Indian Council of World Affairs

Abstract: Xi Jinping has endeavoured to carry out numerous changes in Tibet to assert federal control. These changes are transforming the region in various aspects, but mutual suspicion and mistrust between the Tibetans and the Chinese continue. 

The geostrategic importance of Tibet’s location is vital to China. It is situated on the Tibetan Plateau bordering India, China, Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar. It has an abundance of natural resources, including minerals and water, which are vital for China’s economic development and energy security. For China, it is the gateway to South Asia. Tibet is often referred to as the “water tower of Asia”, given that it is the starting point of Asia’s major river systems. It is also referred to as a third pole when viewed in conjunction with the Arctic and Antarctic, due to its significance for global climatic parameters. In addition, Tibet also has a rich socio-cultural heritage. The paper explores the divergent perspectives of China, the US and India on Tibet.   

Tibet in Historical Context

Following the Second World War, China annexed Tibet in 1950. An agreement was signed between the Chinese Government and the Tibetan government in 1951. The Chinese government signed the “17-point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet” with the Tibetan government. In 1959, the Lhasa uprising occurred, during which the Dalai Lama fled to Dharamshala, India. Ever since the Dalai Lama fled to Dharamshala, it has become a point of contention between India and China.

Following this event, the issue of sovereignty and the Human Rights of Tibetans has been a crucial issue vis-à-vis Tibet. Various countries made statements in the course of UN General Assembly debates and condemned the Chinese action.[i] The delegate from the Philippines said, “It is clear that on the eve of the invasion in 1950, Tibet was not under the rule of any foreign country.” A representative from Thailand stated that the majority of states “refute the contention that Tibet is part of China”. The US also condemned the Chinese “aggression” and “invasion” of Tibet. [ii]

Tibet has become a crucial issue in evolving geopolitical dynamics. So far, there have been three UN General Assembly Resolutions on Tibet in 1959, 1961, and 1965. The UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 1353 (XIV) 1959, on 21 October 1959. This resolution addressed the human rights situation in Tibet. It “Calls for respect for the fundamental human rights of the Tibetan people and for their distinctive cultural and religious life.” In 1961, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 1723 (XVI).  This resolution “Calls for the cessation of practices which deprive the Tibetan people of their fundamental human rights and freedoms, including their right to self-determination.”[iii] The 1965 UNGA Resolution expressed concern over the human rights and suppression of the Tibetans' cultural and religious life. It “Calls for the cessation of all practices which deprive the Tibetan people of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which they have always enjoyed.”[iv]

As the 14^th Dalai Lama is ageing, the issue of succession has come to the forefront. The reincarnation of the Dalai Lama has become a pertinent issue in deciding the future of Tibet. According to Lamaistic belief, when a Dalai Lama dies, his spirit is reincarnated in the body of his successor, born at the moment of his death.[v] (It has become yet another point of friction between China and the Dalai Lama.) The Dalai Lama has said the sole authority to recognise the next Dalai Lama will be the Gaden Phodrang Trust, the office of the Dalai Lama. [vi]

China opines that the succession of the Dalai Lama should be under Chinese Law. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has clarified its position: “The Dalai Lama’s reincarnation must follow the principles of domestic recognition, the ‘golden urn’ [vii] process and approval by the central government, in line with religious traditions and laws.”[viii] In ancient China, an order was issued by the then-emperor of China, requiring Tibetans to use a golden vase or urn as the final stage in deciding between three children identified as potential reincarnations of a high lama. After reciting appropriate prayers, a name would be drawn from the urn.[ix] The golden urn process was started during the Qing Dynasty. The Chinese government has insisted on confirming the next Dalai Lama by drawing lots from a golden urn, a method that was occasionally used in the past to identify the reincarnations of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama. It may be recalled that the golden urn method was not used for choosing the 9th or the 13th Dalai Lamas during the Qing era, nor was it implemented in the identification of the 14th Dalai Lama, who was born after the Qing dynasty’s fall.[x]

Conversely, in 2011, the Dalai Lama rejected the Chinese position on the issue of reincarnation. He has stated: “The process by which a future Dalai Lama is to be recognised [and…] the responsibility for doing so will rest exclusively with members of the Gaden Phodrang Trust, the office of the Dalai Lama.” In May 2025, he reiterated that the Golden Phodrang Trust is the “only authority” to decide the process of succession, and no other authority can interfere in this matter, rejecting once again any official Chinese say in the matter. [xi]

Political Development in Tibet under Xi Jinping

Over the years, Tibet has been experiencing significant transformation, and many of these changes began in 2012, when Xi Jinping took leadership in China. China regards Tibet as an integral part of its territory. In 2003, China identified Tibet as one of its core interests, alongside Taiwan and Xinjiang. Later, the South China Sea and East China Sea were also incorporated as the core interests of China. All these regions constitute China’s restive periphery.

According to a report by the International Campaign for Tibet, Xi Jinping’s primary aim vis-à-vis Tibet is to securitise the region and Sinify the Tibetan people within the Chinese nation state.[xii] In 2013, at the first session of the 12th National People’s Congress, Xi Jinping stated, “To govern the country well, we must first govern the frontier well, and to govern the frontiers well, we must first ensure stability in Tibet.”[xiii] This statement of intent marks a new chapter in China’s approach to Tibet. At the Central Ethnic Work Conference held on 28 and 29 September 2014, Xi Jinping stressed the need to “resolutely walk the correct road of China’s unique solution to the ethnic question.” He spoke for the first time about adhering to the “eight persistence.” The “eight persistences” entail: the leadership of the CCP; China’s unique socialist road; safeguarding the unity of the motherland; the uniform equality of all ethnic groups; the perfection of the system of regional ethnic autonomy; striving for mutual unity and prosperity for all ethnic groups; forging an ideological basis for an integrated Chinese nation; and governing the county according to law.[xiv] On economic and social development in Tibet, he emphasised: “Key efforts in the work for Tibet should be spent on ensuring national unity and consolidating ethnic unity, with realising long-term and comprehensive social stability as an obligatory task.”[xv]

On September 1, 2015, China commemorated the 50^th anniversary of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). Yu Zhengsheng, a top political advisor, attended the anniversary with a 65-member delegation at the Potola Square.[xvi]

On August 20, 2025, Xi Jinping visited Tibet for the second time as the President of China to mark the 60th anniversary of the establishment of TAR. (Earlier, he visited in 2021.) He took a high-level delegation consisting of Wang Huning (Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Consultative Conference) and Cai Qi (first-ranked member of the Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party) along with him.

During his visit to Tibet, Xi Jinping stressed the importance of fostering the region’s stability, development, and well-being.  He emphasised the use of Mandarin and more economic, cultural, and personnel exchanges between Tibet and the rest of China.[xvii] He highlighted the importance of major infrastructure projects such as the Dam on the Brahmaputra River and the Chengdu-Tibet railways in Tibet. His visit was meant to send a message to the separatist forces that China maintains strong control over Tibet. The anniversary was meant to showcase Beijing’s intent to take Tibet’s development forward while opposing any attempt at separatism.[xviii] This acquired even more significance for China amidst the developments taking place vis-à-vis the succession plan of the Dalai Lama.

Communist Party Congress and Tibet

At the 19^th Communist Party Congress held in 2017, Xi Jinping reiterated his strong opposition to “separatism.” He said, “We will not tolerate anyone, using any means, at any time to separate one inch of land from China,” he said. “Blood is thicker than water.”[xix] At the 20th Party Congress held in 2023, there were no new policy guidelines on Tibet. Still, Xi Jinping clarified his priorities and emphasised the reinforcement of existing policies, along with the central task of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). He said, “From this day forward, the central task of the Communist Party of China will be to lead the Chinese people of all ethnic groups in a concerted effort to realise the Second Centenary Goal of building China into a great modern socialist country in all respects and to advance the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation on all fronts through a Chinese path to modernisation.”[xx]

It is therefore evident that Xi Jinping has been making all the efforts through his statements to make his presence felt in various aspects of Tibet’s governance and make the effort to integrate them fully with the mainland to realise what he describes as the goal of National Rejuvenation.

The Tibetan Society under Xi Jinping

Education

Ever since Xi Jinping took power, he has been attempting to modify Tibetan society. He has implemented various measures to reform Tibet’s education system, language, and influence the religious beliefs/practices of Tibetan society.

China’s aim vis-à-vis education policy in Tibet is to reduce the access of ethnic education to Tibetans in their mother tongue. A report published by Tibet Action Institute titled “When They Came to Take Our Children: China’s Colonial Boarding Schools and the Future of Tibet” highlights the state of early education in Tibet. It reveals that nearly one million children are already separated from their families and put in a boarding school started by the Chinese government. These boarding schools aim to indoctrinate children as young as four to be loyal to the CCP. This has resulted in “deracinate Tibetan children from their culture, language and identity.” These schools have become a major source of controversy for the treatment given to children. The impacts of colonial boarding schools are compounded by Chinese authorities banning extracurricular weekend and holiday classes in the Tibetan language while also forbidding children from participating in religious activities, even when they are at home.[xxi] The schools are a cornerstone of Xi Jinping’s campaign to undermine Tibetan identity and create a homogenous Chinese identity.

Xi Jinping also changed the education system in Tibet. China introduced a “Bilingual Education” system in 2010 for schools in all minority regions of the country.  The Chinese government has two models of the education system in Tibet. The first model primarily uses the Chinese medium of instruction, and the Tibetan language is taught as one of the subjects. The second model uses Tibetan as a medium of instruction. These schools are located in rural farming and nomadic communities where people do not understand Mandarin. However, there are a few Tibetan medium secondary schools in Tibet. [xxii]

In Tibet, the compulsory education system has been extended to 15 years, granting the state authorities total control over children's education.  According to reports, in 2015, Xinhua stated that Mandarin had already been introduced not only into secondary schools but also into urban primary schools in the TAR.

The Chinese officials justify the shift in the language by stating that shifting to the Chinese language enhances the job prospects of the Tibetans.[xxiii] The CCP has also included Xi Jinping’s “Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in the New Era” at the primary school level through to the university.[xxiv]

Religion

According to Article 36 of the Chinese Constitution of 1982, Buddhism is one of the only five officially recognised religions in China, and its “normal religious activities” are nominally protected by the constitution. However, the Chinese government has often redefined and misinterpreted “normal” to justify additional restrictions on constitutional freedoms in the name of preserving social stability.[xxv] In an endeavour to make China politically and culturally homogenous, Xi Jinping is trying to Sinicise Buddhism. To detach Buddhism from Tibetan culture, monks are pressured to replace traditional Tibetan-language scriptures with Chinese translations. Co-opting Tibetan Buddhism will bring China one step closer to the “Chinese dream”.

China’s State Administration for Religious Affairs promulgated the “Measures for the Administration of Religious Activity Sites,” or “Order Number 19”. It is a significant step by the Chinese government in curtailing the religious freedom of Tibetans.[xxvi] According to the order, all temples, monasteries and mosques are required to obtain official permission to carry out any religious activity. Publicity and education campaigns must promote the Chinese language and “ethnic unity.” In 2017, the government issued orders to tear down Larung Gar, Tibet’s most popular Buddhist monastery.[xxvii] As of 1 January 2024, all religious groups in China are required to “carry out patriotic education and enhance the national awareness and patriotic sentiments of clergy and believers.” Any deviation from showing loyalty to Xi Jinping, the Chinese flag and patriotic sentiment will be punishable.[xxviii]

The Economic Vulnerability of Tibet under Xi Jinping

Tibet is known for its abundant natural resources. China has been exploiting coal, copper, gold and lithium from Tibet, and they have shifted many of its mining projects to Tibet.

In January 2025, Global Times published that China’s Ministry of Natural Resources had discovered a lithium belt in Tibet. With this discovery, the overall lithium reserve had risen to 16.5 per cent of all global resources that China possesses. Before this discovery, China had 6 per cent of the global reserves. Now China has become the second-largest holder of lithium resources worldwide, only after Chile.[xxix] Further, a report titled “Tibet, a New Frontline of White Gold Rush in Global Race for Renewable Energy” by Turquoise Roof has stated that Tibet has 85 per cent of all reserves of lithium in China. [xxx] It also highlights that the Tibetan plateau has been assessed to hold at least 3.655 million tonnes of China’s estimated 4.047 million tonnes of lithium.

China leads in lithium extraction technology and premium lithium battery manufacturing. In 2024, China’s lithium-ion battery sector experienced significant growth, with the nation’s total battery output reaching 890 gigawatt-hours, a 16 per cent increase compared to the previous year. This development has attracted attention from various industries towards Tibet. Lithium is a vital element in the country’s expanding new energy sector, crucial for making electric vehicle batteries and electronic devices. It is also used in batteries for several consumer goods manufactured in China. Chinese electric vehicle manufacturer BYD has already acquired an 18 per cent stake in Zhabuye Lithium. Zhabuye Lithium holds exclusive mining rights for 20 years at Zhabuye Salt Lake, located in the Shigaste Prefecture of the TAR.

Conversely, the extraction of lithium presents several environmental hazards and threatens ecological biodiversity. During lithium extraction, various chemicals are released into the soil. These harmful substances are then carried by rivers and floods, contaminating agricultural fields and impeding crop growth. It also pollutes surface waters and severely affects groundwater. Workers in these mines and nearby residents are also affected by the chemicals released during the extraction process. In many parts of the Tibetan Plateau, hundreds of acres of vegetation and agricultural land have been damaged, further exacerbating food security issues in the region.[xxxi]

Tibet is also rich in copper and gold. The Jiama mine, the largest copper mine in China, is located in Tibet. It is located within the Gangdise Copper Metallogeny Belt in Central Tibet, approximately 60 km east of Tibet’s capital, Lhasa. Following the completion of Phase 1 in 2010, Phase 2 resumed in June 2024.[xxxii] On 7 April, an additional 43.2 tonnes of gold resources worth 20 billion yuan were discovered in the Tsaidam Basin in Tibet.[xxxiii]

Package water from Tibet

Besides minerals from Tibet, there is also a craze in China, as well as all over the world, for bottled water from Tibet. In the last two decades, China has become the largest consumer as well as a major producer of bottled water. The water coming from Tibet is perceived as a pure source of water. It has become a new point of growth for China’s bottled water industry. The Chinese companies can charge a premium price for these bottles.

The bottled water industry started in 2006, and by 2014, the number had increased to 30 operators. These companies have taxes and subsidies from the government. China is offering bottlers incentives, including tax breaks, low-interest loans, and a minimal extraction fee.[xxxiv] In 2014, under the rubric of an initiative called “Sharing Tibet’s Water with the World”, the regional government in Tibet signed a contract with 16 companies to further enhance the water packing industry in the region.[xxxv]

The Tibetan provincial government has begun expanding the bottled water industry. They have a long-term plan to produce 10 million cubic metres of bottled water by 2025. Currently, 28 companies are bottling and exporting water from Tibet. Brands such as 5100 Tibet Spring Water, Himalaya Natural Mineral Water, Qomolangma Glacier Natural Mineral Water, and Dagu Glacier Natural Spring Water are gaining popularity across China. Many of these are also being exported outside China from Tibet. It may be recalled that China donated 1,500 tonnes of drinking water from Tibet to the Maldives during their acute water crisis of 2024. [xxxvi]

Development Along the India-China Border Area Vis-à-vis Tibet under Xi Jinping

Certain developments in Tibet alongside the India-China border have bearing for India as well. The construction of the Dam on the Brahmaputra River and the infrastructure development in the Western Theatre Command are of concern for India.

Chinese Premier Li Qiang announced the construction of the Medog dam in the lower reaches of the Brahmaputra River (Yarlung Zangbo) at Nyingchi City in Tibet. He called the dam the “project of the century.” The estimated cost of the project is US$167 billion. The project will surpass the Three Gorges Dam as the world’s largest hydropower dam. The Medog dam is expected to have an installed capacity of 60 GW and is likely to generate approximately 300 billion kWh annually. The dam will be vital in reducing China’s reliance on coal energy. The Yarlung Tsangpo flows south into India, where it becomes the Brahmaputra River, and then flows into Bangladesh. India and Bangladesh are apprehensive about the downstream implications of a water conflict, which could potentially affect millions of people who depend on the river for agriculture, fisheries and daily consumption.[xxxvii] China Yajiang Group, a newly formed state-owned entity, will construct the dam. [xxxviii] The implications of such a big dam on local and surrounding geology, environment, ecology and human settlement also need analysis and study.

Among China’s five theatre commands, the Western Theatre Command (WTC) is the largest theatre and plays a vital role in overseeing the security of Tibet. It was founded on 1 February 2016. Tibet, Xinjiang, Sichuan, Ningxia, Gansu, Qinghai, Chongqing, Shaanxi, and Yunnan provinces fall under the purview of WTC. It is responsible for border security along the borders with India, Afghanistan and other Central Asian countries, which are also within its area of responsibility. China has upgraded the border infrastructure in the WTC. Notably, it has constructed roads, airbases, landing strips, helipads and logistics sites in Tibet and Xinjiang to support rapid military deployments. In recent years, China has been developing well-off villages (Xiaokang) in Tibet’s border regions. By 2022, a total of 624 villages had been established. Infrastructure in these border villages has greatly improved, and various industries are thriving. The production and living standards of border residents have also risen considerably. These Xiaokang villages carry strategic importance and serve dual purposes for China in times of emergency.[xxxix]

US Approach to Tibet

Given the geostrategic and geoeconomic importance of Tibet and its sharpening rivalry with China in different theatres of the world, the US has shown interest in the developments of Tibet. During his first term, Donald Trump passed acts in favour of Tibet. In 2018, he signed the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act (RATA), and on January 28, 2020, the Tibetan Policy Support Act (TPSA) was enacted. The TPSA modifies and reauthorises various programmes and provisions related to Tibet and China. In addition, on June 19, 2024, Nancy Pelosi led a congressional delegation to meet the Dalai Lama in Dharamshala, India. This was her third meeting with the Dalai Lama. China was very critical of the visit. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Lin Jian, in his press conference on 18 June, said, “It’s known by all that the 14th Dalai Lama is not a pure religious figure, but a political exile engaged in anti-China separatist activities under the cloak of religion. We are gravely concerned over the relevant reports and urge the US side to fully recognise the anti-China separatist nature of the Dalai group; honour the commitments the US has made to China on issues related to Xizang, have no contact with the Dalai group in any form, and stop sending the wrong signal to the world.” [xl]

To further support Tibet and promote dialogue between China and the Dalai Lama, on July 12, 2024, the US President signed the “Promoting a Resolution to the Tibet-China Dispute Act” / Resolve Tibet Act to emphasise US support for Tibet. The 2024 Act has 6 sections, and one of the sections states “Modifications to the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002”. In a manner, the 2024 Act contests the Chinese claim on Tibet; it refers to ‘Tibet’ as the “Tibet-China dispute”. It also urges China to engage in meaningful and direct dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives, as well as democratically elected leaders of the Tibetan community, “without preconditions, to seek a settlement that resolves differences,” according to international law. [xli] It may be recalled that the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 (TPA) is a key legislative measure that guides the US policy toward Tibet. Its stated purpose is “to support the aspirations of the Tibetan people to safeguard their distinct identity.” [xlii]

Recently, the US Secretary of State Marco Rubio wished the Dalai Lama on his 90th birthday and said, “The Dalai Lama continued to inspire people by embodying a message of unity, peace and compassion.”[xliii] With the promulgation of various acts, along with Nancy Pelosi's visit, the US is trying to project its commitment towards the Tibetans. These acts also help draw international attention to the region.

India’s Approach to the Tibet Issue

It is worth noting that, over the years, India has followed a pragmatic and well-balanced approach to the issue of Tibet.

On 15 August 1947, the British Mission in Lhasa officially became the Indian Mission. India recognised Tibet as an independent entity, but the Government of India accepted that the Tibetan government was the best judge of their issues. The interim Indian government invited Tibet to the Asian Relations Conferences (ARC) held in April 1947 in Delhi, organised by the Indian Council of World Affairs.[xliv] In the conference, both Chinese and Tibetan delegates participated.

In 1947, the Government of India contacted the Tibetan Government to ratify the existing bilateral treaties, particularly the Simla Convention. This was the first formal communication between India and the Tibetan Government.[xlv] The Simla Convention was signed on July 3, 1914. British India, Tibet and China signed the Simla Convention (China did not sign the final agreement), which led to the creation of the McMahon Line, a boundary that separates Tibet from India in the eastern sector.[xlvi]

In 1951, Tibet signed the 17-point agreement with China.[xlvii] India continued to maintain trade and cultural relations with Tibet. In 1952, at a press conference, when asked about the Indian Mission in Lhasa, Prime Minister Nehru said: “It dealt with certain trade and cultural matters more or less”.[xlviii]

On April 29, 1954, India and China signed “An Agreement Between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China on Trade and Intercourse Between the Tibetan region of China and India”, formally known as the Panchsheel. The agreement was signed in Beijing by the Indian Ambassador to China, N Raghavan and the Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister, Zhang Hanfu.[xlix] The agreement formalised India’s recognition of Tibet as a part of China.  Additionally, India officially closed its mission in Lhasa, and all trade with the Tibet region was subsequently rerouted through China.[l] Two months later, Premier Zhou Enlai visited India. During his visit, India and China issued a Joint Statement on June 28, 1954, explaining the vision of Panchsheel.[li]

In 1956, India invited the 14th Dalai Lama to visit the country for the celebration of the 2500^th birth anniversary of Lord Buddha. The Dalai Lama could manage clearance from the Chinese side and visit India. During his visit, he explored the possibility of political asylum in India.[lii] The Dalai Lama discussed the issue with Prime Minister Nehru, and he “advised him to go back”.[liii] He also met Vice President S. Radhakrishnan and the Chogyal (king) of Sikkim during his visit.   

With Tibet’s deteriorating situation, the Dalai Lama fled to India in March 1959. The Indian government granted asylum to the Dalai Lama. There were many debates and discussions in the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha after the Dalai Lama’s flight in India. During a debate in the Lok Sabha on 27 April 1959, Prime Minister Nehru said: “I stated some time ago that our broad policy was governed by three factors: (1) the preservation of the security and integrity of India; (2) our desire to maintain friendly relations with China; and (3) our deep sympathy for the people of Tibet. We shall continue to follow that policy because we think that is a correct policy not only for the present but even more so for the future.” [liv]

Subsequently, the Tibetans were allowed to set up a so-called government in exile in Dharmshala, although India has never acknowledged this. Over the decades, India has given a lot of facilities to the Tibetan community on humanitarian grounds. [lv]

On December 19-23, 1988, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited China on a five-day state visit. This marked the first visit by an Indian Prime Minister since the 1962 India-China war. During the visit, the Chinese side expressed concern over anti-Chinese activities by Tibetans in India. “The Indian side reiterated the long-standing and consistent policy of the Government of India that Tibet is an autonomous region of China and that anti-China political activities by Tibetan elements are not permitted on Indian soil.” [lvi] On June 22-27, 2003, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited China. During the visit, the Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation Between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China was signed. The declaration states: “The Indian side recognised that the Tibet Autonomous Region is part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China and reiterates that it does not allow Tibetans to engage in anti-China political activities in India. The Chinese side expressed its appreciation for the Indian position and reiterated that it is firmly opposed to any attempt or action aimed at splitting China and bringing about “independence of Tibet”. ”[lvii]

India’s approach to Tibetan living in exile in India

Until now, India has followed a generous policy towards the Tibetans living in exile in India. In 1959, around 80,000 Tibetans accompanied the Dalai Lama. According to CTA, approximately 100,000 Tibetans live in India.[lviii] They are mainly living in Karnataka, Himachal Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, West Bengal, Ladakh and Delhi. [lix]

India is not party to the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol and does not have a national refugee protection framework.[lx] Therefore, Tibetans in India are considered foreigners under domestic law.  The types of documents issued to Tibetans residing in India and the privileges those documents confer have evolved. India issues three types of documents for Tibetans residing in the country: Registration Certificates, Identity Certificates, and Special Entry Permits. Each serves a distinct purpose. None of the documents confer citizenship rights, and all of them must be renewed periodically.[lxi]

After much deliberation between the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), the Ministry of External Affairs, the concerned State Government and the delegation of the Central Tibetan Administration, the MHA issued the Tibetan Rehabilitation Policy in 2014.[lxii] The policy aimed to bring about uniformity with respect to extending various facilities by the Central Government and the state governments to the Tibetans settled in different parts of the country. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has issued the Tibetan Rehabilitation Policy, 2014.[lxiii]

Besides the above-stated policy, India and Indians have a religious and spiritual connection with the Tibetan region.

For Indians, the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra, located in Tibet, is the ultimate pilgrimage. The Kailash Mountain and Lake Mansarovar are considered the ultimate pilgrimage sites on Earth, and the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra is said to be the greatest of all pilgrimages. Geographically, Mount Kailash is situated in Ngari Prefecture, Tibet. [lxiv] The Lake Mansarovar region is the source of the River Indus, the River Brahmaputra, and the largest tributary of the Ganga River, three key rivers of the Indian subcontinent and the Indo-Gangetic plains.

In Hindu mythology, Mount Kailash is considered to be the abode of Lord Shiva, the God of destruction and one of the Hindu trinity, and whose number of devotees in India outnumber the population of most countries in the world. The religious significance of the Yatra is mentioned in Hindu scriptures like the Shiv Purana, Vishnu Purana, Skanda Purana and Ramayana. Given its importance, the Government of India has always made an effort to ensure that Indians can visit Mount Kailash and do their yatra/pilgrimage. It may be recalled that, according to Article III of the “Agreement on Trade and Intercourse with Tibet Region” of 1954, both sides agreed to the smooth facilitation of the Yatra.[lxv] Tibet is important to Hindu India because of the spiritual and sacred connection with Kailash Mansarovar; just as India is important to Buddhist Tibetans for Bodh Gaya, Sarnath and Rajgir.

India acknowledges that the Tibet Autonomous Region is a part of China, but it never endorsed China’s claim that Tibet always belonged to China. Instead, India avoids making reference to that claim and commenting on Tibet’s religious affairs.[lxvi]

India’s approach to the Dalai Lama has been deliberately fuzzy since inception. The Tibetan government-in-exile, or Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), operates from Dharamshala, yet India neither recognises it as a government nor dismisses its presence.

On 4 July 2025, responding to the media queries regarding the recent statement by HH the Dalai Lama (The Dalai Lama had made a statement that the India-based Gaden Phodrang Trust will choose the next Dalai Lama and not by any other authority), the Indian spokesperson stated: “We have seen reports relating to the statement made by His Holiness the Dalai Lama about the continuation of the Dalai Lama institution. The Government of India does not take any position or speak on matters concerning beliefs and practices of faith and religion.” The government has always upheld freedom of religion for all in India and will continue to do so.” The remarks indicate India’s balanced approach to the issue. It has also left the matter of selecting the Dalai Lama’s successor in the hands of Tibetan Buddhists, as people familiar with the matter have said. The spokesperson reiterated that India had no position on the process of choosing the next Dalai Lama.[lxvii]

However, India may eventually have to take a position on whether the successor of the Dalai Lama could continue to stay in India or not, if the question somehow gets raised. The central institutions and individuals involved in identifying the next Dalai Lama are based in India. The Gaden Phodrang Trust was registered in Dharamsala in 2011 and operates from the Dalai Lama’s private office.[lxviii]

If China chooses to appoint its own Dalai Lama, things will get sensitive for India; a two Dalai Lama scenario will have implications for India as well as a strategic impact on the geopolitics of the region.

India’s policy towards the Tibet issue takes into account that there is an unresolved border with China. Thus, upholding its national interest, India has responded to the developments vis-à-vis Tibet and the Dalai Lama, whenever required. However, Tibet continues to remain a vexed issue in the India-China equation matrix.

Conclusion

Chairman Mao Zedong considered Tibet as the right palm of China, with five fingers: Nepal, Bhutan, and the three Indian territories of Ladakh, Sikkim, and Arunachal Pradesh. [lxix]

Xi Jinping is seeking to revive this strategy through an enhanced focus on Tibet, greater engagement with Nepal and Bhutan, territorial incursions in India, and repeated claims on Arunachal through steps such as naming and renaming Indian cities in Chinese and issuing staple visas. China has made Tibet its core interest. Since 2023, China has been using the Mandarin term “Xizang” instead of “Tibet” in all official correspondence. This tactic is part of a larger strategy of diluting the Tibetan identity. Various policies of the Chinese government in Tibet continue to be seen by Tibetans, especially those in exile, as a violation of their human rights.

The US is showing reinvigorated interest in Tibet. In the US, there is bipartisan support for Tibet.  They are also concerned about the cause of human rights and freedom for the Tibetans. 

India is following a pragmatic approach towards Tibet. In addition to its concerns with China, India has its own security issues vis-à-vis Tibet. India’s policies and decisions are carefully calibrated, and it takes cognisance of the fact that the impending Dalai Lama issue will have both domestic and international ramifications for India. 

Today, Tibet stands at the crossroads. The Chinese government is exercising sovereignty over the land. It has altered the topography of the land, induced forceful changes in the lifestyle, and is exploiting and mining the region for its economic benefits. In addition, the sharpening US-China rivalry continues to further complicate the situation.

*****

*Dr. Teshu Singh, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.

Endnotes 

[i] Walt van Pragg and Michael C. van, https://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/legal-status-tibet  Accessed on August 12, 2025.

[ii] Ibid

[iii] https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/205653?ln=en&v=pdf Accessed on August 22, 2025.

[iv] https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/2079(XX) Accessed on July 12, 2025.

[v] Reincarnation of a Dalai Lama, https://doi.org/10.1038/144779a0 Accessed on July 12, 2025.

[vi] Xinlu Liang, Beijing, says Dalai Lama’s succession plan breaks tradition, tensions expected to rise, South China Morning Post, 2 July 2025 https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3316626/beijing-says-dalai-lamas-succession-plan-breaks-tradition-tensions-set-rise  Accessed on July 12, 2025.

[vii] Xinlu Liang, Beijing says Dalai Lama’s succession plan breaks tradition, tensions expected to rise, South China Morning Post, July 02, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3316626/beijing-says-dalai-lamas-succession-plan-breaks-tradition-tensions-set-rise

Accessed on July 12, 2025.

[viii] Xinlu Liang, Beijing says Dalai Lama’s succession plan breaks tradition, tensions expected to rise, South China Morning Post, July 02, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3316626/beijing-says-dalai-lamas-succession-plan-breaks-tradition-tensions-set-rise

Accessed on July 12, 2025.

[ix] Neelam Raaj, Dalai lama Issue: India can't be complaint or seen as insensitive to Tibetan, says Robert Barnett, Times of India, July 5, 2025, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/dalai-lama-issue-india-cant-be-compliant-to-china-or-seen-as-insensitive-to-tibetans-robert-barnett/articleshow/122270325.cms

Accessed on July 12, 2025.

[x] How is the Dalai Lama Chosen?, https://www.britannica.com/topic/How-Is-the-Dalai-Lama-Chosen  Accessed on July 12, 2025.

[xi] Statement Affirming the Continuation of the Institution of the Dalai Lama

July 2, 2025, 2 July 2025, https://www.dalailama.com/news/statement-affirming-the-continuation-of-the-institution-of-dalai-lama , Accessed on  12 July 2025

[xii] Generation change 10 years of Xi Jinping’s Sinification and securitization of Tibetans, International Campaign for Tibet, https://savetibet.org/generation-change/

Accessed on June 11, 2025. Accessed on July 12, 2025.

[xiii] Xi sets out plans for a new era in Tibet, http://m.tibet.cn/eng/opinion/editorial/202009/t20200901_6846369.html Accessed on July 05, 2025.

[xiv] James Leibold, A Family Divided: The CCP’s Central Ethnic Work Conference, Jamestown Foundation, China Brief Volume: 14 Issue: 21 https://jamestown.org/program/a-family-divided-the-ccps-central-ethnic-work-conference/ Accessed on July 05, 2025.

[xv] Timeline: Xi Jinping and Tibet's development, Xinhua, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-03/28/c_137930954.htm Accessed on July 05, 2025.

[xvi] China celebrates 50th anniversary of Tibet’s autonomy, CGTN, 8 September 2015, https://america.cgtn.com/2015/09/08/china-celebrates-50th-anniversary-of-tibets-autonomy Accessed on July 05, 2025

[xvii] Xinhlu Liang, Chinese President Xi Jinping arrives in Tibet for landmark anniversary,  South China Morning Post, 20 August 2025, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3322542/chinese-president-xi-jinping-arrives-tibet-landmark-anniversary

Accessed on August 27, 2025.

[xviii]  Xi’s visit to Tibet heralds a new era of China’s development, South China Morning Post, August 27, 2025,  https://www.scmp.com/opinion/comment/article/3323033/xis-visit-tibet-heralds-new-era-chinas-development Accessed on August 27, 2025.

[xix] Xi opens 19th Party Congress with stark warning to any territory seeking independence, https://tibetnetwork.org/xi-opens-19th-party-congress-with-stark-warning-to-any-territory-seeking-independence/ Accessed on July 05, 2025.

[xx] China’s 20th Party Congress: intensification of security and assimilation, https://savetibet.org/chinas-20th-party-congress-intensification-of-security-and-assimilation/ Accessed on June 20, 2025.

[xxi] When They Came to Take Our Children” - China’s Colonial Boarding Schools and the Future of Tibet: China’s Colonial Boarding Schools and the Future of Tibet, May 2025, https://tibetaction.net/when-they-came-to-take-our-children/ Accessed on June 20, 2025.

[xxii] Bilingual Education Policy in Tibet: The Systematic Replacement of  Tibetan Language with Mandarin Chinese, Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, 2017, https://tchrd.org/special-report-on-bilingual-education-policy-in-tibet/

[xxiii] The human rights situation in Tibet and the international response, September 30, 2020, https://www.congress.gov/event/116th-congress/joint-event/LC68497/text Accessed on June 05, 2025.

[xxiv] China to add 'Xi Jinping Thought' to national curriculum, Reuters, August 25, 2021,

https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-add-xi-jinping-thought-national-curriculum-2021-08-25/ Accessed on June 10, 2025.

[xxv] China’s “Order Number 19” Escalates its Continuous Religious Repression in Tibet, September 01, 2023, https://tibet.net/chinas-order-number-19-escalates-its-continuous-religious-repression-in-tibet/

Accessed on July 01, 2025.

[xxvi] China’s “Order Number 19” Escalates its Continuous Religious Repression in Tibet, September 01, 2023, https://tibet.net/chinas-order-number-19-escalates-its-continuous-religious-repression-in-tibet/ Accessed on July 01, 2025.

[xxvii] Judith Hertog, For Xi Jinping, Religion Is Power, The Atlantic, May 05, 2024, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2024/05/tibetan-buddhism-xi-jinping-china/678284/ Accessed on July 10, 2025.

[xxviii] Ibid

[xxix] Feng Fen, China announces finding of 2,800-km lithium belt, home to world's 2nd largest reserve, Global Times, January 08, 2025, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202501/1326497.shtml Accessed on July 02, 2025.

[xxx] Turquoise Roof, Tibet, a new frontline of ‘white gold rush’ in global race for renewable energy, November 01, 2023, https://turquoiseroof.org/white_gold_rush_in_tibet/ Accessed on July 10, 2025.

[xxxi] Pema Gyalpo, China's Greed for Lithium is Killing the Tibetan Plateau, https://japan-forward.com/china-lithium-mining-killing-tibetanplateau/#:~:text=Professor%20Pema%20Gyalpo%20May%2013,REUTERS/Staff/File%20Photo Accessed on July 01, 2025.

[xxxii] Major Chinese gold mine in Tibet resumes operation, Tibet Review, June 1, 2024,

https://www.tibetanreview.net/major-chinese-gold-mine-in-tibet-resumes-operation/

Accessed on July 09, 2025.

[xxxiii] China’s intensive mining in Tibet is raising serious concerns about Tibet’s ecology. July 26, 2024, https://tibetpolicy.net/chinas-intensive-mining-in-tibet-is-raising-serious-concern-about-tibets-ecology/

Accessed on July 08, 2025.

[xxxiv] Brahma Chellaney, China’s Thirst Threat, February 17, 2016, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-himalayan-glacier-water-mining-threat-by-brahma-chellaney-2016-02 Accessed on July 05, 2025.

[xxxv] Michael Buckley, Tibet in plastic bottles, https://www.tibetrightscollective.in/visual-explainers/tibet-in-plastic-bottles Accessed on July 05, 2025.

[xxxvi] In 2014, India helped a parched Maldives. A decade on, China steps in with Tibet water,  Times of India, 28 March 2024,  https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/in-2014-india-helped-a-parched-maldives-a-decade-on-china-steps-in-with-tibet-water/articleshow/108833590.cms  Accessed on July 05, 2025.

[xxxvii] Meredith Chen, China is building the world’s biggest hydropower dam. Why is India worried? July 23, 2025, South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3319175/china-building-worlds-biggest-hydropower-dam-why-india-worried Accessed on July 24, 2025.

[xxxviii] Ishika Mookerjee, China’s $167 Billion Mega-Dam Promises Boost for Green Finance, Bloomberg, July 22, 2025, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-07-22/china-s-167-billion-mega-dam-promises-boost-for-green-finance Accessed on July 24, 2025.

[xxxix] Jennifer Jun and Brian Hart, China Is Upgrading Dual-Use Villages along Its Disputed Indian Border, May 16, 2024, https://chinapower.csis.org/analysis/china-upgrading-dual-use-xiaokang-villages-india-border/ Accessed on July 24, 2025.

[xl] Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian’s Regular Press Conference on 18 June 2024, http://za.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/fyrth/202406/t20240618_11437897.htm Accessed on  12 August 2025.

[xli] The Resolve Tibet Act: A historic development and an opportunity, https://freetibet.org/latest/the-resolve-tibet-act/ Accessed on September 13, 2025.

[xlii] The Tibetan Policy Act of 2002: Background and Implementation Susan V. Lawrence Specialist in Asian Affairs November 5, 2014, Accessed on August 12, 2025.

[xliii] Krishna N. Das and Shivam Patel, Dalai Lama turns 90, gets global support in challenge for China, Reuters, July 7, 2025,  https://www.reuters.com/world/china/dalai-lama-turns-90-vows-keep-defying-china-years-2025-07-06/ Accessed on  August 14, 2025.

[xliv] Claude Arpi, India Tibet Relations (1947-1962), Vij Books: New Delhi, 2003,  https://usiofindia.org/pdf/M-1-2023%20Mr%20CLAUDE%20ARPI.pdf Accessed on September 15, 2025.

[xlv] Ibid

[xlvi] R. S. Kalhan, The McMahon Line: A hundred years on, July 03, 2014, IDSA, https://www.idsa.in/publisher/comments/the-mcmahon-line-a-hundred-years-on

Accessed on October 2, 2025.

[xlvii] The 17-point Agreement – What China promised, what it really delivered and the future?

May 23, 2019, https://tibet.net/the-17-point-agreement-what-china-promised-what-it-really-delivered-and-the-future-2/

 Accessed on October 1, 2025.

[xlviii] Tibet Bulletin, The Evolution of Nehru’s Policy towards Tibet, https://www.claudearpi.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/01055NehrusTibetTibbul-1.pdf

Accessed on September 17, 2025.

[xlix] Agreement on Trade and Intercourse with Tibet Region,  https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/7807/Agreement+on+Trade+and+Intercourse+with+Tibet+Region

Accessed on September 17, 2025.

[l]Panchsheel, /https://www.mea.gov.in/uploads/publicationdocs/191_panchsheel.pdf Accessed on September 17, 2025.

[li] ibid

[lii] Rajiv Sikri, The Tibet Factor in India-China Relations, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 64, No. 2, pp. 55-71, https://www.jstor.org/stable/i24385526  Accessed on September 18, 2025.

[liii] Dalai Lama sought refuge three years before the uprising, claims biographer, South China Morning Post,  March 10, 2009, https://www.scmp.com/article/672750/dalai-lama-sought-refuge-three-years-uprising-claims-biographer, Accessed on October 6, 2025.

[liv] Indian Parliament on the issue of Tibet Lok Sabha Debate, Tibetan Parliamentary and Policy Research Centre, https://www.tpprc.org/publication/lok_sabha_debates_on_tibet-2006.pdf  Accessed on September 18, 2025.

[lv]  Rajiv Sikri, The Tibet Factor in India-China Relations, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 64, No. 2, pp. 55-71, https://www.jstor.org/stable/i24385526 Accessed on September 18, 2025.

[lvi] Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s Visit to China, 1989, China Report. https://doi.org/10.1177/000944558902500209 Accessed on October 14, 2025.

[lvii] Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation Between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China, June 23, 2003, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl%2F7679%2Fdeclaration+on+principles+for+relations+and+c 

[lviii] Vijay Kranti, Tibet Reborn – A Unique Refugee Saga, Central Tibetan Administration, https://tibet.net/tibet-reborn-a-unique-refugee-saga/#:~:text=The%20Tibetan%20refugee%20community%20under,and%20some%20other%20Western%20countries Accessed on September 20, 2025.

[lix] India: Most of the 72,312 Tibetan refugees in India have settled themselves, Tibetan Review, 27 April 2022, https://www.tibetanreview.net/india-most-of-the-72312-tibetan-refugees-in-india-have-settled-themselves/ Accessed on September 23, 2025.

[lx] India,  https://www.unhcr.org/ie/sites/en-ie/files/legacy-pdf/4cd96e919.pdf Accessed on September 23, 2025

[lxi] Legal Overview of the Status of Tibetans in India, https://tibetanlegalassociation.org/en/legal-overview-of-the-status-of-tibetans-in-india/  Accessed on September 23, 2025.

[lxii] Ministry of Home Affairs, https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/202208/FFR_ANNEXURE_A_17092019%5B1%5D.pdf Accessed on September 23, 2025.

[lxiii] India: Most of the 72,312 Tibetan refugees in India have settled themselves, Tibetan Review, 27 April 2022, https://www.tibetanreview.net/india-most-of-the-72312-tibetan-refugees-in-india-have-settled-themselves/ Accessed on September 23, 2025.

[lxiv] Teshu Singh, Kailash Mansarovar Yatra: Recent Developments, /show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=12875&lid=7874 Accessed on September 26, 2025.  

[lxv] Agreement on Trade and Intercourse with Tibet Region, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/7807/Agreement+on+Trade+and+Intercourse+with+Tibet+Region#:~:text=The%20High%20Contracting%20Parties%20agree%20that%20pilgrimage%20by%20religious%20believers,Tibet%20Region%20of%20China%20in Accessed on September 20, 2025.

[lxvi] Junjun Sharma Pathak, Balancing Faith and Geopolitics: Amitabh Mathur on Tibet’s Future and the Legacy of the Dalai Lamas, India's World, September 2, 2025,

https://indiasworld.in/balancing-faith-and-geopolitics-amitabh-mathur-on-tibets-future-and-the-legacy-of-the-dalai-lamas/

Accessed on September 20, 2025.

[lxvii] No position on matters of faith: India after China warns on Dalai Lama succession row; MEA says religious freedom always upheld, The Times of India, July 4, 2025

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-takes-no-position-on-matters-of-faith-mea-on-dalai-lama-succession-row-walks-tightrope-on-sino-india-ties/articleshow/122251851.cms  Accessed on September 25, 2025.

[lxviii] Swati Chawla, India must endorse the Dalai Lama’s statement on his succession, India's World, September 2, 2025 https://indiasworld.in/india-must-endorse-the-dalai-lamas-statement-on-his-succession/ Accessed on September 20, 2025.

[lxix] Brahma Chellany, China’s Five-Finger Punch, July 22, 2020,

https://tibet.net/chinas-five-finger-punch/ Accessed on August 14, 2025.