Indian Council of World Affairs

Over the decades the region of West Asia and North Africa has evolved into a flashpoint of the global geopolitics. The regional political trajectory of last many years has been marked by an enduring instability and political uncertainty. The long-standing conflicts in the broader Arab region lead many in the strategic community to believe that instability and uncertainty are likely to shape the regional politics for years to come. 

The ongoing Israel-Gaza war has triggered one debacle after another of varying scales and degrees, which seem to be far from extinct in the near future. One recalls how Hezbollah in Lebanon joined Hamas against Israel without due contemplation, and how the Houthis in Yemen followed a similar path, targeting ships in the Red Sea in solidarity with Hamas and the attack continue even today. 

Within a year after the Israel-Gaza war, Hezbollah’s war battery was exhausted, and eventually, a ceasefire was imposed in December 2024. However, Israeli military strikes have continued in southern Lebanon—a Shiite-dominated region and the epicentre of Hezbollah. 

The nominal ceasefire in Lebanon was soon followed by the ouster of President Bashar Assad in Syria, providing a strategic pretext to Israel for repeated military actions. Added to this are current happenings in Iran and Yemen, which illustrate how relentless multi-front Israeli military actions have weakened, if not obliterated, most of the region’s anti-Israel forces. Hezbollah, since its emergence in the mid-1980s as a formidable force in Lebanese politics, has fought many wars—some successful, some not—against Israel. But today, it seems to have lost its strategic depth, military capability, and popular support. Many of its stalwarts, including General Secretary Hassan Nasrallah, have been killed in a series of clandestine military operations. 

Today, Hezbollah seems to have lost its political appeal in the country, and many are questioning the legitimacy of its military power and it is being asked to surrender its weapons. Many of its domestic and regional opponents believe that Hezbollah’s arsenal must be dismantled and state structure instead be strengthened. For most of its four-decade of existence, Hezbollah has maintained its own militias and participated in the country's political process, despite unfruitful occasional demands for disarmament. 

The voices against Hezbollah’s continued armament received new impetus in the wake of changing political dynamics within and outside the country. The mounting pressure can be attributed to Hezbollah’s diminishing role in national politics, the growing ascendancy of Israel, mounting external pressure (read Israel, the US, and Gulf countries) against Hezbollah, and the Lebanese new government’s own stubborn policy of not allowing Hezbollah any more to carry arms and act like a state within the state and challenge the state’s legitimacy.[i]

Hezbollah and the Question of Its Demilitarization

The Hezbollah (Party of God) has been one of the most powerful religious-cum-political-cum-militant entities in Lebanon, and over the decades, since its establishment in 1985,[ii] it acquired the status of an indispensable political force in the country. Its origin can be traced back to the evolving political landscape marked by the cultural, social, and political resurgence following Israel’s unprecedented military actions against the war of attrition involving Palestinian refugees in Lebanon in the early 1980s.[iii] It emerged first as a factional group within the Lebanese Resistance Forces, which moved to the path of reconciliation soon after Israeli military forces  adopted an aggressive posture against anti-Israeli outfits in the country. Gradually the Hezbollah morphed into a major political force and entered into full-fledged national politics. In 1992, for the first time, it won eight seats in the national assembly.[iv]

Its existence in the national political spheres is marked by an exceptionality when it operates within the state and outside the domain of the state as well. It enjoys a certain monopoly over the power structure of the country without accountability in the modern political sense,[v] as it has enjoyed full military control over the Israel-Lebanon border and had significant control over the Lebanese border with Syria. It has alternated between being a state and a non-state actor according to convenience, thereby keeping their identity blurred in the region and adding to the region’s instability.

It is not for the first time that the question of disarming Hezbollah has emerged in Lebanon. Today’s demand for disarming Hezbollah emanates from a UNSC resolution (1701) passed on 11 August 2006, in the aftermath of the Israel-Hezbollah war, which lasted for almost a month.[vi] The resolution (1701), apart from urging the cessation of hostilities between the two, also sought the complete surrender of the arms by all the militias in Lebanon. Before 1701, another resolution (1559) was passed by the UNSC in 2004, which, apart from calling for Syrian forces to withdraw from Lebanon, also called for the dismantling of weaponries by all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias.[vii] In accordance with resolution 1559, Syrian forces withdrew from Lebanon, but Hezbollah refused to lay down its arms, claiming that it was not a militia but a national resistance movement.[viii] Subsequently, the exercise of Hezbollah’s armament continued, and for the first time in the political history of Lebanon, Hezbollah became part of the government in 2006 under Prime Minister Fouad Saniora.[ix] The issue of dismantling Hezbollah’s weaponry was discussed in the light of the resolution (1559) in the National Consensus Dialogue, held in Lebanon in March 2006. It was decided to disarm the Palestinian militias residing outside the refugee camps. The Hezbollah refused to participate in the dialogue until it was addressed not as a militia but as a resistance, a categorization which precluded its disarmament, and this was agreed.[x]

The UNSC, in another of its resolutions (1680), passed in May 2006, welcomed the decision of the National Consensus Dialogue to disarm the Palestinian militias but emphasised that efforts should continue to disarm all other militant groups in Lebanon.[xi] In accordance with the decision of the National Consensus Dialogue, many sectarian militias were disbanded, and disarmed but the government failed to disarm the Amal or the Hezbollah, as both happen to be powerful Shiite blocs in the country.  

Iran and Hezbollah

The Iran-Hezbollah connection has never been a secret. Most of its founding leaders, like Mohhamed Hussian Fazullah and Shamsuddin, received their religious education in Iranian seminaries.[xii] The current leadership of Hezbollah draws inspiration from Shiite religious theology as practised in Iran. They are also ardent followers of Ali Khamenei, and their militias maintain close ties with Iranian Al-Quds forces. In Lebanon the Hezbollah has always been accused of imposing the Iranian political agenda in the country, and other Shiite blocks sometime find it difficult to ally with it because of its ideological and political connection with the Iranian regime.  

Both Syria and Iran until recently continued to arm and support Hezbollah and use it as a proxy to funnel weapons to the anti-Israeli forces.[xiii] For years, Hezbollah acted like a frontline buffer zone for both Syria and Iran against Israel. It is worth recalling here that Israel could attack Iran in June this year only after Hezbollah as a military power was subdued and President Assad in Syria was ousted.

Amidst growing confrontation between the government and Hezbollah over the issue of disarming the latter, and owing to its long-term support to the Hezbollah, Iran condemned the decision of the government to disarm Hezbollah.[xiv] In April 2025, Lebanese Foreign Minister Youssef Rajia had summoned the Iranian Ambassador in Lebanon to express his displeasure over the latter’s saying, ‘disarming Hezbollah was a trap by enemy states’.[xv] On 15 August 2025, Ali Larijani, Secretary to the Spiritual Leaders’s National Security Council and former Speaker of the Majlis (assembly),[xvi] visited Lebanon and, during his meeting with Hezbollah officials, stated that any plan to disarm Hezbollah is a dream that would not come true and called it a policy dictated by the United States and Israel.[xvii] During his visit, the Lebanese national leadership refused to meet him, and the Lebanese Foreign Minister said that Lebanon would not tolerate such unacceptable conduct under any circumstance and will not permit any external party. Senior Lebanese officials also accused Iran of violating its sovereignty, as Iran has always used Hezbollah as its strategic asset to disrupt the balance of power in the region.[xviii]

Why Now?

Soon after the new government was formed in Lebanon in February 2025 after more than two years of interim cabinet, the question of disarming Hezbollah became the most challenging task for the government. On 5 August 2025, the Lebanese cabinet approved a plan calling for Hezbollah and other militias in the country to surrender their arms to the state. The government had asked the Lebanese National Army to present a blueprint by the end of August and to accomplish its objective by the end of the year.[xix] In the first week of September 2025, the commander of the Lebanese army, Rodolphe Heikal, presented five-stage plans to disarm Hezbollah and that would last for three months. The plan also stipulates that by the end of the year, Hezbollah, along with other militias, would be completely disarmed in the entire area in the south of the Litani River.[xx]

Earlier Youssef Rajia had stated that the government’s decision to disarm the Hezbollah is irreversible. He also stated that Shiite sects need not fear, and Rajia also accused the Hezbollah of making Shiites hostage to its ideology.[xxi] On his part, Lebanese Economic Minister, Amer Bisaat has stated that the possession of weapons by Hezbollah is a major obstacle to the economic growth of the country.[xxii]  

There are many reasons for this mounting pressure to disarm Hezbollah, but the most visible seems to be Hezbollah’s own growing vulnerability and loss of support from its strategic mentors (Iran and Syria). The last two years of the Israel-Gaza war have not only increased the militaristic sway of Israel across the region but have also almost rendered Hezbollah an irrelevant actor in the national politics.

Along with Hamas, Hezbollah is equally subjected to an unprecedented amount of pressure to disarm itself, and the pressure is directly linked to an all-out consensus among the Gulf monarchies and their US partner against the presence of any militias in the region.

At the forefront of the regional and global chorus to disarm Hezbollah is Israel, which enjoys the full support of the US. Prime Minister Netanyahu recently stated that Israel can think of reducing its military presence in Lebanon if the Lebanese government takes concrete action to disarm Hezbollah.[xxiii] Netanyahu also said that it is time for Lebanon and Israel to move forward with a shared goal of disarming Hezbollah.

On the other hand, the US has repeatedly called on the government in Lebanon to disarm the Hezbollah, and Tom Barrack, the US envoy to Lebanon, has asked for a gradual withdrawal from the southern border to pave the way for the new government to disarm the Hezbollah.[xxiv] In a press conference along with a visiting US delegation to Lebanon, Tom Barrack stated on 25 August 2025 that Israel has no plan to occupy the region but will not withdraw unless it reviews the government plan to disarm Hezbollah. He also added that in exchange, Israel would give a counterproposal to withdraw from the five points Israeli forces are occupying which they were supposed to leave under the November 29 ceasefire plan.[xxv] Another member of the US delegation stated that Israel will look at Lebanon differently after Hezbollah is disarmed.[xxvi] It is also reported that there is a plan to develop a Trump Economic Zone in the vicinity of the Israel-Lebanon border. This decision is being seen as the US’ move to deprive the Hezbollah of any future intention to rebuild itself near the Israel-Lebanon border and to avoid any confrontation between Israel and Lebanon post disbanding and disarming of Hezbollah.

One cannot overlook the economic angle to the current move of the Lebanese government. The national economy has been devastated on account of years of instability and an anarchy-like situation. Qatar and Saudi Arabia have already promised to invest in the reconstruction of the war-torn zone in southern Lebanon.[xxvii] The new government is aware that this aid will not be forthcoming until decisive action is taken against Hezbollah, especially considering the uneasy relationships between the Gulf nations and the group. In a recent meeting with Lebanese Prime Minister Nawwaf Salam, King Abdullah II of Jordan stated that his country fully supports the Lebanese government in strengthening its security and preserving its sovereignty.[xxviii] The new government in Lebanon is trying to strike a balance between its geopolitical and strategic requirements and its economic needs.

On 28 August, the Lebanese army launched the first round of its operation to confiscate arms from the Palestinian refugees living in camps in the southern part of Tyre city. Several trucks loaded with light and heavy weapons, including B-2 missiles, were seen coming out of these camps.[xxix] A statement from the army said that the move was taken in light of the decision taken in a meeting between President Mahmood Abbas and President Aoun held in May.[xxx]  

Hezbollah’s Reaction

Since the new government has unveiled its plan to disarm Hezbollah, the latter lost no time in condemning the decision. Two major Shiite blocks in the country, Amal Movement and Hezbollah, issued a joint statement terming the decision a breach of the national interest and the noncompliance of the National Consensus Dialogue. The statement added that their rejection is an affirmation of the right to preserve the weapons that have proved their ability to break the back of the enemies (read Israel).[xxxi] The Hezbollah also accused the Lebanese government of surrendering to the will of Israel and said that it would not relinquish its weapons and wage a battle if required to maintain its weaponry.[xxxii] They also threatened that any move in this direction could trigger a civil war,[xxxiii] but the Lebanese foreign minister has rebutted this, saying that nothing could reverse the decision of the government.    

The newly appointed General Secretary of Hezbollah, Naim Qassem, said that Hezbollah will not surrender its weapons, and may engage in a battle similar to Karbala if Israeli forces do not withdraw from the occupied land of southern Lebanon, release their prisoners, halt their aggression, and begin negotiations.[xxxiv]

Naim Qassem also said that the state would bear the responsibility in case any internal strife takes place.[xxxv] Addressing a crowd on the eve of the commemoration of the death of Imam Hussian,[xxxvi] Qassem said that anti-government street protests against the former’s decision could reach the US embassy as well.[xxxvii] Similar sentiments were expressed by Nabih Berri, Speaker of the National Assembly and leader of the Amal party,[xxxviii] who stated that possession of the weapons could not be subject to negotiation and the issue can be discussed only in the light of National Consensual Dialogue. He also called for another national dialogue to determine the fate of those weapons and added that weapons are the honour and pride of the Lebanese resistance movement.[xxxix] He also said that disarming militias was not just a substitute for the ceasefire agreement that Israel is ignoring, but a way to bargain and apply pressure.

Expressing his annoyance over the mechanism of disarming Hezbollah and involving the national army in this exercise, one member of the political council of Hezbollah, Mr Mohammad Al-Khansa, said that the state made a major mistake by involving the army because a political issue should be resolved politically, not militarily, and moreover, the army is for the nation, and it should not be pitted against its own people.[xl] He also stated that domestic political processes should not take place in Saudi Arabia and any national issue should be resolved within the national territories. The Vice President of the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council, Sheikh Ali Al-Khatib, denounced the arrogance against the resistance (Hezbollah) and said that Lebanon should not be given as a gift to Israel.[xli] One member of the pro-Hezbollah party ‘Loyalty to the Resistance’, Hassan Ezzeddine, stated that the decision of the government is reflective of its surrender to Israel-US pressure and it is a major sin. He also condemned the Lebanese government for surrendering the national sovereignty to an enemy country.[xlii]

Hezbollah’s linking the issue of arms surrender to the withdrawal of the Israeli forces is itself a major departure from the past, as it stated many times in the past that no situation can force Hezbollah to disarm. But linking its demilitarisation to the Israeli withdrawal seems to be a calculated and strategic move to prolong its battle against government’s drive to disarm it. There are reports that the US administration has asked Israel to reduce its non-urgent military actions in Lebanon so the action to disarm Hezbollah could be expedited or put into operation.

Conclusion

In the light of the above narratives, one can argue that the decision to disarm Hezbollah is a sort of historic one. The question of disarming would not have emerged had Israel not inflicted severe damage on Hezbollah in its recent war and had the Syria regime, its main political and military backer, not collapsed.  The new government in Lebanon and anti-Hezbollah regional powers are trying to exploit the growing vulnerability of Hezbollah in the wake of its diminishing role in the national politics. While diminished, Hezbollah seems to continue to mobilise people with a rhetorical claim that it is the only force capable of confronting Israel and protecting Lebanon’s border. Hezbollah has on its part warned that it would oppose efforts to disarm it.  In fact, Hezbollah is already projecting this policy of the government as a surrender to external pressure.

However, the new Lebanese government and key external actors have maintained firm messaging to Hezbollah amid its threat. Additionally, in a step that has the potential to turn around the politics of the region, Israel has hinted that it could revise its Lebanese policy, military and its posture at the borders if Hezbollah is disarmed and disbanded.

*****

*Dr. Fazzur Rahman Siddiqui, Sr. Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.

Endnotes  

[i] Bilqeez, Abduallah. Hezbollah Min-al-Tahreer El-al-Rad (1984-2006). (Lebanon: Centre for Studies of the Arab Unity). p.n.    

[ii] Bilqeez, Abduallah. Hezbollah Min-al-Tahreer El-al-Rad (1984-2006). (Lebanon: Centre for Studies of the Arab Unity). p.n.    

[iii] Bilqeez, Abduallah. Hezbollah Min-al-Tahreer El-al-Rad (1984-2006). (Lebanon: Centre for Studies of the Arab Unity). p.n. 64.    

[iv] Bilqeez, Abduallah. Hezbollah Min-al-Tahreer El-al-Rad (1984-2006). (Lebanon: Centre for Studies of the Arab Unity). p.n. 38.  

[v] Lina Khatib, How Hezbollah holds sway over Lebases state, Research Paper: Middle East and North Asia Program, Chatham House, June 2021. Accessed https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/06/how-hezbollah-holds-sway-over-lebanese-state September 4, 2025.  

[vi] Joseph Aoun: Israel defies the will of international al community by attacking UNIFIL, Rail-Youm (Arabic). September 4, 2025. Accessed https://sl1nk.com/dzEVs September 6, 2025.

[vii] UN Security Council Resolution 1559. September 2 2004. Middle East Web, September 2, 2024, Accessed http://mideastweb.org/1559.htm September 4, 2025.

[viii] Bilqeez, Abduallah. Hezbollah Min-al-Tahreer El-al-Rad (1984-2006). (Lebanon: Centre for Studies of the Arab Unity). p.n.62.    

[ix] Bilqeez, Abduallah. Hezbollah Min-al-Tahreer El-al-Rad (1984-2006). (Lebanon: Centre for Studies of the Arab Unity). p.n.64.

[x] Martin Wahlisch, The Lebanese National Dialogue, Bergoh Foundation, March 2007. Accessed  https://berghof-foundation.org/files/publications/NDH_Lebanon.pdf September 11, 2025.

[xi] http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1680

[xii] Bilqeez, Abduallah. Hezbollah Min-al-Tahreer El-al-Rad (1984-2006). (Lebanon: Centre for Studies of the Arab Unity). p.n.35.  

[xiii] Anthony H. Cordesman, Lebanese Security and Hezbollah. Centre for Strategic and International Studies. July 14, 2006. Accessed https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/060714_lebanese_security.pdf September 7, 2025.  

[xiv]

[xv] https://www.newarab.com/news/lebanon-fm-summon-iranian-envoy-over-x-post-hezbollah-arms

[xvi] Lebanese Foreign Minister: The decision to disarm Hezbollah is irreversible, Al-Quds-Al-Arabia, August 5, 2025. Accessed  https://l1nq.com/lpJM September 7, 2025.

[xvii] Fix Your Own’s Woes: Beirut condemns Iran over Hezbollah disarming remarks, Iran International, August 9 2025. Accessed   https://www.iranintl.com/en/202508099703 September 10 2025.

[xviii] Yassar Aslan, Hezbollah once Again, Al-Qaherah 24 (Arabic), August 15, 2025. Accessed https://www.cairo24.com/2262696 September 6, 2025.

[xix] Lebanese Foreign Minister: The decision to disarm Hezbollah is irreversible, Al-Quds-Al-Arabia, August 5, 2025. Accessed https://l1nq.com/lpJM6   September 7 2025.

[xx] Lebanese Foreign Minister: The army to disarm the Hezbollah within three months, Al-Quds Al-Arabi (Arabic), September 9, 2025. Accessed  https://l1nq.com/Hj3xK September 9, 2025.

[xxi] Lebanese Foreign Minister: The decision to disarm Hezbollah is irreversible, Al-Quds-Al-Arabia, August 5, 2025. Accessed  https://l1nq.com/lpJM September 7, 2025.

[xxii] Lebanese Economic Minister: monopoly over weapons by other than sate is an obstacle to economic growth, Al-Sharq (Arabic). September 12, 2025. Accessed  https://l1nq.com/tJFHm  September 13 2025.

[xxiii] Netanyahu calls for disarming Hezbollah in exchange for reducing Israeli military actives, Al-Ikhbar (Arabic). August 25, 2025. Accessed https://l1nq.com/QQLqp September 7, 2025.

[xxiv] Axios: Trump Plans to develop special economic zone in southern Lebanon, Al-Ikhbar (Arabic). August 22, 2025. Accessed https://sl1nk.com/bzEvU September 7, 2025

[xxv] US Envoy: Israeli withdrawal l is linked to Hezbollah disarmament. Al-Sharq (Arabic). August 26, 2025. Accessed https://sl1nk.com/kE0h5 September 2, 2025.

[xxvi] US Envoy: Israeli withdrawal l is linked to Hezbollah disarmament. Al-Sharq (Arabic). August 26, 2025. Accessed https://sl1nk.com/kE0h5 September 2, 2025.

[xxvii] Axios: Trump Plans to develop special economic zone in southern Lebanon, Al-Ikhbar (Arabic). August 22, 2025. Accessed https://sl1nk.com/bzEvU September 12, 2025.

[xxviii] King of Jordan: Jordan fully supports Lebanon in its effort to strengthen its security, Al-Sharq (Arabic). August 19, 2025. Accessed  https://l1nq.com/UYqqJ September 5, 2025.

[xxix] https://www.nna-leb.gov.lb/en/justice-law/804774/palestinian-weapons-handover-to-lebanese-army-at-t

[xxx] The Lebanese army officially begins receiving the Palestinian arms, Rail Youm (Arabic). August 28, 2025. Accessed  https://l1nq.com/dovZE   September 10, 2025.

[xxxi] Hezbollah and Amal to hold rally, Al-Ikhbar (Arabic). August 25, 2025. Accessed https://sl1nk.com/JjS9G September 3, 2025.

[xxxii] Yassar Aslan, Hezbollah once Again, Al-Qaherah 24 (Arabic) August 15, 2025. Accessed https://www.cairo24.com/2262696 September 6, 2025.

[xxxiii] Lebanese Foreign Minister: The decision to disarm Hezbollah is irreversible, Al-Quds-Al-Arabia, August 5, 2025. Accessed https://l1nq.com/lpJM6 September 7, 2025.

[xxxiv] Lebanese Foreign Minister: The decision to disarm Hezbollah is irreversible, Al-Quds-Al-Arabia, August 5, 20025. Accessed https://sl1nk.com/lpJM6 September 7, 2025.

[xxxv] Lebanese Foreign Minister: The decision to disarm Hezbollah is irreversible, Al-Quds-Al-Arabia, August 5, 2025. Accessed https://sl1nk.com/lpJM6 September 7, 2025.

[xxxvi] Lebanese Foreign Minister: The decision to disarm Hezbollah is irreversible, Al-Quds-Al-Arabia, August 5, 20025. Accessed  https://sl1nk.com/lpJM6 September 7, 2025.

[xxxvii] Lebanese Foreign Minister: The decision to disarm Hezbollah is irreversible, Al-Quds-Al-Arabia, August 5, 2025. Accessed https://sl1nk.com/lpJM6 September 7, 2025.

[xxxviii] This is an older party than Hezbollah, an ally of Hezbollah and formed soon after the civil war broke out in Lebanon in 1975. 

[xxxix] Berrih like Qassim: Weapons are our pride, Al-Quds-Al-Arabia, July 31, 2025, Accessed https://sl1nk.com/MI27n September 10, 2025.

[xl] Al-Khansa: The dialogue with the Shiites should not be through Saudi Arabia or Hadas Channal, Al-Akhbar (Arabic). August 20, 2025. Accessed https://sl1nk.com/JQk7s September 5, 2025. 

[xli] Al-Khatib: Do not give Lebanon as a gift to Israel, Al-Ikhbar (Arabic). August 31, 2025. Accessed https://l1nq.com/FamNa September 5, 2025.

[xlii] Ezzaddeen: Disarming Hezbollah is the US and Israeli Objectives, Al-Ikhbar (Arabic). August 31, 2025. Accessed https://l1nq.com/7gfx2 September 6, 2025.