ventures tailored to the region’s collective strategic needs.

In the course of its endeavours towards minilateralism, Japan must focus on recognising the need for strengthening economic, security and normative order-building approaches to counter even China’s geoeconomic and geostrategic objectives. There have been calls for a more regional approach to the cooperation framework in the Indo-Pacific, and Japan has the agency to deliver outcomes that value partnership, peace and progress.[xviii] The vision and commitment of Japan could provide a meaningful and constructive alternative to not just western-dominated frameworks but also balance China in its attempts to unilaterally change the status quo. An alliance under stress would also provide an opportunity to Japan to assert its natural self, its Asian regional identity that has somewhere got eroded especially within its society, through strengthened new-era partnerships in its region.

Conclusion

Japan’s embrace of minilateralism since the 21^st century is a signal for strategic recalibration, driven by what some may call “alliance fatigue” and a quest for regional responsibility in a fragmented geopolitical environment, and an assertion of a regional Asian identity while adhering to the territorial sovereignty and integrity of the stakeholders. These flexible, informal platforms offer a way to co-design regional governance and security while upholding national agency.

To successfully shape a free, open, and resilient Indo-Pacific order, Japan must strike a balance between security and geoeconomic engagement through minilateralism. If Tokyo is able to prioritise equitable rule-making over alignment with Western norms, it would further strengthen Japan’s role as a regional stakeholder to preserve and enhance the strategic autonomy of all states.

***** 

*Dr Tunchinmang Langel, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA)
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

[i] Kahler, Miles. (1992). Multilateralism with small and large numbers. International Organization 46(3): 681–708.

[ii] Singh, B., & Teo, S. (Eds.). (2020). Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific: The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Mechanism, and ASEAN (1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003000839 (Accessed August 18, 2025).

[iii] Koga, K. (2022). A New Strategic Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific. Asia Policy, 17(4), 27–34. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27254590 (Accessed August 18, 2025).

[iv] Grossman, M. (2005). The Tsunami Core Group: A Step toward a Transformed Diplomacy in Asia and Beyond. Security Challenges, 1(1), 11–14. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26459016 (Accessed August 18, 2025).

[v] Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2025). Overview of Japan-China-ROK Cooperation. Asian and Ocean Affairs Bureau, April 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100782208.pdf (Accessed August 19, 2025).

[vi] Langel, Tunchinmang. (2024). Restarting South Korea-Japan-China Trilateral Leaders’ Summit 2024. Indian Council of World Affairs, June 4, 2024. /show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=10948&lid=6958 (Accessed August 19, 2025)

[vii] The National Archives. Japanese Instrument of Surrender, 1945. https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/explore-the-collection/stories/japanese-instrument-of-surrender-1945/ (Accessed August 19, 2025).

[viii] Office of Policy Planning and Coordination on Territory and Sovereignty. End of the War and Negotiations toward the Conclusion of the Peace Treaty: End of the War/ Start of Occupation. https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/ryodo_eg/taiou/takeshima/takeshima02-01.html (Accessed August 19, 2025)

[ix] Office of Policy Planning and Coordination on Territory and Sovereignty. End of the War and Negotiations toward the Conclusion of the Peace Treaty: End of the War/ Start of Occupation. https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/ryodo_eg/taiou/takeshima/takeshima02-01.html (Accessed August 20, 2025).

[x] Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library. (1951). Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan; September 8, 1951. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/japan001.asp (Accessed August 20, 2025).

[xi] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (1960). Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America. January 19, 1960. https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html (Accessed August 20, 2025).

[xii] Wang Jian. (2024). “Minilaterals Destabilize the Asia-Pacific Region”. Taihe Institute. June 7, 2024. http://www.taiheinstitute.org/UpLoadFile/files/2024/5/31/1327268243b64df50-7.pdf (Accessed August 26, 2025)

[xiii] Zihan Zhu. “Reconfiguring Hierarchies: Japan's Pursuit of Networked Security in a Contested Indo-Pacific”. The SAIS Europe Journal of Global Affairs. https://www.saisjournal.eu/article/112-Zihan-Zhu-Reconfiguring-Hierarchies-Japans-Pursuit-of-Networked-Security-in-a-Co.cfm (Accessed August 26, 2025)

[xiv]Thomas Wilkins. (2021). “Japan as a contributor to the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific”. Sasakawa Peace Foundation, September 22, 2021. https://www.spf.org/iina/en/articles/thomas_02.html (Accessed August 26, 2025)

[xv] Alexandra Sakaki. (2025). “Japan in Southeast Asia: Countering China’s Growing Influence”.  SWP Research Paper, June 2025. https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/japan-in-southeast-asia-countering-chinas-growing-influence (Accessed August 26, 2025)

[xvi] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2019). “Towards Free and Open Indo-Pacific”. November 2019. https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000407643.pdf (Accessed August 26, 2025)

[xvii] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2023). The Future of the Indo-Pacific－Japan’s New Plan for a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”－“Together with India, as an Indispensable Partner”. March 20, 2023.

 https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100477739.pdf (Accessed August 20, 2025).

[xviii] Dai-Ichi-Life Research Institute Inc. (2024). Japan's Engagement with the Global South

Shaping the Future of International Order. DLRI Report, April 2024. https://www.dlri.co.jp/english/report_en/202404MI.html (Accessed August 20, 2025).