Indian Council of World Affairs

Abstract: Since the Arab Spring, last fourteen years have witnessed the Egypt-Türkiye relationship transformed from severe strain, rivalry to cooperation and now further consolidation of ties. Further, new areas of cooperation such as defense and energy are now being introduced in the relationship. This cooperation is also playing out in Syria, Libya and the Horn of Africa. This paper identifies the pillars of this strategic realignment between Egypt and Türkiye, locating it within the changing geopolitics, economic dynamics and conflicts. 

Introduction

The relationship between Türkiye and Egypt has witnessed a tremendous transformation, shifting from confrontation to cooperation and consolidating into a robust normalisation of diplomatic engagement. The present thaw has created new opportunities in security, defence, strategic, energy, and economic sectors, emphasising a significant transition from the past ten years of hostility following Egypt’s political transition in 2013. Ankara’s direct support to the Muslim Brotherhood (MBH) became a source of confrontation with Cairo, leading to diplomatic backlash, proxy conflict in Libya and Syria, and a decline in trade flows. However, the costs of prolonged confrontation combined with shifting regional dynamics and pressing domestic challenges ultimately created the conditions for reconciliation.

Türkiye’s support of MBH isolated it in the region. It increased the strain on its economy, prompting Ankara to reach out not only to Egypt but also to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Israel and Syria. Egypt, then struggling to recover from the effects of the Arab Spring, faced economic challenges, domestic stability issue and pressure from conflicts in its neighboring areas of Libya, Syria, and the Horn of Africa. Exploratory talks beginning in 2021 gradually reduced tensions, though normalisation was delayed until the re-election of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The breakthrough came with Erdogan’s visit to Cairo in February 2024, where he and President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi pledged cooperation on issues ranging from Libya, Syria, Africa, economic cooperation and energy security.

Since then, high-level mechanisms such as the Strategic Cooperation Council and joint declarations have institutionalised the partnership. Cairo and Ankara understood that cooperation is more fruitful than confrontation. Egypt has also expressed its desire to join Türkiye’s KAAN fighter jet programme and the production of drones together. Also, they extended cooperation on regasification, LNG trading and exploration of natural resources in the sea, reflecting convergence on many key areas. They also planned to expand their trade to $15 million in the coming years, underscoring the complementarily between Egypt’s energy resources and the industrial capacity of Türkiye. This paper identifies the pillars of strategic realignment between Egypt and Türkiye, locating it within the changing geopolitics, economic dynamics and conflicts.

Background

Türkiye’s quest for reconciliation started in 2021 when it repaired its ties with Syria, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, particularly owing to the fast-changing regional dynamics and protracted crisis of its economy. However, it was not only Türkiye that wanted to reconcile its relations with Arab countries. The countries in the region were also interested in reconciling their relations with Türkiye. Syria under Assad wanted to end its isolation, while the UAE sought geopolitical pragmatism to hedge against Iran and reduce its dependency on the US military and technology. Meanwhile, Riyadh wanted to restore its reputation post-Khashoggi affair and concentrate on Yemen, Iran, and the volatility of the oil market.[i] For Israel, Türkiye was a passage to export gas to Europe and buy Azeri oil via Türkiye. Also, these countries showed pragmatism under the auspices of the Abraham Accords to normalise their relations with Israel.

Türkiye had a decade-old rivalry with Egypt due to its support for the MBH during Arab Spring in 2011. The relationship became so strained that both countries declared each other’s diplomatic envoys persona non grata. They exchanged verbal confrontations at regional and global forums and used proxy tactics in neighbouring countries to meet their geopolitical goals. Türkiye sought to repair its ties because of its isolation in the Arab region and the necessity for Gulf petrodollars to strengthen its economy, with the Gulf States perceiving the MBH as an existential threat to their governance. The ideological rivalry did not completely end the economic relations between Cairo and Ankara, but it drastically reduced the trade from $2.3 billion in 2017 to $1.2 billion in 2018.[ii]On regional conflicts, the two countries had supported opposite sides in Syria, Libya and Iran. In 2021, the Ul-Ula declaration ended the blockade of Qatar at the beginning of 2021, and in 2023, the Saudi Arabia-Iran deal further increased the prospect of stability in the region. This was the time when MBH activities in the West Asia region had been either completely banned or strictly restricted. Türkiye established its quasi-permanent presence in Somalia, Libya, Syria and Qatar. Henceforth, there was little reason to continue the confrontation with Egypt, which had become detrimental to its economic and geopolitical ambitions.

However, Egypt was also facing these two challenges as it was reconsolidating the state apparatuses after the Arab Spring’s impact. These shifts were deeply linked with issues, such as divided Libya, intra-Gulf reconciliation, Israel's perennial conflicts with Lebanon, supply chain disruption and economic crisis due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine conflict. The diplomatic and intelligence personnel from both sides met to conduct “exploratory talks” in May and September 2021, leading to the appointment of ambassadors and the meeting of President Al-Sisi and President Erdogan in Qatar in 2022 during FIFA World Cup.[iii] However, normalisation occurred after Erdogan’s presidential election victory. On 14 February 2024, President Erdogan visited Egypt and held a joint press conference with President Al-Sisi. It only served as the official announcement of progress in improving bilateral relations since 2021. They agreed to cooperate in Libya, Syria, Palestinian statehood, the Horn of Africa, the military, security, and the energy sectors.

The Reasons for Improvement of Ties

President Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party has ideological similarities with the Muslim Brotherhood (MBH). Ankara’s financial and ideological support to MBH increased during the Arab Spring, culminating in the close cooperation in economic, diplomatic, and regional issues during the presidency of Mohammed Morsi in 2013, who was a lifetime member of MBH. However, the growing cooperation on Islamist ideology between Morsi and Erdogan created tension with Egypt’s statecraft and its institutions, which were built on the line of Arab nationalism and secularism. Therefore, Egypt was divided into two sections: secular-liberal and Islamist. The former became the source of President Morsi’s removal through popular protests, leading to the winning of the presidential election by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in 2014. Following which Egypt and Turkiye’s bilateral relations became confrontational for a period from which they have now emerged as this paper argues.

Egypt had completely banned MBH. Furthermore, other countries in the region, such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Syria, also outrightly banned the Islamist organisation. In contrast, countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, and Kuwait partially restricted the activities of MBH. Qatar does not have clear stand on MBH, and its policy towards the organisation can be considered ambiguous or supportive. In North Africa, Morocco has imposed significant limitations on MBH, while Ennahda in Tunisia failed to collaborate with liberal political sections, resulting in a decrease in its power. In Algeria, the Brotherhood’s activities are controlled by the government due to its clandestine activities.  

The decline of the influence of MBH also affected Turkiye’s influence in the region as the Arab countries started seeing Brotherhood as an extended arm of Ankara to meet its geopolitical interests in the region. Turkiye became isolated, and its economy was declining; repairing ties with the countries in the region was the only solution to improve its economy and regain its influence. Turkiye started deporting MBH activists to Egypt in 2019, even revoking the citizenship of MBH members after Erdogan visited Egypt in 2024, and shut down MBH-affiliated TV/media channels. Egypt is a clear beneficiary of Turkiye’s changed attitude towards MBH. However, it needs to be said, there is as yet no complete removal of MBH from Turkiye because an offshoot of MBH, such as the International Organisation to Support the Prophet of Islam (IOSPI), is still allegedly operating under the influence of Erdogan’s government.[iv]

The result of these dynamics centered on the approach to the Islamist MBH is the current consolidation of the bilateral relations between Egypt and Türkiye as seen in the following key areas:

Geopolitical Pragmatism and Strategic Convergence

In 2021, Türkiye and Egypt conducted exploratory talks to navigate the way to normalise their relations, leading to a breakthrough when President Erdogan visited Egypt after the exploratory talks. The outcome of the visit was the signing of the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council, underscoring the cooperation in Syria, Libya, the Horn of Africa, along with military, security, energy and economic cooperation.[v]

The Strategic Council’s establishment institutionalised the communication and created channels for engagement in energy, defence, trade and infrastructure. The reconciliation revealed their pragmatism on regional issues and their commitment to economic cooperation. Realistic calculations can define this convergence, as both the government recognised that rivalry is costlier than cooperation. The new realignment between Cairo and Ankara highlighted a dominant regional trend in which survival, stability and economic interests are prioritised over conflict and rivalry, leading to domestic fragility and weakening the external outlook of a country. Both countries saw gains in Libya, Sudan, Somalia and the Red Sea, where coordination could reduce tensions and boost stability. They agreed on restoring security in Libya and prioritising political solutions in Sudan and Syria.[vi]

Defence and Military Cooperation

On 4 September 2024, President Al-Sisi visited Türkiye to participate in second high-level meeting of the Strategic Cooperation Council to address regional issues and challenges at a high level. This was the second high-level meeting between the two countries in less than a year.[vii] During the visit, President Al-Sisi and the delegations from Egypt’s air force expressed interest in the KAAN programme and Türkiye’s defence system, which resembles the “Iron Dome”. It was followed by Egypt’s armed forces chief Gen. Ahmed Khalifa’s visit to Ankara in May 2025, which expanded the dialogue, training, technology transfer and knowledge sharing on the sidelines of the fourth Egypt-Türkiye Military Committee meeting.[viii] The pro-Turkish government news outlet Daily Sabah noted that the government has approved Egypt’s participation in the KAAN programme as a co-producer of a fifth-generation superior fighter aircraft. However, the two countries have not yet signed a deal on KAAN cooperation. The two countries intended to boost military self-sufficiency and reduce dependence on external actors. If Egypt joins the KAAN programme, experts believe it will change the air power balance away from the US.

The two countries conducted joint military exercise on 21 April 2025. Turkish Special Forces conducted advanced combat and technical activities with their Egyptian counterparts in the capital, Ankara, marking a significant development in their bilateral relations.[ix]

Another area of cooperation between Egypt and Türkiye involves unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and drones. On 26 August 2025, Egypt and Türkiye signed an agreement in Cairo to jointly produce vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) drones known as BAHA. This drone is designed to lift off like a helicopter while cruising like a small plane.[x]The drone will enhance the Egyptian army’s intelligence-gathering capabilities, similar to the drones used by the Turkish army. Also, there is a high possibility that Egypt will acquire the Bayraktar TB2 drones in the near future, which has changed the dynamics of conflicts in Azerbaijan, Libya and Ukraine. It has become evident that the two countries are prioritising the indigenisation of the defence industry to reduce their dependency on external actors.

Security Coordination at Regional Level

In the Horn of Africa, Türkiye and Egypt converge for different reasons. The recent Ethiopia-Somaliland agreement, which granted access of port Berbera to Addis Ababa via the Red Sea and potential recognition of Somaliland, has escalated tensions with Egypt and troubled Türkiye.[xi]

Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) acquired Somalia’s three offshore blocks to conduct exploration of gas and oil. Cairo is concerned about Ethiopia’s increasing power and influence following the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and its potential access to the Red Sea. This situation could diminish Egypt’s significance in energy politics and regional waterways. Ethiopia also buys Turkish drones for defence and other technical solutions. In response, Cairo strengthened its Red Sea strategy by increasing naval presence and forming new alliance with Ankara. The latter has opposed the deal because it intends to undermine the territorial sovereignty of Somalia, a close economic and defence partner of Türkiye.[xii]Türkiye has a greater involvement in Somalia and ties with Ethiopia, which it can use as a source of leverage to negotiate the cooperation between Egypt and Ethiopia. However, they did not formally announce cooperation in Somalia, instead, Egypt’s deployment of troops, and Türkiye’s transfer of weapons to the Somalian government considered as a jointly operated activity to counter Al-Shabaab, potentially increasing pressure on Ethiopia to find ways to cooperate with Egypt. The pragmatic partnership unfolds a new sub-regional change driven by Türkiye and Egypt, highlighting the emergence of multipolarity. 

In Sudan, Egypt’s position is shaped by concerns over Nile water security and broader geopolitical interests, and it is looking for political stability in Khartoum. Türkiye has substantial investments in Sudan and promotes stability in order to secure its economic interests. The deepening of regional tensions with the growing cooperation between Cairo and Ankara also influences Sudan to increase its cooperation with the two countries. This makes the Egypt-Türkiye reconciliation particularly significant, since their strategic partnership can reinforce Cairo’s ongoing mediation efforts in Sudan, where internal conflict threatens to spill over into an already fragile Libya.[xiii]On its own, Ankara has struggled to mediate between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, a limitation highlighted by past experiences. In contrast, Egypt has remained active on the diplomatic front, notably hosting the Summit of Sudan’s neighbouring countries in July 2023.[xiv]

In Libya, the growing partnership has eased the rivalry between Türkiye and Egypt, and now they seek to promote stability by reducing the divide between General Khalifa Haftar and Tripoli. The stability also paved the way for investment in reconstruction and hydrocarbons, which increased mutual benefits and shared interests. In this context, series of initiatives have been taken by Türkiye and Haftar to increase their cooperation. On 9 November 2024, a high-ranking Turkish officer met Haftar’s officer, showing that for the first time, the two parties are willing to open dialogue. Another significant development occurred on April 4, 2025 when Haftar’s son Colonel Saddam Haftar visited Türkiye to meet Minister of Defense Yasar Guler. In June 2025, three military technical delegations from eastern Libya participated in military training programs in Ankara.[xv]

Energy Cooperation

Türkiye has emerged as a significant market for Egypt’s LNG since 2021, and establishment of a Strategic Council has formalised the energy cooperation between the two countries. They have institutionalised the energy cooperation in various sectors, including natural gas infrastructure, LNG trading opportunities, underground storage and the sharing of technical information. They further expanded the cooperation on natural gas and nuclear power. On 12 May 2025, Turkish Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAS) and Egypt Natural Gas Holding Company (EGAS) signed an agreement under which Türkiye’s Floating Storage and Regasification Unit (FSRU) will operate in Egypt for the first time outside of the country. The agreement has also resulted in a MoU to institutionalise collaboration in mining and hydrocarbons through technical knowledge sharing in oil, gas, geothermal energy, hydrogen and critical minerals.[xvi]

The two countries’ economies complement each other, as Türkiye offers solid industrial infrastructure and Egypt is energy-rich. The growing energy cooperation between Egypt and Türkiye has implications for the Eastern Mediterranean energy landscape. Egypt has emerged as an important energy player in the region, and Türkiye wants to benefit from this. It is the founding member of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), which includes Greece, Cyprus, France, Israel and Italy, but not Türkiye.[xvii] Türkiye’s inclusion in the EMGF may result in monetising Eastern Mediterranean gas resources. However, Türkiye would not join the forum, as it would go against the fundamentals of Turkish foreign policy, leading to recognition of the Republic of Cyprus and respect for the maritime boundaries it contests.[xviii]

Egypt is seeking closer energy cooperation with Türkiye due to several challenges it faces in producing more gas, including the depletion of ageing fields like Zohr gas field, rising domestic demands that exceeds gas exports and non-payment of dues to foreign companies. Türkiye can assist Egypt with regasification capacity, as it possesses deep-water exploration experience in both the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean.

Economic Cooperation

During the geopolitical confrontation, the two countries-maintained trade and economic cooperation because they had signed the Free Trade Agreement in 2005. Since the revival of their partnership, they have intended to expand the FTA. Egypt is Ankara’s first economic partner in Africa, while Türkiye is the first export destination of Egyptian goods. Since 2024, the economic relations between the two countries have remained balanced and robust, aiming to increase the trade volume to 15 billion dollars in the coming years.

Cairo and Ankara also agreed to develop two new industrial parks in Egypt. The first project is in the New Administrative Capital, costing 120 million dollars, and the second is located in New October City, located adjacent to Giza. Turkish investment in Egypt reached 3 billion dollars in 2024, primarily in manufacturing and services. Around 50000 Egyptians were employed in Turkish-owned textile industries in Egypt. Egypt is establishing a specialised unit within the General Authority for Investment and Free Zones (GAFI), aimed at providing personalised assistance and resolving challenges that may be encountered.[xix]Egypt can also be an industrial and logistics hub for Türkiye to expand its trade and economic relations with Africa. However, the regional challenges and disruption of supply chains are the real bottlenecks that may stymie the progress in their bilateral economic relations.

Conclusion

The renewed cooperation between Türkiye and Egypt has changed their confrontation into a pragmatic partnership in the energy, defence and economic sectors. The common concerns and challenges in Sudan, Syria, Libya and the Horn of Africa have reinforced their cooperation. The growing convergence in defence, economic and energy sectors reveal that Ankara and Cairo have started prioritising mutual interests and stability over the post-ideological differences. Their coordination reflects a broader regional trend where survival outweighs confrontation. Institutional frameworks like the Strategic Cooperation Council anchor this new phase. The partnership underscores how shifting dynamics in the West Asia region reshape old rivalries into opportunities for collaboration.

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*Dr. Arshad, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA)
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

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[iv] A New Muslim Brotherhood outfit operates under the wing of the Erdogan government to execute influence operations, Nordic Monitor, February 12, 2025, accessed https://tinyurl.com/yusyjsxa, September 24, 2025.

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[vi] Egypt-Türkiye cooperation brings profound changes in ties with African countries, Atlantic Council, November 18, 2024, accessed https://tinyurl.com/mtd7mvwn, August 22, 2025.

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[xi] Egypt-Türkiye cooperation brings profound changes in ties with African countries.

[xii] In the Horn of Africa, Turkiye and Egypt unfold a strategic alignment-or potential rivalry, Atlantic Council, January 23, 2025, accessed https://tinyurl.com/2btxvkj8, August 25, 2025.

[xiii] From rivalry to cooperation: The geopolitical implications of Egypt-Turkiye rapprochement, Atlantic Council, January 23, 2025, accessed https://tinyurl.com/ykmnafpn, September 1, 2025.

[xiv] Could Turkey and Egypt together develop a more effective diplomatic approach to Sudan’s brutal civil war?, ISPI, December 23, 2024, accessed https://tinyurl.com/v9f2r98a, September 2, 2025.

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