Indian Council of World Affairs

Abstract: Ethiopia’s inauguration of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) marks a turning point in Nile geopolitics, ending Egypt’s century-long hydro-hegemony. While Cairo frames GERD as an existential threat, the dispute is less about water flows and more about history, sovereignty and power. The key question is whether Ethiopia will replicate past patterns of domination or use GERD as a platform for cooperation, transforming it from a flashpoint of rivalry into a cornerstone of regional integration. 

On 9 September 2025, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed officially inaugurated the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), a 5,150-megawatt project on the Blue Nile. Notably, the inauguration was celebrated in the presence of various African regional neighbours, including Ismaïl Omar Guelleh, President of the Republic of Djibouti; Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of the Republic of South Sudan; Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, President of the Federal Republic of Somalia and William Samoei Ruto, President of the Republic of Kenya. This grand project also achieved support at the multilateral level by the African Union Commission and Claver Gatete, United Nations Under-Secretary-General and Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA).[i]

It is a historic event, making the completion of the largest hydroelectric dam in Africa and a symbol of national sovereignty for Ethiopia. Notwithstanding, it remains more than a decade-old flashpoint of insecurity for Egypt and Sudan. Earlier, contestation was centred on the construction and filling phases of the dam. Post-GERD inauguration, the conversation shifted around the dam to assess its long-term management for the region. This paper examines the causes of this insecurity in light of this new development and whether Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan can cooperate to achieve mutual development. 

GERD’s National and Regional Significance for Ethiopia 

The GERD on the Blue Nile is a landmark project not only for Ethiopia but for Africa as a whole. With a storage capacity of 74 billion cubic metres, roughly equivalent to the combined annual water shares of Egypt and Sudan, the dam stands as Africa’s largest hydropower project. With a current capacity of 5,150 megawatts, the dam is expected to reach an annual output of approximately 15,700 gigawatt-hours when fully operational, placing Ethiopia at the centre of the continent’s energy transformation.[ii]

National Significance

The GERD is more than a massive infrastructural achievement; it is a symbol of sovereignty, unity and self-reliance, signifying a new era of African development. For Ethiopia’s 130 million citizens, 45 per cent of whom still lack electricity, the dam promises not only power but dignity, addressing decades of unmet socioeconomic needs.[iii] By funding the GERD largely through citizen bond purchases rather than international loans, Ethiopia has demonstrated a decisive break from aid dependency, echoing a broader African shift towards autonomy, seen, for example, in Francophone countries distancing themselves from French influence.[iv]

The dam has also become a tool of domestic cohesion, uniting Ethiopia’s diverse ethnic regions around a shared national project. Public rallies in Afar, Harari and Sidama celebrated its completion, [v] while Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed opened the site for public visits twice a week, calling the GERD a project that “bears the mark of all Ethiopians”.[vi] In a country often strained by ethnic fragmentation, the GERD has served as a unifying symbol of collective pride and self-determination.

Regional and Continental Dimensions

Beyond national borders, the GERD is a regional power multiplier. Expected to generate $1 billion annually, Ethiopia positions itself as an emerging energy hub, exporting electricity to Sudan, Kenya and Djibouti, with plans to extend supply to Tanzania and South Sudan. These confidence-building initiatives foster supply chain integration and align with the African Union’s Agenda 2063, by promoting rural industrialisation, internet penetration, and broader educational access.[vii]

While upstream riparian states broadly support the GERD as a symbol of equitable use, downstream states, Egypt and Sudan, remain wary, fearing reduced water security. Yet, even amid disputes, new dynamics are taking shape since the inauguration of the dam. Kenya[viii] and South Sudan[ix] have signalled interest in electricity agreements with Ethiopia, while Somalia has offered to mediate despite its own tensions with Addis Ababa over Somaliland.[x] These moves suggest that development priorities increasingly outweigh older rivalries. With regard to Egypt and Sudan, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed, reiterated his government’s readiness to continue dialogue around the dam, which is not meant to harm the interests of Egypt and Sudan.[xi]

At the continental level, the GERD represents an African-led model of self-financed mega-projects, challenging narratives of dependency on foreign aid. Its completion largely without international support has set a precedent for energy independence that resonates across Africa. Ethiopian President Taye Atske-Selassie, addressing the 80th UN General Assembly, linked the inauguration to another milestone: the long-awaited Nile River Basin Commission, to be established in Entebbe, Uganda, in September 2025 under the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA).[xii] With only Egypt, Sudan and the DRC yet to ratify, the dam inauguration perhaps could renew the confidence to institutionalise an African-owned water governance framework, despite lingering divisions.

Simultaneously, the international community has responded cautiously. The US, the EU, and China have limited themselves to calling for restraint and dialogue within the African Union framework, avoiding direct pressure on Ethiopia. In contrast, the Arab League, aligning with Egypt, has condemned Ethiopia’s unilateral actions and pressed for a binding legal agreement.[xiii]

While the GERD has become a transformative force for Ethiopia at the domestic, regional and continental levels, shifting Africa’s narrative towards self-reliance, its success depends on Addis Ababa’s ability to balance national ambitions with downstream insecurities, which require understanding the context of the Nile rivalry owing to colonial times.

Colonial Legacies Sowing Resentment among African States

The age-old Nile politics rests on the river’s course, which flows through 11 African countries, with multiple sources but has two main tributaries: the White Nile and the Blue Nile. The White Nile starts around Lake Victoria in the upper riparian East Africa (Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi and DRC), while the Blue Nile begins in the upper riparian Ethiopia at Lake Tana. The two rivers meet in Khartoum, Sudan, before flowing north through Sudan and Egypt to the Mediterranean.[xiv]

Source: https://nowater-nolife.org/nile-river-basin/

The Nile flows through African countries, but its politics were shaped primarily by British colonial self-interest. The British interests were two-fold concerning their control over the Nile River. The first was to secure Egypt’s cotton-based economy, and the other was to safeguard the strategically significant Suez Canal as a linchpin of Pax Britannica, preventing other foreign powers from competing for control in Egypt. Initially centred on Egypt, Britain expanded its strategy after annexing Sudan, treating the Nile as a single planning unit, limiting the upstream modernisation of the basin, including Ethiopia, and also sowing mistrust between Cairo and Khartoum.[xv]

Britain leveraged against Egypt by emphasising Sudan’s role as Egypt’s “water gate”[xvi] while simultaneously discouraging joint sovereignty, nurturing a separate Sudanese identity, and weakening Egypt’s influence in the country. To secure control, Britain brokered a series of treaties: the 1902 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty, restricting Ethiopia from unilateral projects on the Blue Nile and Lake Tana to provide Egypt and Sudan with Nile water security; the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, granting Egypt veto power over upstream projects and treating the river as its entitlement; and finally, the 1959 Egypt–Sudan Agreement in post-independence times, which allocated nearly the entire Nile flow between the two downstream states.[xvii] Upstream countries were excluded, leaving them with no legal share and sowing enduring resentment. These colonial arrangements institutionalised a hydro-political imbalance that laid the foundation for future disputes.[xviii]

Balancing Hydro-Hegemony Politics with New Power Relations

Until Ethiopia launched the GERD in 2011, Egypt maintained a position of hydro-hegemony over the Nile, grounded in colonial-era treaties and reinforced by its political and military power. Upstream states, such as Ethiopia, were long constrained by instability and limited technology, leaving Egypt relatively unchallenged despite the former’s contribution of 86 per cent to the Nile’s waters.[xix]

Egypt reinforced this dominance through its coercive and ideational power. Successive leaders, including Anwar Sadat, threatened military action against Ethiopia if it attempted to divert water, with Sadat declaring in the 1970s that water was the only matter to push Egypt back to war. Beyond coercion, Cairo monopolised data, producing technical knowledge, shaping international discourse on Nile management and tying Sudan into its hydropower orbit through the 1959 Agreement. Even during the Cold War, Sudan remained Egypt’s junior partner, with both states benefiting from the US aid as part of a downstream bloc.[xx]

Ethiopia, however, has consistently resisted external attempts to curtail its sovereignty over the Nile, from rejecting colonial interference to challenging Egypt’s hegemony. It has long disputed the 1902 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty, signed by Britain on behalf of Egypt and Sudan, pointing to discrepancies between the English and Amharic texts. Its negotiations with Britain over Lake Tana in the 1920s–30s, though unsuccessful, marked an early effort to assert sovereign rights over Nile development.[xxi] In the post-colonial era, Egypt perpetuated a similar colonial model of exclusion, invoking these treaties to block international financing for upstream projects. The completion of GERD, funded domestically without external support, thus, represents a decisive break from this legacy.

The launch of the GERD in 2011 marked the decline of Egypt’s uncontested dominance and the emergence of a multipolar Nile politics. Upstream states began coordinating through frameworks like the Nile Basin Initiative (1999) and the Cooperative Framework Agreement (2010), challenging Egypt’s claim to “historic rights”. GERD’s completion crystallised this shift, transforming Ethiopia into a central actor capable of rebalancing power. The focus of disputes has also shifted from construction and filling to operation and long-term management, opening space for potential cooperation. This is especially critical given the Nile’s centrality to Egypt, meeting its water needs mainly from the Blue Nile, and the opportunities for Ethiopia to export power across the region via the GERD on the Blue Nile. Meanwhile, Sudan is caught between the potential benefits of the dam, which include regulated flows and flood prevention, on the one hand, and fears of risks, including information exchange and assistance during the extreme drought season, on the other hand.[xxii]

Sudan’s Unique Position: Between Ambiguity and Assertiveness

Sudan occupies a unique middle ground. Historically tied to Egypt’s hydro-hegemony, it benefited from the 1959 treaty but began recalibrating in the 1990s, especially after relations soured during its Islamist turn. In parallel, Khartoum developed closer ties with Ethiopia, establishing the Ethiopia–Sudan Technical Advisory Committee (1991), later utilised in deepening cooperation through data-sharing on projects like the Roseires Dam in 2022.[xxiii] This signalled Khartoum’s interest in independent water cooperation with Addis Ababa.

By the 2000s, Sudan began reframing its Nile policy more in self-interest than subordination. Although it joined Egypt in rejecting the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) in 2010, its reasoning was to protect its own priorities rather than uphold Egypt’s dominance. This shift was further reinforced after the GERD’s announcement in 2011, when Sudan dismissed the findings of the International Panel of Experts, arguing that the review lacked a legal basis and catered primarily to the interests of Egypt and Ethiopia.[xxiv] Moreover, Sudan has increasingly sought a balancing role. It welcomed aspects of GERD’s inauguration and is even willing to mediate like it did earlier, through trilateral talks in 2020, where 90% of technical issues were agreed upon, though legal and binding commitments remained unresolved.[xxv]

Newer power relations between upstream, downstream and non-riparian countries have begun to develop, beyond the traditional Egypt-Sudan relations, which has led to a shifting regional order in favour of upstream riparian states. Notwithstanding, Sudan’s approach often seems ambiguous, as it behaves like a swing state. On one hand, it rejected Ethiopia’s unilateral filling and operation of the GERD in the quadripartite meeting of foreign and water ministers alongside Egypt on 3 September 2025, ahead of the official inauguration of the GERD. On the other hand, a recently leaked agreement between Sudan and Ethiopia, dated 26 October 2022, revealed a technical arrangement for the filling and operation of the dam between the two countries, acknowledging the interconnected nature of the GERD and Sudan’s Roseires Dam.[xxvi] It indicates Khartoum’s pragmatic alignment with Addis Ababa, even as it publicly coordinated with Egypt, particularly given the civil conflict that broke out in Sudan in April 2023, increasing its reliance on Egyptian support.[xxvii]

The GERD has become the catalyst of a turning point in Nile politics, symbolising Ethiopia’s assertion of sovereignty and Sudan’s recalibration of alliances. Yet, for this development to translate into peaceful, win-win development, Ethiopia, the new hydropower force in the region, must also address the insecurities of Egypt and Sudan, both of whom remain directly affected by GERD’s operation.

Addressing Concerns of Egypt and Sudan

There have been concerns from Egypt and Sudan about the GERD erupting since 2011, owing to their downstream position in the Nile basin, which led to multiple negotiations with no substantial outcome, even post-completion and inauguration of the dam. On the contrary, a few hours after the Ethiopian PM opened the dam, the Egyptian foreign minister sent a letter to the head of the United Nations Security Council, describing the GERD as a project implemented in violation of international law.[xxviii]

Egypt’s apprehensions are rooted in acute water insecurity. The country relies on the Nile for 98 per cent of its freshwater needs, with nearly 85 per cent of that flow originating from the Blue Nile, where the GERD is located. Under existing agreements, Egypt’s allocation is just 55.5 billion cubic metres annually, which it considers a non-negotiable “red line”. Egypt argues that the GERD could reduce water reaching its High Aswan Dam (HAD), undermining storage capacity during normal years and posing an existential threat in times of prolonged drought. Yet, evidence from GERD’s first unilateral filling by Ethiopia in 2020 suggests otherwise: Egypt’s prudent management and higher-than-average inflows kept HAD’s levels stable, indicating limited day-to-day impacts under normal conditions. However, water shortage can be concerning during an extreme drought-like situation.[xxix]

Sudan’s concerns, while distinct, are equally pressing. The Roseires Dam, located close to GERD, is highly sensitive to changes in flow and operations, while downstream infrastructure, such as the Merowe and Sennar dams, irrigation schemes and urban water supply in Khartoum, requires predictable flows. Sudan’s most serious alarm came in July 2020, when Ethiopia’s first filling of GERD, undertaken without notification, caused disruptions in Khartoum’s drinking water supply. Though the interruption involved only a small volume, it exposed Sudan’s vulnerability to uncoordinated operations. In response, Ethiopia and Sudan revived their Eastern Nile Technical Advisory Committee (ESTAC) and signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to facilitate daily data and information exchange between the GERD and Roseires. This practical step highlighted that regular coordination and transparency, rather than the dam itself, are central to Sudan’s security.[xxx]

The GERD has already transformed Nile politics from a downstream monopoly historically dominated by Egypt into a contested but pluralistic order where upstream states, particularly Ethiopia, have begun asserting agency. But sustaining this shift requires more than symbolism. It depends on mutual trust, transparency and reliability, without which the dam risks becoming a flashpoint rather than a foundation for regional development.

Way Forward for Cooperation: From Dividing Waters to Sharing Benefits

Now that the GERD is complete, Ethiopia stands at a crossroads in shaping the future of Nile politics. The first is a path of self-interest: maximising hydropower production without accommodating downstream concerns. This approach risks Ethiopia becoming a new hydro-hegemon, repeating the patterns of domination it has long resisted. However, according to experts, such an approach would require Ethiopia to maintain a steady hydropower generation to sustain revenues and keep increasing its reliability to meet its revenue objectives, which will depend upon Ethiopia’s power purchasing agreements with its neighbours. While Ethiopia could still secure revenues through power export agreements, open hostility from Egypt and Sudan would undermine both its financial returns and regional security, potentially escalating tensions into direct confrontation.

The alternative path is one of compromise and benefit-sharing. Evidence suggests that in over 90 per cent of modelled years, Egypt’s water flows will not be reduced by GERD, with shortages arising mainly from natural droughts rather than Ethiopian action. During rare, prolonged droughts, Ethiopia could mitigate downstream insecurities by providing supplemental releases and sharing real-time data. Moreover, Ethiopia’s drive to maximise hydropower necessitates that it releases water downstream regularly, thus aligning its economic incentives with Egypt and Sudan’s water security.[xxxi]

This compromise could evolve into a transitional agreement focused less on rigid water allocations and more on energy partnerships. Studies indicate that regional power trade stabilises GERD’s hydropower output, ensuring reliable downstream flows while reducing greenhouse gas emissions.[xxxii] Such sustainable arrangements would help offset Egypt’s projected water deficit, estimated to reach the threshold for extreme water scarcity in 2033,[xxxiii] while giving Sudan greater energy and water security. For Ethiopia, the returns would be both financial and diplomatic, strengthening its standing as a responsible regional power. This approach would build mutual trust in both diplomatic and economic relations between the states, moving them away from a colonial mindset towards pan-African cooperation.

Recent regional developments show the feasibility of this approach. The East African Power Pool (EAPP),[xxxiv] for instance, is preparing to launch a regional Day-Ahead Market for electricity trading in 2025, backed by interconnections, such as the Kenya–Tanzania power link. By embedding the GERD within such regional frameworks, [xxxv] Nile states can move away from zero-sum politics towards integrated development that links water, energy, food, and environmental security.

Challenges to Address

Moving towards this cooperative model will require all three states, especially Ethiopia and Egypt, to overcome entrenched positions. Egypt continues to frame the GERD as a violation of international law, appealing to institutions such as the UN Security Council, while Ethiopia insists on its sovereign rights and has consistently resisted legally binding water-sharing treaties. Moreover, in the wake of the recent excessive flooding affecting downstream Egypt and Sudan, regional responses have diverged notably. Egypt has issued its strongest warning to Addis Ababa, vowing to take “all necessary measures” to safeguard its water security, and linking the recent flooding to alleged mismanagement at the GERD.[xxxvi] Ethiopia, in response, has rejected these accusations, asserting that the GERD actually plays a mitigating role in curbing the historically devastating floods along the Nile, rather than contributing to them.[xxxvii] Sudan, meanwhile, has opted for a measured and diplomatic approach, quietly managing the crisis without directly confronting Ethiopia.[xxxviii]

To balance Ethiopia, Egypt has also sought to expand its influence by engaging upstream states like Uganda and Rwanda, offering development financing cooperation as part of broader Nile diplomacy. [xxxix] For instance, President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, during his recent bilateral talks with Uganda, highlighted Egypt’s recently launched $100 million financing mechanism for infrastructure and development projects in the southern Nile Basin states.[xl] Meanwhile, Ethiopia emphasises its adherence to the 2015 Declaration of Principles (DOP), accusing Egypt of clinging to colonial-era treaties and obstructing Nile basin frameworks, such as the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), which finally entered into force in 2024.[xli] The absence of trust remains the greatest barrier: Egypt fears permanent loss of control, while Ethiopia resists legal obligations that could constrain its development.

A transitional compromise, centred on energy trade and regional integration rather than fixed water quotas, offers a way to break this deadlock.[xlii] The costs of continued rivalry are high: border disputes, inflated military spending and chronic political instability. The benefits of cooperation, by contrast, extend beyond water, opening space for joint prosperity across the Horn and Nile Basin.

Conclusion

Nile negotiations are undergoing a historic shift. The talks, earlier, revolved around GERD’s construction and filling; today, the focus is shifting towards long-term operation and management. This shift creates space for consensus. On one side, Ethiopia has decisively ended Egypt’s century of hydro-hegemony by completing the GERD; on the other, it now bears the responsibility of providing credible assurances to its neighbours. Yet, Ethiopia’s reluctance to accept binding agreements sits uneasily beside its official rhetoric of cooperation.

The real test ahead is whether Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan can transform the GERD from a symbol of rivalry into a foundation for mutual trust, energy integration, and shared prosperity. Doing so would mark not only the end of colonial-era water politics, but also the beginning of a new African era of unity, sustainable growth, and regional integration.

***** 

*Nandini Khandelwal, Research Analyst, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal. 

Endnotes

[i] “PM Abiy Inaugurates Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).” ENA English. September 2025. https://www.ena.et/web/eng/w/eng_7298478.

[ii] “Webuild: Grand Ethopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) Inaugurated, Biggest Hydropower Project Ever Built in Africa.” Webuildgroup. September 9, 2025. https://www.webuildgroup.com/en/media/press-releases/grand-ethopian-renaissance-dam-gerd-inaugurated/.

[iii] “Ethiopia Launches Mega Dam, Eyes Political, Economic Benefits despite Tensions with Egypt.” Thearabweekly. September 9, 2025. https://thearabweekly.com/ethiopia-launches-mega-dam-eyes-political-economic-benefits-despite-tensions-egypt#:~:text=with%20Egypt%20%7C%20%7C%20AW-,Ethiopia%20Launches%20mega%20dam%2C%20eyes%20political%2C%20economic%20benefits%20despite%20tensions,not%20to%20harm%20its%20brothers.%E2%80%9D.

[iv] Dr. Oteng - Gyang. 2025. “The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) – a Lesson for Africa.” Modern Ghana. September 22, 2025. https://www.modernghana.com/news/1434220/the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-gerd-a.html.

[v] “Ethiopians Continue Celebrating Self-Funded GERD as Symbol of Unity, Prosperity.” ENA English. 2025. https://www.ena.et/web/eng/w/eng_7368531.

[vi] “GERD to Open Its Doors to Public Visits.” 2025. Ebc.et. September 26, 2025. https://www.ebc.et/english/Home/NewsDetails?NewsId=1766.

[vii] Mbaku, John. 2025. “Ethiopia’s Mega Dam Has Taken 14 Years to Build: What It Means for the Nile’s 11 River States and Why It’s so Controversial.” The conversation. September 8, 2025. https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-mega-dam-has-taken-14-years-to-build-what-it-means-for-the-niles-11-river-states-and-why-its-so-controversial-264665.

[viii] “Kenya to Sign Power Deal with Ethiopia after Africa’s Largest Dam Launched.” 2025. Citizen Digital. September 9, 2025. https://www.citizen.digital/news/kenya-to-sign-power-deal-with-ethiopia-after-africas-largest-dam-launched-n369359.

[ix] “President of South Sudan Announces Plan to Sign Power Supply Agreement with Ethiopia.” 2025b. Fana Media Corporation S.C. September 9, 2025. https://www.fanamc.com/english/president-of-south-sudan-announces-plan-to-sign-power-supply-agreement-with-ethiopia/.

[x] “Somali Leader States His Nation Willing to Facilitate Ethiopia, Egypt Dialogue.” 2025. Menafn.com. September 18, 2025. https://menafn.com/1110079410/Somali-Leader-states-his-nation-willing-to-facilitate-Ethiopia-Egypt-dialogue.

[xi] “The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Is Inaugurated without Egypt and Sudan.” 2025. Ayin network - شبكة عاين. September 9, 2025. https://3ayin.com/en/gerd-2/.

[xii] “Nile River Basin Commission Nears Establishment.” The Reporter Ethiopia. September 27, 2025. https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/47212/.

[xiii] “Ethiopia’s Dam Inauguration Raises Stakes in Regional Crisis.” Arab News. September 17, 2025. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2615666.

[xiv] “Nile River.” Education.nationalgeographic.org. National Geographic. June 30, 2022. https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/nile-river/.

[xv] Tvedt, Terje . 2010. “About the Importance of Studying the Modern History of the Countries of the Nile Basin in a Nile Perspective.” In The River Nile in the Post-Colonial Age, edited by Terje Tvedt, 1–12. I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd. https://terjetvedt.w.uib.no/files/2017/03/Pages-from-River-Nile_FINALa.pdf.

[xvi] For instance, the construction of upstream water projects such as Sennar Dam in Sudan in the 1920s was used to deter Egypt from resisting the British, given its high dependence on Nile waters.

[xvii] The amount of waters for Egypt and Sudan was increased from 48bcm to 55.5bcm and 4bcm to 18.5bcm respectively. It totaled to 74bcm waters.

[xviii] Op.cit.14

[xix] Darwisheh, Housam. 2021. “Sudan and Egypt’s Hydro-Politics in the Nile River Basin - Institute of Developing Economies.” Institute of Developing Economies, 2-3. https://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Reports/Dp/818.html.

[xx] Darwisheh, Housam. 2021. “Sudan and Egypt’s Hydro-Politics in the Nile River Basin - Institute of Developing Economies.” Institute of Developing Economies, 4-6. https://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Reports/Dp/818.html.

[xxi] Op.cit. 14.

[xxii] “Bridging the Gap in the Nile Waters Dispute.” 2019. Africa Report N°271, International Crisis Group, 19-24. https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/271-bridging-the-gap.pdf.

[xxiii] Mohamed, Yasir A, and Seifeldin H Abdalla. 2025. “The Negotiations around the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD): A Sudanese Perspective.” Water International, September, 1–25. https://doi.org/10.1080/02508060.2025.2539566.

[xxiv] Charles, Khalil. 2018. “Nile Water Crisis Places Sudan, Egypt and Ethiopia on the Brink of War.” Middle East Monitor. January 15, 2018. https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180115-nile-water-crisis-places-sudan-egypt-and-ethiopia-on-the-brink-of-war/.

[xxv] Op.cit.22.

[xxvi] Op.cit.11.

[xxvii] Ibrahim, Elfadil. 2025. “The Nile Water ‘War’ Is Over. Ethiopia Won.” Thearabweekly . September 17, 2025. https://thearabweekly.com/nile-water-war-over-ethiopia-won#:~:text=This%20strategic%20retreat%20is%20not,battleground%20for%20regional%20proxy%20wars.-.

[xxviii] Salem, Saleh. 2025. “From Military Option to ICJ, Can Egypt Respond to Ethiopia GERD?” The New Arab. September 13, 2025. https://www.newarab.com/news/military-option-icj-can-egypt-respond-ethiopia-gerd.

[xxix] Whittington, Dale, Jim Hall, Anna Murgatroyd, and Kevin Wheeler. 2024. “Should Egypt Be Afraid of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam? The Consequences of Adversarial Water Policy on the Blue Nile.” Water Policy, December. https://doi.org/10.2166/wp.2024.257.

[xxx] Op.cit.22.

[xxxi] Op.cit.28.

[xxxii] Mikiyas Etichia, Mohammed Basheer, Ruben Bravo, Jose Gutierrez, Atsede Endegnanew, Jose M Gonzalez, Anthony Hurford, et al. “Energy Trade Tempers Nile Water Conflict.” Nature Water 2 (4). https://doi.org/10.1038/s44221-024-00222-9.

[xxxiii] “Egypt CCDR Lays out Priority Climate Actions and Investment Opportunities.” World Bank, 8 Nov. 2022, www.worldbank.org/en/country/egypt/brief/egypt-ccdr-lays-out-priority-climate-actions-and-investment-opportunities.

[xxxiv] The Eastern Africa Power Pool (EAPP), established in 2005 has 13 member countries: Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan, Burundi, Djibouti, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Kenya, Libya, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda to coordinate cross-border power trade and grid interconnections for regional energy developmental integration.

[xxxv] “Final Grid Testing before Ethiopia Exports Electricity to Tanzania - ESI-Africa.com.” ESI-Africa.com. January 6, 2025. https://www.esi-africa.com/east-africa/final-grid-testing-before-ethiopia-exports-electricity-to-tanzania/.

[xxxvi] Namatovu, Jackie. 2025. “Egypt’s Sisi Revives Military Options over Ethiopia Dam.” ChimpReports. October 13, 2025. https://chimpreports.com/egypts-sisi-revives-military-options-over-ethiopia-dam/.

[xxxvii] “GERD Prevented ‘Historic Destruction’ in Sudan, Egypt, Ethiopia Asserts.” Adisstandard. October 4, 2025. https://addisstandard.com/gerd-prevented-historic-destruction-in-sudan-egypt-ethiopia-asserts/.

[xxxviii] Salah, Ehsan, et al. “Sudan Nashra: Sudan Downplays GERD-Caused Floods to Avoid Diplomatic Row | AU-Led Sudanese-Sudanese Meetings Postponed | Military Breaks Aerial Blockade over Fasher | over 80 Killed in Military Airstrikes on Nyala | Machar Trial Kicks Off, Immunity Pushed Aside.” Mada Masr. October 5, 2025. https://surl.li/finbwq.  

[xxxix]“Nile Water ‘Matter of Existence’ for Egypt: El-Sisi to Rwandan President - Foreign Affairs - Egypt.” Ahram Online. September 23, 2025. https://english.ahram.org.eg/News/553654.aspx.

[xl] “Egypt, Uganda Strengthen Water Cooperation, Address Nile Governance.” Dailynewsegypt. August 4, 2025. https://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2025/08/05/egypt-uganda-strengthen-water-cooperation-address-nile-governance/.

[xli] Sahlu, Sisay. “Foreign Minister Defends GERD in Letter to UN Security Council, Slams Egypt’s ‘Colonial Mindset.’” The Reporter Ethiopia. September 20, 2025. https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/47104/.

[xlii] Op.cit. 31.